Seaman v. Fleurjean

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

DONNA ANN SEAMAN,

as Personal Representative of

the Estate of Shaun Seaman,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-1060-WFJ-NHA

DETENTION DEPUTY MARC

FLEURJEAN, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY JONATHAN

MORALES, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER

COVEY, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY JESSE

LOVELACE, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY JASON

FAIN, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY JOHN

VIVIANO, individually;

DETENTION DEPUTY RONALD

HENSLEY, individually;

SHERIFF GRADY JUDD,

official capacity;

LYNN BROOM, RN,

individually;

CORIZON HEALTH,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Marc Fleurjean, Jonathan Morales,

Christopher Covey, Jesse Lovelace, Jason Fain, John Viviano, Ronald Hensley (the

“Detention Deputies”), and Sheriff Grady Judd’s Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Dkt. 84. Plaintiff Donna Seaman, as

Personal Representative of the Estate of Shaun Seaman, has filed a response in

opposition, Dkt. 91, and Defendants replied. Dkt. 95.1 Upon careful consideration,

the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment.

BACKGROUND2

This case arises out of the death of Shaun Seaman at the Polk County Jail. See

generally Dkt. 1. On May 12, 2021, the Polk County Sheriff’s Department took Mr.

Seaman into administrative confinement and placed him on suicide watch in the S-

Medical Building of the South County Jail (“S-Med”). Dkt. 1 ¶ 27. On May 13, 2021,

Mr. Seaman was roomed with three other inmates in “ISO-2”: John Smith, Sean

Collins, and Daniel Glanton. Dkt. 83 ¶ 1. The Polk County Sheriff’s Office Suicide

Watch Policy (the “Suicide Watch Policy”) requires that inmates in S-Med must “be

1 Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Strike or Limit Opinion Testimony of defense expert Dr. Richard Hough. Dkt. 68.

This Order neither addresses Plaintiff’s motion to strike nor relies on Dr. Hough’s expert report.

2 The relevant facts are derived from Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiff’s Response to the Statement

of Undisputed Facts, and the record in this case. See generally Dkt. 83; Dkt. 92. When evaluating the Motion for

Summary Judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Jacoby v. Baldwin County, 835 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).

observed every fifteen (15) minutes either continuously or at irregular intervals not

to exceed fifteen (15) minutes by the detention staff” and that these observations be

logged. Dkt. 91-13 at 2.

On May 13, at approximately 3:10 or 3:15 PM, detention staff began

distributing medication to inmates in S-Med. Dkt. 83 ¶ 3; Dkt. 82 at 34:12-25.

Around this time, Smith and Collins got into a physical altercation, with Smith

violently attacking Collins and standing on his neck. Dkt. 83 ¶ 5; Dkt. 91-15

(showing May 13, 2021, incident report). Following this altercation, Collins was

immediately removed from ISO-2 and placed into ISO-1. Dkt. 83 ¶ 7. Smith

remained in ISO-2 with Mr. Seaman and Glanton while the detention staff finished

the “med pass.”3 Id. Around 10-15 minutes later, after the med pass was complete,

detention staff removed John Smith from ISO-2 and placed him into ISO-4 by

himself. Id. at ¶ 8; Dkt. 92 ¶ 27. It is during this 10-15 minute window that Smith

severely beat Mr. Seaman, resulting in blunt force trauma to his head, a skull

fracture, and multiple brain contusions. Dkt. 91-11 at 1; Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 34, 40. Four hours

later, at approximately 7:40 PM, detention staff finally discovered that Seaman was

unresponsive and unconscious. Dkt. 83 ¶ 25. Mr. Seaman was subsequently

3. “Med pass” refers to the process by which medical staff and detention deputies distribute medicine to inmates in S-

Med. Dkt. 82 at 35:4-8.

transported to a hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries approximately one

week later on May 21, 2021. Dkt. 91-11 at 1; Dkt. 1 ¶ 40.

I. The Relevant Actors

a. Defendant Marc Fleurjean

Defendant Marc Fleurjean is a detention deputy currently employed by the

Polk County Sheriff’s Office, having recently been promoted to the rank of sergeant.

Dkt. 83 ¶ 22. Fleurjean has worked for the Polk County Sheriff’s Office since June

19, 2017. Id. Fleurjean was assigned to S-Med on May 12-13, 2021, for the overnight

shift from 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM. Id.; Dkt. 80 at 11:17-12:3, 17:23-25. Fleurjean’s

only interaction with Mr. Seaman is that Mr. Seaman and Collins were housed in S-

Med during Fleurjean’s overnight shift. Dkt. 80 at 18:1-24. However, when

conducting his 15-minute rounds, Fleurjean did not recall observing Mr. Seaman

since another detention deputy could have been using his ID number when logging

observations of inmates in S-Med. Id. at 20:18-21:6.4

At the time of Smith’s fatal attack on May 13, 2021, Fleurjean had already

finished his overnight shift and was not on duty. Id. at 11:17-12:3, 36:14-37:2.

Fleurjean worked another overnight shift on May 13-14, 2021, from 6:00 PM to 6:00

4 In Defendant Fleurjean’s deposition, he explains that the 15-minute observation for inmates on suicide watch is done

on handheld devices that scan a tag on each ISO cell. Dkt. 80 at 19:17-25. Per Polk County Sheriff’s Office policy,

each detention deputy is required to log in to these handheld devices with their own ID before conducting their rounds;

however, deputies often use the handheld scanner without logging the previous deputy off. Id. at 20:21-22:7. As such,

the observation log may list the ID of a deputy who did not conduct the observation. Id.; see also Dkt. 82 at 58:3-14

(deposition of John Viviano discussing the same issue of deputies not logging themselves out of the handheld devices).

AM in another part of the South County Jail. Id. at 37:9-21. Fleurjean never went to

S-Med following Smith’s attack on Mr. Seaman, participated in any subsequent

investigation, or wrote a report about the incident. Id. at 39:10-19.

b. Defendants John Viviano and Jonathan Morales

Defendant John Viviano was a detention deputy employed by the Polk County

Sheriff’s Office from 2017 to 2022. Dkt. 82 at 9:3-8. Defendant Jonathan Morales

is a detention deputy currently employed by the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. Dkt.

91-3 at 9:14-18. On May 13, 2021, Viviano and Morales worked the 6:00 AM to

6:00 PM shift and were assigned to inmate movement that day. Dkt. 82 at 15:9-21,

27:3-25; Dkt. 91-3 at 28:19-29:4. At approximately 3:00 PM, Viviano’s assignment

was changed to relieve a deputy in S-Med. Dkt. 82 at 28:1-19, 31:4-9. Because

Viviano was training Morales that shift, Morales accompanied Viviano to S-Med

following the change in assignment. Id. at 28:20-25; Dkt. 91-3 at 29:3-21, 31:3-24.

When Viviano and Morales arrived at S-Med, Defendant Jason Fain was the only

other deputy on duty. Dkt. 82 at 32:9-14.

Around 10-15 minutes after arriving at S-Med, Viviano and Morales

accompanied Nurse Lynn Broom as she began conducting the med pass. Dkt. 82 at

34:10-25; Dkt. 91-3 at 34:15-35:16. While Viviano was collecting the medicine cups

from ISO-1, Nurse Broom and Morales moved on to ISO-2, where the physical

altercation with inmates Smith and Collins was ongoing. Dkt. 82 at 35:12-23; Dkt.

91-3 at 36:3-25. Morales moved to intervene after spotting Smith standing on

Collins’ neck. Dkt. 91-3 at 36:3-37:19, 40:5-41:11. When entering ISO-2 to break

up the fight, Morales recalls inmate Glanton standing off to the side and Mr. Seaman

lying down under a blanket. Id. at 41:12-42:12. After arriving at ISO-2, Viviano also

recalls Glanton standing up and Mr. Seaman lying down. Dkt. 82 at 36:13-24. After

having Nurse Broom medically access Collins, Morales and Viviano moved Collins

to ISO-2 with the assistance of Defendant Fain. Id. at 38:23-39:14; Dkt. 91-3 at

42:13-44:4. A supervisor was informed of the incident between Collins and Smith.

Dkt. 82 at 43:12-44:14. Viviano and Morales then continued the med pass for the

rest of S-Med. Id. at 40:25-41:8. This took approximately 10-15 minutes. Id. Viviano

recalls that Smith was not immediately removed from ISO-2 since he was compliant

and showed no signs of aggression. Id. at 39:19-24; 108:22-109:7.

After completing the med pass, Viviano and Morales returned to the ISO-2

to remove Smith and put him into ISO-4 alone. Id. at 41:5-42:20, 44:18-45:4.

Viviano and Morales did not check on or speak with Mr. Seaman or Glanton after

Smith’s removal from ISO-2. Id. at 46:10-24; Dkt. 91-3 at 48:2-18. Morales did not

notice any blood on the floor of ISO-2, was not told that Mr. Seaman was hurt by

Nurse Broom or Glanton, and did not hear anyone crying out in pain. Dkt. 91-3 at

72:10-73:9. Viviano also does not recall Mr. Seaman calling for help, did not hear

anyone else in the cell cry for help, and does not remember seeing any blood on the

floor. Dkt. 82 at 109:8-110:22. However, Viviano testified that nothing was

preventing him from stopping the med pass to check on Mr. Seaman. Id. at 48:16-

19. Viviano ended his shift early at 5:00 PM and was relieved by Defendant Ronald

Hensley. Id. at 50:12-21. At the same time, Morales was reassigned back to inmate

movement and left S-Med. Dkt. 91-3 at 51:5-12.

c. Defendant Jason Fain

The Polk County Sheriff’s Office has employed Defendant Jason Fain as a

detention deputy since 2017 or 2018. Dkt. 83 ¶ 24. Fain was on shift on May 13,

2021, from 6:00 AM to 6:00 PM. Dkt. 77 at 35:15-20. On that day, Fain was assigned

with Hensley and Deputy Medina in S-Med. Id. The detention deputies, along with

the nursing staff, were responsible for the inmates in ISO-2. Dkt. 83 ¶ 24. Later in

the shift, Deputy Medina left S-Med and was relieved by Viviano and trainee

Morales. Id.; Dkt. 77 at 46:9-47:7. The only contact Fain may have had with Mr.

Seaman on May 12 or 13, 2021, was placing him in ISO-2, although he does not

remember if he was the deputy who did so or not. Dkt. 83 ¶ 24.

Following the arrival of Viviano and Morales, Fain began distributing meals,

while the other two deputies started the med pass with Nurse Broom. Dkt. 77 at

49:16-50:13. However, right before the meal distribution began, Fain went over to

ISO-2 to assist Morales with breaking up the Smith/Collins fight after overhearing

shouting. Id. at 50:8-51:23. Fain assisted Morales in moving Collins out of ISO-2 to

get evaluated by Nurse Broom. Id. at 51:10-52:24. Fain recalls that Smith was not

immediately removed from ISO-2 since “the situation was under control.” Id. at

53:16-54:19. Fain also testified that no other deputies in S-Med observed Smith

assault Mr. Seaman. Id. at 56:1-10. Additionally, Fain did not call for backup

because everything appeared to be under control once they separated Smith and

Collins. Dkt. 83 ¶ 16. While Fain could have checked up on Mr. Seaman or Glanton,

he did not do so because the incident had been between Smith and Collins, and it

had been resolved. Id. Fain also recalls Smith being compliant and not attacking any

other inmates or deputies. Dkt. 77 at 86:1-87:5.

Following the altercation and Smith’s removal from ISO-2, Fain resumed

distributing meals. Id. at 56:15-22. Fain passed out food trays to ISO-2 when only

Mr. Seaman and Glanton were left in the cell. Dkt. 83 ¶ 12. He does not remember

Mr. Seaman acknowledging the food tray or eating, although it is not odd for an

inmate to ignore a detention deputy passing out food. Id. Nor does Fain recall seeing

any blood or anything abnormal about Mr. Seaman as he lay on the floor of the cell.

Id. ¶ 17.

d. Defendant Ronald Hensley

The Polk County Sheriff’s Office has employed Defendant Ronald Hensley

as a detention deputy since August 2005. Dkt. 83 ¶ 21. Hensley worked the 6:00 AM

to 6:00 PM shift on May 13, 2021. Dkt. 79 at 53:11-15. Initially, Hensley was

assigned to S-Med but was reassigned to “Building 7” for a couple of hours at around

12:30 PM. Id. at 65:3-66:18. Hensley returned to S-Med at around 4:00 PM to relieve

Defendant Viviano, who was leaving early. Id.; Dkt. 83 ¶ 14. While Hensley was

not present during Smith and Collin’s physical altercation, Defendant Viviano

briefed Hensley on the incident when he came back to S-Med at around 4:00 PM.

Dkt. 79 at 68:5-22. By the time Hensley arrived at S-Med, Collins and Smith were

already separated and removed from ISO-2. Id. at 69:3-24.

However, Hensley had prior dealings with Smith. Id. at 32:3-34:23. Hensley

had authored two incident reports involving Smith fighting with other inmates, one

dated May 4, 2021, and the other on May 12, 2021. Id.; see Dkt. 91-8; Dkt. 91-9.

Additionally, in the early morning hours of May 13, Collins reported to Hensley that

another inmate (allegedly Smith) had punched him during the 6:30 AM shower time.

Dkt. 79 at 57:11-58:12. Upon investigation, Hensley dismissed Collins’ complaint

since Smith was not housed in the same cell as Collins at the time. Id. at 57:11-60:25.

Collins provided a recorded statement in which he stated that he was punched in the

face in the morning by John Smith on May 13, 2021, and reported this incident to

the detention deputies. Dkt. 92 ¶ 9; see Dkt. 96 at 7:20.

e. Defendants Christopher Covey and Jesse Lovelace

Defendant Jesse Lovelace is a detention deputy employed by the Polk County

Sheriff’s Office since 2019. Dkt. 91-1 at 8:22-9:8. Defendant Christopher Covey is

a former detention deputy who the Polk County Sheriff’s Office employed until his

departure to become an electrician. Dkt. 91-2 at 10:5-11:1. Both Lovelace and Covey

worked the 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM overnight shift in S-Med on May 13-14, 2021. Dkt.

91-1 at 38:7-23; Dkt. 91-2 at 30:23-31:3. At the beginning of their shift, Lovelace

and Covey were briefed about the incident between Inmates Smith and Collins, and

both inmates had already been removed from ISO-2. Dkt. 91-1 at 29:10-30:2; Dkt.

91-2 at 25:9-22. By the time Lovelace went on duty, Smith had already been

removed from S-Med, and Collins was still in ISO-1. Dkt. 91-1 at 43:3-11. During

the continuous 15-minute observation checks of the “front [ISO] cells” in S-Med,

Lovelace only recalls that Mr. Seaman was lying down under the green blanket. Dkt.

91-1 at 47:6-50:15. Lovelace also did not remember seeing any blood in ISO-2

during his check, but testified he would have entered the cell to check up on Mr.

Seaman if he had seen blood. Id. at 82:3-10, 94:20-95:1. Covey was only doing 15-

minute checks on the “back [ISO] cells” (i.e., not ISO-2 where Mr. Seaman was

being held) since he was also handling transfer paperwork for inmates who were

being pulled off suicide watch and being transferred back to the general population.

Dkt. 91-2 at 41:3-21.

At approximately 7:30 PM, Lovelace and Covey were “clear[ing] off” S-Med

by transferring the inmates back to the general population buildings. Dkt. 91-1 at

62:9-66:20. When Mr. Seaman failed to respond to Covey’s command, he asked

Glanton to wake Mr. Seaman up. Id.; Dkt. 91-2 at 45:17-47:7. When Glanton went

to check up on Mr. Seaman and moved his arm, Covey noticed some blood on the

floor around his head. Dkt. 91-2 at 45:17-47:7. Covey then approached Mr. Seaman,

removed the green blanket covering his body, and saw blood on his face and the cell

floor. Id. Covey then had Lovelace secure Glanton and called for medical backup.

Id. Both Lovelace and Covey asked Glanton about what happened in ISO-2, but

Glanton never responded to either deputy.5 Dkt. 91-1 at 65:10-20; Dkt. 91-2 at

48:12-17. Nurse Broom entered ISO-2 and, after observing Mr. Seaman, informed

Covey that they needed to call an ambulance. Dkt. 91-2 at 61:23-62:14. Following

the arrival of medical staff, Covey and Lovelace were managing the other inmates

in S-Med and did not accompany Mr. Seaman to the hospital. Dkt. 91-1 at 67:16-22;

Dkt. 91-2 at 62:9-14.

When Nurse Broom went into ISO-2, she recalls Mr. Seaman lying “on his

stomach,” and she had to “uncover” him since Mr. Seaman still had the suicide

smock6 over him. Dkt. 91-4 at 51:1-15. After “log roll[ing]” Mr. Seaman onto his

5 While Glanton’s deposition was not taken, he did provide a statement to the State Attorney’s Office for the 10th

Judicial Circuit. In that statement, Glanton recalled that after Collins was removed from ISO-2, “Smith approached

[Mr. Seaman], who was asleep in the back corner of the cell and lying face down on the ground and began to repeatedly

stomp on [Mr. Seaman’s] head. Smith then put a blanket over [Mr. Seaman’s] head and walked away. Approximately

ten minutes later, Smith walked back to [Mr. Seaman] and repeatedly stomped on his head again multiple times.” Dkt.

91-10 at 8–9. Importantly, “Glanton stated at this time, detention staff removed Smith and Collins from the cell, but

he does not believe detention staff saw [that Mr. Seaman] was injured since his head was covered by a blanket placed

by Smith.” Id. at 9.

6 Inmates on suicide watch are provided with a suicide-prevention garment—a “suicide smock.” Dkt. 91-4 at 80:15-

22.

back, Nurse Broom found him decerebrate,7 with the snoring respirations and fixed

pupils. Id. at 51:1-15, 81:4-14. When medical staff failed to get a pulse oxygen

reading on Mr. Seaman, Nurse Broom immediately told the deputies to call 911. Id.

at 48:3-12. While inside ISO-2, Nurse Broom remembers a pool of blood underneath

Mr. Seaman, but did not recall seeing any blood on the walls of the cell. Id. at 49:3-

12.8

f. Inmate John Smith

John Smith was classified as a “Maximum” security inmate based on the

severity of the current offense and the seriousness of his offense history. Dkt. 92 ¶

3; Dkt. 91-5 (showing custody assessment of John Smith). Defendant Covey testified

that he knew of John Smith from “word through the jail.” Dkt. 92 ¶ 1. Nurse Broom

was aware of John Smith from multiple past altercations and described him as being

“aggressive.” Id. ¶ 2. Defendant Hensley personally observed John Smith fighting

another inmate on at least two separate occasions. Id. ¶ 5.

7 A medical term used to describe a patient who has their arms and legs outstretched, with muscles held rigidly. Dkt.

91-4 at 50:10-22. Decerebrate posturing is an indicator of severe brain damage.

8 Additionally, Nurse Broom also opined that “based on the condition of Seaman, he wouldn’t have lasted four hours

in that cell.” Dkt. 91-4 at 57:23-24. Nurse Broom further explained that:

based on the condition that we found Seaman in at the time, it was my opinion that if he had been

in that condition for four hours, there was no way he would have lived for [those] four hours in that

condition. I would have assumed that, you know, it had [] happened much later in the shift. But

again, that was, at that point, my opinion, and I didn't know, you know, if he had just gotten to that

point or if he was, you know, much better and just progressively worsened.

Id. at 58:5-14. When asked if she had an opinion on whether Mr. Seaman’s condition progressively worsened, Nurse

Broom clarified, “No, I couldn’t say that. But I knew what I was saying was he would not have lasted four hours

without medical attention in the condition that he was in at that time.” Id. at 58:15-21.

Defendant Fain, however, did not know Smith to have behavioral issues, and

never had “an issue” with him. Dkt. 83 ¶ 59. Nor does Fain recall any incident with

Smith prior to the altercation between Smith and Collins. Id. Defendant Viviano does

not recall having any prior contact with Smith before May 13, 2021, and was not

aware of his “maximum” classification status. Dkt. 82 at 15:9-21, 27:3-8. Defendant

Morales also never had any prior interaction with Smith and did not know of Smith’s

“maximum” classification when reassigned to S-Med on May 13, 2021. Dkt. 91-3 at

12:1-3, 15:22-16:2, 19:16-22.

II. Polk County Sheriff’s Office Suicide Watch Policy

“S-Med” houses medically classified inmates whom medical staff have

determined cannot be housed in the general population, including inmates on suicide

watch or medical observation. Dkt. 83 ¶ 38. ISO cells are used to house inmates on

suicide watch, and the policy regarding suicide watch is that inmates are housed

without property and given suicide prevention clothing. Id. ¶ 39. Direct observation

for an inmate on suicide watch is a one-on-one watch when an inmate is actively

trying to harm himself. Id. ¶ 40; see Dkt. 91-13 at 2 (“When the inmate is at the

nurse’s station and the nurse determines the inmate is suicidal . . . The inmate shall

be placed into a holding cell away from the general population. A single inmate on

suicide watch constitutes a one (1)-on-one (1) suicide watch.”).

However, when an inmate only requires “increased observation to ensure the

safety of inmates that may be of higher risk of something happening to them” than

the general population, 15-minute observation checks are done instead. Dkt. 83 ¶ 41;

see Dkt. 91-13 at 2 (“The inmate shall be observed every fifteen (15) minutes either

continuously or at irregular intervals not to exceed fifteen (15) minutes by the

detention staff.”). Looking for “signs of life” during the 15-minute checks does not

include physically going into the cell and manipulating the inmate. Dkt. 83 ¶ 41. As

a precaution, detention deputies assigned to S-Med conduct their rounds every 13

minutes and constantly walk around and monitor the inmates during these rounds.

Id. ¶ 42.

When an inmate is on suicide watch and is lying down or sleeping, deputies

generally look for anything “out of the ordinary” and signs of breathing. Dkt. 82 at

106:17-107:5. Inmates on suicide watch sleep a lot, and it is common for them to be

lying under the green blankets. Dkt. 83 ¶ 45. Detention deputies generally do not

look up disciplinary reports for inmates on suicide watch, as inmates are held

together, regardless of classification. Id. ¶ 46. In the ISO cells, maximum and

minimum-security inmates may be held together, but they are not held together in

general population cells. Id.

III. The Instant Litigation

On May 12, 2023, Donna Ann Seaman, as the personal representative for Mr.

Seaman’s estate, filed the instant suit. Dkt. 1. Ms. Seaman brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and state law wrongful death claims against Defendants in this case. Id. As relevant

to the instant motion for summary judgment, Ms. Seaman brings the following

claims against the Detention Deputies and Sheriff Grady Judd:9

• Marc Fleurjean (Individual Capacity) — Count I- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Protect Claim

• Jonathan Morales (Individual Capacity) — Count II- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XII- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Failure to Protect Claim

• Christopher Covey (Individual Capacity) — Count III- 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XIII- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Failure to Protect Claim

• Jesse Lovelace (Individual Capacity) — Count IV- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XIV- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Failure to Protect Claim

• Jason Fain (Individual Capacity) — Count V- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XV- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Protect Claim

• John Viviano (Individual Capacity) — Count VI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XVI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Protect Claim

9 Defendants Lynn Broom and Corizon Health Inc. did not join the instant motion for summary judgment. See

generally Dkt. 84. Additionally, the proceedings in this case against Defendant Corizon Health have been stayed

pursuant to the automatic stay provision of the United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). See Dkt. 11.

• Ronald Hensley (Individual Capacity) — Count VII- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Deliberate Indifference Claim, Count XVII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Protect Claim, and Count XVIII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Train Claim

• Sheriff Grady Judd (Official Capacity) — Count XIX- 42 U.S.C. §

1983 Failure to Train Claim, Count XX- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Policy

Liability Claim, and Counts XXI–XXVII- Wrongful Death Claims

under Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Id. at 1–68.

On March 25, 2025, the Detention Deputies and Sheriff Grady Judd filed the

instant motion for summary judgment, arguing the Detention Deputies are entitled

to qualified immunity, Sheriff Judd is entitled to summary judgment on the official

capacity claims, and Sheriff Judd is not vicariously liable on the state law wrongful

death claim. Dkt. 84 at 4.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is “no genuine issue as to

any material fact [such] that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a).

An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the

governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is

“genuine” if the evidence could lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving

party. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986).

The moving party has the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact, and all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.

See Allen v. Tyson Foods Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997); Pennington v.

City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting a court must

“review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party”). Once the moving party satisfies its initial burden, it shifts to the

non-moving party to come forward with evidence showing a genuine issue of

material fact that precludes summary judgment. Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 284 F.3d

1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 2002); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e), (c).

Speculation or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba v.

Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005).

The court may not weigh evidence to resolve a factual dispute; if a genuine

issue of material fact is present, the court must deny summary judgment. Hutcherson

v. Progressive Corp., 984 F.2d 1152, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, the court

should deny summary judgment if reasonable minds could differ on the inferences

arising from undisputed facts. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d

1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).

Importantly, a district court is only required to consider “the cited materials”

when deciding a summary judgment motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3), and “[m]aking

district courts dig through volumes of documents and transcripts would shift the

burden of sifting from petitioners to the courts . . . [D]istrict court judges are not

required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record.” Chavez v. Sec’y

Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011). “[T]here is no burden

upon the district court to distill every potential argument that could be made based

on the materials before it on summary judgment. Rather, the onus is upon the parties

to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in

summary judgment are deemed abandoned.” Solutia, Inc. v. McWane, Inc., 672 F.3d

1230, 1239 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Dunmar Corp.,

43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).

DISCUSSION

Defendants moves for summary judgment on several grounds, arguing the

Detention Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on the failure to protect and

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims; Sheriff Judd is entitled to

summary judgment on the official capacity claims because there is no official policy

behind any purported constitutional violation; and Sheriff Judd is not vicariously

liable on the state law wrongful death claims because Mr. Seaman’s death was not

caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission by any employee. Dkt. 84 at 4.

The Court will address each argument in turn.

I. Qualified Immunity Standard

Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary

functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Loftus v.

Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). “[E]ntitlement to qualified

immunity is for the court to decide as a matter of law.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879

F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018). When determining whether government officials

are entitled to qualified immunity, “courts are required to view the facts and draw

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the [non-moving party].” Scott

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (quotations omitted). “In qualified immunity

cases, this usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts.” Id. “If, at

the summary judgment stage, the evidence construed in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff shows that there are facts inconsistent with granting qualified immunity,

then the case and the qualified immunity defense proceed to trial.” Stryker v. City of

Homewood, 978 F.3d 769, 773 (11th Cir. 2020).

To receive qualified immunity, an official must first “establish that he or she

acted within the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation and

internal quotations omitted). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that “(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation”. Id. at 1340–41

(citation and internal quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Detention Deputies were acting within

the scope of their discretionary authority while performing their duties in S-Med

during the relevant time period. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 21; Dkt. 91 at 4–5. Instead, the heart of

this dispute is Plaintiff’s contention that the Detention Deputies violated Mr.

Seaman’s Fourteenth Amendment Right to be protected from a substantial risk of

serious harm from another inmate. Therefore, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing

that the Detention Deputies are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Stalley v.

Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1284 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Gaines v. Wardynski, 871

F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2017)). To prevail, Plaintiff must show (1) that the

Detention Deputies’ conduct violated Mr. Seaman’s constitutional rights, and (2)

that the rights were clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id.

II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect and Deliberate Indifference

Claims against the Detention Deputies

Plaintiff brings Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect and deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need claims against all seven detention deputies in

their individual capacities. See Dkt. 1. The Eighth Amendment’s10 proscription

10 Technically, Plaintiff’s failure to protect and deliberate indifference claims stem from the Eighth Amendment and

only apply to convicted prisoners. See Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1318 n.13

(11th Cir. 2005). Since Mr. Seaman was a pretrial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

against cruel and unusual punishment governs the treatment of inmates while in

prison. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994). The prohibition requires

prison officials to “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”

Id. at 832 (internal quotation marks omitted). The duty to protect encompasses

“protect[ing] prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. at 833

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When a plaintiff invokes this

principle in a lawsuit against prison officials, courts refer to the plaintiff’s claims as

a “failure-to-protect” claim. Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2021).

Additionally, the “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs of prisoners

constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,

428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The Court begins by addressing Plaintiff’s failure to

protect claims and then considers the deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need claims against all the Detention Deputies.

a. Failure to Protect

To succeed on a failure to protect claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

satisfy three elements: (1) the plaintiff must show that she was incarcerated under

not the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, governs the Court’s analysis. See Hale

v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the analysis is the same because “the

standards under the Fourteenth Amendment are identical to those under the Eighth.” Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d

1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007); see Patel v. Lanier Cnty. Georgia, 969 F.3d 1173, 1188 (11th Cir. 2020); Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034, 1045 n.35 (11th Cir. 2014).

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the plaintiff must show that

the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, amounting to deliberate

indifference; and (3) the plaintiff must demonstrate causation—that the

constitutional violation caused her injuries. Cox, 15 F.4th at 1357–58 (citation and

quotations omitted). Plaintiff must establish all three elements to prevail on her

failure-to-protect claims.

Element one, a substantial risk of serious harm, “is assessed under an objective

standard.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). To prevail, a

plaintiff must allege “conditions that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk

of serious injury to his future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,

1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lane, 835 F.3d at 1307). Plaintiff can either

demonstrate a “general threat” to inmates based on dangerous conditions or locations

in the prison, or an individualized risk based on a “specific threat” to an inmate. Id.

at 1233, 1235–36; see also Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty., Ga., 400

F.3d 1313, 1320–21 (11th Cir. 2005).

Under the second element, deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that

a defendant: (1) “was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”;

(2) “disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in

the criminal law.’” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (en

banc) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). To demonstrate “subjective recklessness

as used in the criminal law,” a plaintiff “must show that the defendant was actually,

subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff[.]” Id. at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). Subjective awareness

requires that a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw

the inference.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep't of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The determination of whether a risk has

been disregarded is objective: “the [defendant] must have responded to the known

risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she ‘knew of ways to reduce the harm’

but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233 (quoting

Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 620). In other words, “even if the defendant ‘actually knew

of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,’ he ‘cannot be found liable under the

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’”

Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–845). “As applied in the

prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard sets an appropriately high

bar.” Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020).

“Finally, the plaintiff must show a ‘necessary causal link’ between the

defendant’s failure to act reasonably and the plaintiff’s injury.” Marbury, 936 F.3d

at 1233 (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 623). A causal connection requires that the

defendant “(1) had the means substantially to improve the inmate’s safety, (2) knew

that the actions he undertook would be insufficient to provide the inmate with

reasonable protection from violence, and (3) had other means available to him which

he nevertheless disregarded.” Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1298 (11th Cir.

2024) (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 622).

Here, Defendants seem to concede that Smith could be considered a general

threat that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to Mr. Seaman based on his

violent history. Dkt. 84 at 7. Instead, Defendants focus on Plaintiff’s failure to show

the second element of deliberate indifference. Id. Specifically, Defendants maintain

that “even if [the Detention Deputies] knew John Smith was a problem inmate, was

‘prone to violence,’ or had a history of causing problems in the Jail, this would not

be enough to establish that they were subjectively aware of a risk to [Mr. Seaman].”

Id. at 9. Plaintiff, however, contends Defendants “had subjective knowledge of the

risk of serious harm presented by John Smith” and “disregarded the serious risk by

allowing John Smith to remain unsupervised in the cell with Mr. Seaman for 10-15

minutes after they observed John Smith with his foot on Collins’ neck.” Dkt. 91 at

8, 10.

Threats between inmates are commonplace and thus, “[n]ot ‘every injury

suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into a constitutional

liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.’” Mosley v. Zachery,

966 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020) (omission in original) (quoting Bowen v.

Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016)). Indeed,

correction officers “must possess enough details about a threat to enable them to

conclude that it presents a ‘strong likelihood’ of injury, not a ‘mere possibility.’”

Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1236 (citations omitted). As such, Plaintiff must show that Mr.

Seaman “suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, sufficiently serious[,]” and

that he suffered that deprivation because all the Detention Deputies, some of whom

were not even on duty at the time of Mr. Seaman’s death, were deliberately

indifferent to a risk of serious harm—i.e., the risk of harm of keeping John Smith in

the cell with Mr. Seaman after John Smith violently attacked another inmate. Wade,

106 F.4th at 1262 (citation and quotations omitted).

Because Defendants seemingly concede element one (and construing the facts

in a light most favorable to Plaintiff), the Court finds a reasonable jury could find

that keeping Mr. Seaman housed in ISO-2 with a violent inmate who had just brutally

attacked another inmate can constitute a substantial risk of serious harm.

Next, the Court considers element two, deliberate indifference, and asks

whether (1) the Detention Deputies were “subjectively aware that [Mr. Seaman] was

at risk of serious harm[,]” (2) they “disregarded that risk[,]” and (3) they “acted with

‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law[.]’” Id. at 1255. Furthermore,

the Detention Deputies “‘cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause’ if [they] ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” Id. at 1262

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45). Because the seven detention deputies were

on shift at different times, on different days, and had varying levels of involvement

on the day of Smith’s fatal attack, the Court analyzes the deputies separately. See

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Each individual

Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knows.”).

i. Defendant Marc Fleurjean

To satisfy the subjective component of deliberate indifference, Plaintiff had

to show that before the assault, Defendant Fleurjean was “aware of facts from which

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and

that Fleurjean “dr[ew] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. But nothing in the

record indicates that Fleurjean was aware of any danger facing Mr. Seaman before

the fatal attack by John Smith.

Critically, Fleurjean was not even on duty at the South County Jail when

Smith assaulted Mr. Seaman. There is no dispute that he was assigned to S-Med on

May 12-13, 2021, for the overnight shift from 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM. Dkt. 80 at 11:17-

12:3, 17:23-25. As such, Fleurjean’s only interaction with Mr. Seaman was when he

was housed in ISO-2 during the deputy’s overnight shift prior to the fatal attack. Id.

at 18:1-24. Again, at the time of Smith’s attack on Mr. Seaman on May 13, 2021, at

around 3:25 PM, Fleurjean had already finished his overnight shift and was not on

duty. Id. at 11:17-12:3, 36:14-37:2. Put simply, there is no indication that Fleurjean

was subjectively aware of a future attack by Smith nine hours after getting off duty

or that he was involved with the decision to keep Smith in ISO-2 with Mr. Seaman

following the fight. Thus, the Court finds Defendant Fleurjean is entitled to qualified

immunity on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim in Count XI.

ii. Defendants John Viviano, Jonathan Morales, and Jason Fain

As to Defendants Viviano, Morales, and Fain, the three deputies in S-Med at

the time of Smith’s fatal attack on Mr. Seaman, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently

demonstrate the subjective component of the deliberate indifference test.

“[A] general awareness of an inmate’s propensity for being violent does not

satisfy the subjective awareness requirement.” Oliver v. Harden, 587 F. App’x 618,

620 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.

2003)). In Carter, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in a

Section 1983 action where the plaintiff, a “Level 1” inmate with no history of

violence while in prison, was assaulted by a close-security “Level 5” inmate with

whom he shared a cell, and who was pending reclassification to maximum-security

status. 352 F.3d at 1347–48. Although the defendants “clearly knew that [the Level

5] inmate Barnes was a ‘problem inmate’ with a well-documented history of prison

disobedience and had been prone to violence,” and although the correction officers

also had “specific notice from Plaintiff that Inmate Barnes acted crazy, roaming his

cell like a ‘caged animal,’” this knowledge was not enough to show that defendants

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1349–50.

Any “negligent failure” of the defendants to protect the plaintiff from an attack did

not create the sufficiently culpable state of mind necessary to satisfy the subjective

awareness requirement when none of the statements constituted a threat and no

request for protective custody was ever made. Id. at 1350.

Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections also offers insight into the

subjective component. 508 F.3d 611 (11th Cir. 2007). In Rodriguez, the Eleventh

Circuit considered whether the prison-official defendants were subjectively aware

of a substantial risk of serious harm facing the prisoner-plaintiff ahead of a brutal

prison attack. Id. at 613. The summary judgment record indicated that Rodriguez

“verbally informed [Defendant] Kugler” on “at least two occasions” of threats made

against his life. Id. at 618. Similarly, Rodriguez “spoke to [Defendant] Johnson on a

number of occasions regarding the threats on his life.” Id. at 614. Rodriguez also

filed “an Inmate Request form,” in which he communicated that he feared for his

safety and requested protection. Id. In vacating the grant of summary judgment for

the defendants, the circuit court concluded that the plaintiff’s communications

comprised “enough evidence of subjective knowledge to get [Rodriguez’s] claim to

a jury.” Id. at 618.

Here, unlike the plaintiff in Rodriguez, the record is devoid of any facts that

would demonstrate that Defendants Viviano, Morales, and Fain were subjectively

aware of a substantial risk of harm faced by Mr. Seaman. First, in contrast to the

threats on the plaintiff’s life that the defendants were made aware of in Rodriguez,

there is no evidence of any verbal threats made by Smith on Mr. Seaman’s life. Nor

is there any evidence that Mr. Seaman spoke to the three deputies about fearing for

his safety or needing protective custody. Second, while Defendants Viviano and

Morales were the first responders to Smith’s attack on Collins, there is no indication

that Smith was going to subsequently attack Mr. Seaman after the deputies broke up

the initial fight. Indeed, Viviano recalls that Smith was not immediately removed

from ISO-2 since he was compliant and showed no signs of aggression. Dkt. 82 at

39:19-24; 108:22-109:7. Morales testified Smith was not removed from ISO-2

immediately since he had complied with his verbal commands to get off Collins, and

Morales’ priority was to get the victim (Collins) away from the aggressor (Smith)

by moving Collins to another ISO cell. Dkt. 91-3 at 39:19-40:24, 45:10-16. When

Fain arrived at ISO-2 after hearing shouting, he recounted that additional deputies

were not called as “the situation was under control.” Dkt. 77 at 53:16-54:19. Fain

also recalls Smith being compliant and not attacking any other inmates or deputies

after breaking up the altercation with Collins. Id. at 86:1-87:5.

Third, Viviano, Morales, and Fain’s general awareness about Smith’s violent

history is not enough to satisfy the subjective component. Plaintiff is correct that

Smith has a history of fighting other inmates, and these fights are documented in

Incident Reports and Disciplinary Reports, which are available for all detention

deputies to view. Dkt. 91 at 9. Collins also specifically told Fain that another inmate

(allegedly Smith) had punched him during breakfast on May 13. Dkt. 77 at 27:4-12.

However, as shown in Carter, housing a low-security inmate (like Mr. Seaman) with

a maximum-security inmate (like Smith) who has a well-documented history of

violence—without more—is not enough to show that the three detention deputies

were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm posed to Mr.

Seaman. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349–50. Instead, the record only shows that

Viviano, Morales, and Fain might have been subjectively aware of a substantial risk

of serious harm posed to Collins, and the deputies reasonably acted upon that threat

by immediately entering ISO-2 to remove Smith from Collins’ neck, removing

Collins from the cell, and providing him with medical attention. Dkt. 82 at 38:23-

39:14, 40:10-17; Dkt. 91-3 at 42:13-44:4; Dkt. 77 at 51:4-53:12.

Put simply, to find Viviano, Morales, and Fain culpable, based on their

subjective awareness of Smith’s “propensity for being a problematic inmate,” would

“unduly reduce awareness to a more objective standard, rather than the required

subjective standard set by the Supreme Court.” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350; see

Johnson v. Boyd, 568 F. App’x 719, 722 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding attacker’s

destructive behavior in cell prior to attack did not sufficiently show a “strong

likelihood” of injury to plaintiff); Chatham v. Adcock, 334 F. App’x 281, 293 (11th

Cir. 2009) (finding no deliberate indifference shown where plaintiff’s fellow inmate

was a “problem inmate” with “violent tendencies,” and plaintiff asserted that fellow

inmate threatened him repeatedly in days before assault, but did not identify any

specific serious threat from fellow inmate which he then reported to any other

corrections officer before the assault on him); McBride v. Rivers, 170 F. App’x 648,

655 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding no subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm

where plaintiff merely advised he “had problems” with fellow inmate and stated he

was “in fear for [his] life” if placed in same cell with his eventual assailant, but “did

not identify a specific prior incident, from which the defendant could infer that a

substantial risk existed”); Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860, 863–64 (11th Cir.

2006) (“General knowledge about an inmate’s violent tendencies, without more

specific information about the risk, does not constitute deliberate indifference”).

Because no constitutional violation has been shown, the Court finds that Defendants

Morales, Fain, and Viviano are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s failure

to protect claims in Counts XII, XV, and XVI.

iii. Defendant Ronald Hensley

Next, nothing in the record indicates that Defendant Hensley was subjectively

aware of any danger facing Mr. Seaman before the fatal attack by Smith. Like

Defendant Fleurjean, Hensley was not on shift in S-Med at the time of Smith’s attack

on Collins and Mr. Seaman. Hensley was initially assigned to S-Med on May 13,

but was reassigned to “Building 7” at around 12:30 PM. Dkt. 79 at 65:3-21. Hensley

only returned to S-Med at around 4:00 PM to relieve Defendant Viviano. Id. at

65:22-66:4. Importantly, Hensley was not present during Smith and Collin’s

physical altercation and only heard about the incident from Defendant Viviano. Id.

at 68:5-25. When Hensley returned to S-Med in the afternoon, Collins and Smith

were already separated and removed from ISO-2. Id. at 69:3-24. Because Hensley

was in another part of the jail in the hours leading up to Smith’s fatal attack on Mr.

Seaman, Plaintiff cannot show Hensley was “aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed]” and that

Hensley “dr[ew] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

However, Plaintiff points to evidence showing that Hensley had subjective

knowledge of “John Smith’s propensity for violence” based on prior interactions

with Smith. Dkt. 91 at 9. Hensley had previously authored two incident reports

involving Smith fighting with other inmates, one dated May 4, 2021, and the other

on May 12, 2021. Dkt. 79 at 32:3-34:23; see Dkt. 91-8; Dkt. 91-9. Additionally, in

the early morning hours of May 13, Collins reported to Hensley that another inmate

(allegedly Smith) had punched him while showering. Dkt. 79 at 57:11-23.

Nevertheless, as discussed above, such facts might support a finding that Hensley

had a subjective awareness of a substantial risk of serious harm posed to Collins, but

not nearly enough to show Hensley was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk

of serious harm to Mr. Seaman. Again, “a general awareness of an inmate’s

propensity for being violent does not satisfy the subjective awareness

requirement.” Oliver, 587 F. App’x at 620 (citing Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350).

Plaintiff demonstrates at most that Defendant Hensley “only possessed an awareness

of [Smith’s] propensity for being a problematic inmate,” which alone does not

permit the “inferential leap” that Defendant Hensley had the culpable state of mind

under the stringent deliberate indifference standard. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

The Court finds Defendant Hensley is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s

failure to protect claim in Count XVII.

iv. Defendants Christopher Covey and Jesse Lovelace

Finally, the Court also finds Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently demonstrate the

subjective component of the deliberate indifference test as to Defendants Covey and

Lovelace. Both Lovelace and Covey worked the 6:00 PM to 6:00 AM shift in S-Med

on May 13-14, 2021. Dkt. 91-1 at 38:7-23; Dkt. 91-2 at 30:23-31:3. At the beginning

of their shift, Lovelace and Covey were briefed about the incident between Smith

and Collins, and both inmates had already been separated. Dkt. 91-1 at 29:10-30:2;

Dkt. 91-2 at 25:9-22. Lovelace testified that Smith had already been moved from S-

Med, away from Mr. Seaman, who was still in ISO-2. Dkt. 91-1 at 43:3-11. In other

words, because any substantial threat from Smith had long passed, there is no

possibility that Covey and Lovelace were subjectively aware that Mr. Seaman was

at risk of serious harm while he lay in ISO-2. Nor could they have disregarded any

possible risk since Smith was not even housed in S-Med at the time Covey and

Lovelace went on duty. Thus, there is no genuine dispute that Covey and Lovelace

did not have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind” that amounted to “deliberate

indifference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. The Court finds that Defendants Covey and

Lovelace are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims in

Counts XIII and XIV.

b. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

As discussed above, the “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs

of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” in violation

of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at

173). To prove a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a

plaintiff “must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry,” Farrow v. West,

320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003), and must establish a “necessary causal link”

between the challenged conduct and their injuries. Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d

1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019).

The objective inquiry turns on whether the plaintiff experienced an

“objectively serious medical need.” Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1243. On the other hand,

the subjective inquiry turns on whether the “prison official acted with an attitude of

‘deliberate indifference’ to [the] serious medical need.” Id. A prison official acted

with deliberate indifference if he (1) “was subjectively aware that the inmate was at

risk of serious harm”; (2) “disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law.’” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 839). The third prong will be satisfied only if the plaintiff shows “that

the defendant actually knew that his conduct—his own acts or omissions—put the

plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 1253. Even when a defendant has

subjective knowledge of a serious risk, “a defendant who ‘responds reasonably’ to

[such] a risk . . . ‘cannot be found liable’ under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1255

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845). “As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-

indifference standard sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment does not distinguish between the

two different deliberate indifference claims. Rather, Defendants lump the failure to

protect and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims into a single

analysis, arguing the subjective awareness prong has not been met for either type of

Section 1983 claim. See Dkt. 84 at 7–11. Plaintiff, however, properly separates the

two distinct claims and first argues Mr. Seaman had an objectively serious medical

need. The Court agrees.

“A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Mann v. Taser, Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d

1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “[T]he medical need must be one

that, if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farrow, 320 F.3d

at 1243 (citation and quotations omitted).

Here, a reasonable jury could easily find that Mr. Seaman had an objectively

serious medical need as he lay bleeding on the floor in ISO-2 for hours without

medical attention. See Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1122 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting

that “severe pain that is not promptly or adequately treated can present a serious

medical need”). The undisputed autopsy report showed Mr. Seaman suffered blunt

force trauma to the head, leading to a skull fracture and multiple contusions to his

brain. Dkt. 91-11 at 1, 5. These are serious medical injuries that ultimately proved

fatal. Id. at 1; see Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533, 1538 n.4 (11th Cir. 1990)

(collecting cases and noting that a “recent traumatic injury,” like a beating and sexual

assault, automobile accident, soft-tissue shoulder injury, or one-and-a-half inch

bleeding cut, is generally sufficient to demonstrate a serious medical need). Plaintiff

has sufficiently demonstrated that Mr. Seaman had a serious medical need.

The second element, deliberate indifference to that serious medical need,

requires Plaintiff to prove that each of the seven detention deputies was “actually,

subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff” and that they failed to “‘respond[ ] reasonably to the risk.’” Wade, 106

F.4th at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S at 844–45). “Each individual Defendant

must be judged separately and on the basis of what that person knows.” Burnette,

533 F.3d at 1331.

i. Defendant Marc Fleurjean

Plaintiff once again fails to present any evidence demonstrating Defendant

Fleurjean was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Seaman’s medical needs. Nothing in

the record indicates that Fleurjean had subjective knowledge of a “substantial risk

of serious harm” to Mr. Seaman at all, let alone one caused by his own

conduct. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262.

As previously discussed, Fleurjean was not even on duty in the South County

Jail at the time of Smith’s attack on Mr. Seaman. Dkt. 80 at 11:17-12:3, 36:14-37:2.

While Fleurjean worked another overnight shift on May 13-14, 2021, from 6:00 PM

to 6:00 AM, he was assigned to another part of the South County Jail. Id. at 37:9-21.

Fleurjean never went to S-Med during his May 13-14 shift, did not participate in any

subsequent investigation, and did not write a report about the incident. Id. at 39:3-

19. As such, Fleurjean cannot be deliberately indifferent to a medical need he is not

even aware of at the time. The Court finds that Defendant Fleurjean is entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need

in Count I.

ii. Defendants John Viviano, Jonathan Morales, and Jason Fain

As to Defendants Viviano, Morales, and Fain, the three deputies in S-Med at

the time of Smith’s attack on Mr. Seaman, the deliberate indifference element is a

much closer call.

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is

a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference

from circumstantial evidence . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. However,

“[g]eneralized awareness of a serious medical need is insufficient to state a claim of

deliberate indifference.” Collins v. Ferrell, No. 21-14027, 2024 WL 4677418, at *3

(11th Cir. Nov. 5, 2024). As such, a plaintiff must point to evidence showing “the

defendant prison official actually knew of a substantial risk of serious harm, not just

that he should have known.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1257 (emphasis in original).

Plaintiff argues that circumstantial evidence—which Farmer says the Court

may consider and from which the Court may draw reasonable inferences—indicates

that all three deputies knew Smith had attacked Mr. Seaman, and the Court may

further assume that all three knew that he faced a risk of serious harm without

medical attention. Dkt. 91 at 15–17. First, Plaintiff points to the investigative

photographs which show “blood on the walls as follows, west wall blood was present

upwards of 5 feet and 11 inches, north wall blood was present upwards [of] 6 feet

and 11 inches[,] and on the east wall blood upwards of 6 feet and 9 inches.” Id. at 15

(citing Dkt. 91-12). Blood was also found on the green blankets covering Mr.

Seaman and on the floor of ISO-2. See Dkt. 91-12 at 48–52. Based on this

“overwhelming physical evidence,” Plaintiff contends “a strong and reasonable

inference arises that the Detention Deputies must have seen the blood” because

“[t]he conditions of the cell were such that a visual inspection, even from outside the

door or during routine monitoring, would have revealed visible signs of injury and

violence.” Dkt. 91 at 16. Second, Plaintiff asserts that Viviano, Morales, and Fain

were all present or close by when Smith attacked Collins and put a foot on his neck.

Id. As such, Plaintiff argues that it is “unfathomable to believe that having observed

John Smith’s foot on Collins’ neck, the detention deputies would not perform a

safety/welfare check on an inmate in the same cell, regardless of whether there was

blood strewn about the cell.” Id. at 17. Once the three deputies went back to ISO-2

to remove Smith from the cell, “a reasonable inference arises that the deputies did,

in fact, observe Mr. Seaman in an injured state and deliberately disregarded what

they saw.” Id.

Defendant, on the other hand, argues there is no deliberate indifference

because Glanton, the fourth inmate in the cell, “gave no signal or indication

whatsoever that anything was wrong with [Mr. Seaman]. The Detention Deputies

were not constitutionally required to assume the worst when there was no subjective

knowledge of harm to [Mr. Seaman]. Nor does the lack of entering the ISO-2 cell to

physically shake or manipulate Plaintiff when he appeared to be sleeping show a

subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Dkt. 84 at 11.

Here, even when construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court cannot

reasonably infer that once Viviano, Morales, and Fain returned to ISO-2 to remove

Smith from the cell, they must have known about Mr. Seaman’s serious medical

need based on physically entering ISO-2, the speckles of blood on the walls, and Mr.

Seaman lying under a blanket that covered his injuries. While none of the three

deputies decided to check on Mr. Seaman’s welfare, despite having the ability to do

so after removing Smith and Collins from ISO-2, see Dkt. 82 at 48:16-19; Dkt. 77

at 63:19-64:6, the decision not to do so in hindsight does not mean it was

unreasonable. See Stalley, 124 F.4th at 1287 (“We know with the benefit of hindsight

that the decision did not succeed in saving Villegas’s life. But that does not mean it

was an unreasonable decision, much less a deliberately indifferent one.”); Powell v.

Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 924 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Qualified immunity leaves room for

mistaken judgments.”).

Plaintiff must point to evidence showing the three deputies “actually knew of

a substantial risk of serious harm, not just that he should have known.” Wade, 106

F.4th at 1257 (emphasis in original). First, Morales did not notice any blood on the

floor of ISO-2, and neither Nurse Broom nor Glanton informed Morales that Mr.

Seaman was hurt. Dkt. 91-3 at 72:10-73:9. Nor did Morales recall anyone in ISO-2

crying out in pain. Id. Second, Viviano also does not remember Mr. Seaman or

anyone else calling for help, nor does he remember seeing any blood on the floor

when he entered the cell to remove Smith. Dkt. 82 at 109:8-110:22. Finally, Fain

testified that it is not abnormal to see inmates constantly lying around, nor is it

common practice to physically wake up inmates during the 15-minute

observations.11 Dkt. 77 at 91:1-18. When Fain delivered Mr. Seaman’s food tray to

ISO-2 (following Smith’s removal), he did not recall seeing any blood or anything

abnormal about Mr. Seaman lying down. Id. at 92:9-15. Even though Mr. Seaman

failed to acknowledge his food tray, Fain testified that it is not “odd” for an inmate

to ignore the deputies when passing out food trays. Id. at 61:6-13.

At bottom, the three deputies were only actually aware of a situation between

Collins and Smith, and the deputies reasonably acted upon that threat by

immediately entering ISO-2 to remove Smith from Collins’ neck, moving Collins

from the cell to receive medical attention, and then separating Smith by placing him

in ISO-4 alone. Dkt. 82 at 38:23-39:14, 40:10-17, 44:18-45:4; Dkt. 91-3 at 42:13-

44:4; Dkt. 77 at 51:4-53:12. While Viviano, Morales, and Fain should have known

11 To the extent Plaintiff argues that the deputies should have been physically interacting with Mr. Seaman during

each 15-minute observation based on the Suicide Watch Policy, the Eleventh Circuit has previously found that failing

to follow jail policy does not constitute deliberate indifference, absent some evidence of subjective awareness of a

risk of harm to Mr. Seaman. See Stone v. Hendry, 785 F. App’x 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding that the improper

90-minute gap between cell checks, without evidence of subjective awareness of a risk of harm, cannot give rise to

establish a constitutional violation); Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 989 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding a 100-minute

gap between checks, which violated jail policy, did not constitute deliberate indifference); Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty.,

50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding a 150-minute gap between checks did not constitute deliberate

indifference).

that Mr. Seaman could have been attacked and severely injured during the ten to

fifteen minutes he was left alone with Smith, they cannot be held liable under the

Eighth Amendment for not appreciating that Mr. Seaman faced a serious medical

need, even if “the risk was obvious and a reasonable prison official would have

noticed it.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842 (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant

risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation,

cannot . . . be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”). Because no

constitutional violation has been shown, the Court finds that Defendants Morales,

Fain, and Viviano are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need claims in Counts II, V, and VI.

iii. Defendant Ronald Hensley

With regards to Defendant Hensley, nothing in the record indicates that

Defendant Hensley was subjectively aware of Mr. Seaman facing a serious medical

need after being attacked by Smith. Again, Hensley was not in S-Med at the time of

Smith’s attack on Collins and Mr. Seaman. He was reassigned to “Building 7” at

around 12:30 PM and only returned to S-Med at around 4:00 PM. Dkt. 79 at 65:3-

66:4. Hensley only heard about the incident between Smith and Collins from

Defendant Viviano after returning to S-Med. Id. at 68:5-25. Moreover, by the time

Hensley returned to S-Med in the afternoon, Smith had already been removed from

ISO-2 and separated from Mr. Seaman. Id. at 69:3-24. Conversely, Plaintiff has

presented no evidence that Hensley, once returning to S-Med in the afternoon, was

subjectively aware of Mr. Seaman’s injuries.

Because Hensley was in another part of the jail during Smith’s fatal attack on

Mr. Seaman and only subjectively knew about an (already resolved) altercation

between Smith and Collins after returning to S-Med, Plaintiff has failed to

demonstrate Hensley was “actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused

a substantial risk of serious harm to [Mr. Seaman].” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839). The Court finds Defendant Hensley is entitled to

qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to serious medical need

claim in Count VII.

iv. Defendants Christopher Covey and Jesse Lovelace

Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently demonstrate the

subjective component of the deliberate indifference test as to Defendants Covey and

Lovelace. As discussed previously, Lovelace and Covey worked the overnight shift

in S-Med on May 13-14, hours after Smith’s attack on Mr. Seaman. See Dkt. 83 ¶

25. At the beginning of their shift, Lovelace and Covey were briefed about the

incident between Smith and Collins, see Dkt. 91-1 at 29:10-30:2; Dkt. 91-2 at 25:9-

22, but Lovelace recalls that Smith had already been removed from S-Med entirely.

Dkt. 91-1 at 43:3-11. During the continuous 15-minute observation checks of the

“front cells” in S-Med, Lovelace only remembers that Mr. Seaman was lying down

under the green blanket. Dkt. 91-1 at 47:6-50:15. On the other hand, Covey did not

even observe Mr. Seaman as his 15-minute checks were on the “back cells” (not

ISO-2 where Mr. Seaman was being held). Dkt. 91-2 at 41:3-21.

Even after accepting the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Covey

and Lovelace’s conduct did not rise to the level of “subjective recklessness as used

in criminal law” because neither deputy disregarded Mr. Seaman’s serious medical

need. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255. Indeed, the criminal law standard finds

recklessness “only when a person disregards a risk of harm of which he is

aware[,]” id. at 1256, and neither Covey nor Lovelace was aware that Mr. Seaman

had a serious medical need until they began transferring S-Med inmates back to the

general population. In other words, Covey and Lovelace did not have any subjective

knowledge of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to Mr. Seaman once on shift, let

alone a risk caused by their own conduct. Id. at 1262.

Even if Covey and Lovelace had the requisite culpable mental state, a

defendant “‘cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause’ if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk.’” Id. at 1262 (quoting Farmer, 511

U.S. at 844–45). Here, the record shows that Covey and Lovelace reasonably

responded to Mr. Seaman’s medical needs by immediately calling for medical staff

once they became aware of a medical emergency. The facts show that at

approximately 7:30 PM, Lovelace and Covey were “clear[ing] off” S-Med by

transferring the inmates back to the general population buildings. Dkt. 91-1 at 62:9-

66:20. When Mr. Seaman failed to respond to Covey’s command to wake up, he

asked Glanton to check up on Mr. Seaman. Id. at 62:22-63:4; Dkt. 91-2 at 45:17-

47:7. When Covey noticed blood in the cell after Glanton moved Mr. Seaman, he

had Lovelace secure Glanton and immediately called for medical backup. Dkt. 91-2

at 45:17-47:7. Put simply, Covey and Lovelace took reasonable steps to reduce the

harm once they became aware of Mr. Seaman’s injuries. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at

620 (“An official responds to a known risk in an objectively unreasonable manner if

he knew of ways to reduce the harm but knowingly declined to act or if he knew of

ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

While Mr. Seaman ultimately passed away from his injuries, Covey and

Lovelace were not deliberately indifferent to Mr. Seaman’s medical needs.

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a substantial

risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they responded

reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”). The Court

finds that Defendants Covey and Lovelace are entitled to qualified immunity on

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims in Counts III and

IV.12

III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Policy Liability Claim

Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Judd in his

official capacity under Monell.13 The Supreme Court severely restricts municipality

liability under Section 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

694 (1978). For a municipality to be held liable, it must be directly responsible for

the unconstitutional acts, not simply under a theory of respondeat superior. See

Marsh v. Butler Cty., 268 F. 3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001).

“A county is liable under [section] 1983 if one of its customs, practices, or

policies was the moving force behind a constitutional injury.” Grochowski v.

Clayton Cnty., 961 F.3d 1311, 1321 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[A] plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated;

(2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

12 Even if a reasonable jury could find that Viviano, Morales, Fain, Hensley, Covey, and Lovelace were deliberately

indifferent to a serious medical need, the Court is doubtful that there is a genuine dispute as to the causation element.

Plaintiff summarily asserts, without any expert medical witness testimony, that a “reasonable jury could conclude the

failure to provide timely medical treatment to a known serious injury resulted in Mr. Seaman’s untimely death.” Dkt.

91 at 18. This unsupported, conclusory statement that Mr. Seaman would have survived if he had gotten medical

attention sooner is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Based on the Court’s review of the record, the only

possible causal link between the Detention Deputies’ deliberate indifference in failing to provide timely medical

treatment for four hours and Mr. Seaman’s death eight days later is Nurse Broom’s testimony that Mr. Seaman could

not have survived for four hours in the condition he was found in. Dkt. 91-4 at 58:5-14. However, Nurse Broom also

testified she could not provide an opinion on whether Mr. Seaman had progressively worsened over time, only that

Mr. Seaman “would not have lasted four hours without medical attention in the condition that he was in at that time.”

Id. at 58:15-21.

13 The Eleventh Circuit has found that “[w]hen, as here, the defendant is the county sheriff, the suit is effectively an

action against the governmental entity he represents.” Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402

F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005).

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the

violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Under

element two, “[a] plaintiff has two methods by which to establish a municipality’s

policy: identify either (1) an officially promulgated policy or (2) an unofficial

custom or practice shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the

municipality.” Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2018)

(alterations adopted). A single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient

to demonstrate a policy or custom for purposes of Section 1983 liability. Craig v.

Floyd Cnty., Ga., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011). Instead, a plaintiff must

establish the existence of a pattern of similar violations. Id. Alternatively, “[i]n the

absence of a series of constitutional violations from which deliberate indifference

can be inferred, the plaintiff must show that the policy itself is unconstitutional.” Id.

at 1311 (alteration adopted).

Here, Plaintiff does not identify any official policy or custom to which an

inmate’s serious medical need is ignored, nor does Plaintiff argue that the Suicide

Watch Policy is unconstitutional. Rather, Plaintiff contends that Sheriff Judd failed

to train his staff on the Suicide Watch Policy properly, and his deputies’ actions in

disregarding the policy mean that the Polk County Jail permitted a practice that

allowed “15-minute checks without verifying that the inmate was conscious,

responsive, or even alive.” Dkt. 91 at 24–25. The Court finds no merit in these

arguments. Again, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not shown any underlying

violation of Mr. Seaman’s constitutional rights. The lack of a constitutional violation

is dispositive of his claim for municipal liability. See Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-

Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming grant of summary

judgment for a county and supervising officers because “[t]here can be no policy-

based liability . . . when there is no underlying constitutional violation”).

Even if Plaintiff had shown an underlying violation, Plaintiff has not pointed

to any specific custom or policy that caused Mr. Seaman’s death. To the contrary,

Plaintiff’s expert witness agrees that there were adequate policies in place at the Polk

County Jail, see Dkt 91-10 at 19–20 (expert report of Aubrey Land), but instead

argues that the depositions of the Detention Deputies demonstrate their failure to

follow those policies, based on blatant inaccuracies in the observation logs. Dkt. 91

at 27–29. Such evidence forecloses any argument that Sheriff Judd had a policy that

caused Mr. Seaman’s death. No causation exists when employees do not follow

official policies. See Tittle v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir.

1994) (explaining that the county cannot be held liable “for the acts and omissions

of jail personnel that were contrary to [c]ounty policy”); Greenway v. S. Health

Partners, Inc., 827 F. App’x 952, 962 (11th Cir. 2020) (“No causation exists when

the policies were not followed.”); Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, Ala., 420

F.3d 1262, 1271 (11th Cir. 2005) (“It is only when the execution of the government’s

policy or custom inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable under

section 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted)).

However, Plaintiff points to Rogers v. Sheriff of Santa Rosa Cnty., Fla., No.

21-13994, 2023 WL 2566087, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2023), arguing that “customs

and practices for monitoring suicidal inmates that differed from the Polk County

Sheriff’s Office written policies” allow for a finding of liability against Sheriff Judd.

The Court disagrees and finds Rogers inapposite. In Rogers, the defendant sheriff

appealed a district court’s denial of its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law (“JMOL”) after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the Monell

claim. Rogers, 2023 WL 2566087, at *4. Despite written policies to the contrary,

testimony at trial showed the Santa Rosa County Jail had a practice or custom of (1)

permitting two of the three windows of a suicide watch cell to be covered, (2)

housing suicidal inmates in a cell with a metal partition that blocked a deputy’s view

from the booking desk, and (3) “allowing deputies to perform visual checks on

suicidal inmates by glimpsing the inmate through a cell window while the deputy

remained seated at the booking desk.” Id. at *3. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the

district court’s denial of the renewed JMOL since the jail’s deliberately indifferent

policies allowed “Escano-Reyes to be placed in a cell with a metal partition on which

a ligature could be tied and with the majority of its windows concealed by curtains

or other coverings. And contrary to the Jail’s written procedures, its custom allowed

deputies to monitor Escano-Reyes by performing a solely visual check—in this case,

merely seeing flashes of movement—from the booking desk rather than confirming

that he was safe.” Id. at *5.

Here, even construing the record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there

is no indication that, within the Polk County Jail,14 there was any policy or custom

that reached the level of deliberate indifference shown in Rogers. Setting aside the

fact that Rogers was a suicide case that had already gone to trial, the three policies

and customs identified by the Eleventh Circuit have no resemblance to the policies

at issue in this case. There are no allegations that, contrary to written policy, the Polk

County Jail has permitted the windows in ISO cells to be partially covered or that

Polk County correction deputies can conduct 15-minute checks of S-Med from the

booking desk. Rather, Plaintiff seems to assume that since the Detention Deputies

failed to follow Polk County’s written Suicide Watch Policy adequately, see Dkt.

91-13 at 2, there must have been a (deliberately indifferent) custom or practice

within the Polk County Jail that differed from the written policies. Dkt. 91 at 26–27.

The Court disagrees. When construing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the

depositions of the Detention Deputies demonstrate that they clearly failed to follow

Polk County’s Suicide Watch Policy, see id. at 27–28 (collecting depositions of

14 Because “a suit against a public official in his official capacity is considered a suit against the local government

entity he represents,” Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989), the Court refers to “Sheriff

Judd” and “the Polk County Jail” interchangeably in this section.

discrepancies in the observation log), but their failure to follow the written policy

does not automatically suggest that another custom or practice exists within the Polk

County Jail. Unlike in Rogers, where witnesses testified at trial about internal

customs within the jail that were contrary to written policy, Rogers, 2023 WL

2566087, at *3–4, the record here simply shows the Detention Deputies failed to

follow the written Suicide Watch Policy, not that the Detention Deputies were

following some alternative internal custom or practice within the Polk County Jail.

Plaintiff also argues that there is an unofficial custom or practice where

maximum-security inmates are allowed to be housed with minimum-security

inmates in S-Med. Dkt. 91 at 30–31. Plaintiff must show that Sheriff Judd had a

custom of permitting a constitutional violation and that this custom was the “moving

force” behind that violation. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (citing Grech v. Clayton Cnty.,

335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003)). A custom is “a practice that is so settled and

permanent that it takes on the force of the law.” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1290

(quotation omitted). A single incident cannot establish custom; instead, courts look

to a practice that is “longstanding and widespread.” Id. (citing Brown v. City of Fort

Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)). “A single incident of a

constitutional violation is insufficient to prove a policy or custom even when the

incident involves several subordinates.” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277,

1299 (11th Cir. 2023).

Here, setting aside that the Court already determined there has been no

underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence of a

longstanding and widespread history of constitutional violations in S-Med based on

the practice of allowing maximum-security inmates to be housed with minimum-

security inmates. The single incident involving Mr. Seaman is insufficient to impose

liability on Sheriff Judd. See Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310 (“This requirement of proof

prevents the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident ensures that a

municipality is held liable only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions

of its duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose acts may fairly be

said to be those of the municipality.” (citation and quotations omitted)). Again, there

is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Seaman’s death was

caused by inadequate policies rather than the failure (of the Detention Deputies) to

follow the constitutionally sound policies that were in place at the South County Jail.

Sheriff Judd is entitled to summary judgment on the Monell claim in Count XX.

IV. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train

Next, Plaintiff brings failure to train claims against Defendants Hensley15 and

Sheriff Judd in Counts XVIII and XIX. See Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 178-193; Dkt. 91 at 19. A

plaintiff can also demonstrate official policy by showing there is a policy of

15 Interestingly, Plaintiff brings a failure to train claim against Defendant Hensley, not Defendant Viviano. See Dkt. 1

¶ 179. Defendant Viviano was the deputy who oversaw Defendant Morales’ training on May 13, 2021. Dkt. 82 at

28:20-25; Dkt. 91-3 at 29:3-21, 31:3-24.

inadequate training or supervision. Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v.

City of Miami, 637 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “A plaintiff seeking to establish

municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an

employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal action

was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.”

Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407 (1997)

(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).

To establish that a city was “deliberately indifferent,” a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the municipality knew of the need to train in a particular area and

that it made a deliberate choice not to take any action. Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Deliberate indifference can be established in two

ways: (1) by demonstrating a widespread pattern of similar constitutional violations

by untrained employees, or (2) by showing that the need for training was so obvious

that a municipality’s failure to train its employees would result in a constitutional

violation. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 (2011); Gold, 151 F.3d at

1350–52. However, without actual or constructive notice of a need to train or

supervise in a particular area, a municipality is not liable as a matter of law for any

failure to train and supervise. Gold, 151 F.3d at 1351. A municipality may be put on

notice of a need to train if it “is aware that a pattern of constitutional violations

exists[.]” Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009); see

also Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference

for purposes of failure to train.” (internal citations omitted)).

As an initial matter, there is no evidence that Sheriff Judd had actual or

constructive notice that a particular inadequacy in the Suicide Watch Policy was

causing jail employees to violate the constitutional rights of inmates. Plaintiff has

presented no evidence of a pattern of similar prior constitutional violations by

untrained correction deputies in the South County Jail, which would establish actual

or constructive notice of a training deficiency. See Denham v. Corizon Health, Inc.,

675 F. App’x 935, 942–43 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (finding that two prior

incidents are not enough to support a failure to train theory against a county).

Plaintiff, however, relies on the “obvious” exception, arguing “the need for

regular, substantive training on suicide prevention protocols and 15-minute checks

is undeniably obvious.” Dkt. 91 at 22. “In some cases, the need for training is so

obvious that deliberate indifference can be established even without an earlier

violation of pattern of abuse[,]” as long as it was “obvious that the

municipality’s failure to train or supervise its employees would result in a

constitutional violation.” Am. Fed’n of Labor, 637 F.3d at 1189. However, the

Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that “the [obvious] exception creating municipal

liability under § 1983 for failure to train applies in only a very narrow range of

circumstances and a municipality’s culpability ‘is at its most tenuous where a claim

turns on failure to train.’” Mingo v. City of Mobile, Ala., 592 F. App’x 793, 800 (11th

Cir. 2014) (first citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 398 and then quoting Connick, 563 U.S.

at 61). Indeed, “this [obvious] standard is difficult to meet,” Denham, 675 F. App’x

at 942, and a “single instance of unconstitutional conduct can create Monell liability

only when ‘proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing

unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal

policymaker.’” Martin v. City of Macon Ga., 702 F. App’x 941, 944 (11th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Schmelz v. Monroe Cty., 954 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1992)).

Here, Plaintiff does not argue that the Suicide Watch Policy (or any other Polk

County Jail policy) is unconstitutional. Instead, Plaintiff contends the depositions

from Viviano, Morales, Covey, Lovelace, and Fain—in which all the deputies admit

they were “probably” trained on the Suicide Watch Policy at some point at the

beginning of their employment but never received continuing training—

demonstrates “a systemic failure to adequately train detention deputies on suicide

watch procedures, a failure so widespread and fundamental that it rises to the level

of deliberate indifference.” Dkt. 91 at 20–22 (collecting depositions). The Court

disagrees.

Plaintiff concedes that the Detention Deputies received training at some point

on the Suicide Watch Policies, but that the failure to “provide ongoing instruction,

reinforcement, or oversight” shows deliberate indifference. Dkt. 91 at 23. However,

the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that when a government official receives some

training pursuant to constitutional policies, the “obvious” exception does not apply.

See Mingo, 592 F. App’x at 802 (finding the defendant officers received training at

the beginning of their employment at the police academy, and “because the City

provides training on the use of a four-point restraint and the identification of the

mentally ill—training pursuant to policies that Ms. Mingo concedes are

constitutional—the City cannot be held liable under § 1983”); Lewis, 561 F.3d at

1293–94 (finding no § 1983 liability where the record contained evidence showing

that the city did provided “some training on the use of the hobbles[,]” and concluding

that the use of the hobble restraint “does not rise to the level of obviousness reserved

for a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights may be a

highly predictable consequence of a failure to provide adequate training.” (citation

omitted and alteration accepted)).

Additionally, on the issue of whether it was deliberately indifferent to not have

the Detention Deputies received continuing training on S-Med policies, the Eleventh

Circuit has found “[i]t will not ‘suffice to prove that an injury or accident could have

been avoided if an officer had better or more training, sufficient to equip him to

avoid the particular injury-causing conduct.’” Mingo, 592 F. App’x at 801–02

(quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390). “This is so because even adequately

trained officers will sometimes make mistakes, and the fact that they do so does not

necessarily indicate that the training program is inadequate.” Id. at 802. As such,

because Sheriff Judd provided some training on the Suicide Watch Policy (and that

the training was pursuant to policies that Plaintiff never argues are unconstitutional),

Sheriff Judd cannot be held liable under Section 1983.

Accordingly, Defendant Hensley16 is entitled to summary judgment on

the individual capacity failure to train claim against him in Count XVIII, and Sheriff

Judd is entitled to summary judgment on the official capacity failure to train

claim against him in Count XIX.

V. Wrongful Death Claims under Fla. Stat. § 768.28

Finally, Plaintiff brings state law wrongful death claims in Counts XXI–

XXVII. See Dkt. 1 at 53–68. Florida has waived sovereign immunity for torts

committed by government employees, including ordinary negligence claims against

jail officials. Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1); see also Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of

Monroe Cnty., Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1119 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder Florida

law, a county’s treatment of an individual inmate in its custody is an operational

function, for which the State of Florida has waived governmental immunity.”).

Indeed, Florida agencies or subdivisions—here, Sheriff Judd in his official

16 Defendant Hensley was not in a supervisory role and was not responsible for training anyone on May 13, 2021. The

record undisputedly shows that it was Defendant Viviano who was in charge of training Defendant Morales on the

day in question, not Hensley. See Dkt. 82 at 28:20-25; Dkt. 91-3 at 29:3-21, 31:3-24.

capacity—may be sued and “held liable for an employee’s intentional act(s) as long

as the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment and the act

or omission is not committed in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner

exhibiting wanton and willful disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” City of Boynton

Beach v. Weiss, 120 So. 3d 606, 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (first citing City of Miami

v. Simpson, 172 So.2d 435, 437 (Fla. 1965); and then citing Fla. Stat. § 768.28). It

is uncontested that the Detention Deputies’ actions were within the scope of their

employment.

The Wrongful Death Act, Fla. Stat. § 768.16, is a tort under Florida law. To

establish a negligence-based wrongful death action, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the

existence of a legal duty owed to the decedent, (2) breach of that duty, (3) legal or

proximate cause of death was that breach, and (4) consequential damages.” Acosta

v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F.4th 1233, 1242 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Jenkins v. W.L.

Roberts, Inc., 851 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)). “It is long established that,

under Florida law, corrections officers owe individuals within their custody a duty

to use reasonable care for their safety.” Cook, 402 F.3d at 1119. The plaintiff bears

the burden of proving causation, see Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d

1063, 1069 (11th Cir. 2004), but she needn’t necessarily submit expert testimony to

do so. See Claire's Boutiques v. Locastro, 85 So. 3d 1192, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Florida law follows the “more likely than not” standard of causation and requires

proof that the defendant’s conduct probably caused the plaintiff’s injury. Gooding v.

University Hosp. Bldg., Inc., 445 So. 2d 1015, 1018 (Fla. 1984).

As an initial matter, the Court grants summary judgment on the wrongful

death claim in Count XXI that relates to Defendant Fleurjean. As previously

discussed, Fleurjean was not on duty at the South County Jail when Smith attacked

Mr. Seaman, nor was he assigned to S-Med upon his return to duty in the afternoon

of May 13, 2021. Dkt. 80 at 11:17-12:3, 17:23-25, 37:9-21. Plaintiff has cited no

evidence that Fleurjean breached his duty to Mr. Seaman when the deputy was not

physically present in the South County Jail during the entire incident. Thus, Sheriff

Judd is entitled to summary judgment on the wrongful death claim arising from any

of Fleurjean’s acts or omissions.

However, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the

other six detention deputies—Viviano, Morales, Fain, Hensley, Covey, and

Lovelace—were negligent in failing to take steps to protect Mr. Seaman and provide

medical care following Smith’s attack and that their acts and omissions caused his

death. Indeed, while the Court found that the six deputies did not have subjective

knowledge that rose to “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,” a

reasonable jury could still find that (1) the decision to keep Smith in ISO-2 after he

attacked another inmate, (2) being physically present inside ISO-2 without seeing

the any blood, (3) seeing Mr. Seaman lying motionless on the floor (supposedly

asleep) after a violent flight in his cell, (4) failing to check on Mr. Seaman’s welfare

for four hours despite conducting 15-minute checks, and (5) numerous discrepancies

in the S-Med observation logs could—when considered together—constitute a

breach of duty that more likely than not caused Mr. Seaman’s death.

Accordingly, at the summary-judgment stage, where the Court must construe

the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Ms. Seaman has done enough to go

to trial on her wrongful death claims. The Court denies Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the wrongful death claim in Counts XXII–XXVII.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 84, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

1. Summary judgment is GRANTED on the following Counts:

a. Marc Fleurjean (Individual Capacity) — Count I- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to

Protect Claim

b. Jonathan Morales (Individual Capacity) — Count II- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure

to Protect Claim

c. Christopher Covey (Individual Capacity) — Count III- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XIII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure

to Protect Claim

d. Jesse Lovelace (Individual Capacity) — Count IV- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XIV- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure

to Protect Claim

e. Jason Fain (Individual Capacity) — Count V- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Deliberate

Indifference Claim and Count XV- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Protect

Claim

f. John Viviano (Individual Capacity) — Count VI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim and Count XVI- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure

to Protect Claim

g. Ronald Hensley (Individual Capacity) — Count VII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Deliberate Indifference Claim, Count XVII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to

Protect Claim, and Count XVIII- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Failure to Train Claim

h. Sheriff Grady Judd (Official Capacity) — Count XIX- 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Failure to Train Claim, Count XX- 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Policy Liability

Claim, and Count XXI Wrongful Death Claim under Fla. Stat. § 768.28.

2. Summary Judgment is DENIED on Counts XXII–XXVII Wrongful Death

Claims under Fla. Stat. § 768.28 against Sheriff Grady Judd (Official Capacity).

DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on July 11, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record