Deromano v. Alabama State Bar

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARLOS DEROMANO, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Case No.: 2:25-cv-00223-RDP

}

ALABAMA STATE BAR, }

}

Defendant. }

CARLOS DEROMANO, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Case No.: 2:25-cv-00224-RDP

}

ALABAMA JUDICIAL COMMISSION, }

}

Defendant. }

}

}

CARLOS DEROMANO, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. }

} Case No.: 2:25-cv-00225-RDP

NAPHCARE, }

}

Defendant. }

}

}

CARLOS DEROMANO, }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. }

}

JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF’S } Case No.: 2:25-cv-00226-RDP

DEPARTMENT, et al., }

}

Defendants. }

}

Plaintiff, }

}

v. } Case No.: 2:25-cv-00227-RDP

}

QTC MEDICAL SERVICES, INC., et al., }

}

Defendants. }

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

These cases are before the court on Plaintiff’s five amended civil complaints and five

motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff filed these cases on February 11, 2025,

along with five motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The cases were referred to a

magistrate judge and then consolidated under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (See Docs. # 5, 6 in 25-

cv-00223). The magistrate judge presiding over the consolidated case ordered Plaintiff to amend

the various complaints to cure pleading deficiencies in them. (See Doc. # 6 in 25-cv-00223). The

magistrate judge warned Plaintiff that a failure to file appropriate amended complaints could result

in the dismissal of his cases. (Id. at 13). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed five amended complaints, but

the magistrate judge concluded that each failed to remedy several deficiencies that the court had

outlined, and thus that each were due to be dismissed. The magistrate judge then referred these

cases to the undersigned when all parties did not consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.

(Doc. # 10 in 25-cv-00223). After careful review, the court concludes that these matters are due to

be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

I. Background

Plaintiff Carlos DeRomano is an Alabama resident who, beginning in February 2024, was

the subject of criminal law enforcement and civil judicial proceedings related to charges of

“harassing communications, and disorderly conduct from 4-24-24 – 5-1-24, then from 5-29-24 –

6-25-24.” (Doc. # 7 at 11 in 25-cv-00223). In the civil proceedings, Plaintiff was accused of

against Plaintiff on March 1, 2024. (Doc. # 7 at 10 from 25-cv-00224). Plaintiff asserts that even

though he filed a response, those filings were “left on a desk” for about a week. (Id.). On March

11, 2024, Judge Agee held a preliminary injunction hearing that Plaintiff did not attend; however,

Plaintiff alleges that he was not notified of the hearing. (Id. at 9, 13). Plaintiff asserts that he first

heard about the hearing when he received an email from the prosecution on the day of the hearing.

(Id. at 10). Plaintiff left a voicemail for Judge Bernadette Brown Green, who thereafter reported

to police that the email was threatening. (Id. at 13). On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff called Judge

Green, and they spoke about whether the notice of the hearing had been mailed to Plaintiff; Judge

Green maintained that it had been mailed but encouraged Plaintiff to request a new hearing date.

(Id. at 10-11).

A new hearing was scheduled and occurred on April 12, 2024. (Id. at 13). At that hearing,

according to Judge Green, Plaintiff “was extremely accusatory, abusive, and disrespectful to the

Court and all parties present,” did not present any evidence, was disruptive, and refused to answer

questions. (Id.). The hearing ended abruptly due to Plaintiff’s continued use of strong language

and profanity. (Id.). Shortly after the hearing, Judge Green reported that Plaintiff left several

threatening voicemails with the court and sent several emails “that included intimidating, strongly

abusive and vulgar language.” (Id.). Plaintiff contests this characterization and alleges that Judge

Green has no evidence and that he never threatened to harm anyone. (Id. at 15). On April 17, 2024,

Judge Green swore out two criminal complaints against Plaintiff, one for harassing

communications and another for disorderly conduct. (Id. at 14). Both were based on the events

following the April 12, 2024 hearing. (Id.). On April 24, 2024, Plaintiff was arrested based on

these complaints.

Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to represent himself in the criminal matter but was forced

to hire an attorney, Leroy Maxwell, who he claims did nothing to help him. (Doc. # 7 at 7, 11-12,

Michael Streety. (Doc. # 7 at 16, from 25-cv-00224). Plaintiff claims Judge Streety mocked

Plaintiff’s disabilities and denied him access to representation. (Id.). He also alleges that once

arrested, he was given a $10,000 cash-only bond, and that he was repeatedly denied the ability to

pay it. (Doc. # 7 at 10-11, from 25-cv-00223). Plaintiff further asserts that he incurred significant

costs to board his dogs while he was in jail. (Doc. # 7 at 16 from 25-cv-00224). Plaintiff was

released from jail on May 1, 2025. (Doc. # 7 at 9 from 25-cv-00223). Plaintiff was jailed again on

May 30, 2024 for a failure to appear, which Plaintiff asserts was improper because his scheduled

court date was still in the future. (Id. at 7, 11). He describes various abuses that occurred in the jail

(including being denied holistic medical treatment) and claims that “I died in jail from abuse.” (Id.

at 13). Plaintiff also alleges that on June 6, 2024, although he was scheduled for a hearing before

Judge Katrina Ross, he was not retrieved from his cell and the hearing had to be rescheduled. (Doc.

# 7 at 18, from 25-cv-00224). Due to this rescheduling, Plaintiff asserts, he died from malnutrition

in jail and later had a “severe high blood pressure attack” after he ate salty green beans. (Id. at 19).

Plaintiff also contends that Pat Ballard denied him due process by not allowing him access to

water, gave Plaintiff more jail time out of “vengeance,” and allowed opposing counsel (Michael

Thompson) to lie. (Id. at 20).

Plaintiff also alleges that on June 12, 2024, his trial began with Michael Thompson as the

prosecutor, and that Thompson falsely accused him of sending threatening emails. (Doc. # 7 at 13-

14, from 25-cv-00223). Plaintiff asserts that the trial court concluded that Thompson “was lying.”

(Id.). Plaintiff also states that he sent this transcript to the Alabama State Bar. (Id.). On June 17,

2024, Plaintiff alleges he appeared for a hearing before Judge Katrina Ross, but he could not leave

the jail because his ankle monitor removal was wrongfully delayed. (Id. at 18). On June 25, 2024,

Plaintiff was released from jail. (Id. at 17). He states that he was forced to wear an ankle monitor

from June 25 to December 10, 2024. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff also alleges that because the trial judge

for specific reasons), his service dog “bled out in my arms (my family).” (Id. at 11).

Plaintiff alleges that he filed a state bar complaint against Danny Carr (the head of the

District Attorney’s office), and that Carr responded that the District Attorney did not speak to

Plaintiff because he believed Plaintiff was represented. (Id. at 10). In November 2024, the venue

for Plaintiff’s criminal trial changed and Plaintiff claims he did not receive notice. (Id. at 13). In

December, he alleges Thompson sent a fraudulently altered audio recording of Plaintiff to the

District Attorney and to the trial judge. (Id. at 15). Plaintiff then alleges that he successfully argued

that being forced to wear an ankle monitor was unconstitutional, but that he encountered opposition

when trying to get it removed. (Id. at 12-13). Plaintiff further asserts that Ashley Patterson and

Demario Thorton lied in court by stating that Plaintiff had a lawyer and was not representing

himself. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that he later appeared in a second criminal trial and was not

allowed to remain in court and represent himself “because of my medical mask.” (Id. at 11). He

also asserts that the judge allowed the prosecution to enter the altered audio clip of him into

evidence and found him guilty based on that clip. (Id. at 15).

Plaintiff has also sued the Alabama Judicial Commission, explaining that he has reported

eight “justices” to the commission “for violating my civil and constitutional rights as an act of

vengeance for their peer” (Doc. # 7 at 8, from 25-cv-00224) and that the commission sent back

letters concluding that “they did not do anything unethical, we will not take any action.” (Id. at

25).

Plaintiff has also sued the jail’s medical provider, Naphcare, alleging that during the two

time periods that he was in jail, they ignored his holistic health requests, mocked his disabilities,

denied him access to clean water, and “lied on [his] medical records to the VA which got [Plaintiff]

denied for [his] SS disability.” (Doc. # 7 at 5, 11-12, from 25-cv-00225). He also alleges that the

nurses at Naphcare lied to him about giving him intestinal medication when they were really

Amendment right to free exercise of religion when he was not given vegetarian meals. (Id.).

Plaintiff further alleges that once he was released from jail the first time, on May 1, 2024, he went

directly to the emergency room and discovered that he had lost sixty-five pounds and had dark

urine due to kidney failure. (Id. at 12). At some point, Plaintiff alleges, the jail sprayed an industrial

strength horse pesticide to kill lice, which caused him to have an asthma attack, but Naphcare

nurses did not give him any medical help. (Id. at 13). The next day, Plaintiff alleges, he woke up

with bruises that he was told were from being resuscitated due to his having no pulse or breath.

(Id. at 13-14). After Plaintiff was arrested for the second time, he alleges, he had a medical episode

in the dayroom in which he lost consciousness multiple times, and Naphcare nurses incorrectly

coded it as a suicide attempt. (Id. at 12-13). Plaintiff alleges that around June 14, 2024 he started

coughing up blood and Naphcare told him that they could not treat his disabilities. (Id. at 14). After

being released from jail the second time, on May 13, 2025, Plaintiff asserts that he saw a traumatic

brain injury doctor for treatment of brain injuries that he claims to have sustained while in jail. (Id.

at 15).

Plaintiff has also sued the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, the Trussville Police

Department, the Irondale Police Department, and thirteen deputies, alleging various constitutional

violations. (Doc. # 10 at 3, from 25-cv-00226). He then set out various allegations against each

deputy, claiming that they permitted the filing of false police reports (id. at 9), conducted a

warrantless arrest of him on April 24, 2024 that involved the use of excessive force and an

unconstitutional search of his house (id. at 9-10), handcuffed him so tightly that his hands “swelled

up purple” (id. at 9) and that this exacerbated pre-existing nerve damage in his hands (id.), mocked

his disabilities and religion (id. at 10), lied about his bond amount (id.), forced him to strip while

threatening him with physical abuse (id.), “slammed [him] into the jail cell bars” (id.), tried to

force “Jesus Christ onto [him]” (id. at 10-11), “tried to make [him] wear a turtle suit as humiliation

him to use the phone (id.), falsely told others that he had threatened to kill a judge (id.), refused to

provide him medical help (id.), put him into general population even though he was classified as

in protective custody (id. at 12), refused to provide him with clean water or “food I can eat” (id. at

12-13), destroyed his front door in a second illegal arrest on May 29, 2024 (id. at 12), attempted

to murder his service dog (id.), worsened his tinnitus disability by blowing out his right eardrum

(id. at 13), joked about him drinking toilet water (id.), threatened to kill him (id.), lied to him about

food not containing meat when it did (id.), lied to the VA about his medical condition (id. at 5),

and refused to allow him to speak to his counsel to prepare for trial. (Id.).

Plaintiff has also sued QTC Medical Services, Inc. (“QTC”), Dr. Laxmi Challa, Lauren

Pope, and Michael Thompson. QTC is a health provider that contracted with the VA. (Doc. # 8 at

8, from 25-cv-00227). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that QTC lied to the VA by contending that

Plaintiff’s medical condition originated from something other than his military service (id. at 10-

11), that he was mocked when he called QTC and threatened to pull fire alarms in their buildings

and told them “I was in my truck with my 2nd amendment rights” (id. at 12-13), that the QTC

attorney edited an audio recording of Plaintiff calling QTC and played it in a court hearing (id. at

13), that QTC committed HIPAA violations (id.), that a QTC attorney lied in court by claiming

that Plaintiff had threatened to kill people (id. at 14) and, as a result, his social security disability

being denied (id. at 15), and that his service dog died because of QTC’s lies. (Id. at 5).

II. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint provide “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

However, the complaint must include enough facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pleadings that contain nothing more

than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” do not meet Rule 8 standards,

assertion[s]” without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although “[t]he

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” the complaint must demonstrate

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A plausible claim for

relief requires “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” to support the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “1) eliminate any allegations in the

complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.’” Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App’x 136, 138

(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)).

That task is context specific and, to survive the motion, the allegations must permit the court based

on its “judicial experience and common sense . . . to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. If the court determines that well-pleaded facts, accepted as

true, do not state a claim that is plausible, the claims are due to be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570.

III. Analysis

Below, the court evaluates each of the five complaints and explains why each is due to be

dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against the Alabama State Bar, the Jefferson County District Attorneys,

clerks at the District Attorney’s office, Michael Thompson, and Leroy Maxwell fail for various

reasons. Plaintiff’s claims against the Jefferson County District Attorneys fail because they violate

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and because the Eleventh Amendment affords

immunity to the District Attorneys in their official and individual capacities. As to the District

Attorney’s office, Plaintiff asserts violations of his Eighth Amendment right to “be treated as a

human”; Sixth Amendment rights to be heard as a representative of himself; and First Amendment

right to free exercise of religion to not kill people or be accused of threatening to kill people. (Doc.

# 7 at 9-10, from 25-cv-00223).

Plaintiff’s allegations violate Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because they

do not contain a short and plain statement of the claims showing why he is entitled to relief. For

example, although he asserts that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right “to be treated

as a human,” Plaintiff merely details that he was treated “with cruel and unusual punishment while

attaching excessive fees and fines upon me” and implies that he was “subjected to punishments

that are disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed or that are considered inhumane.”

(Id.). These allegations are entirely speculative. Plaintiff does not even state specifically what cruel

and unusual punishments or excessive fees and fines were imposed on him. As best the court can

tell, the bond imposed on Plaintiff was $10,000. Plaintiff presents no allegations as to why this

forms the basis of his Eighth Amendment allegation, and certainly presents no legal basis for such

a claim.

More importantly, the Jefferson County District Attorney’s Office and the District

Attorneys (Carr, Patterson, and Thornton) are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment

because they were acting in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment states: “The

Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Federal courts (including the

Eleventh Circuit) have interpreted this immunity to extend to state prosecutors because they are

state employees and thus, represent the state. See Williams v. Monroe Cnty. Dist. Att’y, 702 F.

App’x 812, 813-14 (11th Cir. 2017). Further, even if Plaintiff were suing them in their individual

capacity, the action would be barred because prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity “for actions

undertaken while functioning as an advocate for the government.” Id. at 813; see also Rowe v. City

of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 273 (1993)). Although Plaintiff alleges that Carr, Patterson, and Thornton lied to him

during the judicial proceedings and that such dishonesty was “outside of their oaths” and “guiding

principles,” these alleged actions still occurred while the prosecutors were acting as advocates for

the government. (Doc. # 7 at 10-16). Therefore, the District Attorney’s Office and the individual

prosecutors are entitled to prosecutorial immunity and Plaintiff’s claims against them fail.

The claims against the Alabama State Bar also fail because the Eleventh Amendment

confers immunity to state bar associations and their employees because they, like state courts, are

“arms of the State.” See Caffey v. Ala. Sup. Ct., 469 F. App’x 748, 751 (11th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff’s claims against his former lawyer, Maxwell, fail because he cannot recover for a

violation of a constitutional right by a private actor unless that actor is engaging in state action.

See Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686, 693-94 (11th Cir. 2021). None of Plaintiff’s allegations

suggest that Maxwell was engaging in state action during the events alleged in the complaint.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff were bringing a state law legal malpractice claim against Maxwell, this

would not confer federal question jurisdiction on this court and thus, this court would be without

subject matter jurisdiction. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against the Alabama State Bar,

the Jefferson County District Attorneys, clerks at the District Attorney’s office, Michael

Thompson, and Leroy Maxwell are due to be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission also fail. He alleges

that the commission “covers up the rights violations of other judges in the State of Alabama” and

“they do not care” whether judges are acting “outside of their oaths.” (Doc. # 7 at 4-5, from 25-

cv-00224). However, Plaintiff “has no right secured by the Constitution to proceed before or

receive relief from a . . . judicial oversight commission.” Watkins v. Griffin, 2016 WL 7192105, at

*4 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 31, 2016). To proceed on this claim, Plaintiff must identify a specific right that

was violated. Under the pro se complaint form heading asking Plaintiff for the specific federal

statutes or constitutional provisions at issue, he listed the canons of judicial ethics, as well as his

First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

(Doc. # 7 at 3). The canon of judicial ethics is not a federal statute or constitutional right. To the

extent Plaintiff has listed alleged constitutional rights violations, he has not explained how his

rights were violated, nor has he complied with Rule 8 by providing “a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). For these reasons,

Plaintiff’s claims against the Alabama Judicial Commission are due to be dismissed.

C. DeRomano v. Naphcare, 25-cv-00225

Plaintiff’s claims against Naphcare also fail. He alleges that Naphcare violated his First,

Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because its doctors, nurses, and

employees mistreated and mocked him in various ways. (Doc. # 7 at 3, 11-13, from 25-cv-00225).

Naphcare is a private corporation, but of course a private entity that contracts “to provide medical

services to inmates” may be liable for a violation of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

because “it performs a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Bucker

v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). In such circumstances, a federal court applies the

standard for liability outlined in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

This standard allows an entity to be sued directly under § 1983 if “the action that is alleged to be

officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Id. at 690. “[T]o demonstrate a policy

or custom, it is ‘generally necessary to show a persistent and widespread practice.’” McDowell v.

Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wayne v. Jarvis, 197 F.3d 1098, 1105 (11th

Cir. 1999)). Although Plaintiff alleges the details of the specific actions that individual nurses and

Naphcare staff took involving him, he has not identified any Naphcare policy statement, ordinance,

regulation, or official decision, nor has he identified any persistent and widespread practice.

Indeed, other than his statement that “[e]very single citizen who[] goes into this jail is subject to

this treatment” (Doc. # 7 at 15), which he does not support with any plausible facts, Plaintiff only

describes the treatment that he received. Finally, Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged any claim of

deliberate indifference to his medical needs. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against

Naphcare are due to be dismissed.

D. DeRomano v. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dep’t, et al., 25-cv-00226

Plaintiff’s claims against the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, the Trussville Police

Department, the Irondale Police Department, and thirteen individual deputies also fail. Plaintiff’s

claims against the Sheriff’s Department and the two police departments are due to be dismissed

because in Alabama, neither a sheriff’s department nor a police department “is [] a legal entity

and, therefore, is not subject to suit or liability under section 1983.” Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d

1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff’s claims against the thirteen deputies allege that they violated his First, Second,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. # 10 at 3,

from 25-cv-00226). Plaintiff’s allegations against each deputy are set out in more detail above, but

suffice it to say he generally alleges that they filed false police reports (id. at 9), conducted a

warrantless arrest and an unconstitutional search of his house (id. at 9-10), forced him to strip

refused to provide him with clean water or “food I can eat” (id. at 12-13).

As currently pleaded, none of these allegations state a claim for a discernible constitutional

or federal statutory violation. For example, although there is a cause of action under the Fourth

Amendment for arrests or prosecutions based on false police reports, see Williams v. Miami-Dade

Police Dep’t, 297 F. App’x 941, 945-49 (11th Cir. 2008), Plaintiff does not claim that the allegedly

false police reports in this case led to these outcomes. And, although Plaintiff vaguely alleges an

illegal arrest and unconstitutional search of his house (stating that Deputy Khalania “violated my

4th amendment right by violating my secure property rights, which lead to my home being

destroyed”), he does not provide any detail or explain what made the arrest illegal, how any search

occurred, or how any search violated his property rights or Fourth Amendment rights. Although

Plaintiff does claim that Deputy Khalania handcuffed him so tightly that his hands “swelled up

purple” (id. at 9) and that this exacerbated pre-existing nerve damage in his hands (id.), “only the

most exceptional circumstances will permit an excessive force claim on the basis of handcuffing

alone.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff has not sufficiently

alleged such a claim.

Plaintiff’s complaints about incidents in jail include that Deputies Yukho, Thomas, and

others violated his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion because they tried to force

“Jesus Christ onto [him]” (id. at 10-11) and falsely claimed that he was suicidal even though this

was against his religion. (Id.). To have stated a claim under the First Amendment, however,

Plaintiff must have pleaded plausible facts showing that the deputies substantially burdened his

sincere exercise of religious beliefs. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“The free

exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a

central religious belief or practice.”). A “substantial burden” “involves something more than an

incidental effect or inconvenience on religious exercise and ‘is akin to significant pressure which

Robertson, 782 F. App’x 794, 801 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of

Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004)). Although Plaintiff has claimed that insensitive

comments were made by the deputies, he has not alleged facts to show that the deputies or their

comments placed any significant pressure on him to coerce him to conform his religious behavior.

Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because

he was forced to strip while being threatened with physical abuse, slammed into jail bars, and not

provided clean food and water. An excessive-force Eighth Amendment claim encompasses both a

subjective and objective component. Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020).

The subjective component requires that “the excessive force must have been sadistically and

maliciously applied for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Breeden, 280

F.3d 1308, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff has not pleaded that the deputies’ actions of forcing

him to strip while threatening him or slamming him into jail bars was done “sadistically and

maliciously” or even for the purpose of causing harm. Here, he alleges that he was slammed into

the jail bars while he was being moved, and has not sufficiently alleged any actions were

intentional. (Doc. # 10 at 10-11). The objective component “focuses on whether the official’s

actions were ‘harmful enough,’ Hudson [v. McMillian], 503 U.S. [1, ]8 [(1992)], or ‘sufficiently

serious,’ Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), to violate the Constitution.” Sconiers, 946

F.3d at 1265. “Not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”

Id. (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)). An inmate strip search or body cavity

search is constitutional, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979), even if done without an apparent

penological purpose. Moton v. Walker, 545 F. App’x 856, 860 (11th Cir. 2013). And again, without

more detailed allegations about being “slammed” into cell bars, the court cannot infer that Plaintiff

has stated a viable Eighth Amendment claim.

clarifies was vegetarian food (Doc. # 10 at 12-13), is not an actionable Eighth Amendment

violation. Although the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide “reasonably

adequate food,” Robbins, 782 F. App’x at 804 (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567,

1572 (11th Cir. 1985)), “[n]either [the Eleventh Circuit] nor the Supreme Court ha[s] ever held

that the Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to indulge inmates’ dietary preferences –

regardless of whether those preferences are dictated by religious, as opposed to non-religious,

reasons.” Id. at 804-05. Rather, “[a] well-balanced meal, containing sufficient nutritional value to

preserve health, is all that is required.” Id. at 805 (quoting Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1569-70, 1575).

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of a well-balanced or nutritional meal. He also has

not provided any non-conclusory allegations about any failure to provide him with clean water.

His bald, conclusory statement therefore does not provide sufficient detail to plausibly allege that

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated.

The rest of Plaintiff’s claims against the deputies are likewise wholly conclusory. They

assert without elaboration that guards mocked his disabilities, lied about his bond amount, made

him wear a “turtle suit,” shined flashlights into his cell at night, denied him access to phones,

refused to provide him medical help, placed him in the wrong jail population area, worsened his

tinnitus disability, and lied to the VA about his medical condition. (Doc. # 10 at 10-13). Because

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged facts to show that any of the deputies violated his constitutional

rights, his allegations are insufficient under Rule 8.

In sum, Plaintiff’s fourth complaint is replete with conclusory allegations and is largely

indecipherable. It is unclear what he is claiming, against whom, and what his plausible factual

grounds for those claims are. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against the Jefferson County

Sheriff’s Department, the Trussville Police Department, the Irondale Police Department, and

thirteen deputies are due to be dismissed.

Plaintiff’s claims against QTC Medical Services, Dr. Laxmi Challa, Lauren Pope, and

Michael Thompson also fail. He alleges that the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) referred

him to QTC Medical Services, and while four doctors confirmed that he had a medical issue, his

disability claim was denied based on a medical opinion from Dr. Challa. (Doc. # 8 at 10, from 25-

cv-00227). Plaintiff alleges that he reported to QTC supervisor Pope that these were “lies” because

he had never seen Dr. Challa, and he asserts Pope confirmed that Dr. Challa’s opinion was

improper. (Id. at 11-12). Based on this alleged admission, Plaintiff sought further resolution of

QTC’s purported “medical malpractice and fraud.” (Id.).

Eventually, QTC stopped responding to Plaintiff. (Id. at 12). Plaintiff then called QTC’s

office locations to tell them he was coming to pull their fire alarms and would be “in [his truck]

with [his] 2nd amendment rights.” (Id. at 12). Michael Thompson represented QTC and moved for

a temporary restraining order against Plaintiff in a state court. (Id. at 13). When Plaintiff tried to

speak with Thompson about QTC’s “medical fraud/malpractice,” Thompson told him he could

only discuss the motion for a temporary restraining order. (Id.). During the hearing on that motion,

Thompson allegedly “lied” about and altered the evidence offered against Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff

also makes conclusory allegations about QTC staff mocking him when he threatened to pull the

fire alarms (id.), QTC committing unspecified HIPAA violations (id.), and his service dog dying

because of QTC’s “lies.” (id. at 5).

Plaintiff alleges that this conduct violates his constitutional and federal statutory rights, but

he fails to state a claim for relief under these provisions. (See id. at 3). First, Plaintiff claims that

Defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but he does

not connect his factual allegations with any of the rights afforded under these amendments – or

any other constitutional right. Absent any explanation provided in a short and plain statement as

to why he “is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), Plaintiff has not met the Rule 8 standard.

or rely on only “labels and conclusion” or “naked assertion[s]” without supporting factual

allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557.

Plaintiff next claims that Defendants violated the Health Care Fraud Act and the False

Claims Act. The Health Care Fraud Act is a criminal statute, and a private citizen cannot prosecute

a criminal action in federal court. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347; Otero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 832 F.2d 141,

141 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A] private citizen has no judicial cognizable interest in the prosecution or

non-prosecution of another.”) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). And,

while the False Claims Act allows a private person to bring a claim on behalf of the United States

Government – otherwise known as a qui tam claim – a district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a qui tam claim that is filed by a pro se plaintiff. Taylor v. Multiplan Network,

817 F. App’x 947, 947 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873-74 (11th

Cir. 2008)).

For all these reasons, the court does not to have jurisdiction over the federal claims raised

in Plaintiff’s fifth complaint. Without any federal question jurisdiction (or diversity jurisdiction,

which Plaintiff does not claim), the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over the state law

claims of medical malpractice and fraud. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v.

Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against QTC Medical Services, Dr. Laxmi Challa,

Lauren Pope, and Michael Thompson are due to be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. #

11) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the court hereby ORDERS that each of these

actions shall be, and are, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. The

Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to include a copy of this Order in each of these cases and to close

these cases. Costs are to be taxed against Plaintiff.

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his address

of record.

DONE and ORDERED this July 14, 2025.

DAVID Z 24 2

CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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