McClain v. Strada

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHNNY EUGENE McCLAIN, #117427, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) NO. 3:25-cv-00557

)

F/N/U STRADA, et al., ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Johnny McClain, a state inmate incarcerated at the Trousdale Turner Correctional Center

(TTCC), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1, “the Complaint”)

and paid the civil filing fee. (Doc. No. 2.)

The Complaint is now before the Court for the initial screening required by the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See 28 U.S.C § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, . . . as soon as

practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity[.]”).

I. PLRA SCREENING STANDARD

In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the

Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the

Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’

and ‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181

(2024) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or

unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville,

Michigan, 87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se

Complaint a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Inner City, supra.

II. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

The Complaint is filed under Section 1983, which authorizes a federal action against any

person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-

Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint

must therefore plausibly allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2)

that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th

Cir. 2014).

A. Allegations and Claims to Relief

Plaintiff alleges that he was stabbed multiple times by another inmate during an altercation

on August 21, 2024. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) He alleges that CoreCivic1 staff had “clear knowledge of

escalating tensions” between Plaintiff and inmate Jeremiah Key, as well as “specific threats posed

by [Key],” yet failed to take any action to protect him from Key’s attack. (Id.) During the

1 CoreCivic is a private corrections management firm that operates TTCC pursuant to contract with the

State of Tennessee. https://www.tn.gov/correction/state-prisons/state-prison-list/trousdale-turner-

correctional-center.html (last visited July 14, 2025).

altercation, correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe watched without intervening. (Id.) As a result

of Key’s attack, Plaintiff suffered injuries including “a stab wound to his eye that now impairs his

vision.” (Id.) For over eleven hours after the attack, Plaintiff was denied medical care. (Id.) After

Plaintiff filed grievances, he “experienced retaliation orchestrated by CoreCivic staff, and physical

assault by correctional staff” on September 9, 2024, when Lt. Hill and three other, unnamed

officers “drug [him] into the showers and attempted to drown him while in handcuffs and fully

dressed.” (Id. at 2–3.) While this was going on in the showers, correctional officer Rickey Hill

sprayed pepper spray all over Plaintiff’s cell, causing further trauma to Plaintiff’s injured eye. (Id.

at 3.) Nurse Jane Doe witnessed the incident in the showers but “ran away when [Plaintiff] was

crying for help and did not report” the matter. (Id.)

In January 2025, Plaintiff and Key were placed in the same vehicle for transport to the

county jail in Hartsville, Tennessee. (Id.) On May 12, 2025, “high ranking officials” placed

Plaintiff in further danger by openly stating in the Pod that he was “running their Pod hot.” (Id.)

As a result of the August 2024 altercation with Key, Plaintiff was investigated and

criminally charged by attorneys Jack Bare and Nicholas Bailey, “despite no evidence he possessed

a weapon or initiated the altercation.” (Id.) The results of their allegedly improper investigation

were used against Plaintiff at his parole hearing. (Id.)

Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims for deliberate indifference to safety and to

serious medical needs, and for use of excessive force. He asserts Fourteenth Amendment claims

for denial of due process in disciplinary and retaliatory actions. He asserts retaliation claims under

the First Amendment. Finally, he claims violations of his rights under the Tenth Amendment and

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Doc. No. 1 at 3–4.) He sues the following Defendants in

their individual and official capacities:

Commissioner Strada; CEO Damon Hiniger (CoreCivic); Third Party Staffing

Agency; WellPath; Lt. E[d]mond Hill; Sgt. Bonds; SCO Campbell; ACOS

Mitchell; Contract Monitor Rickey Hill; Nurse Jane Doe; C/O Elisha Futrell; C/O

Hunt; Medical Personnel Trombley; Chief of Unit Managers Carter; 15th Judicial

District of TN ADA Jack Bare; Attorney Nicholas Bailey; Classification Crawford;

Chief Mitchell; Warden Huggin; Mrs. Arrington; Two John Doe Transportation

Officers; Warden Secretary Watts; Commanding Officer Ms. Fuqua; Jane Doe C/O

with C/O Hunt at the time of incident; Trousdale County Commissioner; Trousdale

County Judge Brown; Trousdale County, TN.

(Doc. No. 1 at 1.) Plaintiff seeks relief including damages and the “[i]mmediate removal of any

detainer or fabricated criminal charge resulting from the August 2024 assault.” (Id. at 4–5.)

B. Legal Analysis

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires that convicted

inmates be protected from known dangers to their personal health or safety and prohibits the use

of excessive force against them. Regarding failure to protect, an Eighth Amendment violation may

occur when prison guards fail to protect one inmate from an attack by another inmate. See Walker

v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). However, “not all injuries suffered by an inmate

at the hands of another prisoner result in constitutional liability for prison officials under the Eighth

Amendment.” Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998). The inmate must show that

the defendant prison official was deliberately indifferent “to a substantial risk of serious harm” to

the inmate. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994); Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290, 294

(6th Cir. 2004). To meet this standard, the inmate must show “that the official was subjectively

aware of the risk” and “disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.”

Greene, 361 F.3d at 294 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations that

“CoreCivic staff” knew of the tension between himself and inmate Key, as well as Key’s specific

threats, falls short of sufficiently pleading any particular official’s deliberate indifference to a

known risk. However, his allegation that correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe watched the

attack without intervening is sufficient at this early stage to state a colorable failure-to-protect

claim, even though Key had a knife. See Walker, 917 F.2d at 1453 (“Viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could have concluded that officers Ritz and Jordan

had opportunities to prevent the stabbing death . . . by intervening when Eggleston attacked Fails

in the yard as the guards looked on.”); but see Patmon v. Parker, 3 F. App’x 337, 338 (6th Cir.

2001) (affirming summary judgment for prison guards because guards “have no constitutional duty

to intervene in an armed assault by an inmate when the intervention would place the guard in

danger of physical harm”). Development of the factual record may establish otherwise, but at this

point, viewing the Complaint’s allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, they are

sufficient for this claim against correctional officers Hunt and Jane Doe to survive initial screening.

These two Defendants are also plausibly claimed to have been deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

serious need for medical treatment in the eleven hours after his stab wounds––including a stab

wound to his eye––were inflicted. See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir.

2004) (“When prison officials are aware of a prisoner’s obvious and serious need for medical

treatment and delay medical treatment of that condition for non-medical reasons, their conduct in

causing the delay creates the constitutional infirmity.”).

Regarding excessive force, the “core judicial inquiry” in considering such a claim is

“whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (quoting Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). In addition to this subjective inquiry, there is also an objective

component to Eighth Amendment excessive-force claims, which requires the pain inflicted to be

sufficiently serious. Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v.

Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)). However, the Court may not apply a “de minimis

injury” test to such claims, as “the judicial inquiry should focus on ‘the nature of the force rather

than the extent of the injury.’” Williams, 631 F.3d at 384 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 34).

Presuming the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations that Lt. Hill and three other, unnamed officers “drug

[him] into the showers and attempted to drown him while in handcuffs and fully dressed” (id. at

2–3), the Court finds that the serious nature of the force, the maliciousness of its application, and

the seriousness of the resulting injury are colorably established for purposes of initial review.

Further factual development may reveal otherwise, but at this early stage, Plaintiff’s allegations

are sufficient to allow his claim for excessive force to proceed against Lt. Hill and the three

unnamed officers (whose identities must soon be ascertained) in their individual capacity, whether

those Defendants used force against Plaintiff themselves or failed to protect him from another

officer’s use of force. See Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Our cases teach

that, in order to hold Officer Scott liable for the use of excessive force, Mrs. Turner must prove

that he (1) actively participated in the use of excessive force, (2) supervised the officer who used

excessive force, or (3) owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.”)

(citing cases).2

Plaintiff alleges that the excessive use of force occurred “[u]pon filing grievances”

concerning the assault and its aftermath. (Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.) Regardless of whether subsequent

disciplinary proceedings resulted in a finding that Plaintiff was responsible for misconduct related

to his altercation with Key, he may assert a plausible claim of First Amendment retaliation based

on the alleged shower incident and Defendant Rickey Hill’s dousing of his cell with pepper spray

2 Nurse Jane Doe on the other hand, who allegedly witnessed the shower incident and ran away, cannot be

held liable for her “mere presence during the altercation, without a showing of some direct responsibility”

or a showing that she “had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Burgess

v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Turner, supra). The Complaint’s allegations do not

support a plausible claim that Nurse Jane Doe can be held liable for failing to intervene in the correctional

officers’ use of excessive force.

in response to his protected conduct of filing a nonfrivolous grievance. See Maben v. Thelen, 887

F.3d 252, 262–64 (6th Cir. 2018). To state such a claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged

in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was

motivated at least in part by his protected conduct. Id. at 262, 264. Liberally construing the

Complaint’s allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, they are sufficient to plausibly establish these three

elements and allow his retaliation claim to proceed against Lt. Hill, correctional officer Rickey

Hill, and the three unnamed correctional officers, all in their individual capacity.

Plaintiff’s claims to denial of his Tenth Amendment rights, his Fourteenth Amendment due

process rights “in disciplinary . . . actions,” and of “[d]iscrimination in federally assisted programs”

under Title VI (see Doc. No. 1 at 3–4), are stated sparsely and in conclusory fashion. They are not

supported by any facts concerning the alleged discrimination or the procedures during prison

disciplinary proceedings against him, nor do they identify the Defendant(s) to which they are

directed. The rules governing pleading in federal court require that a complaint contain only “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a)(2). But that short and plain statement must be supported by “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true,” to make the claimed right to relief not just possible, but plausible. Hill, 630 F.3d

at 470–71. This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but it does require “more

than labels[,] conclusions, [or] a formulaic recitation” of the elements of a cause of action. Ryan

v. Blackwell, 979 F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). The Complaint’s factual allegations must be “sufficient to give notice to the defendant

as to what claims are alleged” against him, Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722

(6th Cir. 2010), and to enable the Court to determine the viability of those claims. Here, the

Complaint is devoid of factual material which would enable the Court to analyze the viability of

Plaintiff’s Tenth, Fourteenth, and Title VI claims under the standards discussed above. Those

claims therefore will be dismissed.

As stated above, Plaintiff’s First and Eighth Amendment claims will proceed against

Defendants Hunt, correctional officer Jane Doe, Lt. Edmond Hill, Rickey Hill, and three unnamed

correctional officers. All other individual Defendants named in the Complaint’s caption (see Doc.

No. 1 at 1) but not otherwise referred to in its factual allegations or claims (see id. at 2–3)3 will be

dismissed from this action. See Green v. Correct Care Sols., No. 3:14-cv-01070, 2014 WL

1806997, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. May 7, 2014) (citing cases) (“It is a basic pleading essential that a

plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. Where a person is named as a

defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal as to that

defendant, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.”); see also Murphy

v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Personal involvement is necessary to establish

section 1983 liability.”) (citing Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims against Trousdale County, Third Party Staffing Agency, and

WellPath, as well as his official-capacity claims against Hunt, correctional officer Jane Doe, Lt.

Edmond Hill, Rickey Hill, and the three unnamed correctional officers, all require the injury

claimed by Plaintiff and attributed to those Defendants to have resulted from the application of a

policy or custom of the entity, or a policy or custom of the employer of those individuals sued in

their official capacity. See Savoie v. Martin, 673 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 2012) (requiring § 1983

3 These Defendants include Commissioner Strada, CEO Hiniger, Sgt. Bonds, SCO Campbell, ACOS

Mitchell, C/O Elisha Futrell, Medical Personnel Trombley, Chief of Unit Managers Carter, Classification

Crawford, Chief Mitchell, Warden Huggin, Mrs. Arrington, Two John Doe Transportation Officers,

Warden Secretary Watts, Commanding Officer Ms. Fuqua, the (unnamed) Trousdale County

Commissioner, and Trousdale County Judge Brown.

claims against private contractors or private corporations employed by a state to be supported by

allegations that a policy or custom of the entity was the moving force behind the constitutional

deprivation); Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (requiring that a § 1983

claim against a municipality be supported by a showing that the moving force behind the injury

was a municipal policy or custom); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that

“individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent,” such

that the entities that employ such individuals “are the only true defendants in th[e] case”). No such

policy-or-custom allegations are contained within the Complaint, so the case will not proceed

against the municipal/organizational defendants, or against the aforementioned TTCC employees

in their official capacity.

Finally, the attorneys who (allegedly) “improperly initiated criminal charges against

Plaintiff” and opposed his effort to win release on parole, Jack Bare and Nicholas Bailey, are

immune from suit under Section 1983 over their actions on behalf of the State of Tennessee. As

state employees, prosecutors in their official capacity share the sovereign immunity of the state

that they represent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66, 169 (1985) (“The Court has

held that, absent waiver by the State or valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment

bars a damages action against a State in federal court. This bar remains in effect when State

officials are sued for damages in their official capacity.”) (citations omitted); Morgan v. Bd. of

Pro. Resp. of the Supreme Ct. of Tennessee, 63 F.4th 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2023) (“As for suits under

§ 1983, Tennessee has not consented to such lawsuits and Congress has not removed states’

sovereign immunity under the statute.”). In their individual capacity as well, Bare and Bailey are

entitled to prosecutorial immunity from suit because their alleged wrongful actions were

“intimately associated with the judicial process,” such as the initiating of criminal charges against

Plaintiff over the August 2024 altercation and the opposition of his release on parole, even if such

actions amount to “unquestionably illegal or improper conduct, including instances where a

defendant is genuinely wronged.” Price v. Montgomery Cnty., Kentucky, 72 F.4th 711, 719–20

(6th Cir. 2023) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Van de Kamp v.

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341–43 (2009) (recognizing absolute prosecutorial immunity from suit

under Section 1983 for all actions taken in capacity as officers of the court); Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the

State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under [§] 1983.”). And any

constitutional claim of malicious prosecution which might escape the reach of prosecutorial

immunity would require Plaintiff to establish that the criminal proceeding was resolved in his

favor, Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 309 (6th Cir. 2010), which he has not pled.4

III. PENDING MOTIONS

Because the results of PLRA screening will include the dismissal of Defendant Bailey from

this action, “Defendant Bailey’s Motion to Dismiss” (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED as moot.

It is further apparent that many filings in this matter have been made by an individual

Plaintiff identifies as “my legal aid,” Ms. Jacqueline Mayberry. (Doc. No. 17-1 at 1.) Those filings

include the pending “Motion to Add a Name” (Doc. No. 8), “Motion to Amend Complaint” (Doc.

4 Relatedly, the “removal of any . . . fabricated criminal charge” filed by Bailey (Doc. No. 1 at 4) is not

relief that is available to Plaintiff under Section 1983. It is well settled that direct challenges to pending

charges, as distinguished from the “circumstances” or conditions of the charged detainee’s confinement,

are not properly lodged under Section 1983 but are within the sole province of habeas corpus. See

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (“Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to

particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.”); Davenport v. Miller, No. 2:24-CV-

2838, 2024 WL 4440971, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2024) (habeas corpus is sole remedy for detainee seeking

nonmonetary relief based on defects in criminal pretrial proceedings), report and recommendation adopted,

2024 WL 4665665 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2024); Guzman v. Gadson, No. 1:21-CV-3135-MHC-RDC, 2021

WL 11718275, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021) (“Plaintiff’s § 1983 action must be dismissed as § 1983 is

not available for a challenge seeking the dismissal of a criminal indictment.”), report and recommendation

adopted, 2021 WL 11718270 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 10, 2021).

No. 26), and “Motion for Injunctive Relief” (Doc. No. 27). These motions arrived via mail from

Ms. Mayberry’s residential address in Madison, Tennessee, signed and submitted for filing by her

as though she were Plaintiff’s attorney. But there is no indication that Ms. Mayberry in a licensed

attorney. Accordingly, she may not represent Plaintiff in this Court. Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d

228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Federal law allows parties to plead and conduct their own cases

personally or by counsel. … The rule against non-lawyer representation protects the rights of those

before the court by preventing an ill-equipped layperson from squandering the rights of the party

he purports to represent.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The pending motions

improperly filed by Ms. Mayberry on Plaintiff’s behalf (Doc. Nos. 8, 26, and 27) are DENIED.

Plaintiff and Ms. Mayberry are admonished that all future filings in this pro se case must

be signed personally by Plaintiff, not by Ms. Mayberry (or any other non-lawyer) purportedly on

Plaintiff’s behalf. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). The Clerk SHALL provide Ms. Mayberry with a copy

of this Order at the return address provided on her mailings. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 26 at 2.)

IV. CONCLUSION

As discussed above, the Complaint in this case will be allowed to proceed beyond initial

screening with respect to seven defendants. For three of them (Hunt, Edmond Hill, and Rickey

Hill), there appear to be service returns on file. (See Doc. No. 7.) Having paid the filing fee,

Plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that each of the other remaining Defendant is served with a

summons and a copy of the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). Resources for pro se litigants,

including instructions for how to accomplish service of process, are available free of charge on the

Court’s website as well as by request to the Clerk’s Office so long as the privilege is not abused.

As to correctional officer Jane Doe and the three unnamed correctional officers, process

cannot be served, because process cannot be served upon unidentified individuals. Therefore,

Plaintiff MUST exercise due diligence and conduct a reasonable investigation to promptly

determine the full names of these Defendants so that process can be timely served under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Plaintiff MUST then file a motion to amend the Complaint to name

the Defendants. Upon referral, the Magistrate Judge may take any necessary action related to

service of process upon the unnamed Defendants, including providing for Plaintiff to serve early,

limited discovery to ascertain their identity or ordering the TTCC warden to provide identifying

information.

Defendants Strada, Hiniger, Bonds, Campbell, Mitchell, Futrell, Trombley, Carter,

Crawford, Mitchell, Huggin, Arrington, John Doe Transportation Officers, Watts, Fuqua,

Trousdale County Commissioner, Trousdale County Judge Brown, Trousdale County, Third Party

Staffing Agency, WellPath, Nurse Jane Doe, Bare, and Bailey are DISMISSED from this action.

The Court’s determination that the Complaint states colorable claims for purposes of this

initial screening does not preclude the Court from dismissing any claim at any time for the reasons

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude any Defendant from filing a motion to

dismiss any claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to oversee service of process, to enter

a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any

pretrial motions under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if

necessary, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ELI RICHARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE