The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
DELTA DIVISION
CATHERINE GARRISON PLAINTIFF
v. Case No. 2:24-cv-00020-JM
DUMAS PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT DEFENDANT
ORDER
Catherine Garrison, a former teacher for the Dumas Public School District, filed this action
alleging that her employer interfered with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA). The District denies her allegations of interference and has filed a motion for
summary judgment (Doc. No. 12) which is ripe for determination. For the reasons stated below,
the motion is granted.
Background
Garrison taught five ninth-grade English classes and two communications classes at
Dumas High School (DHS) when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident on September 15,
2022. Her injuries were severe and included a broken femur and a shattered elbow. She
requested and was granted continuous FMLA leave from September 16, 2022 through December
18, 2022. Garrison did not heal sufficiently to return to the classroom by the end of her FMLA
leave. She utilized her short-term disability benefits and did not return to her position in the
classroom until February 7, 2023. Garrison retired from the District at the end of the following
school year.
In the immediate wake of Garrison’s accident, the DHS assistant principal, Amber
Brown-Madison, took over her two communications classes. The District reached out to two
retired teachers in an attempt to hire a long-term substitute teacher that was qualified to teach
Garrison’s English classes but both declined. In the alternative, the District placed her English
students on an online learning program, Edmentum.1 Brown-Madison, who was certified to teach
Garrison’s classes, initially “kept up with the students’ work on the Edmentum program” while
substitutes monitored the classroom. (Doc. No. 12-2, ¶ 7). On September 29, 2022 Garrison
contacted Brown-Madison to let her know that Garrison had created a Google Classroom for her
English classes and would make specific Edmentum assignments for her students there.
The record reflects the following communications between Garrison, Brown-Madison,
and the DHS principal, Jacob Lanehart (with the administrators’ communications italicized):2
• On September 28, 20202, Garrison messaged Brown-Madison that she had
created a Google classroom that the students needed to join so they could access
the Edmentum assignments and other work and guided notes she would be
posting. She concluded, “Please let me know if this is gonna work. Thanks.”
• About this same time, Brown-Madison messaged Garrison, “Good afternoon,
how are you? . . .. I saw the class you set up in Edmentum and it says RTI. Is that
what you would like all your students to do and complete?” (Doc. 17-5, p. 10).
Garrison responded “Yes. All [students] should do the modules I have open.”
• On October 7, Garrison emailed Brown-Madison and Lanehart the following: “I
need all my 9th graders to enroll in my Google class ASAP! I am making specific
Edmentum assignments and will score them.” (Doc. No. 17-5, p.2).
• Brown-Madison responded that she would go to each class to make sure it was
done.
• On October 11, Garrison emailed her students—copying Brown-Madison and
Lanehart—about joining Google Classroom, making up missing assignments, and
advising them that “material from these assignments WILL be on your semester
exam!”
• Brown-Madison responded that she would check in again to make sure all the
students had joined.
1 Garrison previously used Edmentum (an online platform that provided an entire course of
instruction with related materials) as a teaching tool but had not introduced her students to it
before her accident.
2 Taken from the exhibits to Garrison’s SUMF response. (Doc. No. 17-5, -7).
• On October 14, Garrison emailed Brown-Madison, “I sent you the two grades I
would like to add to Eschool for ninth grade English. Typically, I drop one
classroom grade and one quiz grade, but as I cannot really see the impact of that, I
will let you make that decision. Thanks so much!”
• Brown-Madison responded, “Got it, thank you!”
• On October 24 at 10:34 a.m., Lanehart forwarded a message to Garrison from a
parent asking about a student’s missing grade. In the forwarded email, he told the
parent that Brown-Madison is putting grades in and that Garrison “is still
working with students” on Google Classroom and uploading assignments.
• On October 24 at 2:16 p.m., Garrison sent the following email to Brown-Madison
and Lanehart:
I have carefully reviewed the gradebook sheet sent to me. I see that the
grades I submitted for the first two required Edmentum assignments were
higher in many cases that what I submitted based on the due dates I had
assigned. I can only assume that students were allowed to redo the work
after I graded it. Therefore, I feel that the grades should stand as they are. I
see that several parents are disappointed that their students have Bs and
Cs, but the last two grades were heavily weighted and would have only
improved those students’ scores.
I cannot tell if any low grades were dropped. I typically always use the
gradebook category feature that lets me drop the lowest quiz score and the
lowest classwork score because I have serious rigor in my classes.
However, if you did not use it, that is fine.
Please note that I am grading and providing feedback to the students this
nine weeks through Google Classroom. Please do NOT reset any mastery
tests. Students have two opportunities. To retake a mastery test, all they
have to do is go back through the tutorial. I AM locking assignments
following due dates. Please do NOT unlock them. I also look at the
submission dates for the Guided Notes compared to the date on the
mastery test. Students are required to complete and submit the notes
BEFORE taking the mastery test. Some just have not followed instructions
until they got zeros. I have that information in all assignments and have
announced it in the class stream.
• Brown-Madison responded explaining why the mastery testes were unlocked
(computer trouble, wifi issues, absences), concluding “Feel free to let me know if
you have any more questions.”
• On November 11, 2022, Brown-Madison emailed Garrison asking if she was
going to send progress report grades for the school to insert into the platform or
if she would be inserting them herself.
• Garrison responded “I cannot access Eschool via my hotspot. The grades in
Google Classroom are up to date and accurate. When are progress grades due in?”
• In response, Brown-Madison stated that the progress grades were due Monday
and said “I will get it done. Would you like me to wait until Monday and just
upload at that time?”
• Garrison responded yes, for her to please wait.
• On November 15, Lanehart emailed Garrison that the school was placing her
“recruiting/retention incentive employee verification forms” in her mailbox, due
to be returned by Friday the 18th to “ensure that checks for the first disbursement
will be processed on time.” (This was related to getting an extra check for
COVID pay.) (Doc. No. 12-1, p. 82).
• Garrison responded for him to please scan and e-mail her form to her to sign and
send back.
• On November 18, Lanehart emailed Garrison about “increasing student
discomfort” as the students are “having trouble with maneuvering through
Google classroom and Edmentum.” He further stated:
“We are all trying to make it through this difficult situation as best we
can. You are commended for providing a way for students to receive some
form of instruction as you convalesce. This cohort of students have the
unfortunate task of receiving instruction via technology though two of
their main courses. It is a lot for this group to undertake while learning
the ins and outs of a new school as well. At this time, we believe we can
better serve the students if we offer them some grace and understanding.
We will continue to assist [the substitute] and the students in the
classroom. However, at this time, we would like all the previous
assignments for the 2nd nine weeks on Google Classroom and Edmentum
to be reopened (no mastery test reopened if students have already had
their two attempts) for the students to correct or complete. Let me know if
you have any questions or concerns.”
• On November 19, Garrison responded that she “will be happy to reopen the
mastery tests, but the Guided Notes is where the learning takes place” and that
many zeros were assigned because the students did not complete the notes.” She
further stated that the substitute could check the remaining modules and let her
know if they were completed “fully and BEFORE the student took the mastery
test.”
• On December 9, Brown-Madison emailed “Good afternoon, Mrs. Garrison, are
your students having a semester exam? If so, how would you like us to administer
it?”
• Garrison responded that she did have a semester exam and explained that a fellow
teacher would have three different versions to give out as well as having the
answer keys.
Other communications were submitted but fall outside the dates of Garrison’s FMLA leave.
It was not until Garrison had returned to work that she realized that she did not have to
work while on FMLA leave. She filed this complaint alleging that while she was on leave, she
was “continuously contacted” by the District, “pressured into returning to work,” and “forced to
perform tasks,” and that these actions constituted interference with her entitlement to FMLA
leave pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 2615. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 36, 40). The District has moved for summary
judgment arguing that Garrison voluntarily worked while she was on FMLA leave, assuming
control of her English classes without being asked to by the District, and that this does not
constitute impermissible interference under the FMLA.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
that the defendant is entitled to entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of
determining whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably
be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
“The court must assess the adequacy of the nonmovants' response and whether that showing, on
admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial.” Hartnagel v.
Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 396 (8th Cir. 1992).
Discussion
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-
month period for several reasons including “because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” 29 U.S.C.A. §
2612(a). It is unlawful for an employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the
attempt to exercise” this right. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2615 (a)(1). “To prevail on an interference claim,
an employee has the burden of proving that she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA, that
the employer “interfered with,” i.e., denied the employee, that entitlement, and that the reason for
denial was connected to the employee's FMLA leave.” Massey-Diez v. Univ. of Iowa Cmty. Med.
Servs., Inc., 826 F.3d 1149, 1158 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting Stallings v. Hussmann Corp., 447 F.3d
1041, 1050 (8th Cir. 2006)). It is undisputed that Garrison was an eligible employee with a
qualifying serious health condition. She requested and was granted twelve continuous weeks of
FMLA leave. The question is whether the District interfered with her FMLA leave.
The FMLA does not define interference. According to the regulations governing the
FMLA, “[o]ne way an employer interferes with an employee's entitlement to FMLA leave is by
‘discouraging an employee from using such leave.’ Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)).
However, “an employee's voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition of
employment) of a light duty assignment while recovering from a serious health condition” does
not constitute interference with FMLA entitled benefits. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d)).
Courts have “drawn a distinction between, on the one hand, receiving nondisruptive
communications such as short phone calls requesting the employee to pass on institutional
knowledge or property as a professional courtesy, and, on the other hand, requiring the employee
to complete work-related tasks or produce work product.” Thompson v. Kanabec Cnty., 958 F.3d
because 698, 706 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Massey-Diaz at 1158-59).
The District relies on the affidavit of Brown-Madison and Garrison’s deposition of
Garrison to establish that no one at the District expected or requested Garrison to perform any
job duties while on FMLA leave or made the performance of any duties a condition of her
employment. Garrison argues in response that “one disputed fact” precludes the entry of
summary judgment on her interference claim: “whether she voluntarily worked from home
without pay during her FMLA leave, or whether [the District] coerced, pressured, and ordered
her to do so.” (Doc. No. 18, p. 5). In support of her position that she was pressured or ordered to
work by the district, she raises three points.
First, Garrison submits the communications between her and her administrators, supra, as
evidence that she was “pressured, coerced, and actually ordered”3 to perform work without pay
during her FMLA leave. This characterization, though oft repeated, does not fit the tone or
content of those communications. Garrison admitted in her deposition that no one from the
District gave her a direct order to do any work. Rather, she felt pressure because when she
communicated with her administrators about what she was doing, they told her they would
follow up with her classes about the work; “even though they're not directly pressuring me,
they're not doing the opposite either. They're not saying, ‘You don't have to do this. You're on
FMLA.’” (Doc. No. 12-1, p. 45). She interpreted the District’s “absence of discouragement” for
her to do the work while on FMLA leave as “encouragement or pressure to make sure it
happened.” (Doc. No. 12-1, p. 45). But more than subjective belief on the part of the employee is
required to find that an employer interfered with rights under the FMLA. See Massey-Diez, 826
F.3d at 1160, fn7. (“Massey–Diez's testimony that she subjectively felt she had no choice but to
3 Plaintiff’s Response, Doc. No. 18, p. 2.
comply with [her employer’s] requests, without any outward manifestation of that feeling
communicated to [her employer] or stronger demands on its part than what appears in the record,
does not create a genuine dispute as to coercion and involuntariness.”). See also Glover v.
Hudson Mem'l Nursing Home, No. 1:22-CV-1072, 2024 WL 759299 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 23, 2024)
(noting that the employee “never expressed reservations” about performing work and there was
no evidence that her employer “required [the employee] to work during her time off as a
condition of continued employment.”)
Second, Garrison she said she felt pressure from the expectations that had been
communicated to the teachers at the beginning of the year in the manual “Everything You
Wanted to Know About DHS but Were Afraid to Ask.” (Doc. 17-3). Under the heading
“Attendance for Teacher and Staff,” the manual stated that in the event of a teacher’s absence:
Your lesson for the day should already be in Google Classroom. However,
teachers are expected to create a substitute folder that will have your roster, class
schedule, duty (if applicable), and any other special instructions for your
classroom in the folder provided by the office. Place the folder in a prominent
location on your desk. With the blended learning format, students should
always have an assignment readily available.
Id. (emphasis in original). The manual did not reference FMLA leave, and there is no evidence
that anyone from the District directed her to it in connection with her leave. The existence of this
manual, without more, is not probative of whether Garrison voluntarily worked while she was on
FMLA leave.
Third, Garrison attributes the District’s failure to secure a qualified substitute to take over
her English classes as evidence of the District pressuring her to work while on FMLA leave. But
there is no evidence that the pressure came from the District. She testified that if Brown-Madison
had completely assumed her English classes, which she was qualified to do, then Garrison would
not have felt pressured to work while on FMLA leave. (Doc. No. 17, ¶ 41.). The District had a
plan in place to cover Garrison’s FMLA leave using Edmentum and substitute teachers to
monitor the students. Plaintiff’s belief that she was required to perform her job duties in the
absence of a certified English substitute is not evidence that the District coerced or pressured her
to perform her job duties while she was on leave as a condition of continued employment. See
Lindsey v. Bio-Med. Applications of Louisiana, L.L.C., 9 F.4th 317, 323–24 (5th Cir. 2021). That
she initiated contact about working from home, chose to maintain control over her English
classes, and was not stopped from doing so by the District does not translate into interference by
the District with her FMLA leave. See Groening v. Glen Lake Cmty. Sch., 884 F.3d 626, 632 (6th
Cir. 2018).
Garrison testified that she felt “very betrayed” by the District once she returned to work
and subsequently learned that she had not been required to perform any duties while she was on
FMLA leave. She testified that she worked roughly five days a week, six hours a day, for a
majority of the time that she was on leave. (Doc. No. 12-1, pp. 59-60). She also testified that she
had no internet at her rural home and so she “had to go to the front door of her house and sit at
her desk with the front door open, in fall and winter, to use her hotspot to perform work” which
was painful for her given her severe injuries. (Doc. No. 17, ¶ 19). There is no evidence that the
District was made aware of the amount of time Garrison was working or under what conditions.
Garrison never expressed any reservations to the District about the work she was doing.
Without citing to any authority, Garrison maintains it was the District’s responsibility to
tell her that she was not expected to work while she was on FMLA leave. The District provided
Garrison with a Notice of Eligibility & Rights and Responsibilities under the FMLA as required.
29 C.F.R. § 825.300. (Doc. No. 12-1, pp. 153-155). That publication explained that she had the
right “to take unpaid, job-protected FMLA leave.” It is not for this Court to place additional
responsibilities on an employer covered by the FMLA.
Based on this record, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could not find that the District
interfered with Garrison’s FMLA leave.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 12) is
GRANTED. The case is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15" day of July, 2025.
ome ans Os JUDGE
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