Haddix v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

A.K.H.,1 §

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Plaintiff, §

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v. § 4:24-CV-1263-BR

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COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY §

ADMINISTRATION, §

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Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on December 27, 2024 to initiate judicial

review of a Social Security Administration decision denying benefits under the Social Security

Act. (ECF 1). On January 2, 2025, the undersigned2 issued a Scheduling Order requiring

Defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint on or before

February 25, 2025. (ECF 5 at 1). That Scheduling Order also provided thirty days after Defendant’s

answer for Plaintiff to file a brief “setting forth all errors that Plaintiff contends entitle Plaintiff to

relief.” (Id. at 2).

Now before the Court is Defendant’s February 21, 2025 Motion to Dismiss. (ECF 11).

Defendant moves the Court to dismiss this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

1 It is the undersigned’s practice to identify the plaintiff using only the first and last initial in filings in social security

disability cases. This ensures that the public maintains access to the opinions (in compliance with Rule 5.2(c)(2)(B)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the E-Government Act of 2002) while still protecting the privacy of non-

government parties’ identities within the opinion.

2 Pursuant to the Northern District of Texas Special Order No. 30-350 (Sep. 11, 2023), this case was originally assigned

to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to serve as presiding judge, with parties instructed to inform the

Court if they intended to withhold consent to disposition by magistrate judge. (See ECF 2, 3).

12(b)(6) on the grounds that Plaintiff’s Complaint was not filed by the applicable deadline. (Id.

at 1). Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s Motion on February 23, 2025. (ECF 12). After reviewing

the filings of the parties and the applicable law, for the following reasons, the Court finds the

Motion should be GRANTED.

I. APPLICABLE LAW

Under the Social Security Act (the “Act”), a person may qualify for benefits (like

supplemental security income or disability insurance) if they are disabled. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§

423(a)(1). When the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”) makes a final, unfavorable

decision on a person’s application for benefits, the Act allows applicants to have that decision

reviewed by a United States District Court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). The lawsuits that result, like this

one, are controlled by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and by the specific rules created to

supplement them for only these cases. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. SOC. SEC. (1)(a)–(b).

The Act only allows a person who has received an unfavorable Social Security decision to

seek review in the Courts “by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him

of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may

allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The SSA considers this sixty-day clock to begin when the person

receives the notice, which it presumes will happen within five days after the notice is sent to the

person. 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c).

The requirement that the lawsuit commence within sixty days stems from the general rule

of sovereign immunity. The federal government of the United States, which includes the

Commissioner of Social Security and the Social Security Administration, cannot be sued in Court

unless the United States Congress allows it. Block v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273, 287 (1983). In the Act,

Congress has waived sovereign immunity, but only for lawsuits commenced within sixty days.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Bowen v. New York, 476 U.S. 467, 478 n.10 (1986).

Congress allows the Commissioner of Social Security to extend this sixty-day waiver.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bowen, 476 U.S. at 479. If the Commissioner declines to do so, Courts can

only extend or “toll” the deadline through their inherent and discretionary powers of equity.

Equitable tolling is available when a litigant has diligently pursued some legal right, but has been

obstructed by some extraordinary circumstance beyond their control. Menominee Indian Tribe v.

United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255–57 (2016); accord Vuoncino v. Forterra, Inc., 140 F.4th 200,

208 (5th Cir. 2025). Without an extension from either the Commissioner or the Court, a suit

commenced after the sixty-day period is barred by sovereign immunity.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing

a complaint with the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 3. They also clarify that “[a] paper not filed

electronically is filed by delivering it[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d)(2). Together, these rules mean that

the deadline established by the Act is the deadline for a person’s complaint to be delivered to the

Court in which they seek review. With the exception of incarcerated persons, whose papers are

deemed filed when they deliver them to prison authorities, this rule of timing applies to everybody,

including pro se plaintiffs. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998); see generally

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (creating the so-called “prison mailbox rule” under rules of

procedure not applicable to this proceeding).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that periods of time are measured by

“exclud[ing] the day of the event that triggers the period; count[ing] every day, including

intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and includ[ing] the last day of the period[.]”

FED R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(A)–(C). They also provide that when the last day falls on “a Saturday,

Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a

Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.” Id. at 6(a)(1)(C). For example, if the sixtieth day after a person

receives notice of an unfavorable Social Security decision is a Saturday, they are automatically

given until the end of the next business day to file their complaint. The Rules list what counts as a

“legal holiday,” and it includes Christmas Day and others. Id. at 6(a)(6).

Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for dismissal of a complaint when that

complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Among

other reasons, a complaint may fail to state a claim for relief due to legal insufficiency of the

allegations it includes. Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385-6 (5th

Cir. 2017). For example, if there is a law that says people in a certain situation cannot succeed in

their lawsuit, and the complaint shows the plaintiff to be in that situation, then the complaint fails

to state a claim for relief.

Ordinarily, when deciding whether to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court

only considers evidence and statements that are contained within the complaint and any documents

the plaintiff attached to it. If the Court needs to look to other matters to make a determination on

dismissal, the rules require the Court to treat them under the framework of summary judgment,

and to give all parties “a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the

motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).

Summary judgment is controlled by Rule 56. That Rule requires the Court to rule on claims

and defenses if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” such that one party is “entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is non-genuine if no

reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for one side, and is immaterial if its resolution does

not affect the outcome of the action. Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233,

235 (5th Cir. 2003) and Crowe v. Henry, 115 F.3d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1997).

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s lawsuit because the SSA Appeals Council

notified her by mail sent October 17, 2024 that it was denying her application, which was more

than sixty-five days before Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit. (ECF 11 at 2). To prove this,

Defendant submitted a declaration made under penalty of perjury by an official employed at the

SSA. (Id. at 10–13). Defendant also included a copy of the notice and a copy of the most recent

unfavorable decision by an Administrative Law Judge (an “ALJ”), the decision that was being

upheld by the Appeals Council. (Id. at 14–38). Because these submissions were not included in

the pleadings, the Court must convert Defendant’s Motion to one for summary judgment.

Plaintiff, in her response, avers that she did not receive the notice from the Appeals Council

until Friday, October 25, 2024, and that she deposited her Complaint with the United States Postal

Service on Monday, December 23, 2024. (ECF 12 at 1–2). She argues this was timely, beginning

with the provision included in the notice, that “[t]he 60 days start the day after you receive this

letter.” (Id.; accord ECF 11 at 35). Accordingly, she starts with Saturday, October 26, 2024, and

counting sixty days from there, finds the sixtieth day was Christmas Day, December 25, 2024.

(ECF 12 at 2). Because Christmas Day is a legal holiday, she reasons that her deadline fell on

December 26, 2024. (Id.). Finally, Plaintiff notes a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure allowing that a

document postmarked before a deadline and received within ten days of the deadline will be

deemed timely filed. (Id.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 5.3 Because her Complaint was mailed before

December 26, and was received by the Court December 27, 2024, less than ten days after

December 26, Plaintiff concludes that it was timely filed. (ECF 12 at 2).

3 Plaintiff specifically refers to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 500.5(b), which is the rule of practice in Texas Justice

Courts. Rule 5 provides the same thing for practice in Texas State Courts generally.

Plaintiff’s analysis contains two errors. The first, which would not be fatal on its own, is

measuring the sixty-day period by counting sixty days after Saturday, October 26, the day after

she received the notice. The provision in the notice from the SSA, that “[t]he 60 days start the day

after you receive this letter[,]” accurately reflects the principle more precisely stated in the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; when measuring a period, you exclude the day of the triggering event

and count every day after it. FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(A)–(B). In other words, Saturday, October 26

was “Day One” of the period, but Plaintiff treats it as “Day 0” instead. Accordingly, the actual last

day of the sixty-day period was Tuesday, December 24.4

Plaintiff’s fatal error is relying on the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which do not apply

in federal court. Plaintiff placed her Complaint in the mailbox December 23, it was postmarked

December 24, and it was received by the Court December 27. (ECF 12 at 2; see also ECF 1 at 11).

Because Plaintiff is not incarcerated, the only of these dates that concerns the Court is the last one.

Because Plaintiff’s complaint was not filed electronically, it was filed when it was delivered to the

Court, and her lawsuit commenced December 27. FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 5(d)(2)(A).

There is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff requested an extension from the

Commissioner. The Motion to Dismiss in this case indicates that the Commissioner declines to

extend the limitations period now. (See ECF 11 at 6–8). There is also no evidence in the record

that Plaintiff was prevented from timely bringing her suit by any extraordinary circumstance

outside of her control. Instead, it appears that she simply misunderstood the applicable rules and

miscalculated the deadline. As courts have often held in prisoner cases, this is not sufficient

justification for equitable tolling, even for pro se plaintiffs. E.g., Howland v. Quarterman, 507

4 This is one day after the last day that would have applied under the SSA’s five-day presumption; the notice was

mailed October 17, and the sixty-fifth day after that was Saturday, December 21, which then extends to Monday,

December 23.

F.3d 840, 845 (Sth Cir. 2007) (regarding a pro se prisoner’s mistaken belief that the Texas mailbox

rule applied to his state habeas corpus application).

Reviewing the evidence Plaintiff submitted in the light most favorable to her, no reasonable

factfinder could dispute that she received notice of the Commissioner’s unfavorable decision

October 25, or that she commenced this suit to challenge that decision on December 27. Because

the latter date is more than sixty days after the earlier date, and there is nothing extending the Act’s

waiver of sovereign immunity in this case, the Commissioner is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.

Tl. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs claims. Having

reviewed Defendant’s Motion (ECF 11) and the applicable law, the undersigned finds the Motion

should be GRANTED. The Court will separately issue judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTERED July 11, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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