“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been 4 || granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its 5 ||claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” 6 || (internal quotation marks omitted
How later courts described this case
- “[W]here the plaintiff has previously been 4 || granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its 5 ||claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” 6 || (internal quotation marks omitted
- affirming sua sponte screening 5 dismissal of pro se prisoner complaint, in part, because it appeared to be untimely and 6 barred by the applicable statute of limitations on its face
- “When […] the inmate knows of the acts when they occurred and knows that he 7 was injured, the claim accrues.”
- “Under federal law, a 4 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the 5 basis of the action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 LANCE WILLIAMS, Case No.: 24-cv-01501-WQH-LR
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL
13 vs. ACTION FOR FAILING TO
STATE CLAIM PURSUANT
14 M. ALVARADO, Correctional Counselor;
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
N. ERICKSON, Correctional Officer;
15
A. RENDON, Correctional Officer,
[ECF No. 4]
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17 Defendants.
18 HAYES, Judge:
19 Before the Court is an amended civil rights complaint filed by former state prisoner
20 Lance Williams, who is proceeding in forma pauperis and without counsel. (ECF No. 4.)
21 Williams’s original complaint was dismissed sua sponte for failing to state a claim upon
22 which § 1983 relief can be granted because it was untimely on its face. (ECF No. 3.) The
23 Court granted Williams leave to amend in order to allege facts which might entitle him to
24 equitable tolling, but his amended complaint fails to do so.
25 Therefore, for the reasons explained, the Court now DISMISSES this civil action in
26 its entirety for failure to state a timely claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted
27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
28 / / /
1 I. SUA SPONTE SCREENING
2 A. Legal Standard
3 Because Williams is proceeding in forma pauperis, his amended complaint, like his
4 original, requires a preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under
5 this statute, the Court must sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis case which is frivolous,
6 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See
7 Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 502 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d
8 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited
9 to prisoners.”). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or
10 malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d
11 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d
12 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
13 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
14 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
15 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
16 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 12(b)(6) require a
17 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
18 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal
19 quotations omitted).1 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare
20 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
21 not suffice.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the
22 defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
23 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Finally,
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1 “Courts must consider the complaint in its entirety,” including “documents incorporated into the
26 complaint by reference” to be part of the pleading when determining whether the plaintiff has stated a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
27 (2007); Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all
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1 while the “court[] must construe pro se pleadings liberally,” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
2 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), it may not “supply essential elements of claims that were not
3 initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
4 1982).
5 B. Factual Allegations
6 Williams’s amended complaint is essentially identical to his original. (See ECF No.
7 4 at 1‒6; cf. ECF No. 1 at 1‒6.) He continues to allege that while he was incarcerated at
8 Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility on August 26, 2019, Correctional Officers
9 Alvarado, Erickson, and Rendon violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to
10 promptly respond to his complaints of chest pain, numbness, and a nose bleed. (ECF No.
11 4 at 2‒3.) Williams contends he was ignored and ridiculed for more than an hour until he
12 passed out, fell off a chair, and hit his head. (Id. at 3.)
13 While he “was coming back to life,” Williams also claims he overheard Erickson
14 refer to him by using a racial epithet, refuse to call a “man down” code, and say: “[T]hat’s
15 what he gets for filing all that paperwork and lawsuits on me.” (Id. at 3‒4.) Williams further
16 alleges Alvarado accused him of faking and that the A-Yard Sergeant refused to issue a
17 medical alarm, although he was eventually “accosted” by medical staff and transported to
18 an emergency room for “numerous tests and pain reduction.” (Id. at 4.)
19 The only difference between the two pleadings is an attached page in which Williams
20 alleges he is entitled to toll the limitations period for four full years “from the time the
21 administrative grievance process ended” in September 2021. (Id. at 9; see also Ex. 1, ECF
22 No. 4-1 at 2.) For the reasons explained, Williams is mistaken.
23 C. Discussion
24 As the Court explained in its February 3, 2025 Order, statutes of limitation prevent
25 the assertion of stale claims by limiting the time within which claims must be filed. See
26 Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
27 banc). When the running of the statute of limitations is “‘apparent on the face of the
28 complaint,’” it may be dismissed for failing to state a claim if “it appears beyond doubt
1 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.”
2 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010)
3 (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also
4 Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1024‒25 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirming sua sponte screening
5 dismissal of pro se prisoner complaint, in part, because it appeared to be untimely and
6 barred by the applicable statute of limitations on its face).
7 “The statute of limitations for federal civil rights claims under section[] … 1983 …
8 is ‘governed by the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions.’” Bonelli
9 v. Grand Canyon Univ., 28 F.4th 948, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bird v. Dep’t of
10 Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quotation marks and
11 alterations omitted)); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004).
12 California’s applicable statute of limitations is two years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1;
13 Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2019).
14 Federal courts also apply the forum state’s law regarding tolling. Wallace v. Kato,
15 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538‒39 (1989)); Mills,
16 921 F.3d at 1166. The burden is on Williams to plead the facts necessary to support
17 equitable tolling. Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993). Under California
18 law, the statute of limitations for prisoners serving less than a life sentence is tolled for two
19 years. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th
20 Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). Accordingly, most California
21 prisoners must bring their § 1983 suits within four years of accrual—a period comprised
22 of the two-year limitations period plus two additional years based on statutory tolling.
23 “Accrual is the date on which the statute of limitations begins to run[.]” Lukovsky v.
24 City of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Unlike the length of the
25 limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of
26 federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; Hardin,
27 490 U.S. at 543‒44 (federal law governs when a § 1983 cause of action accrues). Here, it
28 remains clear from the face of Williams’s amended complaint that his claims accrued on
1 August 26, 2019—the day he alleges Defendants Alvarado, Erickson, and Rendon failed
2 to promptly and appropriately respond to his medical complaints. (ECF No. 4 at 1‒3.) See
3 Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under federal law, a
4 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
5 basis of the action.”) (citations omitted); Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 871 (9th Cir.
6 2018) (“When […] the inmate knows of the acts when they occurred and knows that he
7 was injured, the claim accrues.”).
8 Williams now contends he is entitled to statutory tolling, see ECF No. 4 at 9, but the
9 Court has previously presumed he remained incarcerated for two years following the
10 August 26, 2019 incident and was serving a term of less-than-life at the time. Therefore,
11 the Court continues to credit him with two years of statutory tolling based on his
12 incarceration—from August 26, 2019 through August 26, 2021—pursuant to Cal. Civ.
13 Proc. Code § 352.1. (See ECF No. 3 at 6‒7 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391; Johnson, 207
14 F.3d at 654).)
15 Williams is also correct to note he is entitled to tolling while he “complete[d] the
16 mandatory exhaustion process.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 943 (9th Cir. 2005).2
17 However, Williams’s own exhibits show the administrative grievance procedures available
18 to him at the time were completed, at the latest, by September 22, 2021—when the CDCR’s
19 Office of Appeals rejected his attempt at a Third Level Review, finding he had “exceeded
20 time constraints.” (See ECF No. 4 at 9; Ex. 1, ECF No. 4-1 at 2.)3 Thus, while Williams’s
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2 Williams is incorrect to conclude he “had 4 years from the time the administrative process ended,” or
23 until September 2025, to file suit, however. (See ECF No. 4 at 9.) The Ninth Circuit has made clear that
“[t]he issue is not when the limitations period began, but when it ended.” Soto, 882 F.3d at 871. “The
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exhaustion requirement justifies tolling the statute of limitations[;] … it does not justify creating a new
25 accrual rule.” Id.
26 3 In fact, while the Court will assume Williams is entitled to tolling during the entire time he spent engaged
in CDCR’s administrative grievance process, “[t]here is no clear consensus among Ninth Circuit district
27 courts as to whether a plaintiff is entitled to tolling for grievances that were rejected as untimely under
prison regulations.” Garrett v. Finander, No. 2:18-CV-10754-AB-KES, 2019 WL 7879659, at *11 (C.D.
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1 time for filing this suit was tolled until September 22, 2021, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Proc.
2 Code § 352.1 and Brown, the limitations period set by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 then
3 began to run and expired approximately two years later, on or about September 22, 2023.
4 Williams admits he was released from custody in June 2022, and yet he failed to file suit
5 until August 22, 2024. (See ECF No. 1; ECF No. 4 at 7.)
6 If allegations on the face of a complaint “show that relief is barred by the applicable
7 statute of limitations, [it] is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Jones v. Bock,
8 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). Thus, because Williams seeks to reassert only stale claims, and
9 his amended complaint still fails to include facts sufficient to show he is entitled to further
10 tolling, his suit remains untimely and is subject to sua sponte dismissal for failing to state
11 a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
12 See Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112; Williams, 875 F.3d at 502.
13 D. Leave to Amend
14 Because Williams has already been provided a short and plain explanation of the
15 untimeliness of his claims, as well as an opportunity to amend in order to plead facts which
16 might entitle him to tolling to no avail, the Court finds granting further leave to amend
17 would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014)
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2020 WL 606754 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2020), aff’d, 835 F. App’x 266 (9th Cir. 2021). Williams’s exhibits
21 show he first submitted a CDCR 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, Log No. RJD-A-19-05481, sometime before
September 9, 2019, but was notified via a “Screening Notice” that that appeal was subject to cancellation
22 as abusive of the appeals process pursuant to Cal. Code Regs., § 3084.4 because he filed another appeal,
Log No. RJD-A-19-3862, within the prior 30 days. (See ECF No. 4-2 at 3.) Williams was advised to
23 re-submit “only after a 30 calendar day period ha[d] expired from one submitted appeal to another.” (Id.)
Williams’s exhibits suggest he re-submitted the appeal, because on October 11, 2019, he was advised Log
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No. RJD-A-19-05481 had been forwarded for “further review.” (Id. at 2.) On March 20, 2020, Williams’s
25 appeal was denied on the merits via a Second Level Response because Correctional Officers Ericson,
Alvarado, and Rendon were determined not to have violated CDCR policy. Williams was told that if he
26 wished to “appeal the decision and/or exhaust administrative remedies,” he was required to submit Log
No. RJD-A-19-05481 to the Secretary’s/Third Level of Review. (Id. at 4‒5.) Williams’s Third Level
27 Appeal, however, was not postmarked until May 18, 2020; therefore, the CDCR Office of Appeals issued
a rejection letter dated September 22, 2021 informing him that Log No. RJD-A-19-05481 had been
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1 || C‘‘Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting
2 Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc
3 || Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been
4 || granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its
5 ||claims, [t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.”
6 || (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).
7 CONCLUSION
8 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend
9 barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983
10 |/relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); CERTIFIES that an IFP
11 || appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and DIRECTS
12 || the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close the file.
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
14 || Dated: July 11, 2025 Nitta Z. Ma
15 Hon, William Q. Hayes
16 United States District Court
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