State v. Price

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-878

Filed 16 July 2025

Forsyth County, Nos. 22CRS053931-330, 23CRS000605-330

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

THOMAS HOWARD PRICE, JR., Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 March 2024 by Judge

Stephanie L. Reese in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

9 April 2025.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Senior Deputy Attorney General Kunal J.

Choksi, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Brandon

Mayes, for Defendant-Appellant.

CARPENTER, Judge.

Thomas Howard Price, Jr. (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered after

a jury found him guilty of felony domestic violence protective order (“DVPO”)

violation. Following his conviction, Defendant pleaded guilty to attaining habitual-

felon status. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting certain

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Opinion of the Court

Rule 404(b) evidence and denying his motion to dismiss. After careful review, we

discern no error.

I. Factual & Procedural Background

Defendant and Sonya Price (“Sonya”) married in 2009 and had two children

together. Beginning in June 2018, Defendant routinely emptied Sonya’s bank

account and confiscated her car keys and phone every day when she returned home

from work. Defendant also installed an alarm system in the home; he alone knew the

code. Every night Defendant would activate the alarm, effectively preventing Sonya

from leaving the home without Defendant’s knowledge.

In June 2018, Sonya left work to find that Defendant had swapped her Subaru

Legacy with the parties’ Chrysler Pacifica, which had little to no fuel. Realizing she

did not have enough fuel to make it home, Sonya drove to a nearby gas station. When

she attempted to refuel the Chrysler, however, her card declined due to insufficient

funds. Because Defendant had taken Sonya’s phone the night before, Sonya had to

use the gas station’s phone to call Defendant to ask him to replenish her account.

Approximately one week later, Sonya left work early to file a police report

because “everything kept escalating.” When Sonya arrived at home, Defendant told

Sonya that he knew where she had been, despite Sonya not telling Defendant she

visited the police department. After Defendant confronted Sonya, she took the

children to a movie. When she did not return home at the time Defendant expected,

Defendant called the police. When Sonya and the children returned home, they were

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greeted by police and child protective services (“CPS”). The police and CPS advised

Sonya to leave with the children, but Sonya was “too afraid to leave.” Before

departing, the police made Defendant return Sonya’s phone to her because they were

uncomfortable leaving Sonya without the means to contact 9-1-1 in case of emergency.

Shortly after CPS and police left, however, Defendant took Sonya’s phone back.

In July 2018, Defendant and Sonya argued about a diamond ring Defendant

had purchased for Sonya that he wanted back. Following the argument, Sonya left

the house with the children but returned approximately thirty minutes later. As

Sonya backed her car into the driveway, Defendant sped into the driveway and

intentionally collided with Sonya’s car. Thereafter, Sonya obtained an ex parte DVPO

against Defendant; however, she promptly dismissed it after Defendant erroneously

told Sonya that if she continued to talk to Defendant about the children she was going

to get arrested for violating the DVPO.

On 5 June 2019, Defendant sent Sonya a threatening email at work, stating:

“Today is the day, mark your calendar.” When Sonya returned home, Defendant

accused her of having an extra phone that he did not know about. An argument

ensued and Defendant demanded that Sonya take off her clothes. Sonya took off her

pants but refused to remove any more clothing because the children were present.

During the argument, Defendant told Sonya he would “kill the [children] and let [her]

live with it for the rest of [her] life.” Sonya managed to flee to a neighbor’s house and

called the police. The next morning, Sonya sought and obtained an ex parte DVPO.

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On 13 July 2019, following a hearing on the matter, the trial court granted

Sonya a one-year DVPO against Defendant. In the DVPO, the trial court concluded

Defendant committed acts of domestic violence by placing Sonya in fear of imminent

serious bodily injury and threatening to use a deadly weapon against Sonya and the

children. The DVPO prohibited Defendant from assaulting, threatening, abusing,

following, harassing, or interfering with Sonya or the children. Additionally, the

DVPO ordered that Defendant have no contact with Sonya, including any

“[D]efendant-initiated contact, except through an attorney, direct or indirect, by

means such as telephone, personal contact, email, pager, gift-giving or telefacsimile

machine.”

Despite the DVPO, Defendant continued to send Sonya text messages and

emails. Defendant also showed up at Sonya’s work to lodge a complaint about her

with the compliance office. Although Sonya did not see Defendant that day, Sonya

became aware that Defendant visited her work after she was interviewed by the

compliance office and human resources.

Additionally, after issuance of the DVPO, Sonya discovered twenty-six

cameras that Defendant had hidden in and around the house, including in picture

frames and stuffed animals. Defendant had also installed several cameras outside

the home, including in the trees. Sonya contacted Sergeant Jennifer Doby of the

Winston-Salem Police Department to report Defendant’s attempted communications

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and the cameras. According to Sergeant Doby, Defendant’s messages to Sonya were

“threatening” and “cryptic.”

Sonya continued to renew the DVPO, extending its validity through July 2022.

By April 2022, a divorce from bed and board had been entered between Sonya and

Defendant. In May 2022, Defendant mailed a handwritten letter, dated 27 April

2022, to Sonya’s attorney. Sonya’s attorney shared the letter with Sonya, who

recognized Defendant’s handwriting.

The first paragraph of the letter stated:

The reason behind this correspondence is to inform you of

my intent to have my “Power of Attorney,” Mr. Scott

McDaniel, to file police reports with the Winston-Salem

Police Department for larceny of 2 motor vehicles from

[Sonya’s home address]. The first vehicle being a 2001

Chevy 1500 truck and the second being a 2018 Subaru

Legacy. Also, a third item being a 10 foot long utility

trailer.

Sonya was not familiar with Scott McDaniel, so she conducted an internet search to

identify him. From the search, Sonya learned there was a Scott McDaniel who was

currently in jail, awaiting trial on charges of child abuse and first-degree murder of

a child. Although unaware at the time, Sonya later learned that Scott McDaniel was

an acquaintance of Defendant’s and was not his power of attorney. Sonya understood

Defendant’s reference to Scott McDaniel to be a threat against the children’s safety.

The next paragraph of the letter stated:

Both motor vehicles and the utility trailer were solely

purchased with funds I inherited from my father and solely

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titled in my name alone! I have info that your client,

illegally had a set of keys made to my Subaru and has been

driving my car, which amounts to larceny of a motor vehicle

. . . I also have info. that your client allowed a family

member to drive away with the utility trailer. And had my

truck towed away . . .

When Defendant mailed the letter, the Subaru, the truck, and the utility

trailer were all parked in the driveway at Sonya’s home. Sonya did have a set of keys

made for the Subaru and loaned the utility trailer to her sister on one occasion. But

because Sonya never shared this information with Defendant and only recalled

discussing the parties’ vehicles on one occasion while she was on the phone in the

driveway, Sonya was afraid she was still being surveilled by Defendant. Due to the

level of detail in the letter and her discovery of the cameras, Sonya was concerned

that someone was still watching or listening to her and the children.

Finally, the letter stated the following, in relevant part:

As much as I would love to see her get arrested . . . Your

client is still the mother of my sons, so I am going to give

her one opportunity to get my vehicles and utility trailer

parked back in my driveway before we go to the police.

After reading the letter, Sonya felt “afraid” and was worried that Defendant

“was going to try and do something to [her].” She was “scared[,] confused and really,

really terrified” and considered the letter to be a threat against her and the children’s

safety. Further, Sonya was confused as to why Defendant would threaten to take

away the Subaru, considering it was her only form of transportation. Because of the

letter, Sonya contacted the police.

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Opinion of the Court

On 11 September 2023, a Forsyth County grand jury indicted Defendant for

one count each of misdemeanor DVPO violation and felony DVPO violation. Prior to

Defendant’s trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence

of Defendant’s prior acts that resulted in issuance of the DVPO. In response,

Defendant filed a motion to prohibit testimony regarding any past incidents of

domestic violence. Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court allowed the

State to introduce some, but not all, of the prior bad acts noticed by the State for the

limited purpose of showing Defendant’s motive, intent, malice, absence of mistake,

and modus operandi in sending the letter. Specifically, the trial court restricted the

State from introducing prior acts of physical abuse but allowed evidence of

Defendant’s previous threats and other conduct that resulted in issuance of the

DVPO. On 12 March 2024, Defendant’s case proceeded to trial.

At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss, which the

trial court denied. Defendant renewed his motion at the close of all the evidence.

Again, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The trial court instructed the jury

that it could only consider the 404(b) evidence for non-propensity purposes. The jury

found Defendant guilty of felony DVPO violation and Defendant pleaded guilty to

attaining habitual-felon status. The trial court sentenced Defendant to between

ninety and one-hundred-twenty months of imprisonment. Defendant gave oral notice

of appeal in open court and filed written notice of appeal on 18 March 2024.

II. Jurisdiction

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This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-

1444(a) (2023).

III. Issues

The issues are whether the trial court erred by admitting the Rule 404(b)

evidence and denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

IV. Analysis

A. Rule 404(b)

First, Defendant argues the trial court erred by admitting the Rule 404(b)

evidence because his prior bad acts were not “close enough in time” or “similar

enough” to the handwritten letter to prove motive, intent, lack of mistake, or a modus

operandi. We disagree.

This Court “review[s] de novo the legal conclusion that [] evidence is, or is not,

within the coverage of Rule 404(b).” State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726

S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012). “ ‘Under a de novo review, [this Court] considers the matter

anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.’ ” State

v. Jones, 288 N.C. App. 175, 179, 884 S.E.2d 782, 788 (2023) (quoting State v.

Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008).

“Generally, Rule 404 acts as a gatekeeper against ‘character evidence’:

evidence of a defendant’s character . . . admitted ‘for the purpose of proving that he

acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.’” State v. Pabon, 380 N.C.

241, 258, 867 S.E.2d 632, 643–44 (2022) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(a)

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(2021)). Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible, however, for “other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule

404(b) (2023). Rule 404(b) is a “rule of inclusion[,]” State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278–

79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990) (emphasis in original), because character evidence is

generally admissible when offered for a permissible purpose, Pabon, 380 N.C. at 258,

867 S.E.2d at 644. Ultimately, character evidence is inadmissible “if its only

probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to

commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.” Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278–79,

389 S.E.2d at 54 (emphasis in original).

In considering the admissibility of character evidence offered for a permissible

purpose, the trial court looks to the “twin north stars: similarity and temporal

proximity.” Pabon, 380 N.C. at 258, 867 S.E.2d at 644. Regarding similarity, “near

identical circumstances are not required . . . .” Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. at 132, 726

S.E.2d at 160 (citing State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 304, 406 S.E.2d 876, 890 (1991)).

Instead, “the incidents need only share ‘some unusual facts’ that go to a purpose other

than propensity for the evidence to be admissible.” Id. at 132, 726 S.E.2d at 160

(quoting Stager, 329 N.C. at 304, 406 S.E.2d at 890). The similarities do not need to

“rise to the level of the unique and bizarre,” id. at 131, 726 S.E.2d at 159 (citation

omitted), but they must “support the reasonable inference that the same person

committed both the earlier and the later crimes,” State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 604,

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365 S.E.2d 587, 593 (1988) (citation omitted); see also State v. Gillard, 386 N.C. 797,

811, 909 S.E.2d 226, 245 (2024) (“[T]he ultimate question is one of ‘logical

relevancy.’”).

Temporal proximity “must be considered in light of the specific facts of each

case and the purposes for which the evidence is being offered.” State v. Hipps, 348

N.C. 377, 405, 501 S.E.2d 625, 642 (1998); see also State v. Gray, 210 N.C. App. 493,

507, 709 S.E.2d 477, 487 (2011) (“[I]t is clear that there are no bright line rules when

considering the remoteness prong of the Rule 404(b) admissibility test.”). If, for

example, the evidence is used to show “intent, motive, knowledge, or lack of

accident[,]” then “remoteness [in time] is less significant.” Hipps, 348 N.C. at 405,

501 S.E.2d at 642 (citations omitted). Generally, the temporal proximity requirement

“ ‘affects only the weight to be given [404(b)] evidence, not its admissibility.’ ” State

v. Schmieder, 265 N.C. App. 95, 99, 827 S.E.2d 322, 326 (2019) (quoting State v.

Maready, 362 N.C. 614, 620, 669 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2008)). This is especially true when

the 404(b) evidence “ ‘tends to show a defendant’s state of mind . . . .’ ” Id. at 99, 827

S.E.2d at 326 (quoting Maready, 362 N.C. at 624, 669 S.E.2d at 570).

Defendant argues the admission of his prior bad acts violated Rule 404(b),

because his letter addressed to Sonya’s attorney was not sufficiently similar to his

previous threats against Sonya, which were communicated directly to Sonya.

Defendant further asserts that his prior bad acts do not satisfy the temporal

proximity requirement because they were too remote. Notwithstanding the

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difference in how the threats were transmitted to Sonya, key similarities exist

between the contents of the letter and Defendant’s previous threats. Further, the

letter was not too remote in time to render the 404(b) evidence inadmissible.

Defendant has a well-documented history of engaging in threatening and

harassing conduct directed at Sonya through specific means, including control of the

parties’ vehicles, threats against the children, threats of taking legal action, and

surreptitious use of surveillance. These same methods of exerting control are either

directly mentioned or alluded to in Defendant’s letter. Although Defendant may not

have previously threatened Sonya by letter, his prior threats are sufficient to support

a conclusion that Defendant sent the letter with the intent to harass and threaten

Sonya. When viewed in totality, the prior acts and the letter reflect a consistent

pattern of threatening Sonya through references to their vehicles, the children, legal

action, and surveillance. See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 89–90, 552 S.E.2d 596, 609

(2001) (Evidence of prior acts is admissible “if it is relevant to establish a pattern of

behavior on the part of the defendant tending to show that the defendant acted

pursuant to a particular motive”) (citation omitted).

Defendant attempts to differentiate his prior bad acts from the letter by

arguing his prior bad acts involved direct communications to Sonya, whereas the

letter was addressed and mailed to her attorney. This Court has explained, however,

that the similarity prong of Rule 404(b) focuses “ ‘on the similarities and not the

differences between the two incidents.’ ” Gillard, 386 N.C. at 815, 909 S.E.2d at 247

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(quoting State v. Pickens, 385 N.C. 351, 359, 893 S.E.2d 194, 200 (2023)).

Notwithstanding the differences in the method of delivery, the overlap of “some

unusual facts” satisfies the similarity requirement. See Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. at

132, 726 S.E.2d at 160. Thus, Defendant’s prior threats were sufficiently similar to

the letter and demonstrate Defendant’s motive or intent in writing the letter—to

threaten and harass Sonya.

As for the temporal proximity requirement, Defendant’s prior threats occurred

in 2018 and 2019, approximately three years before the letter. Not only were the

prior threats offered for a proper purpose, “remoteness in time is less significant when

the prior conduct is used to show intent, motive, knowledge or lack of accident[,]” as

is the case here. See State v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382, 388, 646 S.E.2d 105, 110 (2007)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, because remoteness in time

affects primarily “the weight to be given [404(b)] evidence, not its admissibility[,]” we

conclude Defendants’ prior threats were not so remote in time to render the 404(b)

evidence inadmissible. See Schmieder, 265 N.C. App. at 99, 827 S.E.2d at 326. In

sum, because Defendant’s prior bad acts satisfied both the similarity and temporal

proximity requirements, the trial court did not err by admitting the 404(b) evidence.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Next, Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss

for insufficient evidence because he sent the letter to Sonya’s attorney and did not

threaten, harass, or interfere with Sonya in violation of the DVPO. We disagree.

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This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Walters,

276 N.C. App. 267, 270, 854 S.E.2d 607, 610 (2021) (citation omitted). “ ‘Under a de

novo review, [this Court] considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own

judgment for that of the lower tribunal.’ ” Jones, 288 N.C. App. at 179, 884 S.E.2d at

788 (quoting Williams, 362 N.C. at 632–33, 669 S.E.2d at 294).

A trial court properly denies a motion to dismiss when “there is substantial

evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, and (2) that the

defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650

S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id.

at 62, 650 S.E.2d at 33 (citation omitted). The evidence is considered “in the light

most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference

and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Agustin, 229 N.C. App. 240,

242, 747 S.E.2d 316, 318 (2013) (citation omitted).

To establish a DVPO violation, the State must show: “(1) there was a valid

domestic violence protective order, (2) the defendant violated that order, and (3) did

so knowingly.” State v. Williams, 226 N.C. App. 393, 406, 741 S.E.2d 9, 19 (2013)

(citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1) (2008)). “Knowingly” means “[the] defendant knew

what he was about to do, and, with such knowledge, proceeded to do the act charged.”

Id. at 406, 741 S.E.2d at 19 (citations omitted). Under Chapter 50B, a DVPO violation

rises to the level of a felony if the defendant: (1) commits a felony when violating the

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DVPO, see N.C. Gen Stat. § 50B-4.1(d); (2) knowingly violates a DVPO after having

been previously convicted of two misdemeanor offenses under Chapter 50B, see N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1(f); (3) knowingly violates a DVPO by failing to stay away from a

place, or a person, as directed under the terms of the DVPO while in possession of a

deadly weapon, see N.C. Gen. Stat § 50B-4.1(g); or (4) enters a safe house where the

protected person resides, see N.C. Gen. Stat § 50B-4.1(g1). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-

4.1 (2023).

Here, the DVPO ordered that Defendant “not assault, threaten, abuse, follow,

harass (by telephone, visiting the home or workplace, or other means), or interfere

with [Sonya].” Additionally, Defendant was barred from contacting Sonya, including

“any [D]efendant-initiated contact, except through an attorney[.]” Defendant

contends he complied with the DVPO, because it expressly permitted communication

with Sonya’s attorney. He further asserts that the letter was limited to addressing

legal claims regarding his property.

When considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

however, we conclude there is substantial evidence demonstrating the purpose of the

letter was to threaten or harass Sonya. We are not persuaded by Defendant’s

argument that he did not violate the DVPO because he sent the letter to Sonya’s

attorney instead of Sonya. Defendant referenced “your client” several times

throughout the letter, revealing Sonya, not Sonya’s attorney, was Defendant’s

intended recipient of the messages being conveyed by the letter. Further it is illogical

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for Defendant to argue he could not have known that Sonya’s attorney would share

the letter with Sonya considering Defendant threatened to take legal action against

Sonya. Moreover, the letter addressed the status of the parties’ vehicles and falsely

claimed that an individual who had been charged with murdering a child was

Defendant’s power of attorney. Considering the letter and its contents, the 404(b)

evidence, and Sonya’s testimony, a rational juror could conclude the letter contained

messages to Sonya and thinly-veiled threats directed at Sonya in violation of the

DVPO. See Agustin, 229 N.C. App. at 242, 747 S.E.2d at 318. Accordingly, the trial

court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

V. Conclusion

The trial court did not err by admitting the Rule 404(b) evidence or denying

Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we discern no error.

NO ERROR.

Judges COLLINS and HAMPSON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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