Deon Johnston v. Deputy Sean M. Carlson

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 1 of 11

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-10862

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DEON JOHNSTON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

DEPUTY SEAN M CARLSON,

DEPUTY MELANIE STICKNEY,

DEPUTY JOSE P MALDONADO,

Individually/in their personal capacities,

Defendants-Appellees,

NICOLE JOHNSTON,

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 2 of 11

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10862

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:23-cv-00617-SDM-AEP

____________________

Before NEWSOM, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Deon Johnston appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

complaint. He sued Pinellas County Sheriff’s Deputies Sean Carl-

son, Melanie Stickney, and Jose Maldonado alleging two counts of

false arrest under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. The district court deter-

mined that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity be-

cause they had arguable probable cause to arrest Johnston. After

careful consideration, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this appeal, we accept the factual allega-

tions of Johnston’s second amended complaint as true and construe

them in the light most favorable to him. See Almanza v. United Air-

lines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 2017).

In November 2022, Nicole Johnston (“Nicole”)—Johnston’s

wife at the time—obtained a domestic violence injunction against

him. The couple were amid divorce proceedings, and the

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 3 of 11

24-10862 Opinion of the Court 3

injunction prohibited Johnston from (1) contacting Nicole, (2) ap-

proaching within 500 feet of her residence, and (3) knowingly go-

ing within 100 feet of her vehicle. The injunction did not bar John-

ston from visiting any other location or specify that he must remain

a certain physical distance from Nicole.

On December 4, 2022, Johnston attended a Sunday morning

service at Harborside Christian Church, both his and Nicole’s long-

time place of worship. Johnston did not see Nicole or her vehicle

when he arrived at the church, and he took a seat near the front of

the sanctuary. Sometime later, Nicole arrived at the church, saw

Johnston, and called the police. Deputy Carlson arrived at the

scene, and Nicole presented him with a copy of the injunction.

Deputy Carlson read the injunction and informed Nicole that it did

not prohibit Johnston from attending the church. Nicole pro-

tested, arguing that the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office had told her

that the injunction prohibited Johnston from coming within 500

feet of her. Deputy Carlson discussed the situation with his part-

ner, Deputy Stickney, who had not read the injunction herself. In

doing so he incorrectly stated that the injunction prohibited John-

ston from coming within 500 feet of Nicole. The two deputies

then arrested Johnston for willfully violating the injunction by

“showing up and attending [a] church service at the same time” as

Nicole, “despite knowing” that she would probably be there. John-

ston spent the night in jail and was released the next day. Two

weeks later, the state dropped the charge against him, concluding

that the facts and circumstances did not warrant prosecution.

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 4 of 11

4 Opinion of the Court 24-10862

On February 19, 2023, Johnston attended Harborside Chris-

tian Church again. As before, Johnston did not see Nicole or her

vehicle when he arrived. He entered the church and took a seat

near the front of the sanctuary. A few minutes later, Nicole arrived,

saw Johnston, and called the police. Deputy Maldonado answered

the call, read the injunction, and arrested Johnston. Johnston spent

a second night in jail, but two weeks later, the state again dropped

the charge against him.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Johnston sued Deputies Carlson, Stickney, and Maldonado,

alleging false arrest under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 1 The deputies

moved to dismiss Johnston’s claims, but Johnston amended his

complaint—rendering their motion moot. The deputies then re-

newed their motion against Johnston’s amended complaint. They

argued that the complaint was a shotgun pleading and that they

were entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court granted the deputies’ motion to dismiss.

It found that Johnston’s amended complaint was a shotgun plead-

ing, but regardless, the deputies were entitled to qualified immun-

ity because they had arguable probable cause to arrest Johnston.

Specifically, the district court relied on Florida Statute section

741.31(4)(a). That provision makes it a misdemeanor to willingly

1

Initially, Johnston also sued Nicole for malicious prosecution. However, the

parties settled out of court, and Johnston voluntarily dismissed Nicole from

the lawsuit.

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 5 of 11

24-10862 Opinion of the Court 5

violate a domestic violence injunction by, among other things,

“[g]oing to, or being within 500 feet of, the petitioner’s residence,

school, place of employment, or a specified place frequented regu-

larly by the petitioner and any named family or household mem-

ber.” Fla. Stat. § 741.31(4)(a)(2). The district court noted that the

parties offered competing interpretations of the statute.

The deputies argued that section 741.31(4)(a)(2) barred

Johnston from attending the church because he knew that it was a

place frequented by Nicole. Johnston, on the other hand, con-

tended that the word “specified” in the statute limited the prohibi-

tion to the places named in the injunction order, and that the order

did not mention the church. The district court reasoned that John-

ston probably had the better reading of the statute, but it explained

that the deputies only needed to show arguable probable cause to

obtain qualified immunity. It found that the deputies had done so

and dismissed Johnston’s amended complaint. However, the dis-

trict court gave Johnston the opportunity to try once more.

Johnston filed a second amended complaint, and the depu-

ties responded with a third motion to dismiss. The district court

determined that Johnston’s second amended complaint alleged no

new facts that altered the legal analysis of its prior order. The dis-

trict court noted that while Johnston’s legal argument may be cor-

rect, “the deputies’ mistake” in arresting him “was at least reason-

ably arguable.” It reasoned that while Johnston’s new allegations

supported his contention that he did not violate the injunction or

the criminal statute, they did not show that the deputies lacked

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 24-10862

arguable probable cause to arrest him. The district court found

that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed

Johnston’s second amended complaint with prejudice. Johnston

timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo both a district court’s decision to grant

a motion to dismiss and its decision to apply qualified immunity at

the motion to dismiss stage. Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268,

1276 (11th Cir. 2023).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Johnston argues that the district court erred in

determining that the deputies were entitled to qualified immunity.

We disagree.

Qualified immunity protects police officers from liability for

civil damages if their conduct “does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)

(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To receive

qualified immunity, an officer must first establish that he was act-

ing within his discretionary authority when the alleged wrongdo-

ing occurred. See Garcia v. Casey, 75 F.4th 1176, 1185 (11th Cir.

2023). If he does so, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that

qualified immunity should not apply. Keating v. City of Miami, 598

F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff can do this by demon-

strating that (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutionally

protected right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 7 of 11

24-10862 Opinion of the Court 7

of the misconduct. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1185. “Clearly established”

means that the state of the law was plain enough “that every rea-

sonable official would understand what he [was] doing [was] un-

lawful.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

It is clearly established that an “officer violates a person’s

Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures if” he

makes an arrest without probable cause. Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186.

Probable cause exists where generally trustworthy information is

sufficient to indicate to a reasonable person that criminal activity is

afoot. Id. We discern the presence of probable cause by looking to

whether a reasonable officer in the situation of the defendant could

have concluded that there was a substantial chance of criminal ac-

tivity. See Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 902 (11th Cir. 2022).

But in the context of a federal false arrest claim, an officer

does not need to show that he had actual probable cause to obtain

qualified immunity; he only needs to show that he had arguable

probable cause. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186; Hunter v. Bryant, 502

U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (“Even law enforcement officials who reason-

ably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present are en-

titled to immunity.”). “An officer has arguable probable cause if ‘a

reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal landscape at the time

of the arrests, could have interpreted the law as permitting the ar-

rests.’” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68). Put

another way, “the arguable probable cause inquiry in a false arrest

case is no different from the clearly established law inquiry in any

other qualified immunity case. Unless the law ‘makes it obvious

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 8 of 11

8 Opinion of the Court 24-10862

that the officer’s acts violated the plaintiff’s rights,’ the officer has

qualified immunity.” Id. at 1187 (quoting Washington, 25 F.4th at

903) (alteration adopted).

In this case, neither party disputes that the deputies were

acting within their discretionary authority when they arrested

Johnston. Thus, to succeed on appeal, Johnston must show that

the deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity. Keating, 598

F.3d at 762. In other words, he must show that the deputies did

not have at least arguable probable cause to arrest him. He fails to

carry his burden.

Johnston’s arguments focus more on whether the deputies’

actions were legally correct than whether they had arguable prob-

able cause to arrest him. He contends that his reading of section

741.31 is the appropriate one, and that the terms of the injunction

did not prohibit him from attending the church. But the fact that

the deputies were mistaken does not mean that they lacked argua-

ble probable cause to place Johnston under arrest.

As the district court correctly observed, officers can be rea-

sonably mistaken about the law and still be entitled to qualified im-

munity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 231 (“The protection of

qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government

official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake

based on mixed questions of law and fact.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)). Police officers are often forced to make

quick decisions, and sometimes the application of a statute is un-

clear. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 67 (2014) (“A law

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 9 of 11

24-10862 Opinion of the Court 9

prohibiting ‘vehicles’ in the park either covers Segways or not, but

an officer will nevertheless have to make a quick decision on the

law the first time one whizzes by.” (citation omitted)). So long as

an officer’s mistake is reasonable, arguable probable cause exists,

and he does not lose the protection of qualified immunity. See

Washington v. Rivera, 939 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding

that an officer who failed to report that plaintiff had paid a fine—

which led to the plaintiff’s arrest—had made “a reasonable mistake

in the legitimate performance of her duties” and was entitled to

qualified immunity); Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1558

(11th Cir. 1993) (holding that an officer’s reasonable mistake in es-

timating the number of patrons in a restaurant established arguable

probable cause for an arrest based off a building code violation);

Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding

that officers’ mistaken arrest of plaintiff who shared the same name

of—and had a similar appearance to—a suspect was “arguably rea-

sonable” and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity).

Here, the factual allegations show that the deputies’ mistake—be-

lieving that they had probable cause to arrest Johnston based on

the injunction and statute—was a reasonable one.

For the first arrest, Deputies Carlson and Stickney re-

sponded to a call that Johnston was violating a domestic violence

injunction. They arrived and found Johnston—who had been

found by a Florida court to meet the requirements for a domestic

violence injunction—sitting in the same room as the woman who

sought the injunction, at a place he should have reasonably sus-

pected she would be. Nicole presented Deputy Carlson with a

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 10 of 11

10 Opinion of the Court 24-10862

copy of a twelve-page injunction, which stated in bold that John-

ston should have “No Contact” with her, unless otherwise pro-

vided. Initially concerned about the applicability of the injunction,

Deputy Carlson discussed the situation with his partner, Deputy

Stickney. After discussing the situation, the deputies arrested John-

2

ston under section 741.31 for willfully violating the injunction.

The second arrest, involving Deputy Maldonado, took place

a few weeks later, but its facts are essentially the same. Deputy

Maldonado responded to a call that Johnston was violating a do-

mestic violence injunction. He arrived, was presented with the in-

junction, found Johnston in the same room as Nicole, and arrested

Johnston under section 741.31 for willfully violating the injunction.

While up for debate, we cannot say that the deputies’ inter-

pretation of the injunction and the statute was objectively unrea-

sonable. As the district court explained, law enforcement officers

are often called upon to make quick judgments, and usually do not

have the luxury of pondering the applicability of statutes in a calm

environment. See Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1541 (11th

Cir. 1990) (“In making probable cause decisions, law enforcement

officers are not charged with knowing legal technicalities and nu-

ances, but with ‘the factual and practical considerations of every-

day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal

2

Johnston argues that the deputies did not rely on section 741.31 in making

the arrest, but this assertion is contradicted by the record as both Deputy Carl-

son’s and Deputy Maldonado’s respective reports included the statute as the

basis for their arrests.

USCA11 Case: 24-10862 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 07/14/2025 Page: 11 of 11

24-10862 Opinion of the Court 11

technicians, act.’” (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,

175 (1949))).

When the deputies arrived at the church, they were con-

fronted with (1) an injunction prohibiting Johnston from having

contact with Nicole, and (2) Johnston and Nicole together in the

same room. Between the injunction’s “No Contact” provision, and

the unintuitive language of section 741.31(4)(a), the deputies could

have reasonably concluded that they had probable cause to arrest

Johnston. See Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1186 (“An officer has arguable

probable cause if ‘a reasonable officer, looking at the entire legal

landscape at the time of the arrests, could have interpreted the law

as permitting the arrests.’” (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 68)). As the

district court observed, this decision is supported by the fact that

three different deputies, two on one occasion, and a third on an-

other, made the same mistake of law.

Thus, like the district court, we conclude that the deputies

had arguable probable cause and are entitled to qualified immun-

ity.

CONCLUSION

The deputies are entitled to qualified immunity and the dis-

trict court did not err in dismissing Johnston’s complaint.

AFFIRMED.