Hall v. Eddy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

TIFFANY HALL, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-3332

)

MELINDA EDDY et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Before the Court for screening is a Complaint (Doc. 1) filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983

by Plaintiff Tiffany Hall, an inmate at Logan Correctional Center (“Logan”). Plaintiff also

filed Motions for Injunctive Relief (Docs. 4, 6), Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc.

14), Subpoena (Doc. 15), Recusal (Doc. 20), and Status (Docs. 11, 18, 19).

I. Complaint

A. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In

reviewing the Complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).

However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be

provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,

721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff’s pleading alleges constitutional violations at Logan against the following

individuals and entity: Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) Director Latoya

Hughes, former IDOC Director Rob Jeffreys, former Warden Jean Marie Case, former

acting Warden Melinda Eddy; Warden Michael Long, Major Nathan Thomas, Internal

Affairs Head Chad McGinnis, Investigator Justin Russell, Corrections Officers McCarty

and Ryan Robinson, and Logan.

Plaintiff claims that from November 2022 to December 2023, Defendants Case,

Eddy, Hughes, Jeffreys, Long, and Thomas were negligent and failed to protect her by (1)

allowing male staff to perform unclothed strip searches on her person without being

trained in cross-gender strip searches (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 8:1), (2) making it optional for

male staff to perform unclothed strip searches of transgender offenders, which Plaintiff

asserts causes “dependency, breeding ground for sexual abuse and sexual harassment”

(Id. at 8:2.), and (3) forcing Plaintiff to get unclothed in front of Defendants McCarthy and

Robinson (Id. at 8:3.). Plaintiff further claims that Defendants Case, Eddy, Hughes,

Jeffreys, Long, McGinnis, Russell, and Thomas were negligent and failed to protect her

by refusing to initiate a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) protocols when they learned

about Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment against Defendants Robinson and

McCarty (Id. at 9:4).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Thomas and Long have strip-searched her, and

Defendants McCarty and Robinson sexually harassed her while performing strip

searches through disparaging verbal comments and using restraints in a sexually

suggestive manner. (Id. at 8:1, 9:5; 10:6.)

C. Analysis

State officials must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). For a state official to be held liable

for failure to protect, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an objective and a

subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). The objective

component requires the risk of harm to be “sufficiently serious.” Id. The subjective

component focuses on whether the official had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id.

To satisfy the subjective component, the official must know of and disregard an

excessive risk to a prisoner’s safety. Id. at 837. “In failure to protect cases, ‘[a] prisoner

normally proves actual knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained

to prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.’” Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475,

480 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also McGill v.

Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991). To support an inference that an official knew

of a substantial risk of harm, the inmate’s complaint to the official typically must identify

“a specific, credible, and imminent risk of serious harm.” Gevas, 798 F.3d at 481.

Plaintiff does not state a failure to protect the claim as she does not provide facts

that establish or permit a reasonable inference as to either component. Additionally,

Plaintiff does not state a constitutional violation under § 1983 based on an allegation of

negligence. See McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[N]egligence, even

gross negligence, does not violate the Constitution.”); see also Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara,

861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment is violated by acts or

omissions that exhibit deliberate indifference; mere negligence is insufficient. . . .

Similarly, negligent conduct by a state official does not implicate the Due Process

Clause.”).

Plaintiff also does not state a claim under the PREA, which does not establish a

private cause of action. See Ross v. Gossett, 2016 WL 335991, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2016

(The PREA “does not create a private cause of action” but instead “establishes finding

of facts, sets forth statistics, recites research, adopts standards, and provides for grant

money”) (collecting cases); see also Sims v. Doe, 2018 WL 4027632, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug.

22, 2018) (“The PREA does not create a private cause of action in federal court.”) (citing

Bentley v. Baenen, 2018 WL 1108701 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 27, 2018)).

Plaintiff does not state a claim against Logan. A building, such as a jail or a prison,

cannot be sued under § 1983. Smith v. Knox Cty. Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012);

see also White v. Knight, 710 F. App’x 260, 262 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he fact that a building is

owned by a corporate entity or a government agency does not make the building a suable

person under § 1983.”).

“There is no question that strip searches may be unpleasant, humiliating, and

embarrassing to prisoners, but not every psychological discomfort a prisoner endures

amounts to a constitutional violation.” Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003).

“[O]nly those searches that are maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional security,

and hence totally without penological justification are considered unconstitutional.”

Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004). Even where a valid penological reason

justifies a search, how “the searches were conducted must itself pass constitutional

muster.” Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2009). Therefore, a search of a

prisoner may violate the Eighth Amendment if it is “conducted in a harassing manner

intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain.” Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 939.

Plaintiff’s account is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against

Defendants Long, McCarty, Robinson, and Thomas based on strip searches conducted

and the alleged comments made by McCarty and Robinson during their search of

Plaintiff. See West v. Radke, 48 F.4th 836, 850 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating “[c]ourts have long

recognized that sex is a trait relevant to inmate privacy” and citing cases explaining it is

a greater invasion of privacy to have one’s naked body viewed by a member of the

opposite sex in case addressing cross-sex strip searches in prison); see also Gillis v. Pollard,

554 F. App’x 502, 505 (7th Cir. 2014) (“A prison guard carrying out a prison security

measure can violate the Eight Amendment in one of two ways: by maliciously inflicting

pain or injury, see Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012), or by performing

some action that is ‘intended to humiliate the victim or gratify the assailant’s sexual

desires,’ Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2012).”).

II. Injunctive Relief

A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should

not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); accord Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never

awarded as of right”).

The purpose of a temporary restraining order and, ultimately, a preliminary

injunction is to preserve the status quo pending a final hearing on the merits of the case.

American Hospital Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1330 (7th Cir. 1980). “The standards for

issuing temporary restraining orders are identical to the standards for preliminary

injunctions.” Anthony v. Village of South Holland, 2013 WL 5967505, * 2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8,

2013). “To determine whether a situation warrants such a remedy, a district court engages

in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases: a threshold phase and a balancing

phase.” Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of United States of America, Inc.,

749 F.3d 1079, 1085-86 (7th Cir. 2008).

“To survive the threshold phase, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must

satisfy three requirements.” Valencia v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 883 F.3d 959, 965 (7th

Cir. 2018) (quoting Girl Scouts, 549 F.3d at 1086). The movant must show that: “(1) absent

a preliminary injunction, [she] will suffer irreparable harm in the interim period [before]

final resolution of [her] claims; (2) traditional legal remedies would be inadequate; and

(3) [her] claim has some likelihood of succeeding on the merits.” Id. The court proceeds

to the balancing phase after the moving party satisfies each threshold requirement. Id. at

966.

Plaintiff filed successive Motions for Injunctive Relief. Plaintiff’s initial filing

requests that the Court require Defendants Eddy and Hughes to implement nine specific

procedures related to strip searches of her person. (Doc. 4 at 2-6.) Similarly, Plaintiff’s

second filing reiterates her harassment claims against Defendants McCarty and Robinson

and requests that the Court Order Defendant Hughes to implement related personnel

changes given her allegations. However, because neither filing addresses the threshold

requirements noted supra, Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief (Docs. 4, 6) are denied.

III. Recusal

“A motion to disqualify a judge [under 28 U.S.C.] § 144 is allowed if a party files a

timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against a

party.” Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2001). “Unlike § 144, which

requires recusal of a judge when there is actual personal bias or prejudice, 28 U.S.C. §

455(a) requires a judge to recuse [herself] when his presiding over a case would create an

appearance of bias.” Id. at 717 n.16; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (“Any justice, judge, or

magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify [herself] in any proceeding in which

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). Section 455(b) lists additional

circumstances where a judge should disqualify himself. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).

The basis for Plaintiff’s motion for recusal (Doc. 20) originates from her claim that

the Court has not entered a timely Merit Review Order in this case, which is insufficient.

See Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ecual is required only if the actual

bias or prejudice is proved by compelling evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also O’Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 988 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] judge’s

bias against a litigant must ‘arise from an extrajudicial source.’”) (quoting Hook, 89 F.3d

at 355).

Furthermore, the “personal bias” required to justify recusal is prejudice from

sources other than participation in the proceedings or prior contact with related cases. 28

U.S.C. § 455; see also In re City of Milwaukee, 788 F.3d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[O]pinions

formed by [a] judge [based on] facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the

current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or

partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would

make fair judgment impossible.”) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)).

Additionally, “[a]dverse decisions do not establish bias or even hint at bias.” Khor Chin

Lim v. Courtcall, Inc., 683 F.3d 378 (7th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s

Motion for Recusal (Doc. 20).

IV. Amend Complaint, Subpoena, and Status Motions

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (Doc. 14) requests permission to clarify

and add claims to her existing suit, which is denied. The Court does not accept piecemeal

amendments. If Plaintiff opts to file an amended pleading, it must stand independently

without reference to her initial filing and contain all claims against all defendants. In

other words, Plaintiff’s amended pleading must specify the constitutional violation,

when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v.

Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff

must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a

constitutional right.”).

Plaintiff’s Motion for Issuance of a Subpoena (Doc. 15) is denied as premature. As

explained below, entry of the Court’s Merit Review Order begins the service phase. After

Defendants have been served and responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint, which usually

takes sixty days, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order that provides guidance and

deadlines to assist Plaintiff during the discovery process, including the procedure to

request subpoenas.

Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 11, 18, 19) are moot with the entry of the

Court’s Order.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motions for Injunctive Relief (Docs. 4, 6), Leave to File an Amended

Complaint (Doc. 14), Issuance of a Subpoena (Doc. 15), and Recusal (Doc. 20) are

DENIED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motions for Status (Docs. 11, 18, 19) are MOOT.

3) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Long

McCarty, Robinson, and Thomas as noted supra. Plaintiff’s claims against

Defendants proceed in their individual capacity only. Additional claims shall

not be included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party

for good cause shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Jean Marie Case, Melinda

Eddy, Latoya Hughes, Rob Jeffreys, Chad McGinnis, Justin Russell, and Logan

Correctional Center as parties.

5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait

until counsel has entered an appearance before filing any motions to give

Defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions

filed before counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature.

Plaintiff need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed by the

Court.

6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.

Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not

filed an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of

this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

service of process, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive

motion deadlines.

7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by

Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall

submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed

by the Clerk.

8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends

the waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent

pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits

of those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no

response to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.

9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.

Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents

that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does

not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses

are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests

and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses

sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the

subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,

which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of

a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this

lawsuit with prejudice.

12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within

thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect

formal service through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and will

require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard

procedures.

ENTERED July 15, 2025.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE