Jackson v. Gilday

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Nathaniel Jackson, Case No. 0:24-cv-01155-SAL

Plaintiff,

v.

Admiral Michael Gilday; Vice Admiral

Richard Cheeseman, Jr.; Executive Officer

ORDER

Johnny Mincey; Commander Ely Infante;

Lieutenant Commander Luke Wilson;

Unknown Officers 1–10,

Defendants.

Nathaniel Jackson (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against the above-captioned

defendants (“Defendants”) alleging violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. Defendants move to dismiss on several grounds.

[ECF No. 48.] Plaintiff opposes their motion, ECF No. 53, and Defendants have replied,

ECF No. 57.

This matter is before the court on the Report and Recommendation (“Report”)

issued by United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)

and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), recommending that Defendants’ motion be

granted. [ECF No. 67.] Plaintiff objects to portions of the Report and its ultimate

recommendation. [ECF No. 68.] Defendants oppose his objections. [ECF No. 69.] For the

reasons below, Plaintiff’s objections are overruled, the court adopts the Report as modified,

and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Review of a Magistrate Judge’s Report

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The

recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final

determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71

(1976). In response to a recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections.

See Elijah v. Dunbar, 66 F.4th 454, 459 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)). The district court then makes a de novo determination of those portions

of the Report to which an objection is made. Id. To trigger de novo review, an objecting

party must object with sufficient specificity to reasonably alert the district court of the true

ground for the objection. Id. If a litigant objects only generally, the court need not explain

adopting the Report and must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of

the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident

Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s

note).

An objection is specific so long as it alerts the district court that the litigant believes

the magistrate judge erred in recommending dismissal of that claim. Elijah, 66 F.4th at

460. Objections need not be novel to be sufficiently specific. Id. But “[i]n the absence of

specific objections . . . , this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the

recommendation.” Field v. McMaster, 663 F. Supp. 2d 449, 451–52 (D.S.C. 2009).

B. Motion to Dismiss

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),1 a party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637

F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). The court need not, however, accept the plaintiff’s legal

conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

On a motion to dismiss, the court’s task is limited to determining whether the

complaint states a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. Although Rule 8(a)(2) requires

only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”

a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court can consider “documents that are

explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference,” documents “attached to the

complaint as exhibits,” and documents attached to a motion to dismiss, as long as they are

“integral to the complaint” and “authentic.” Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d

159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016).

1 As noted in the Report, Defendants also raise arguments under Rules 12(b)(2) and

12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But since Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity, Plaintiff’s claims fail under Rule 12(b)(6), and the court need not reach

the personal jurisdiction and venue issues raised in their motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Report

The magistrate judge recommends granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss. [ECF

No. 67.] The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and standards of law, and the

court incorporates those facts and standards with only a brief synopsis of the same.

1. Factual Background

Plaintiff joined the United States Air Force in 2015. Id. at 1. On November 12, 2020,

he pleaded guilty at a general court martial to violations of the Uniform Code of Military

Justice. Id. As a result, he was dishonorably discharged and sentenced to thirty-six months

of confinement. Id. While confined at the Naval Consolidated Brig at Joint Base Charleston

(the “Brig”), Plaintiff converted to Islam. Id. Based on his sincere interpretation of Islamic

tenets, Plaintiff wished to let his beard grow naturally. Id. at 1–2. He knew this would

conflict with the Brig’s policy requiring inmates to shave every morning, so he contacted

the Brig’s chaplain, Lieutenant Luke Wilson (“Lieutenant Wilson”), for advice.2 Id. at 2.

Lieutenant Wilson told Plaintiff to apply for a religious exemption to the grooming

policy. Id. Plaintiff claims he submitted his first exemption request in November 2021,

which was denied in December 2021. Id. His request was allegedly denied because it was

not submitted on the correct form. Id. So Plaintiff submitted a second request on January

2 See U.S. Navy Uniform Regulations, NAVPERS 15665J, § 2201.2.a (“Brig prisoners . . .

are not authorized to wear any facial hair except when medical waivers or religious

accommodation have been granted.”).

7, 2022, this time using a template provided by Lieutenant Wilson. Id. (citing ECF No. 48-

3 at 1–2).

In April 2022, Lieutenant Wilson informed Plaintiff that his second exemption

request was also improperly formatted. Id. Plaintiff updated and resubmitted his request

once again. Id. In line with United States Navy procedures, Lieutenant Wilson then

interviewed Plaintiff and submitted a recommendation to the Commanding Officer,

Executive Officer Johnny Mincey (“Executive Officer Mincey”). Id. Lieutenant Wilson

completed his report on April 15, 2022, finding Plaintiff’s request to be sincere and

consistent with his faith. Id. (citing ECF No. 48-4 at 1–2). His report also noted there is no

consensus within the Muslim community about whether a beard is strictly required. Id.

(citing ECF No. 48-4 at 1–2).

Executive Officer Mincey issued a report to the “Chief of Naval Operations” on

May 3, 2022, recommending denial of Plaintiff’s request. Id. (citing ECF No. 48-5 at 1–

2). Vice Admiral Richard Cheeseman, Jr. (“Vice Admiral Cheeseman”) took over as the

Chief of Naval Operations on June 3, 2022, and granted Plaintiff’s religious exemption

request on November 10, 2022. Id. at 2–3 (citing ECF Nos. 48-1 at 6 & 48-7 at 1–2).

Between February and November 2022, while his exemption request was still

pending, Plaintiff refused to shave and was disciplined as a result. See id. (citing ECF No.

48-8 at 1–28).3 “[His] punishments included time in disciplinary segregation; a reduction

3 The magistrate judge noted that, “[c]ontrary to [Plaintiff]’s assertion that he was

continually held in disciplinary segregation while his exemption request was pending

because he refused to compromise on his religious beliefs, [Plaintiff]’s disciplinary records

in custody classification; and loss of workdays, good conduct time, and the ability to earn

abatement days.” Id.

On March 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed this RFRA suit against the officials involved in

evaluating his request and disciplining him during the interim. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff

seeks monetary damages against Defendants in their individual capacities. See id.

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing inter alia that Plaintiff’s claims are barred

by the doctrine of qualified immunity. See ECF No. 48. The magistrate judge agreed and

recommended Defendants’ motion be granted on that basis. See ECF No. 67.

2. RFRA

RFRA provides that the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s

exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). This is true unless the Government “demonstrates that application

of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;

and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).

The magistrate judge observed that because Plaintiff’s religious exemption request

was granted, “his RFRA claim is necessarily limited.” [ECF No. 67 at 5.] To the extent that

a RFRA violation occurred, she reasoned that it must have occurred while his request was

still pending, between February and November 2022. Id. Finally, since Plaintiff has now

show that 240 days of his time in disciplinary segregation resulted from violations totally

unrelated to the shaving policy.” Id. at 3 n.3 (citing ECF No. 48-9 at 1–10).

been granted a religious exemption, the magistrate judge concluded his request for

injunctive relief is moot, leaving monetary damages as his sole potential remedy. See id.

3. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity shields governmental officials performing discretionary

functions from liability for damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Lebron v. Rumsfeld,

670 F.3d 540, 560 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying qualified immunity to action brought under

RFRA)). The analysis requires determining (1) whether the facts alleged show a violation

of a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at

the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009).

Courts must define the right “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).

4. Analysis and Recommendation

The magistrate judge concluded Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See

id. at 10. Citing Holt v. Hobbs, she found there is “no question that a federal prisoner’s

right to seek religious exemption from an institutional grooming policy was clearly

established at the time of [Plaintiff]’s detention and that denial of an exemption could

violate RFRA.” Id. at 6–7 (citing 574 U.S. 352 (2015)). Still, the magistrate judge

explained that the clearly established right at issue is not the general right to seek a religious

exemption, but the right of a military prisoner to have an exemption adjudicated in fewer

than eight months or to be exempt from policy compliance during the interim. Id. at 7.

Under the Navy’s religious accommodation policy, BUPERS Instruction 1730.11A

(the “Accommodation Policy”), a Navy military prisoner can seek a waiver of any Navy

policy that conflicts with his religious beliefs. See id. at 9. The Accommodation Policy sets

forth the process for requesting a waiver and reviewing the request, as well as the time it

should take to approve the request. Id. Requests must be forwarded to the Deputy Chief of

Naval Operations seven days after their submission. Id. (citing ECF No. 49 at 10). The

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations is then tasked with “expeditiously adjudicat[ing]” the

request. Id.

The magistrate judge acknowledged that Lieutenant Wilson and Executive Officer

Mincey apparently failed to meet the seven-day deadline for forwarding Plaintiff’s request

to Vice Admiral Cheeseman. Id. at 10. She also found that Vice Admiral Cheeseman

“arguably, was not ‘expeditious’ in his adjudication of the request.” Id. “These errors,

however, are not statutory or constitutional in nature; thus, the court cannot say that every

reasonable official would have understood that a seven-month delay would violate

[Plaintiff]’s constitutional or statutory rights.” Id. Since Plaintiff failed to show Defendants

should have been on notice that their actions violated his clearly established rights, the

magistrate judge concluded they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.

B. Plaintiff’s Objections and Defendants’ Responses

Plaintiff’s objections proceed in two parts. See generally ECF No. 68. First, he

argues the magistrate judge’s recommendation conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision

in Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43 (2020). Id. at 2–4. Second, he argues that her

recommendation conflicts with Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015). Id. at 4–6. Defendants

challenge Plaintiff’s objections on the grounds that (A) they lack specificity and (B) they

raise new issues for the first time. ECF No. 69 at 1–4. Defendants also argue in support of

the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the right at issue was not clearly established. Id. at

5–7.

1. Tanzin v. Tanvir

Plaintiff devotes two pages to arguing that the Report conflicts with the Supreme

Court’s decision in Tanvir. See ECF No. 68 at 2–4. As he sees it, the Report “rests heavily

on the Fourth Circuit’s pre-Tanvir decision in Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir.

2012), and a judicial averseness to authorizing money damages against military officials in

their personal capacities.” Id. at 2 (citation modified). The Lebron court held that “whether

RFRA even speaks to the military detention setting . . . [is] anything but clearly

established.” 670 F.3d at 560. Plaintiff argues Tanvir overruled Lebron on this point and

RFRA’s applicability to the military detention setting is now clearly established. See ECF

No. 68 at 2. He also criticizes the Report for attempting to distinguish between prisoners

in military versus civilian custody and for “seek[ing] to create a judicial exception that

Congress did not.” Id. at 2–3. According to Plaintiff, Tanvir expressly allows the type of

monetary damages he seeks, and therefore the magistrate judge’s reliance on Lebron is

misplaced. Id. at 3–4.

The court disagrees with Plaintiff’s contention that the Report “rests heavily” on

Lebron. See id. at 2 (emphasis added). While the Report does address whether RFRA

applies to Plaintiff’s claims and does cite Lebron in that context, the magistrate judge never

definitively resolved the question of RFRA’s applicability in military detention. See ECF

No. 67 at 7–10. Instead, she concluded that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of

qualified immunity—“even if RFRA applies in the military detention setting and even if

monetary damages are appropriate.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added).

Accordingly, the court need not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s Tanvir-based

objections. Even assuming he is correct that RFRA authorizes suits for monetary damages

in the military detention context, the true ground for the magistrate judge’s

recommendation stands: Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the right in question was

“clearly established” and Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

2. Holt v. Hobbs

Plaintiff’s second objection is based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Holt. There,

Gregory Holt, a state prisoner and devout Muslim, challenged a state-prison grooming

policy that prohibited inmates from growing beards unless they had a particular

dermatological condition. See 574 U.S. at 352. The Court found the policy substantially

burdened Holt’s free exercise of religion under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, et seq. Id. at 352–

53. It also emphasized that “RLUIPA [] allows prisoners ‘to seek religious

accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.’” Id. at 358 (quoting

Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniõ do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436 (2006)). In

sum, Holt affirmed the right of a prisoner to seek a religious exemption from an institutional

grooming policy and that such exemptions may be denied only if doing so is the least

restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest—such as preventing

contraband or ensuring proper identification. See 574 U.S. at 356.

Plaintiff contends that Holt “made it ‘sufficiently clear’ to every reasonable official

that prohibiting [him] from growing a beard, absent a compelling interest, was unlawful.”

[ECF No. 68 at 5.] He argues Defendants violated this clearly established right by the “the

continuous, daily enforcement of a no-beard policy against [him]” and by “subjecting him

to punishment for exercising his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Id. at 4.

However, under the qualified immunity doctrine, the court’s analysis “must be

undertaken in light of the case’s specific context, not as a broad general proposition.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 194. “[I]f it was not clear to a reasonable [official] that the conduct

. . . was unlawful in the situation he confronted— then the law affords immunity from suit.”

Parrish ex rel. Lee, 372 F.3d at 301 (quotations omitted). The relevant question is whether,

“at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that

every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 740 (2011) (quotations omitted) (citation modified). In

other words, the law must have provided Defendants with “fair warning” that their conduct

was unlawful. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 741 (2002)).

Plaintiff concedes that framing the right too broadly—such as a general “right to

religious freedom”—would fail to provide meaningful notice to officials. [ECF No. 68 at

5.] But he argues the Report errs in the opposite direction by “defining the right with

excessive specificity,” noting that the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit have rejected

the notion that a right must have been recognized in a factually identical case to be “clearly

established.” Id. (citing Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; Meyers v. Balt. Cnty., 713 F.3d 723, 734

(4th Cir. 2013) (“We repeatedly have held that it is not required that a right violated already

have been recognized by a court in a specific context before such right may be held ‘clearly

established’ for purposes of qualified immunity.”)).

In the Report, the magistrate judge defined the right at issue as “the right of a

military prisoner to have his exemption request adjudicated in less than eight months or to

be free to violate the grooming policy while awaiting a decision on his exemption request.”

[ECF No. 67 at 7.] The court agrees this formulation may define the right with undue

precision—particularly the phrase “in less than eight months,” which likely exceeds the

level of specificity needed. That said, the definition is otherwise sound, as is the magistrate

judge’s overall conclusion.

While Plaintiff insists he is merely asserting the right recognized in Holt, the facts

here differ in significant ways. Holt confirmed a prisoner’s right to seek a religious

exemption from a grooming policy—something Plaintiff did. His request was ultimately

granted. Thus, he is not asserting a right to a religious exemption per se, but rather the right

to have that exemption granted promptly or the right to violate that policy while his request

is pending.

Plaintiff contends his rights were violated “at the moment Defendants first denied

him the accommodation he sought.” [ECF No. 68 at 5.] Yet Holt does not suggest that

religious exemptions must be granted immediately upon request, nor does it establish a

right to disobey institutional policy while an exemption is under review. Plaintiff cites no

case or statute affirming such rights. Accordingly—even assuming they do exist—Plaintiff

has failed to show that the state of the law from February to November 2022 was

sufficiently clear to give Defendants “‘fair warning” that their conduct was unlawful. Tolan,

572 U.S. at 656.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity gives officials “breathing room to make

reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.’” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582

U.S. 120, 150-51 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 743). In the absence of clearly

established authority recognizing the specific rights asserted by Plaintiff, Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity.

I. CONCLUSION

After reviewing the Report, the applicable law, and the record of this case in

accordance with the above standard, the court adopts the Report as modified and GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 48.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ahern □□

July 11, 2025 Sherri A. Lydon

Columbia, South Carolina United States District Judge

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