MOORE v. DAVIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

KELLI MOORE, CHARLES )

MOORE, J. S. M., )

J. L. M.,1 )

)

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. )

) No. 1:23-cv-00089-JPH-MG

CHARLA DAVIS, )

REECIA BELLAMY,2 )

LEIGH ANNE MOORE, )

DAVID BALMER, )

)

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs Kelli and Charles Moore allege that Indiana Department of

Child Services ("DCS") caseworkers violated their Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process rights to familial integrity by conducting a wellness

check at the Moores' home of two minors who the Moores had recently adopted.

The remaining Defendants have moved for summary judgment. Dkt. [85].

For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS that motion.

1 The parties use "J.D.M." instead of "J.L.M." For consistency, the Court does the

same.

2 The clerk is directed to update the docket to reflect that Ms. Bellamy's first name is

spelled "Reecia." See dkt. 86 at 6.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule

56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party's

favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

A. The Moores' foster period

Plaintiffs Kelli Moore and Charles Moore, a married couple, began

fostering J.S.M. and J.D.M. in June 2020. Dkt. 82-1 at 18; dkt. 83-1. On

September 23, 2020, J.S.M. and J.D.M. were adjudicated by a judge in a

Marion County court to be in need of services. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. v.

C.M., 202 N.E.3d 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (unpublished table decision).

Between February and April 2021, DCS received four allegations of child

abuse and neglect against the Moores as to J.S.M., J.D.M., and the Moores'

biological children. Dkt. 83-2. DCS investigated and concluded that these

reports were unsubstantiated. Dkts. 83-5; 83-6; 83-7; 83-8; 83-9.

Defendant Charla Davis, the ongoing permanency Family Case Manager

("FCM") assigned to J.S.M. and J.D.M.'s child in need of services ("CHINS") case

pending in Marion County, remained concerned that the children suffered

abuse and neglect in the Moores' home. Dkt. 82-5 at 9, 34–37, 164. She

found the children's multiple reports of abuse and neglect credible because the

children made those reports numerous times to her and their reports were

consistent in her separate meetings with them. Id.

In April 2021, the Marion County CHINS court granted a motion to

modify the children's foster placement. Dkt. 83-3. From that time until

December 2021, J.S.M. and J.D.M. remained in a foster placement outside the

Moores' home. C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446. In November 2021, the Moores filed

petitions in Hamilton Superior Court to adopt the children. Id.

B. The Moores' adoption petition is granted and J.S.M. and J.D.M.

are transferred to their custody

The Hamilton County adoption court granted the Moores' petition to

adopt J.S.M. and J.D.M. on December 2, 2021. Id. The Moores received notice

of the adoption decree at about 8:30 a.m. the next morning, on December 3,

2021. Id. By 10:00 a.m. that morning, the Moores had taken custody of the

children. Id.; see also dkt. 82-1 at 70.

At about 3:30 p.m. that day, FCM Davis, Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL")

Monique Miller, and a Henry County sheriff's deputy arrived at the Moores'

home. C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446. FCM Davis had learned that morning that

J.D.M. had a strong negative reaction to learning about the adoption and had

to be placed in the car while kicking and screaming about it. Dkt. 82-5 at 119–

20. She had also learned that the children were sick, and she wanted to

ensure that the Moores knew about their illness and that J.D.M. had her

prescribed medicine. Id. at 118–19, 124–25. FCM Davis did not observe these

events firsthand. Dkt. 90-1 at 68–70. Upon learning this information,

Defendant Reecia Bellamy, an FCM Supervisor, instructed FCM Davis to go to

the Moores' home to check on the children. Dkt. 82-3 at 58. The Marion

County CHINS case remained open at this time, and FCM Davis believed that

she was still responsible for the children's wellbeing. Dkt. 82-5 at 124–25; see

also dkt. 82-1 at 73, 77.

When FCM Davis arrived with GAL Miller and the sheriff's deputy, Mr.

Moore told them to get off the Moores' property. Dkt. 90-3 at 13. FCM Davis

told the Moores that "they were going to take the kids back from" the Moores if

the Moores did not allow a welfare check on the children3 because "they were

still the State of Indiana's kids." Dkt. 90-4 at 9–11. The sheriff's deputy told

the Moores that they "had to let them in" because FCM Davis and GAL Miller

had "a removal letter, they're wanting to remove the kids." Dkt. 90-4 at 9; dkt.

90-3 at 8–9. That removal letter, however, discussed the removal of the

children from their biological parents, not the Moores. Dkt. 90-3 at 8–9. FCM

Davis did not tell the Moores that the removal letter did not authorize DCS or

the sheriff's deputy to take J.S.M. and J.D.M. Dkt. 90-1 at 91–93.

After this initial interaction, the Moores called their attorney. Dkt. 82-5

at 138. The Moores' attorney then spoke on the phone with DCS's attorney.

Id. After the attorneys conferred, FCM Davis and GAL Miller conducted the

wellness check. Id. The Moores allowed the wellness check only "under the

threat of the kids being removed from [their] house and arrest." Dkt. 90-3 at

14–15.

3 FCM Davis denies making this statement, but the Court recites the facts in the light

most favorable to the Moores. See dkt. 86 at 14 (citing dkt. 82-5 at 139–40).

The wellness check lasted about thirty minutes. Dkt. 82-1 at 88. FCM

Davis was in the Moores' home for about twenty minutes. Id. During the visit,

FCM Davis "searched the house" and observed the children. Id. at 78, 88. She

did not attempt to remove the children from the home during or after the visit.

Id. at 88.

C. Procedural history

The Moores brought constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against FCM Davis, Supervisor Bellamy, Henry County DCS Defendants FCM

Leigh Anne Gebele and Supervisor David Balmer (collectively "State

Defendants"), and GAL Miller. Dkt. 27. The Moores alleged that the

Defendants violated their Fourth Amendment rights and Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights. The Court dismissed the claims against GAL

Miller. Dkt. 51. The Moores also voluntarily dismissed their Fourth

Amendment claims. Dkt. 65.

The only claim remaining is the Moores' Fourteenth Amendment due

process claim against the State Defendants, who now move for summary

judgment. Dkt. 85.

II.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must

inform the Court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence

demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this

burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify

"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. In

ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence "in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in that party's favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation omitted).

III.

Analysis

In their summary judgment briefing, the Moores abandoned their due

process claims against FCM Gebele and Supervisor Balmer. Dkt. 91 at 1, 26–

27. State Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to FCM Gebele and

Supervisor Balmer is therefore GRANTED.

The only remaining claim is the Moores' Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process familial integrity claim against FCM Davis and

Supervisor Bellamy.4 FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that they are

entitled to summary judgment on the Moores' claim based on qualified

immunity. Dkts. 86, 92.

A. Qualified immunity standard

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

4 Neither side addresses any Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim in

their summary judgment briefs. Dkts. 86, 91, 92. To the extent the Moores maintain

a procedural due process claim against FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy, the Court

finds they have abandoned that claim. See Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588,

597–98 (7th Cir. 2003).

of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S.

7, 11 (2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). This

"clearly established" standard ensures "that officials can 'reasonably . . .

anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.'" Reichle v.

Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 646 (1987)). Qualified immunity thus "balances two important interests—

the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power

irresponsibly and the need to shield officers from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.

The "difficult part" of the qualified-immunity test is "identifying the level of

generality at which the constitutional right must be clearly established."

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 2013). A "high level of

generality" is not appropriate; instead, the question is "whether the law was

clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he

acted." Id.

B. Clearly established law

To meet their burden of showing that a constitutional right is "clearly

established," the Moores must "show either a reasonably analogous case that

has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a factual circumstance

similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so obvious that a

reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as a violation of the

law." Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701. FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy are

therefore entitled to qualified immunity unless precedent "squarely governs"

the case at hand. Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S. 194, 201 (2004)). The Court assesses qualified immunity "in light of all

relevant precedent," regardless of whether it was cited by the plaintiff. Taylor v.

Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 487 (7th Cir. 2025).

The Moores allege FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy violated their

Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to familial integrity by

conducting the December 3 wellness check after the adoption petitions had

been granted. The Moores bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS

caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful." Sebesta v.

Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 234 (7th Cir. 2017).

The Fourteenth Amendment protects the "right to freedom from undue

state interference with family relations." Id. at 232. "This includes the parents'

right 'to bear and raise their children' and the child's right 'to be raised and

nurtured by his parents.'" Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d

463, 478 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Siliven v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 635 F.3d

921, 928 (7th Cir. 2011)). "The constitutional right to familial integrity is not

absolute; rather, it must be balanced against the state's interest in protecting

children from abuse." Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928. To achieve that balance,

"caseworkers must have 'some definite and articulable evidence giving rise to a

reasonable suspicion' of past or imminent danger of abuse before they may

take a child into protective custody." Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478 (quoting

Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also

Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235 ("[T]he state actors needed evidence supporting a

reasonable suspicion of abuse or neglect in order to report, investigate, and

'indicate' [plaintiff]."). "This 'reasonable suspicion' standard is an objective

one," Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 233, that requires "more than a hunch but less than

probable cause," Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928 (internal quotations omitted).

The following facts are undisputed as to what FCM Davis and Supervisor

Bellamy knew when they initiated the December 3 wellness check at about

3:30 p.m.:

• The Hamilton County adoption petition giving the Moores custody of

J.S.M. and J.D.M. had been granted the day before.

• The Moores took custody of the children by 10:00 a.m. on December

3.

• The Marion County CHINS case was still open and pending at that

time.

• FCM Davis was the ongoing permanency caseworker assigned to that

CHINS case.

• The Defendants had received a report after the Moores took custody

but before initiating the wellness check that one of the children was

sick and had a strong negative reaction when the Moores took

custody, kicking and screaming while being placed into the Moores'

vehicle.

Additionally, the parties dispute whether FCM Davis and the sheriff's deputy

threatened to remove the children from the Moores' home if they did not allow

the wellness check, but the Court assumes for the sake of this analysis that

these threats were made.

The question here is whether a reasonable DCS caseworker would have

known that it was clearly unlawful to conduct a wellness check under these

circumstances. See Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235; Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 475.

1. Pending CHINS case

The first issue is whether a reasonable DCS caseworker would have

known that even though the CHINS case was still open, they no longer had the

obligation or authority to investigate the wellbeing of the adopted minors

because the adoption petition had been granted.

The Seventh Circuit recently explained the process for closing a CHINS

case:

CHINS cases remain open until "the objectives of the [CHINS]

dispositional decree have been met," Ind. Code § 31-34-21-11, which can

mean several things, such as reunification or termination of parental

rights and adoption, among others. If reunification is not a viable option,

the State may initiate a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding.

See, e.g., Ind. Code §§ 31-34-21-7.5, 31-35-2-1. The CHINS case

continues until the child achieves permanency, which often does not

occur until after the TPR proceeding (including any appeals) concludes.

See Ind. Code §§ 31-19-11-6; 31-34-21-11.

Ashley W. v. Holcomb, 34 F.4th 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting State of

Indiana's brief from Nicole K. v. Stigdon, 990 F.3d 534, 536–37 (7th Cir. 2021)).

Here, neither party designates evidence to explain what the CHINS

dispositional decree's objectives were. But drawing all reasonable inferences in

the Moores' favor at this stage, the Court assumes that adoption of the children

was the decree's objective. Given that assumption, by the time FCM Davis and

Supervisor Bellamy sought to initiate the December 3 wellness check, the

dispositional decree's objective—the children's adoption—had already been

met.

FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that FCM Davis believed the

pending Marion County CHINS case obligated and authorized her to investigate

J.S.M. and J.D.M.'s wellbeing after the adoption petitions had been granted.

Dkt. 86 at 27. The Moores argue that "the CHINS action does not give

Defendants the constitutional authority to interfere with the new adoptive

family's relations" because, under Indiana law, the CHINS court was required

to dismiss its case once the children were adopted. Dkt. 91 at 15–16. The

Moores contend that under the legal framework for CHINS proceedings, it was

clear that J.S.M. and J.D.M. no longer met the statutory standard for CHINS

once the adoption petition was granted. Id. at 16. The Moores argue that this

is self-evident—the CHINS proceeding was opened based on danger presented

to J.S.M. and J.D.M. by their biological parents, not the Moores, so the danger

to J.S.M. and J.D.M. disappeared when the adoption petition was granted. Id.

The Moores cite In re Infant Girl W., 845 N.E.2d 229, 245–46 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2006), as support for that proposition. In that case, the Indiana Court of

Appeals interpreted Indiana Code § 31-34-21-11, which states that "[w]hen the

[CHINS] juvenile court finds that the objectives of the dispositional decree have

been met, the court shall discharge the child and the child's parent/guardian

or custodian." Id. at 245. There, the probate court had granted the parents'

adoption petition of a child for whom the dispositional goal was adoption, but

five days later, the juvenile court denied the parents' motion to dismiss the

open CHINS case. Id. at 236–37. At the time the parents filed their motion to

dismiss the CHINS action, the goal of the child's dispositional decree had been

met because the child had already been adopted. Id. at 245. Also, the court

reasoned that the child no longer met the statutory standard for a CHINS

"inasmuch as there is universal agreement that [the child] has been well cared

for by the Parents since she was two days old." Id. The court concluded that

"[u]nder these circumstances, the Juvenile Court was statutorily required to

dismiss the CHINS case." Id.

The Moores also designate evidence from which a reasonable jury could

conclude FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy expected the CHINS case to be

dismissed since the adoption petition had been granted. FCM Davis testified

that she expected the CHINS case to be dismissed and agreed that if the CHINS

case had been dismissed, she would not have had the authority to conduct the

December 3 wellness check. Dkt. 90-1 at 73. And Supervisor Bellamy testified

that she had never seen a case where a CHINS juvenile court did not close an

open CHINS case after an adoption petition was granted. Dkt. 90-2 at 22.

However, the Moores' case law and designated evidence do not address

the timing question presented—whether a DCS caseworker still has the

obligation and authority to demand a wellness check after an adoption petition

has been granted but before the CHINS case has been dismissed. In re Infant

Girl W. stands only for the proposition that a CHINS court does not have

discretion to deny a motion to dismiss an open CHINS case once an adoption is

granted. It says nothing about what DCS caseworkers can or cannot do before

a motion to dismiss the CHINS case is filed. Here, there's no designated

evidence suggesting that a motion to dismiss the CHINS case had been filed on

December 3. On the contrary, the CHINS case wasn't closed until December

26, 2021. Dkt. 51 at 15 (citing C.M., 202 N.E.3d at 446). So, the DCS

caseworkers' legal obligations and authority where an adoption petition has

been granted but a CHINS case involving the same children remains open is, at

minimum, not obvious.

Indeed, testimony from FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy taken in the

light most favorable to the Moores shows only that the caseworkers believed

that the CHINS case would be dismissed at some undefined point in the future.

The Moores do not cite any case that would have clearly put FCM Davis and

Supervisor Bellamy on notice that the grant of the adoption petition

immediately terminates the CHINS case, along with DCS's legal authority to act

in response to a reasonable suspicion of past or imminent abuse. See Doe v.

Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 528 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding qualified immunity where

caseworkers relied on state statute that was determined to be unconstitutional

as applied to the plaintiff but the statute's constitutionality had never been

challenged prior to that case and there was "no reported decision (state or

federal) addressing the precise issues" before the court). So, there's no case

clearly establishing that a court's grant of an adoption petition immediately

extinguishes DCS's obligations and authority to investigate the wellbeing of

children with a pending CHINS case.

The Moores, who bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS

caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful," Sebesta, 878

F.3d at 234, therefore have not shown that under the circumstances presented

here, a reasonable DCS caseworker would or should know that it would clearly

be unlawful to demand a wellness check after the adoption petition was

granted.

2. Reasonable suspicion of abuse

That raises the second part of the inquiry: whether a reasonable DCS

caseworker would or should have known that there clearly was not reasonable

suspicion that the children had been abused or were in imminent danger of

abuse.5 See Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 478; Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235. FCM

Davis and Supervisor Bellamy argue that the information they possessed

constituted reasonable suspicion justifying the December 3 wellness check.

Dkt. 92 at 5. They also argue that "it would have been wholly irresponsible for

the Defendants to have ignored the concerns raised on December 3" given

Indiana's statutory requirement that DCS "shall initiate an appropriately

thorough child protection assessment of every report of known or suspected

child abuse or neglect the department receives." Dkt. 86 at 31–32; dkt. 92 at

6. And they contend "the chaotic and ongoing nature of the situation that was

unfolding on December 3" provides further justification for the December 3

wellness check. Dkt. 86 at 27–28; dkt. 92 at 5.

The Moores, who bear the burden of showing "that a reasonable [DCS

caseworker] would or should know that her conduct is unlawful," Sebesta, 878

F.3d at 234, argue that FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy initiated the

December 3 wellness check arbitrarily because they did not have a reasonable

5 For the sake of this analysis, the Court assumes without deciding that Supervisor

Bellamy was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.

suspicion that the children had been abused or were in imminent danger of

abuse. Dkt. 91 at 14–19. The Moores argue that the justifications for the

wellness check offered by DCS were pretext and that FCM Davis's true

motivation for the check was her belief that the unsubstantiated allegations

against the Moores were true. Id. at 25–26.

The reasonable suspicion standard, however, is objective, Sebesta, 878

F.3d at 233, so FCM Davis's true motivation for the visit doesn't carry any

weight. What matters for the qualified immunity inquiry is whether a

reasonable DCS caseworker in FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy's position

would or should have known under clearly established law and considering the

information they possessed at the time that they clearly did not have

reasonable suspicion to conduct the December 3 wellness check. See

Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 475; Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235.

The parties dispute whether the Moores' removal of the children from the

foster placement on the morning of December 3 could be fairly characterized as

"forcible." But the undisputed designated evidence shows that one of the

children had a strong negative reaction to learning about the adoption and was

kicking and screaming while being placed in the car to go with the Moores and

leave the foster family. Dkt. 82-5 at 118–20, 124–25. The Moores do not cite

any cases that would have put FCM Davis and Supervisor Bellamy on notice

that initiating a wellness check under those circumstances would have violated

the Moores' constitutional rights. Accordingly, based on the entirety of the

circumstances presented, a reasonable DCS investigator could have believed

reasonable suspicion existed to initiate the December 3 wellness check. In

other words, it would not have been clear to a reasonable DCS caseworker that

conducting a wellness check under these circumstances was unlawful.

This conclusion is bolstered by the limited nature of the intervention that

Defendants sought to conduct—a brief look around the inside of the home to

assess whether J.S.M. and J.D.M. were safe—rather than taking the children

into protective custody and removing them from their adoptive parents. See

Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928 (holding that removal of child to grandmother's house

was justified by reasonable suspicion, even though it was "far from clear" that

"the state's interest would have justified a greater intrusion on the [plaintiffs']

right to familial integrity"); Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 235 (noting as important that

plaintiff "never lost custody of her daughter" and that the intact family services

she received "interfered only minimally with her family structure"). The

Seventh Circuit recently stated that it "doubt[ed] very much" that a child

services welfare check "amounted to interference with family integrity" at all.

Gilbank v. Wood Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 111 F.4th 754, 788 (7th Cir. 2024)

(en banc) (discussing welfare check based on anonymous tip that plaintiff and

her child were living in a "garage during hot summer weather").

Here, the December 3 wellness check lasted about thirty minutes, and

FCM Davis was in the Moores' home for about twenty minutes. Dkt. 82-1 at

88. During the visit, FCM Davis "searched the house" and observed the

children, but she did not attempt to remove the children from the home during

or after the visit. Id. at 78, 88. This short wellness check was far less intrusive

than the child's removal to a relative's house in Siliven or the six months of

intact family services in Sebesta. Instead, the December 3 check was more

akin to the welfare check in Gilbank, which the en banc Seventh Circuit

doubted amounted to interference with familial integrity. Given the need to

balance the constitutional right to familial integrity against the state's interest

in protecting children from abuse, Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928, it's not clear that

the December 3 wellness check interfered with the Moores' post-adoption

familial integrity, see Gilbank, 111 F.4th at 788. But even if it did, any such

"intrusion on the [Moores'] constitutional right to familial integrity was no

greater than necessary to address" the facts confronted by FCM Davis and

Supervisor Bellamy. Siliven, 635 F.3d at 928–29.

The Moores also argue that they did not consent to the December 3

wellness check because FCM Davis and the Henry County sheriff's deputy

threatened to remove the children from the home if the Moores did not allow

the wellness check to proceed, and the coercive nature of the threat did not

dissipate when the parties' lawyers conferred before the wellness check. Dkt.

91 at 19–22. FCM Davis disputes making this threat. See dkt. 86 at 14 (citing

dkt. 82-5 at 139–40). However, even if those threats were made, FCM Davis

and Supervisor Bellamy didn't need to rely on the Moores' consent as

justification for the December 3 wellness check. That's because, as established

above, a reasonable DCS caseworker could have believed she had reasonable

suspicion to justify the check.

The Moores also argue that FCM Davis and the sheriff's deputy did not

have legal authority to make these threats, which undermines the legality of

the December 3 wellness check.6 Dkt. 91 at 21. The Seventh Circuit has

drawn a distinction between "lawful threats" and "threats not grounded in

proper legal authority." Hernandez, 657 F.3d at 482. Only the latter pose

constitutional issues. Id. In contrast, it does not constitute impermissible

duress for a caseworker to make a threat that's supported by proper legal

authority. Id. And "in the context of protecting a child from his parents,

'proper legal authority' means 'some definite and articulable evidence giving

rise to a reasonable suspicion' of past or imminent danger of abuse." Id.

(quoting Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1019). So here, since a DCS caseworker could

have reasonably suspected abuse, it follows that threatening to remove J.S.M.

and J.D.M. if the Moores did not allow FCM Davis to enter the home and

conduct the wellness check did not undermine the wellness check’s legality.

See Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2006) ("It is not a forbidden

means of 'coercing' a settlement to threaten merely to enforce one's legal

rights.").

In sum, there was no case so "closely analogous" as to put FCM Davis

and Supervisor Bellamy on notice that conducting the wellness check on

December 3 would violate the Moores' constitutional rights. Reed v. Palmer,

906 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2018). Nor were there cases evincing "such a clear

6 The Moores do not argue that any threats made by FCM Davis or the Henry County

sheriff's deputy, on their own, violated the Moores' right to familial integrity.

trend . . . that we can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right

by a controlling precedent was merely a question of time." Id.

Finally, the Moores appear to argue that FCM Davis and Supervisor

Bellamy's conduct was "so egregious and unreasonable that no reasonable

official could have thought [she] was acting lawfully." Id. "Officials can still be

on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). In "rare cases," a

plaintiff can demonstrate a right is clearly established without pointing to

controlling authority by showing an officer's conduct was "so egregious and

unreasonable that no reasonable official could have thought he was acting

lawfully." Reed, 906 F.3d at 546 (emphasis supplied).

The Moores contend that this is one of those rare cases. It's not. FCM

Davis and Supervisor Bellamy were "called upon to make difficult decisions

without the benefit of extended deliberation." Heck, 327 F.3d at 525.

Confronted by such a decision, they chose to act on the information they

learned earlier that day with a measured, proportionate response—a wellness

check. The Moores have not established that no reasonable DCS caseworker

could have chosen the same course of action as FCM Davis and Supervisor

Bellamy.

In conclusion, the Moores have not overcome FCM Davis and Supervisor

Bellamy's assertion of qualified immunity because they have not shown that

they had a clearly established right under the Fourteenth Amendment to have

DCS not conduct a wellness check on J.S.M. and J.D.M. after the adoption

petition was granted and the CHINS case was still open. FCM Davis and

Supervisor Bellamy are entitled to summary judgment.

IV.

Conclusion

State Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Dkt.

[85]. Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/11/2025 ands Pat tanlor—

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All electronically registered counsel

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