Folks v. Sainato

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

JARED FOLKS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 23-643

VINCENZO ANTONIO SAINATO, ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this civil-rights case is Plaintiff Jared Folks’s renewed

motion1 for judgment as a matter of law and alternative motion for a new trial against

Defendants Plaquemines Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Vincenzo Antonio Sainato

and Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Gerald Turlich, Jr., under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 50(b) and 59(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from Jared Folks’s arrest on a warrant that issued based on

the affidavit of Deputy Vincenzo Antonio Sainato.2 Sainato’s affidavit claimed

probable cause that Folks committed two misdemeanors—“Hit-and-run driving”

under LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:100 and “Evidence of compulsory motor vehicle liability

security contained in vehicle” under LA. STAT. ANN. § 32:863.1—in connection with

a collision between a truck owned by Folks’s construction company and a mechanical

gate controlling access to a Plaquemines Parish subdivision.3 Folks sued Sainato,

Turlich, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law, claiming there was

1 ECF No. 126.

2 ECF No. 110 at 1–2; see also Folks v. Sainato, 23-CV-643, 2024 WL 2271668, at *1

(E.D. La. May 20, 2024) (Long, J.).

3 ECF No. 126-4 at 1.

not probable cause for the warrant, and that Sainato’s affidavit featured false

statements or material omissions made with at least reckless disregard for the truth.

A jury was not persuaded.4 After a four-day trial, the jury unanimously found

that Folks failed to prove four claims against Sainato: (1) a Section 1983 claim for

violating Folks’s Fourth Amendment rights under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1978); (2) a Section 1983 claim for violating Folks’s Fourth Amendment rights under

Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled by Thompson

v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022); (3) a Louisiana-law claim for false arrest/false

imprisonment; and (4) a Louisiana-law malicious prosecution claim.5 Because the

jury unanimously found Sainato not liable, Folks’s vicarious-liability claim against

Turlich failed by operation of law. The jury did not reach Sainato’s qualified-

immunity defense because it found Sainato did not violate Folks’s federal rights.6

After the Court entered judgment against him, Folks timely renewed his

motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) and sought a new trial

against Sainato and Turlich in the alternative under Rule 59(a).7 Sainato opposes.8

4 ECF No. 122.

5 Folks brought other claims against other Defendants, but the Court dismissed them at the

Rule 50(a) stage. The claims listed are the only ones relevant to Folks’s motion.

6 ECF No. 122.

7 ECF No. 126. Folks moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a) after Sainato

rested. ECF No. 116. The Court “d[id] not grant” the Rule 50(a) motion, FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2),

and directed Folks to file a renewed motion under Rule 50(b), ECF No. 120 at 1. Folks did so.

8 ECF No. 130. Turlich did not file an opposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

A party may move for judgment as a matter of law against a party under Rule

50(a) after that party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial but before

the jury renders its verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a). If a party’s pre-verdict motion

for judgment as a matter of law is not granted, that party can renew its motion under

Rule 50(b) after the verdict. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). Folks does just that here.

The standard under Rules 50(a) and 50(b) is the same. See Foradori v. Harris,

523 F.3d 477, 485 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court may grant

judgment as a matter of law “only when ‘a reasonable jury would not have a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to find for a party on [an] issue.’” Wantou v. Wal-Mart

Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 431 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)).

“But ‘if reasonable persons could differ in their interpretations of the evidence, then

the motion should be denied.’” E.E.O.C. v. EmCare, Inc., 857 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir.

2017) (quoting Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2005)).

“When a case is tried by a jury,” as this one was, “a Rule 50(b) motion is a

challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.” Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.

State. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 134 F.4th 286, 291 (5th Cir. 2025) (quotation and

alterations omitted). The Fifth Circuit “is generally wary of upsetting jury verdicts.”

Warner v. Talos ERT, L.L.C., 133 F.4th 412, 424 (5th Cir. 2025) (quotation omitted).

It is “especially deferential” to them. Apache Deepwater, L.L.C. v. W&T Offshore, Inc.,

930 F.3d 647, 653 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). Given the “great deference” due

jury verdicts, Bryant, 413 F.3d at 475, courts considering Rule 50(b) motions must

draw all reasonable inferences and resolve all credibility determinations in the light

most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lewis, 134 F.4th at 291 (quotation omitted).

And courts “must” deny Rule 50 motions “unless the facts and inferences point so

strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not

reach a contrary conclusion.” Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quotation omitted).

B. Alternative Motion for a New Trial

After a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for a new trial “for any reason for

which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.”

FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). Rule 59 does not specify the grounds for granting a new

trial. See id. But the Fifth Circuit has said that district courts may grant a new trial

under Rule 59 if “the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the damages

awarded are excessive, the trial was unfair, or prejudicial error was committed in its

course.” Sims v. City of Jasper, 117 F.4th 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

“District courts should not grant a new trial on evidentiary grounds” like those

Folks raises in his motion “unless the verdict is against the great weight of the

evidence.” Six Dimensions, Inc. v. Perficient, Inc., 969 F.3d 219, 230 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quotation omitted). “In other words, the movant must show an absolute absence of

evidence to support the jury’s verdict.” Seibert v. Jackson Cnty., 851 F.3d 430, 439

(5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Whether a verdict is against the great weight of

the evidence is a question committed to the district court’s sound discretion.” Six

Dimensions, Inc., 969 F.3d at 230 (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Folks renews his motion for judgment as a matter of law against Sainato and

alternatively moves for a new trial on all issues against both Sainato and Turlich.

A. Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Folks moves the Court for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) on all

four of his claims against Sainato: (1) his Section 1983 claim under Franks; (2) his

Section 1983 claim under Castellano; (3) his Louisiana-law false arrest/false

imprisonment claim; and (4) his Louisiana-law malicious prosecution claim. Folks

also contends that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on (5) Sainato’s

qualified-immunity defense. The Court considers each claim and defense in turn.

1. Franks Claim Under Section 1983

Folks fails to carry his Rule 50(b) burden to show that a reasonable jury would

not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Folks failed to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence each element of his Franks claim against Sainato.

To recover on his Franks claim against Sainato, Folks had the burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that Sainato’s arrest-warrant affidavit “(1) contains

false statements or material omissions (2) made with at least ‘reckless disregard for

the truth’ that (3) were ‘necessary to the finding of probable cause.’” Hughes v. Garcia,

100 F.4th 611, 619 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155–56) (citing

Winfrey v. Rogers, 901 F.3d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 2018)). The second element required

Folks to prove that Sainato “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the

statement[s]” in the affidavit. Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494 (quotation omitted).

Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations

in the light most favorable to Sainato, see Lewis, 134 F.4th at 291 (quotation omitted),

and mindful of the “great deference” due the jury’s verdict, Bryant, 413 F.3d at 475,

the Court holds that Folks has not carried his burden to show that the “facts and

inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in [Folks’s] favor that reasonable

jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion” on the second, reckless-disregard

element of Folks’s Franks claim. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quotation omitted).

Because Folks fails to carry his Rule 50(b) burden on the reckless-disregard element

alone, the Court need not evaluate the other elements of Folks’s Franks claim.

A reasonable jury could have found that Folks failed to carry his burden to

prove that Sainato “in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the

statement[s]” in the warrant affidavit. Winfrey, 901 F.3d at 494 (quotation omitted).

For starters, a reasonable jury could have found Folks’s testimony about the

substance of his telephone discussions with Sainato not credible in light of Folks’s

lack of full candor about his litigation history, including Folks’s failure to disclose on

direct examination a lawsuit he filed on behalf of his deceased father, and Folks’s

general litigiousness, including Folks’s testimony about at least two other lawsuits

in which Folks claimed that he would suffer pain and mental anguish for the rest of

his life. In combination with those credibility questions, a reasonable jury could have

found that Sainato had no reason to knowingly or recklessly swear out an arrest-

warrant affidavit accusing Folks of committing crimes Folks did not commit given

Folks’s admission that Sainato and Folks had never met before the incident. On top

of all this, a reasonable jury that disbelieved Folks’s testimony about the substance

of his telephone communications with Sainato could also have found that the

inaccuracies in Sainato’s arrest-warrant affidavit were at worst negligent—and thus

not “the product of deliberate falsehoods or a reckless disregard for the truth,” id.

(quotation omitted)—given that (1) a representative of the neighborhood homeowners

association, Kristi Pierson, independently arrived at the same mistaken conclusion

that Folks was driving the truck that struck the neighborhood gate; and (2) Pierson

and Turlich offered testimony from which a jury could reasonably have inferred that

Folks was less than forthcoming, and perhaps even evasive, in connection with

requests for basic information and documentation about the incident.9

Accordingly, because Folks fails to show that no reasonable jury could have

concluded that Folks failed to prove the reckless-disregard element of his Franks

claim, Folks fails to show that the jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to

find that he failed to prove his Franks claim against Sainato.10 The Court therefore

denies Folks’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on his Franks claim.

9 For example, Pierson testified that Folks waited until after business hours the day after the

incident to notify the neighborhood homeowners association of the incident; that Folks failed to provide

the homeowners association proof of insurance or documentation for the driver of the truck; and that

Folks stated in an email to Pierson that “[w]e did not have any contact information at th[e] time” of

the incident, even though Pierson’s contact information was displayed on a sign at the subdivision’s

gate. Turlich, for his part, testified that the Sheriff’s Office received “zero cooperation” from Folks.

10 Folks’s reliance on a question from the jury does not help him carry his burden to show that

a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Folks did not prove

his Franks claim against Sainato. The jury inquired whether it could “put a footnote or message in the

verdict that if there is no finding of fault by Sainato can we indicate that we think Sainato should be

sanctioned by his superiors for wreckless [sic] or irresponsible actions.” ECF No. 126-2 at 1. With the

parties’ agreement, the Court answered that “[t]he jury’s obligation is to follow the instructions

provided by the Court and complete the verdict form as presented.” Id. Contra Folks’s contention, the

jury note’s reference to “wreckless [sic] or irresponsible actions” generally is not a “finding” that

Sainato’s statements in the arrest-warrant affidavit were made with reckless disregard for the truth.

2. Castellano Claim Under Section 1983

Folks fails to carry his burden to show that a reasonable jury would not have

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Folks did not prove his Castellano

claim against Sainato.11 To recover on his Castellano claim against Sainato, Folks

had the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Sainato caused

criminal charges to be brought against Folks without probable cause, resulting in

Folks’s unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 352 F.3d at

953–54; see also, e.g., Bledsoe v. Willis, No. 23-30238, 2023 WL 8184814, at *6 (5th

Cir. Nov. 27, 2023) (per curiam) (recognizing a Section 1983 claim under Castellano

where an officer caused the arrest and commencement of criminal proceedings

against a plaintiff without probable cause based on a clearly deficient investigation).

Importantly, Folks’s arrest-based Castellano claim fails if either charge

against him is supported by probable cause. Folks’s Castellano claim requires an

unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 352 F.3d at 953–54.

An arrest complies with the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe

the suspect committed a crime. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414 (1976).

11 The Fifth Circuit did not recognize a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim when

Folks was arrested in February 2022. See Folks, 2024 WL 2271668, at *6 (citing Espinal v. City of

Hous., 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024)). The en banc Fifth Circuit “extinguished the constitutional

malicious-prosecution theory” in Castellano in December 2003. Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238,

245 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Castellano, 352 F.3d at 954). But the Supreme Court’s April 2022 opinion

in Thompson overruled Castellano and recognized a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim

under Section 1983. See 596 U.S. at 42; see also Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 279 (5th Cir. 2023)

(acknowledging that Thompson overruled Castellano and reinstating pre-Castellano Section 1983

malicious-prosecution precedent). Between Castellano (December 2003) and Thompson (April 2022),

the Fifth Circuit recognized a Section 1983 claim against a defendant whose “bad acts” “happen to

correspond to the tort of malicious prosecution” and “result in an unreasonable search or seizure” in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Morgan, 969 F.3d at 246. That is the claim Folks brings here.

Probable cause for any crime suffices. See, e.g., Voss v. Goode, 954 F.3d 234, 238 (5th

Cir. 2020) (an arrest is justified “by showing probable cause for any crime”). “[I]t is

not relevant whether probable cause exist[s] with respect to each individual charge.”

Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). For the Fourth

Amendment focuses “on the validity of the arrest, and not on the validity of each

charge.” Id. “[U]lterior motives,” like the malicious intent to bring a false charge

against Folks, cannot “invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of

probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred.” Whren v. United States,

517 U.S. 806, 811 (1996). The upshot is this: Even if one of the charges against Folks

was not supported by probable cause, Folks’s arrest was still reasonable under the

Fourth Amendment, and Folks’s arrest-based Castellano claim thus fails, if there was

probable cause to support Folks’s arrest on the other charge. In such circumstances,

because there is one charge supported by probable cause that provides independent

justification for the arrest, the charge unsupported by probable cause cannot have

resulted in “the threshold element of an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure.”

Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 279 (citing Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2) (footnote omitted).

Contending otherwise, Folks invokes a Supreme Court opinion that issued in

June 2024, almost a month after trial. See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S.

556 (2024). Folks claims that, under Chiaverini, “Sainato was required to have

probable cause for each crime he alleged Folks committed.”12 But Folks overstates

Chiaverini’s limited holding and misunderstands its impact given that qualified-

12 ECF No. 126-1 at 12.

immunity doctrine requires the Court to evaluate Sainato’s conduct by reference to

the clearly established law existing in February 2022, when the incident occurred.

Chiaverini involved a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under

Section 1983 and considered the question that “arises when [an] official brings

multiple charges, only one of which lacks probable cause.” 602 U.S. at 558. The

Supreme Court held that, in those circumstances, the valid charge does “not create a

categorical bar” that “insulate[s] the official from a Fourth Amendment malicious-

prosecution claim relating to the invalid charge[.]” Id. at 559. The Supreme Court

expressly “le[ft] for another day the follow-on question of how to determine in those

circumstances whether the baseless charge caused the requisite seizure.” Id.

Chiaverini does not help Folks carry his Rule 50(b) burden on his Castellano

claim (or any other claim) for at least four independent reasons. First, the claim the

Supreme Court considered in Chiaverini—a Fourth Amendment malicious-

prosecution claim under Section 1983—is not presented here. As noted at footnote

eleven of this order and reasons, the Fifth Circuit did not recognize a Fourth

Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under Section 1983 when Folks was

arrested in February 2022, and so no such claim was presented to the jury here.

Second, despite Chiaverini’s rejection of the any-crime rule for Fourth

Amendment malicious-prosecution claims, the any-crime rule still applies to claims

for false arrest and to the analysis of whether an arrest is an unreasonable seizure.

See, e.g., Rivera–Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2024).

Third, Chiaverini “leave[s] for another day” the causation requirement, 602

U.S. at 559, which (as explained above) Folks cannot meet under current precedent

if there was probable cause for one charge that independently justified his arrest.

Fourth and finally, even if Chiaverini reached as broadly as Folks suggests, it

would make no difference to the Court’s Rule 50(b) analysis because Sainato would

still be entitled to qualified immunity on all affected claims. That is for the simple

reason that Folks cannot show that the right Chiaverini recognized in June 2024 was

clearly established at the time of Folks’s arrest in February 2022. See, e.g., Bailey v.

Ramos, 125 F.4th 667, 684 (5th Cir. 2025) (holding that officer was entitled to

qualified immunity because the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct was not clearly

established at the time of the officer’s actions); see also, e.g., Rivera–Guadalupe, 124

F.4th at 303 (holding that officer was entitled to qualified immunity because the right

recognized in Chiaverini was not clearly established at the time of the officer’s

actions); Harrod v. Lee, No. 24-5228, 2024 WL 5103834, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2024)

(essentially the same); Rasawehr v. Grey, No. 24-3322, 2025 WL 1639164, at *4 (6th

Cir. June 10, 2025) (holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity post-

Chiaverini for conduct that occurred pre-Chiaverini because then-existing precedent

required that only one charge be supported by probable cause); Sorrells v. Dodd, No.

21-13568, 2024 WL 3981781, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 29, 2024) (per curiam) (applying

the any-crime rule post-Chiaverini to evaluate an officer’s pre-Chiaverini actions

“[b]ecause the qualified immunity analysis focuses on whether the law was clearly

established at the time of the officer’s actions” (citation omitted)). In sum, even if

Folks were right about Chiaverini’s broader reach, Folks still would be entitled to no

relief under Chiaverini in light of Sainato’s qualified-immunity defense.

Having rejected Folks’s Chiaverini arguments and settled on the role probable

cause plays in the analysis of the Castellano claim (and others), the Court returns to

the Rule 50(b) standard. Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all

credibility determinations in the light most favorable to Sainato, see Lewis, 134 F.4th

at 291 (quotation omitted), and mindful of the “great deference” due the jury’s verdict,

Bryant, 413 F.3d at 475, the Court finds Folks has not shown that the “facts and

inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in [Folks’s] favor that reasonable

jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion” on the absence-of-probable-cause

component of Folks’s Castellano claim. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quotation omitted).

A reasonable jury could have found that Folks failed to carry his burden to

prove the absence of probable cause for the “Hit-and-run driving” charge. “Hit and

run driving is the intentional failure of the driver of a vehicle involved in or causing

any accident, to stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident, to give his identity, and

to render reasonable aid.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:100(A). Probable cause “is a

practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical

considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal

technicians, act.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (quotation omitted).

It “is incapable of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals

with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 371

(citations omitted). But the “substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a

reasonable ground for belief of guilt, . . . and that the belief of guilt must be

particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized.” Id. (quotation and

citation omitted). “Probable cause exists when all of the facts known by a police officer

are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed, or

was in the process of committing, an offense.” Sam v. Richard, 887 F.3d 710, 715 (5th

Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “The test is objective, not subjective.” Id. “Critically,

probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,

not an actual showing of such activity.” Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 780

(5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). It “is not a high bar.” Id. (quotation omitted).

A reasonable jury could have found that Folks failed to prove that the facts

known to Sainato were insufficient to clear the “low bar,” Espinal, 96 F.4th at 747, of

probable cause to believe that Folks committed “Hit-and-run driving.” First, as noted

above, a reasonable jury could have discredited Folks’s testimony about the substance

of his telephone discussions with Sainato. A reasonable jury could instead have

credited Sainato’s statements in his arrest-warrant affidavit—which was admitted

into evidence at Folks’s request and in its entirety without objection and without any

request for redaction or a limiting instruction.13 Among other things, that arrest-

13 Folks contends the jury could not properly consider the statements in Sainato’s arrest-

warrant affidavit in evaluating probable cause because those statements are inadmissible hearsay to

the extent they support Sainato’s version of events. ECF No. 126-1 at 8–12; ECF No. 131 at 8–9. The

Court is not convinced. A statement “offered against an opposing party and . . . made by the party in

an individual or representative capacity” is not hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A). Just so here.

The statements in Sainato’s arrest-warrant affidavit are non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) because

Folks offered Sainato’s arrest-warrant affidavit—in its entirety—into evidence against Sainato. In

offering the entire affidavit into evidence against Sainato, Folks did not ask the Court to redact any

purportedly self-serving statements in the affidavit or to instruct the jury of the purportedly limited

purpose(s) for which the affidavit was offered. In all events, Folks cites no authority for the proposition

that non-hearsay statements properly admitted into evidence without objection against an opposing

warrant affidavit includes these statements that, if believed, would allow a

reasonable jury to find that the facts known to Sainato sufficed to permit a reasonable

person to conclude that Folks had committed “Hit-and-run driving”: (1) the truck

involved in the collision had insignia with Folks’s phone number (and Folks answered

the phone when Sainato called him the following day); (2) Folks acknowledged to

Sainato that Folks had “crashed into the fence” and “made no attempt to contact any

authorities”; (3) Folks told Sainato that “we” were in a hurry to get home and watch

the Super Bowl, implying that Folks was involved in the collision; and (4) Folks failed

to provide Sainato basic documents like proof of insurance and registration, despite

promising to do so.14 A reasonable jury also could have found that the facts known to

Sainato sufficed to permit a reasonable person to conclude that Folks committed “Hit-

and-run driving” based on Folks’s email to the homeowners association, forwarded to

Sainato by Pierson, in which Folks stated that “the gate malfunctioned, and closed in

between the cab of my [t]ruck and the bed,” and that “[w]e did not have any contact

information at the time”—implying that Folks was involved in the collision.

In sum, because a reasonable jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to

conclude that Folks failed to prove an absence of probable cause for the “Hit-and-run

driving” charge, and because Folks’s arrest was lawful if supported by probable cause

for any charge, see Voss, 954 F.3d at 238, a reasonable jury had a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to conclude that Folks failed to prove that Sainato’s conduct

party under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) are transformed into inadmissible hearsay to the extent those already-

admitted statements are later construed by a fact finder to support the opposing party’s position.

14 ECF No. 126-4.

resulted in Folks’s unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. And

because a reasonable jury had a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that

Folks failed to prove that Sainato’s conduct resulted in Folks’s unlawful arrest based

on Folks’s failure to prove an absence of probable cause for the “Hit-and-run-driving”

charge alone, the Court need not evaluate probable cause for the “Evidence of

compulsory motor vehicle liability security contained in vehicle” charge.

Accordingly, Folks fails to show that the jury lacked a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find that he failed to prove his Castellano claim. So the Court

denies Folks’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on that claim.

3. False Arrest/False Imprisonment Under Louisiana Law

Folks fails to carry his burden to show that a reasonable jury would not have

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Folks failed to prove his claim

against Sainato for false arrest/false imprisonment under Louisiana law. To recover

on his claim for false arrest/false imprisonment, Folks had the burden to prove that

he was “unlawfully detained by the police against [his] will.” Heaney v. Roberts, 846

F.3d 795, 805 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). “Unlawful detention is restraint

without color of legal authority.” Reese v. City of Baton Rouge, 93-1957, p. 4 (La. App.

1st Cir. 10/7/94); 644 So. 2d 674, 676 (citation omitted). Because “[a]rrests made with

probable cause are not unlawful,” Folks’s false arrest/false imprisonment claim fails

if there was probable cause for any charge against him. Miller v. Desoto Reg’l Health

Sys., 2013-693, p. 5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 12/11/13); 128 So. 3d 649, 656 (citation omitted).

Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations

in the light most favorable to Sainato, see Lewis, 134 F.4th at 291 (quotation omitted),

and mindful of the “great deference” due the jury’s verdict, Bryant, 413 F.3d at 475,

the Court holds that Folks has not carried his burden to show that the “facts and

inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in [Folks’s] favor that reasonable

jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion” as to the existence of probable cause for

the “Hit-and-run driving” charge. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quotation omitted). For

essentially the same reasons given in the previous section of this order and reasons,

a reasonable jury could have found that Folks failed to prove the absence of probable

cause for the “Hit-and-run driving” charge. Because a reasonable jury could have

found that Folks failed to prove the absence of probable cause for that charge, and

because Folks’s arrest was lawful if supported by probable cause in general, see

Miller, 128 So. 3d at 656 (quotation omitted), a reasonable jury had a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find that Folks failed to prove that his arrest was unlawful.

Accordingly, Folks fails to show that the jury lacked a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find that Folks failed to prove his false arrest/false imprisonment

claim. So the Court denies Folks’s Rule 50(b) motion on that claim.

4. Malicious Prosecution Under Louisiana Law

Folks also fails to carry his burden under Rule 50(b) to show that a reasonable

jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Folks failed

to prove his Louisiana-law malicious-prosecution claim against Sainato.

To recover on his Louisiana-law malicious-prosecution claim against Sainato,

Folks had to “establish six elements: ‘(1) the commencement or continuance of an

original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present

defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the

present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the

presence of malice therein; and (6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting

to plaintiff.’” Phillips v. L. Brands Serv. Co., 82 F.4th 291, 302 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Lemoine v. Wolfe, 2014-1546, p. 8 (La. 3/17/15); 168 So. 3d 362, 367).

As for the malice element, “[i]n a malicious prosecution action, malice ‘exists

when a charge is made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for

the truth.’” Id. at 302 (quoting Kelly v. W. Cash & Carry Bldg. Mat. Store, 745 So. 2d

743, 761 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1999)). “Malice may be inferred from the lack of

probable cause[.]” Miller v. E. Baton Rouge Par. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 511 So. 2d 446, 453

(La. 1987). “[T]he determination of malice is a question of fact,” and so it “should be

determined by the trier of fact unless only one conclusion may be reasonably drawn

from the evidence.” Lemoine v. Wolfe, 575 F. App’x 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2014) (per

curiam) (citing Miller, 511 So. 2d at 453). As for the absence-of-probable-cause

element, “[t]he crucial determination . . . is whether the defendant had an honest and

reasonable belief in the guilt of the plaintiff.” Id. at 458 (citation and quotation

omitted). “When determining whether a reasonably cautious person would have

believed that a violation occurred, [the Court] consider[s] the expertise and

experience of law enforcement officials.” Id. (citation and quotation omitted). Because

the charges against Folks were dismissed, “there is a presumption of want of probable

cause” and thus “the burden of showing that [Sainato] acted on probable cause and

without malice is upon [Sainato].” Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

Drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations

in the light most favorable to Sainato, see Lewis, 134 F.4th at 291 (quotation omitted),

and mindful of the “great deference” due the jury’s verdict, Bryant, 413 F.3d at 475,

the Court holds that Folks has not carried his burden to show that the “facts and

inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in [Folks’s] favor that reasonable

jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion” on the malice and absence-of-probable

cause elements of Folks’s claim. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quotation omitted).

First, as for the malice element, a reasonable jury could have found that

Sainato carried his burden to show that he acted without malice—i.e., that Sainato

did not cause the charges to be brought against Folks with knowledge of their falsity

or with reckless disregard for the truth—for essentially the same reasons given in

section III(A)(1) of this order and reasons.

Second, as for the absence-of-probable-cause element, a reasonable jury could

have found that Sainato carried his burden to show that there was probable cause for

the “Hit-and-run driving” offense for essentially the same reasons given in section

III(A)(2) of this order and reasons.15

Accordingly, because Folks fails to show that no reasonable jury could have

concluded that Sainato acted without malice and with probable cause for the “Hit-

and-run driving” charge, Folks fails to show that the jury lacked a legally sufficient

evidentiary basis to find that Folks failed to prove his Louisiana-law malicious-

prosecution claim. So the Court denies Folks’s Rule 50(b) motion on that claim.

5. Qualified Immunity

Folks fails to carry his burden to show that a reasonable jury would not have

a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find that Sainato was entitled to qualified

immunity. Qualified immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per

curiam) (quotation omitted). It “protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

15 In an argument related to a footnote, raised for the first time in Folks’s reply brief, and

unburdened by citation to authority, Folks contends “[t]he ‘any crime’ rule rejected by the Chiaverini

Court has never been an element of a Louisiana malicious prosecution claim.” ECF No. 131 at 8 n.4.

This argument is forfeited at least three times over. See W. Bankers Cap., Inc. v. Kirton McConkie,

P.C., No. 23-CV-5124, 2025 WL 563449, at *4 n.35 (E.D. La. Feb. 20, 2025) (Long, J.) (arguments raised

only in a footnote are forfeited) (citing Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Concordia Par., 88 F.4th 588, 594 (5th Cir.

2023)); Suanphairin v. Ataya, No. 23-CV-3346, 2024 WL 4289573, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2024)

(Long, J.) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited) (first citing United States

v. Ponce, 896 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 2018); and then citing Jones v. Gusman, 515 F. Supp. 3d 520, 523

(E.D. La. 2021))); Wimsatt v. Jaber, No. 22-CV-1012, 2024 WL 2187872, at *7 (E.D. La. May 14, 2024)

(Long, J.) (arguments unaccompanied by citation to supporting authority are forfeited) (citing Stevens

v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t, 17 F.4th 563, 574 (5th Cir. 2021), aff’d 2025 WL 711120 (5th Cir. Mar. 5,

2025) (per curiam)). Triple forfeiture aside, Folks has not shown that his characterization of the

Louisiana law of malicious prosecution is even correct. Louisiana cases describe the relevant element

of a malicious-prosecution claim as “the absence of probable cause for such proceeding,” Miller, 511

So.2d at 452 (emphasis added), suggesting that Louisiana followed some variant of the “any crime”

rule and did not require a charge-by-charge analysis of probable cause before Chiaverini issued.

knowingly violate the law.” Id. at 12 (quotation omitted). To overcome Sainato’s

qualified-immunity defense, Folks had to show that (1) Sainato violated a statutory

or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of

Sainato’s challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).

As outlined in sections III(A)(1)–(4) of this order and reasons, a jury had a

legally sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Folks failed to prove that Sainato

violated Folks’s statutory or constitutional rights. Because a jury had a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to conclude that Folks failed to prove that Sainato

violated Folks’s statutory or constitutional rights, there was necessarily a legally

sufficient evidentiary basis to find Sainato entitled to qualified immunity. So Folks

is not entitled to Rule 50(b) relief on Sainato’s qualified-immunity defense.

B. Alternative Motion for a New Trial

As an alternative to Rule 50(b) relief, Folks moves the Court for a new trial on

all issues against Sainato and Turlich under Rule 59(a)(1).16 Folks contends that he

is entitled to a new trial because Sainato’s counsel “improperly argued that Folks was

at fault and caused his own arrest” during closing argument.17 Folks claims that the

Court’s use of Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5 on mitigation of

damages “allowed Sainato’s counsel to argue Folks’s comparative or sole fault under

the guise of mitigation . . . .”18 Folks does not quote or otherwise identify the precise

16 ECF No. 126 at 2.

17 ECF No. 131 at 1 (alterations omitted).

18 ECF No. 126-1 at 23. It is true that the Court granted Folks’s unopposed motion in limine

on comparative fault, ECF No. 111 at 2, but Folks’s description of the Court’s oral ruling is incomplete.

The Court excluded evidence or argument regarding Folks’s comparative fault for the purpose of

reducing Folks’s recovery, but the Court did not exclude evidence or argument about Folks’s alleged

portion of Sainato’s counsel’s closing argument that he contends entitles him to a new

trial. The Court’s best estimation, however, is that Folks is referring to an unobjected-

to portion of closing argument in which Sainato’s counsel told the jury that, even if it

finds Sainato liable, it should award Folks no damages if it finds that Folks could

have prevented his arrest by, for example, giving Sainato a video of Folks watching

the Super Bowl at the same time as the alleged hit-and-run.

“A motion for new trial premised on improper arguments by counsel should

only be granted when ‘improper closing argument irreparably prejudices a jury

verdict or if a jury fails to follow instructions.’” Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693

F.3d 491, 509 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nissho–Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales,

Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1988)). Courts “examine the propriety of closing

argument by reviewing the entire argument ‘within the context of the court’s rulings

on objections, the jury charge, and any corrective measures applied by the trial

court.’” Nissho–Iwai Co., 848 F.2d at 619 (quoting Westbrook v. Gen. Tire & Rubber

Co., 754 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). A party that fails to object to

improper statements made during closing argument “waive[s]” any objection to them.

Baisden, 693 F.3d at 509. A court may grant a new trial based on unobjected-to

statements only if the closing argument “affect[s] the substantial right of the parties”

by “seriously prejudic[ing] [the movant’s] right to a fair trial . . . .” Edwards v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (quotation omitted); see also, e.g.,

Baisden, 693 F.3d at 509 n.17 (explaining that a movant who fails to object to

misconduct for all purposes. The Court recognized that evidence of Folks’s misconduct may be

admissible for other purposes, for example, to show the reasonableness of Sainato’s conduct.

statements made during closing argument must show that “the statements rise to the

level of severity that would require a new trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice”).

Folks has not carried his burden to show that he is entitled to a new trial based

on unobjected-to improper remarks by Sainato’s counsel during closing argument.

The Court assumes (without deciding) that it was legally incorrect and improper for

Sainato’s counsel to argue to the jury that it should award Folks no damages if it

finds that Folks could have prevented his arrest. Importantly, however, Folks did not

object to that portion of closing argument in which Sainato’s counsel argued that,

even if Sainato were found liable, Folks should recover no damages because Folks

could have prevented his arrest by giving Sainato video of his whereabouts at the

time of the incident.19 Nor did Folks move for a mistrial. See Learmonth v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 733 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting “the failure of defense

counsel to seek a mistrial suggests that any lingering prejudice from the improper

comments was minimal” (quotation omitted)). Instead, Folks “chose to submit the

case to the jury” and only raised a complaint about this portion of the closing

argument when that “strategy failed.” Nissho–Iwai Co., 848 F.2d at 619; accord, e.g.,

Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc., 883 F.2d 372, 376 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that movant

was not entitled to new trial based on improper remarks during closing argument

19 It is true that Folks lodged discrete objections to other portions of Sainato’s counsel’s closing

argument. But Folks did not object to the now-at-issue portion of Sainato’s counsel’s closing argument.

That is important, because a litigant does not preserve an objection to all allegedly improper

statements made during the course of a closing argument merely by lodging discrete objections to some

allegedly improper statements given in closing. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 163

F.3d 265, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing unobjected-to statements during closing argument from

objected-to statements and holding that plain-error review applies to the former); Williams v. C & E

Boat Rentals, L.L.C., 491 F. App’x 459, 461–63 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (conducting a statement-

by-statement analysis of closing argument and reviewing unobjected-to statements for plain error).

because movant “did not move for a mistrial” and instead “chose to gamble on the

verdict”). As a result, to win a new trial, Folks must show that counsel’s closing

argument “affect[ed]” his “substantial right[s]” by “seriously prejudic[ing]” his right

to a fair trial. Edwards, 512 F.2d at 286.

Folks has not made that showing. First, Folks makes “no effort to show how

[the challenged] statements would have affected the outcome at trial” Baisden, 693

F.3d at 509 n.17; he merely concludes the now-at-issue portion of closing argument

“was misleading and prejudicial to [him].”20 Indeed, Folks does not explain how

Sainato’s counsel’s allegedly improper damages argument—i.e., that Folks should

recover no damages against Sainato, even if Sainato is found liable, because Folks

could have prevented his arrest—“would have affected the outcome” on liability. Id.

Nor could Folks have made that required showing in light of the full context of

the four-day trial. The jury unanimously found Sainato not liable on any claim.21

Because the jury found no liability, it did not reach damages.22 But the now-disputed

portion of Sainato’s counsel’s closing argument went only to damages; it did not bear

on liability. In fact, the pertinent portion of the allegedly improper closing argument

assumed Sainato’s liability: In substance, counsel argued that, despite Sainato’s

liability, Folks should still be awarded no damages because he could have prevented

his arrest by giving Sainato the video. Accordingly, because the now-disputed portion

of the allegedly improper closing argument bore only on damages, and because the

20 ECF No. 216-1 at 25.

21 ECF No. 122 at 2–4.

22 Id.

jury found Sainato not liable and did not reach damages, Folks could not carry his

burden to show that the now-disputed portion of Sainato’s counsel’s closing argument

“affected the outcome at trial” even if Folks had tried to do so. Id.; accord, e.g., In re

Isbell Records, Inc., 774 F.3d 859, 872–73 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of motion

for new trial where the disputed statements made during closing argument went to

an issue “that had little or no effect on the jury’s verdict”); Alexander v. Monsanto Co.,

396 F. App’x 137, 140 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (declining to disturb defense verdict

because plaintiff failed to show that counsel’s misstatements of law during closing

argument affected the outcome of the trial).

And in all events, the Court’s instructions to the jury that “[t]he statements of

counsel are not evidence”23 and that “[w]hat the lawyers say or do is not evidence”24

“effectively minimized any prejudice flowing from” Sainato’s counsel’s allegedly

improper remarks during closing argument. Wallner v. Ziegler, 470 F. App’x 230, 233

(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Learmonth, 631 F.3d at 732–33).

Finally, Folks’s attempt to shoehorn his improper-closing argument into the

more forgiving instructional-error analytical framework is unavailing. To win a new

trial based on the Court’s use of Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5 on

mitigation of damages, Folks must show “that the charge as a whole creates

substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its

deliberations.” RSBCO v. United States, 104 F.4th 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2024) (quotation

omitted). And even if Folks makes that showing, he is not entitled to Rule 59(a) relief

23 ECF No. 120-2 at 3.

24 Id.

if the Court “determine[s], based upon the entire record, that the challenged

instruction could not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Folks fails to make either showing for several independent reasons. First,

Folks fails to carry his burden to show that he properly preserved the particular

challenge to the Court’s use of Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5 that

he now raises in his request for Rule 59(a) relief. See Apache Deepwater, L.L.C., 930

F.3d at 653 (observing that a Rule 59 motion “cannot be used to raise arguments

[that] could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued” (quotation

omitted)). An objection to jury instructions “must be made ‘on the record’ and must

state ‘distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.’” Jimenez v.

Wood Cnty., 660 F.3d 841, 844–45 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.

51(c)). “The objection must have been made on the specific ground raised” in a motion

for new trial or on appeal; a general objection to a jury instruction is not sufficient.

Id. (quotation omitted); cf. Fiber Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1158 (5th

Cir. 2006) (reviewing for plain error because, although the appellant objected to the

jury instruction, the appellant did not specifically object on the same ground it later

raised on appeal). Here, Folks fails to show that he lodged anything other than a

general objection to the Court’s use of Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction

15.5. Folks has not shown that he made a specific, formal, on-the-record objection to

that instruction on the same grounds he now raises—i.e., that the evidence did not

support use of the instruction, and that use of the instruction would confuse the jury.

Second, even if Folks had shown that he properly preserved the particular

challenge he now raises, Folks fails to show that the evidence at trial did not support

giving Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5 on mitigation of damages. To

be sure, Folks asserts without much elaboration that “there was no evidence that

Folks failed to mitigate his damages.”25 But Folks forgets that (1) his orthopedic

surgeon, Dr. Marco Rodriguez, testified that he recommended that Folks undergo an

endoscopic rhizotomy to relieve back pain Folks claimed to be experiencing after

being released from jail, and (2) Folks testified he did not undergo the procedure Dr.

Rodriguez recommended. Folks has not met his burden to show that giving the

pattern mitigation-of-damages instruction was unwarranted in light of this evidence.

Third, even if Folks had carried his burden to show that the evidence did not

merit use of Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5, Folks still would not be

entitled to Rule 59(a) relief on instructional-error grounds. Folks necessarily fails to

carry his burden to show that the Court’s use of the pattern instruction on mitigation

of damages “creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been

properly guided in its deliberations” because Folks does not even acknowledge the

standard he must meet in his Rule 59(a) briefing. RSBCO, 104 F.4th at 555 (quotation

omitted). Indeed, Folks cites no Fifth Circuit precedent authorizing a district court to

disturb a jury verdict based on the use of a Fifth Circuit pattern instruction that (1)

correctly states the law but (2) was not merited based on the evidence at trial.

25 ECF No. 126-1 at 24.

Fourth, even if Folks had shown that use of the pattern mitigation instruction

“creates substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly

guided,” id. (quotation omitted), Folks still would not be entitled to relief: It is clear,

“based upon the entire record, that the challenged instruction could not have affected

the outcome of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted). Like Sainato’s counsel’s allegedly

improper closing argument, the pattern mitigation-of-damages instruction went only

to Folks’s damages; it had no bearing on Sainato’s liability. As noted above, however,

the jury unanimously found Sainato not liable and did not reach damages. Because

the challenged mitigation instruction concerned only damages, and because the jury

decided this case on liability without reaching damages, “the challenged instruction

could not have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Finally, the only authority Folks cites, Miller v. Lovett, does not support his

request for a new trial on instructional-error grounds. 879 F.2d 1066 (2d Cir. 1989),

partially abrogated on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). That

is for at least three independent reasons. First, the mitigation instruction given in

Miller materially differs from Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5.

Among other key distinctions, the mitigation instruction given in Miller fails to

clearly convey that the duty to mitigate operates only to reduce an award of damages

to a plaintiff and not to absolve a defendant of liability. Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern

Jury Instruction 15.5, by contrast, makes plain that a plaintiff’s failure to mitigate

damages comes into play only if the jury finds that the defendant was liable and that

the plaintiff suffered damages. Second, unlike the plaintiff in Miller, Folks fails to

carry his burden to show that the evidence at trial did not merit use of the mitigation

instruction, as explained above. And third, here, unlike in Miller, a review of the

entire record confirms that the challenged mitigation instruction could not have

affected the outcome of the case given that (1) the jury decided this case on liability

without reaching damages, and (2) Fifth Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 15.5

bears clearly and directly on damages alone.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Folks’s renewed motion?¢ for judgment as a matter

of law and alternative motion for new trialis DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 11th day of July, 2025.

He ke S 5h

BRANDON 8. LONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

26 ECF No. 126.

28