Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

VALENTIN FLORES SANCHEZ, CASE NO. 1:24-CV-01893-PAG

Plaintiff, JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN

vs. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DARRELL A. CLAY

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Valentin Flores Sanchez challenges the Commissioner of Social Security’s decision

denying supplemental security income (SSI). (ECF #1). The District Court has jurisdiction under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c) and 405(g). This matter was referred to me under Local Civil Rule 72.2 to

prepare a Report and Recommendation. (Non-document entry dated Sept. 9, 2024). For the

reasons below, I recommend the District Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Mr. Sanchez applied for SSI on July 1, 2021, alleging he became disabled on April 1, 2018

due to heart disease, high blood pressure, hepatitis C, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease

(COPD), carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, sleep issues, and knee and ankle pain.

(Tr. 75). The claim was denied initially on October 20, 2021 and on reconsideration on August

12, 2022. (Tr. 101, 111). On January 26, 2023, Mr. Sanchez requested a hearing before an ALJ.

(Tr. 118). On October 12, 2023, Mr. Sanchez (represented by counsel) and a vocational expert

testified before the ALJ. (Tr. 42-65). On November 9, 2023, the ALJ determined Mr. Sanchez was

not disabled. (Tr. 17-32). On September 10, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Mr. Sanchez’s

request for review, making the hearing decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-3;

see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(b)(2)). Mr. Sanchez timely filed this action on October 30, 2024.

(ECF #1).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Personal and Vocational Evidence

Mr. Sanchez was 44 years old on his alleged onset date and 50 years old at the hearing. (See

Tr. 75). He holds a GED (Tr. 42) and has past work experience as a production machine tender

and as a composite of landscape supervisor and landscape laborer (Tr. 60-61).

II. Relevant Medical Evidence1

In June 2018, Mr. Sanchez was hospitalized for two months for a blood stream infection

and osteomyelitis. (Tr. 437, 453, 460; see also Tr. 47). The imaging of his cervical, thoracic, and

lumbar spine showed mild spinal canal stenosis at C5-C6 vertebrae secondary to a small

circumferential disc bulge, and lumbar degenerative disc disease, most pronounced at L5-S1

vertebrae, with a bulging disc abutting the S1 vertebra nerve roots and moderately narrowing the

neural foramina. (Tr. 749-51). Later imaging showed osteomyelitis at the L5-S1 vertebrae.

(Tr. 460).

In May 2020, Mr. Sanchez sought emergency treatment for right-knee pain and swelling

while doing pullups. (Tr. 370, 859). Physical examinations revealed full extension of the leg,

1 Mr. Sanchez challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of his subjective statements about his

back, knee, and neck pain. (See ECF #9 at PageID 1020-24; ECF #12 at PageID 1040). Thus, I

confine my discussion of evidence to those conditions only.

flexion of the knee limited to approximately 60 degrees, mild to moderate effusion in the right

knee, and that Mr. Sanchez walked with a mild limp. (Tr. 372, 862). X-ray imaging of Mr.

Sanchez’s right knee found no fracture, maintained joint spaces, and moderate joint effusion.

(Tr. 372, 862). Mr. Sanchez’s knee was splinted. (Tr. 371, 862).

In July 2021, Mr. Sanchez established care with a primary care provider. (Tr. 888). An

examination showed a normal range of motion and was negative for back pain, myalgias, and neck

pain. (Tr. 890-91). Mr. Sanchez complained of right hand and wrist pains. (Tr. 897). His provider

suspected carpal tunnel syndrome. (Id.). Mr. Sanchez also started on pain relievers for his knee

pain. (Id.).

Mr. Sanchez next returned to his primary care provider in May 2022, complaining of pain

in his right wrist that kept him from working. (See Tr. 935-36). He also complained of knee pain

and reported his knees buckle and he feels short of breath while climbing stairs (Tr. 936). The

provider renewed a prescription for topical pain relievers for Mr. Sanchez’s knee pain. (Tr. 939).

Mr. Sanchez’s most recent medical examination was in December 2022. (See Tr. 963).

There, he did not complain of back pain and his physical examination showed a normal range of

motion. (Tr. 965-66).

III. Relevant Opinion Evidence

On August 24, 2021, state agency medical consultant Maureen Gallagher, D.O., evaluated

Mr. Sanchez as part of the initial evaluation of his disability application. (Tr. 80-81). Dr. Gallagher

opined Mr. Sanchez is limited to medium work; can lift and carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25

pounds frequently; can stand and sit for six hours of an eight-hour workday; can frequently climb

ramps and stairs; can occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently stoop; and is

unlimited in balancing, kneeling, crouching, crawling, reaching, and pushing or pulling. (Id.). Dr.

Gallagher opined Mr. Sanchez has no manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental

limitations. (Tr. 81). On June 28, 2022, state agency medical consultant Gary Hinzman, M.D.,

affirmed the findings on reconsideration. (Tr. 91-92).

IV. Relevant Testimonial Evidence

Mr. Sanchez described neck pain and “a lot” of lower back pain. (Tr. 47-48). He also

described residual pain from a broken left ankle. (Tr. 48). His right knee swells and he can stand

for about 10 minutes before needing to sit and can walk about a half a block. (Tr. 48-49).

When working in landscaping, Mr. Sanchez estimated lifting 30 to 50 pounds at a time,

though he is now unsure if he could lift 20 pounds. (Tr. 46, 50). His primary responsibilities were

backhoe driving and tree trimming (Tr. 51), which his carpal-tunnel related wrist pain and

numbness prevent him from doing (Tr. 46, 51). He cannot squeeze or strain his dominant right

hand without pain. (Tr. 52, 58). He cannot use his right hand to open or squeeze jars or bottles,

but he can use it to button clothes. (Tr. 50-51, 58-59). He also cannot bend down without pain,

making it hard to tie shoes. (Tr. 52). He wears a wrist brace for his carpal tunnel and while his

doctor recommended surgery, he fears the procedure. (See Tr. 51). He has struggled to get regular

medical treatment because of insurance and identity-theft issues. (Tr. 58).

His back and knee pain, combined with his COPD, makes it difficult to climb stairs.

(Tr. 50). He described his knee swelling when climbing stairs and having to pull himself up.

(Tr. 49). He sleeps in the living room to avoid the stairs to his bedroom. (Tr. 50, 58).

STANDARD FOR DISABILITY

Eligibility for benefits is predicated on the existence of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a).

“Disability” is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Commissioner follows a five-step evaluation process—found at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920—to

determine whether a claimant is disabled:

1. Was claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity?

2. Did claimant have a medically determinable impairment, or a combination

of impairments, that is “severe,” which is defined as one which substantially

limits an individual’s ability to perform basic work activities?

3. Does the severe impairment meet one of the listed impairments?

4. What is claimant’s residual functional capacity and can claimant perform

past relevant work?

5. Can claimant do any other work considering his or her residual functional

capacity, age, education, and work experience?

Under this five-step sequential analysis, the claimant has the burden of proof in Steps One

through Four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts

to the Commissioner at Step Five to establish whether the claimant has the residual functional

capacity (RFC) to perform available work in the national economy. Id. The ALJ considers the

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work experience to determine whether the claimant

could perform other work. Id. Only if a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis, including

inability to do other work, and meets the duration requirements, is the claimant deemed disabled.

20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(b)-(f); see also Walters, 127 F.3d at 529.

THE ALJ’S DECISION

At Step One, the ALJ determined Mr. Sanchez had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since July 1, 2021. (Tr. 19). At Step Two, the ALJ named the following severe impairments:

Generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder, depressive disorder, marijuana use

disorder, COPD, lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, cervical stenosis, and right

knee degenerative joint disease.

(Id.). At Step Three, the ALJ found Mr. Sanchez’s impairments did not meet the requirements of,

or were medically equivalent to, a listed impairment. (Tr. 20-23).

At Step Four, the ALJ determined Mr. Sanchez’s RFC as follows:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work as

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c) except [he may only] frequently climb

ramps and stairs and stoop; occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds;

and frequently be exposed to extreme cold, extreme heat, humidity as well as

dust, odor, fumes, and pulmonary irritants. The claimant can perform work

tasks that do not require a specific production rate, such as assembly line

work or work that requires hourly quotas; occasionally and superficially

interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; and has the ability to

carry out, concentrate, persist, and maintain pace for completing simple,

routine, repetitive tasks. “Superficial” is defined as work that does not involve

arbitration, negotiation, confrontation, being responsible for safety of others,

or directing work of others.

(Tr. 23). The ALJ then found Mr. Sanchez could not perform his past relevant work as a

production machine tender or as a composite of landscape laborer and landscape supervisor.

(Tr. 30). At Step Five, the ALJ found Mr. Sanchez could perform other work in the national

economy such as cleaner II, hospital cleaner, or store laborer. (See Tr. 31-32). Thus, the ALJ

concluded Mr. Sanchez was not disabled. (Tr. 32).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing the denial of Social Security benefits, the court “must affirm the

Commissioner’s conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the

correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the

record.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). The Commissioner’s

findings “as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive.” McClanahan v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). “Substantial

evidence” is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Besaw v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir. 1992). But “a substantiality of evidence

evaluation does not permit a selective reading of the record. Substantiality of evidence must be

based upon the record taken as a whole. Substantial evidence is not simply some evidence, or even

a great deal of evidence. Rather, the substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in

the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Brooks v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F.App’x 636, 641

(6th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings, the

court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations, or weigh the

evidence. Brainard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). Even if

substantial evidence (or indeed a preponderance of the evidence) supports a claimant’s position,

the court cannot overturn “so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by

the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is because there is a

“zone of choice” within which the Commissioner can act, without fear of court interference.

Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).

Apart from considering whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the court must determine whether proper legal standards were applied. The failure to

apply correct legal standards is grounds for reversal. Even if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision, the court must overturn when an agency does not observe its own regulations and

thereby prejudices or deprives the claimant of substantial rights. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004).

Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence

in the record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an

accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.Supp.2d

875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (internal quotations omitted); accord Shrader v. Astrue, No. 11-13000,

2012 WL 5383120, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (“If relevant evidence is not mentioned, the

Court cannot determine if it was discounted or merely overlooked.”).

DISCUSSION

Mr. Sanchez argues the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective statements about his back,

knee, and neck pain by not explaining how or why his statements were inconsistent with the other

evidence in the record. (See ECF #9 at PageID 1020-24; ECF #12 at PageID 1040). The

Commissioner responds that no objective medical evidence substantiated Mr. Sanchez’s

complaints of disabling pain and that the opinion evidence assessed he could do medium work

despite his condition. (ECF #11 at PageID 1034-35).

In evaluating the claimant’s subjective reports of symptoms, SSR 16-3p requires the ALJ

consider the claimant’s complaints along with the objective medical evidence, treatment received,

daily activities, and other evidence. 2017 WL 5180304, at *5-8 (Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ also uses

the factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) to evaluate the claimant’s statements:

1. A claimant’s daily activities;

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an

individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;

5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for

relief from pain or other symptoms;

6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or used to relieve pain

or other symptoms; and

7. Any other factor concerning an individual’s functional limitations and

restrictions due to pain and other symptoms.

The ALJ need not analyze all seven factors, only those germane to the alleged symptoms. See Cross

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F.Supp.2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio 2005). An ALJ need not accept a

claimant’s subjective complaints when they are inconsistent with the evidence. SSR 16-3p, 2017

WL 5180304, at *8. Nor must the ALJ “make explicit credibility findings as to each bit of

conflicting testimony, so long as his factual findings as a whole show that he implicitly resolved

such conflicts.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F.App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006).

The ALJ analyzed Mr. Sanchez’s subjective statements of his symptoms as follows:

The claimant’s allegations of disabling functional limitations are not entirely

consistent with the evidence of record. The claimant’s impairments could reasonably

be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, but the intensity of the symptoms and

impact on functioning are not consistent with the totality of the evidence.

As such, the medical record does not establish functional limitations that would

preclude the restrictions stated above. Despite allegations of limitations,

examinations and tests showed stability and symptoms controlled with treatment.

The claimant maintained intact system functioning as demonstrated during

examinations that showed generally regular heart rate and rhythm, clear lungs, full

extremity strength and range of motion, and normal sensation, reflexes,

coordination, and gait with no assistive device. He also showed the ability to interact

with cooperative behavior, full orientation, and ability to provide information,

answer questions, and understand instructions and treatment plans.

The undersigned is cognizant that the degree of limitation that an individual might

experience from impairments might not necessarily be reflected in a particular

treatment note; however, in the instant matter, the longitudinal record does not

reflect a significant degree of functional limitation from the claimant’s impairments.

Treatment notes and examination findings do not support loss of functioning that

would support a disabling degree of physical or mental limitation. Thus, the medical

evidence does not support a greater degree of limitation than that which is set forth

in the above residual functional capacity assessment.

In sum, the claimant’s alleged functional limitations are not entirely consistent with

the claimant’s reported daily functioning, the examination findings of record, and

the persuasive portions of the medical opinions. Nonetheless, the above evidence

supports that the claimant has experienced the degree of limitation reflected in the

residual functional capacity assessment above and discussed above. These limitations

account for any deficits in functioning or symptoms from combined physical and

mental conditions.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds the record does not establish limitations that

would preclude work activity within the residual functional capacity defined in this

decision.

(Tr. 27-28).

The ALJ’s analysis points to three categories of evidence contradicting Mr. Sanchez’s

complaints of disabling pain: the medical record, the opinion evidence, and Mr. Sanchez’s daily

activities. The ALJ’s discussion of the medical record and the medical opinions reference other

portions of the decision. Reading the ALJ’s discussions in those areas, the ALJ provides examples

contradicting Mr. Sanchez’s complaints of disabling pain. At the same time, the ALJ’s discussion

of Mr. Sanchez’s daily activities does not clearly contradict his complaints. Any error is harmless

because the ALJ’s discussion of the medical evidence and the opinion evidence provide substantial

evidence for the ALJ’s conclusion that Mr. Sanchez is not disabled.

I. The ALJ explained the medical record did not support Mr. Sanchez’s complaints of

disabling pain.

SSR 16-3p requires an ALJ “examine the entire case record, including the objective medical

evidence” when evaluating the claimant’s complaints. 2017 WL 5180304, at *5. An ALJ may not

“reject [an individual’s] statements about the intensity and persistence of [his or her] pain . . . solely

because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate [those] statements.”

20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2) (emphasis added). Instead, any lack of evidence is “one factor that may

be considered.” Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-cv-2682, 2018 WL 838371, at *14 (N.D.

Ohio Feb. 12, 2018) (citing Kirkland v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2013)).

Here, the ALJ began analyzing Mr. Sanchez’s complaints by noting “the medical record

does not establish functional limitations that would preclude the restrictions” in the RFC. (Tr. 27).

In other words, the ALJ concluded the medical record indicated Mr. Sanchez could perform

medium exertional work with appropriate postural, environmental, and work-pace limitations. (See

Tr. 23). The ALJ then explained “despite the allegations of limitations, examinations and tests

showed stability and symptoms controlled with treatment.” (Tr. 27). The ALJ then cited the

normal findings from Mr. Sanchez’s physical examinations:

The claimant maintained intact system functioning as demonstrated during

examinations that showed generally regular heart rate and rhythm, clear lungs, full

extremity strength and range of motion, and normal sensation, reflexes,

coordination, and gait with no assistive device. He also showed the ability to interact

with cooperative behavior, full orientation, and ability to provide information,

answer questions, and understand instructions and treatment plans.

(Tr. 27-28). The few treatment notes in the record bear out these characterizations. (Tr. 890-91,

904, 937-38, 965-67). The ALJ qualified the explanation that it was not one particular treatment

note but the ALJ’s impression of “the longitudinal record does not reflect a significant degree of

functional limitation.” (Tr. 28).

Additionally, the ALJ mentioned Mr. Sanchez’s symptoms “were controlled with

treatment.” (Tr. 27). A claimant’s medications and treatment regimen and their effectiveness are

two other factors to consider in analyzing a claimant’s statements. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v).

Although the ALJ did not discuss these notes in the allegation analysis proper, “there is no

requirement that the ALJ incorporate all the information upon which he relied into a single tidy

paragraph.” Evans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-cv-2895, 2020 WL 6064112, at *13 (N.D. Ohio

Oct. 14, 2020); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 370 n.5 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Because it is proper to

read the ALJ’s decision as a whole . . . it would be a needless formality to have the ALJ repeat

substantially similar factual analyses” in different parts of the decision.).

The ALJ’s reference to treatment calls back to earlier in the decision where the ALJ

discussed Mr. Sanchez’s two treatment plans. In the July 2021 and May 2022 primary-care

consultations, Mr. Sanchez complained of hand, wrist, and knee pain. (Tr. 888, 939). The ALJ

noted the treatment plan for those complaints was “medication refills and outpatient visits” in

2021 (see Tr. 26) and “to take medications regularly, including psychotropic medication, future

PFT, continue with inhaler, referral for physical therapy evaluation to address bilateral chronic

knee pain, and routine primary care follow-up” in 2022 (see Tr. 26-27) (citing Tr. 939). The ALJ

later characterized this treatment plan as “conservative.” (See Tr. 29) (“these opinions are

supported by evidence of a conservative course of treatment for impairments that consisted of

medication, office visits, updated testing, and referral to physical therapy”).

The Sixth Circuit has held a conservative treatment approach for a condition can suggest

that condition is not disabling. Branon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.App’x 675, 678 (6th Cir. 2013)

(finding that claimant’s “conservative treatment approach suggests the absence of a disabling

condition.”). Mr. Sanchez’s treatment of medication and office visits is consistent with other

characterizations of conservative treatment. See, e.g., Adams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-3284,

2023 WL 6366106, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2023) (characterizing “epidural injections, medial-

branch blocks, and prescription pain medication” as “conservative treatment”). The ALJ’s findings

that Mr. Sanchez’s conditions were controlled by a conservative treatment plan of medication and

office visits contradicted Mr. Sanchez’s complaints of disabling pain.

The ALJ explained that Mr. Sanchez’s complaints of disabling neck pain and “a lot” of

lower back pain (see Tr. 47-48) were inconsistent with the medical record. Although the ALJ’s

explanation required piecing together references to other portions of the decision, the decision

read as a whole provides substantial evidence that Mr. Sanchez’s complaints were unsupported by

the medical record that documents steady symptoms controlled by a conservative treatment plan

consisting primarily of medication and office visits. Therefore, I conclude remand is not warranted

on this basis.

II. The ALJ explained the medical opinions contradicted Mr. Sanchez’s complaints of

disabling pain.

Second, the ALJ explained that Mr. Sanchez’s “alleged functional limitations are not

entirely consistent with . . . the persuasive portions of the medical opinions.” (Tr. 28). Though not

an explicit factor in SSR 16-3p, an ALJ may evaluate a claimant’s complaints based on the available

medical opinions. Kirkland v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.App’x 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2013) (applying

parallel provision for disability insurance benefits). “[M]edical opinions, plus the lack of objective

medical evidence, provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s credibility finding.” Id.

The ALJ explained that Mr. Sanchez’s “alleged functional limitations are not entirely

consistent with . . . the persuasive portions of the medical opinions.” (Tr. 28). Although the ALJ

did not further discuss the medical opinions in the allegation analysis, the reference to “the

persuasive portions of the medical opinions” refers the reader to the ALJ’s analysis of the opinions

on the next page. As mentioned above, this writing structure is not error on its own. See Evans,

2020 WL 6064112, at *13 (rejecting any requirement of “a single tidy paragraph”).

The ALJ analyzed the medical opinions and found them persuasive to the extent the ALJ

found Mr. Sanchez limited to the medium exertion level. (Tr. 28). This finding directly contradicts

Mr. Sanchez’s subjective statements about what he can do with his symptoms. Mr. Sanchez’s stated

estimate that while he could previously lift 30 to 50 pounds at a time (Tr. 46), he is now unsure

whether he could lift 20 pounds (Tr. 50). The state agency medical consultants opined Mr.

Sanchez could do medium work (Tr. 80-81, 91-92) and the ALJ found those opinions persuasive.

As defined in the regulations, “medium” exertion “involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds.” 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.967(c). In making this finding, the ALJ implicitly determined Mr. Sanchez’s statement that

he is unsure he could lift 20 pounds was inconsistent with the opinion evidence.

Additionally, the ALJ impliedly found Mr. Sanchez’s estimate to be inconsistent with other

evidence. The ALJ explained the medical opinions (and the medium exertion level) were

consistent with “imaging and testing,” normal examination findings, and “a conservative course of

treatment for impairments that consisted of medication, office visits, updated testing, and referral

to physical therapy.” (Tr. 28). By finding Mr. Sanchez’s estimate inconsistent with the medical

opinions, the ALJ implicitly found the estimate inconsistent with the evidence that supported

those opinions.

When the decision is read as a whole, the ALJ incorporated this discussion into the

allegation analysis by finding Mr. Sanchez’s allegations inconsistent with the persuasive portions of

the opinions. While it may be preferable for these findings to be discussed in the allegation

analysis, the ALJ’s explanation can be followed. The ALJ thus properly relied on the medical

opinions to evaluate Mr. Sanchez’s complaints. Together with the lack of objective medical

evidence discussed above, the ALJ’s explanation provides substantial evidence for concluding Mr.

Sanchez’s complaints were not consistent with the evidence. See Kirkland, 528 F.App’x at 427.

Therefore, remand is not warranted on this basis.

III. The ALJ’s failure to explain how Mr. Sanchez’s activities of daily living were inconsistent

with his complaints is harmless because the ALJ’s other findings were proper and

provide substantial evidence for the ALJ’s credibility analysis.

Third, the ALJ noted Mr. Sanchez’s “alleged functional limitations are not entirely

consistent with [his] reported daily functioning.” (Tr. 28). A claimant’s daily activities is one factor

used to evaluate the claimant’s statements about complained-of symptoms. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.929(c)(3)(i). Like the analysis of the medical record, the ALJ mentioned Mr. Sanchez’s daily

activities in one sentence without explanation but did discuss it previously in the decision. That

said, even after reading the decision as a whole, the ALJ’s analysis is unclear.

When examining Mr. Sanchez’s complaints, the ALJ wrote: “In sum, the claimant’s alleged

functional limitations are not entirely consistent with the claimant’s reported daily

functioning . . . .” (Tr. 28). Previously in the decision, the ALJ analyzed Mr. Sanchez’s daily

activities:

The claimant reported his conditions affect daily activities, for example, takes 10

minutes to take out the garbage and one or two hours to cut the grass because he

becomes out of breath and hands hurt . . . [he] can stand 10 minutes, walk half a

block, sit 15 minutes . . . is unable to open jars with his right hand, and has difficulty

with using buttons and zippers . . . seldom goes to the supermarket, and [his]

conditions affect performance of household chores.

(Tr. 24) (citations omitted).

Even reading these two passages together, it is unclear how the ALJ concluded Mr.

Sanchez’s allegations of disabling pain are inconsistent with his reported daily activities. For

instance, removing garbage and mowing the grass are tasks that can be done despite pain,

particularly with breaks. But there is no information about how much grass Mr. Sanchez mows or

how much garbage he takes out or how far it goes. A reasonable reader could thus not infer the

pace at which Mr. Sanchez moves or how many breaks he takes. This factors into the ALJ’s analysis

because the VE testified it would be work preclusive to be “off-task 15% or more of a workday,

excluding regular breaks and lunches,” meaning “no more than eight minutes per hour.” (Tr. 63).

Thus, the ALJ’s analysis that Mr. Sanchez can take out garbage in 10 minutes or mow grass in one

or two hours could be consistent with a medium exertion if he takes no breaks or consistent with

disabling pain if he takes many breaks.

Despite this gap, the ALJ’s lack of explanation in this one factor does not warrant reversal.

An ALJ’s error in making a factual finding when analyzing the credibility of a claimant’s subjective

statements is subject to harmless-error review. See Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 714

(6th Cir. 2012). When an ALJ errs in analyzing a claimant’s subjective statements, that error is

harmless “[s]o long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusions on

credibility and the error does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility

conclusion . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted).

Although the ALJ’s analysis does not explain how Mr. Sanchez’s daily activities are

inconsistent with his subjective statements, the ALJ’s other findings about the medical evidence

and opinions are “sufficiently specific to make clear to the individual and to any subsequent

reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reasons for that

weight.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 248 (6th Cir. 2007); Kirkland, 528 F.App’x at

427 (“Medical opinions, plus the lack of objective medical evidence, provide substantial evidence

for the ALJ’s credibility finding.”). Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s other findings,

remand is not warranted based solely on the ALJ’s erroneous analysis of Mr. Sanchez’s daily

activities. Ulman, 693 F.3d at 714.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Following review of the arguments presented, the record, and the applicable law, I

recommend the District Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision denying supplemental

security income.

Dated: July 15, 2025

YAW

DARRELL A. CLAY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

OBJECTIONS, REVIEW, AND APPEAL

Within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Local Civ. R. 72.3(b). Properly asserted

objections shall be reviewed de novo by the assigned district judge.

Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or

waiver of the right to raise the issue on appeal, either to the district judge or in a

subsequent appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or

whether the party responds to the Report and Recommendation. Berkshire v.

Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be specific and not

merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the Report and

Recommendation; “a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to

object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir.

1991). Objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the

arguments in briefs submitted to the Magistrate Judge. “A reexamination of the

exact same argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific

objections ‘wastes judicial resources rather than saving them and runs contrary to

the purpose of the Magistrates Act.” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-cv-186, 2018 WL

3018175, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018) (quoting Howard, 932 F.2d at 509). The

failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the interest of

justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).

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