The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JEFFERY SCOTT BROWN, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action 1:24-cv-690
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Jeffery Scott Brown, Jr., an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the
assistance of counsel, sues Defendant Officer Cox under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force
and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Compl., ECF No. 7; July 3, 2025 Op. &
Order, ECF No. 19.) This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief
seeking transfer to another facility. (ECF No. 18.) For the following reasons, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief.
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 2, 2024, advancing claims against several
officers and employees of Lebanon Correctional Institute and the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants used excessive force and were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution or failed to provide a remedy for the use of excessive force. (Compl., ECF
No. 7.) On March 5, 2025, after performing an initial screen under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A, the undersigned recommended dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims apart from his
individual-capacity Eighth Amendment excessive force and medical indifference claims against
Officer Cox for damages arising out of a use of force on June 28, 2024. (ECF No. 13.) The
District Judge adopted that report and recommendation on March 24, 2025 (ECF No. 14) and
affirmed that decision on reconsideration on July 3, 2025. (ECF No. 19.) Notably, the District
Judge adopted the undersigned’s recommendation that all claims other than those arising out of
the June 28, 2024 incident with Officer Cox (i.e., those related to an August 8, 2024 use of force
by Officer Hayes) be severed and dismissed without prejudice because those claims were
unrelated and misjoined to the claims against Cox. (ECF Nos. 14, 19.)
Plaintiff now moves for an injunctive relief in the form of transfer to another facility to
prevent retaliation from “the named Defendants.” (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff alleges that, in addition
to the excessive force incidents involving Defendant Cox and nonparty Officer Hayes, Plaintiff
has been subjected to two other incidents of excessive force by nonparty Officer Reeves on
February 13, 2025, and by nonparty Captain Link on an unspecified date. (ECF No. 18.) Reeves
and Link are not, and have never been, Defendants in this action. Plaintiff “fears that further
retaliation is imminent once the named Defendants receive their summons notice.” (ECF No.
18.)
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the
movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet
v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cty. Gov., 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000). In determining whether to issue a preliminary
injunction, the Court must examine four factors: (1) whether the movant has shown a strong
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is not issued; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm
to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction. Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not made the necessary showing of a strong likelihood of success on
the merits. Plaintiff faces a significant burden of proving that Cox’s use of force “was applied . . .
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” rather than “in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). It is not unlikely that Defendant Cox will provide a differing
account of the June 28, 2024 incident, such that the Court’s resolution of Plaintiff’s claim will
require credibility determinations that cannot be made at this stage. Thus, the record currently
available to the Court is not sufficient to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the
merits. See Johnson v. Payton, No. 13-11437, 2013 WL 1843979 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2013)
(denying preliminary injunctive relief where likelihood of success on prisoner’s claims depended
upon credibility assessments).
Moreover, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to be subject to irreparable
harm absent a transfer. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Cox used excessive force more than a year
ago on June 28, 2024, but does not allege any further incidents involving Officer Cox. “Past
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (cleaned up). And, as already determined by the
District Judge, discrete uses of force by other prison staff are not the proper subject of this
lawsuit. Thus, additional uses of force by Officer Hayes, Officer Reeves, and Captain Link
cannot satisfy the irreparable harm requirement. See Jeter v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No.
1:17-CV-756, 2018 WL 5783691, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, 2019 WL 296190 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2019) (refusing to “enjoin non-parties” when
“Plaintiff fail[ed] to allege that any of the named Defendants who remain in this case have taken
any action against him”).
Finally, Officer Cox as an individual lacks the power to unilaterally effect Plaintiff’s
transfer. The injunction that Plaintiff seeks is essentially an order requiring the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction to transfer Plaintiff to another facility. But the Department is
not a party to this action and the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction over it for purposes of
Plaintiff’s motion. And an extra-jurisdictional injunction would hardly serve the public interest.
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s Motion for
Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 18.)
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE