In Re the Matter of: H.G., By Their Next Friend, K.B., and K.B., Individually v. C.G.

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

IN RE THE MATTER OF: H.G., )

BY THEIR NEXT FRIEND, K.B., )

AND K.B., INDIVIDUALLY, )

)

Respondents, )

)

v. ) WD86704

)

C.G., ) Filed: November 12, 2024

)

Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cooper County

The Honorable Keith M. Bail, Judge

Before Division Three: Thomas N. Chapman, P.J., and

Lisa White Hardwick and Alok Ahuja, JJ.

K.B. (“Father”) filed a paternity action in the Circuit Court of Cooper

County, seeking to be declared the natural father of H.G.B. (“Child”), and

requesting the entry of orders governing child support and child custody. C.G.

(“Mother”) is Child’s natural mother. Following a bench trial, the circuit court

entered a judgment adopting the parties’ agreed parenting plan. The court also

granted Father’s request that Child’s surname be changed to a hyphenated name

consisting of both Mother’s and Father’s surnames. Mother appeals, arguing that

the court’s order of a name change constituted an abuse of discretion. We affirm.

Factual Background

Mother and Father were in a romantic relationship during the first half of

Mother’s pregnancy with Child. In the Summer of 2022, a few months before

Child’s birth, Mother and Father separated. Mother moved to Boonville, while

Father returned to his ex-wife in Warsaw. Following their separation, the parties

communicated infrequently. Mother “occasionally” notified Father of medical

appointments related to her pregnancy. Mother testified she did not consistently

communicate with Father because she was upset that he had returned to his ex-

wife.

Child, a girl, was born in Fall 2022. Father was not informed Mother had

gone into labor. He did not participate in selecting Child’s name, and Mother did

not include his name on Child’s birth certificate. From birth through the time of

trial, Child resided with Mother in Boonville.

Father filed a paternity action in the Circuit Court of Cooper County on

November 7, 2022, just a few weeks after Child’s birth. Mother filed an answer

and counter-petition. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to joint legal and physical

custody of Child. They also agreed to a Joint Parenting Plan under which Father

would exercise parenting time with Child approximately 25% of the time. The

parties also agreed that Mother would be awarded $1,000 in monthly child

support, and that Father would pay a share of the expenses for Child’s

extracurricular activities, and of Child’s unreimbursed medical and dental

expenses. One of the issues remaining for trial was Father’s request that Child’s

surname be changed to his own.

The circuit court conducted a bench trial on September 25, 2023, at which

Mother and Father testified. Regarding the surname change, Father testified that

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he believed it was “very important” for Child to have a connection to his name

and family history. Specifically, Father testified that “I think a child should, you

know, have the father’s name even if they’re not together.” Father also noted that

the Joint Parenting Plan provided that he would have ongoing involvement in the

child’s life. Although Father preferred that Child carry his surname alone, he

testified that he was willing to agree that Child have the hyphenated surname of

both parents.

Mother testified that Father had been deceptive and had cheated on her

with his ex-wife, which led Mother to end their relationship and return to

Boonville. Mother also testified that when Father was a child, his father had an

affair and left Father’s mother. Mother claimed that the infidelity of Father, and

of Father’s father, was well-known in Boonville. Mother also testified, without

providing specifics, that she had learned from court records that Father’s family

has “a criminal history” that was purportedly well-known in the community.

Mother testified that she did not want Child to be associated with this

disreputable family history. Mother explained that it was important for Child to

carry her last name, because “I feel that my last name has done me well, and I

hope it can do my daughter well as well.”

The circuit court’s judgment, entered on October 2, 2023, ordered that

Child have the hyphenated surname of Mother and Father, with Mother’s

surname first. The court also ordered that Father’s name be added to Child’s

birth certificate “to reflect he is the natural father of said child.”

Mother appeals.

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Standard of Review

We review the judgment under the standards set forth in Murphy v.

Carron, 536 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Mo. 1976). McLeod v. McLeod, 681 S.W.3d 215, 228

(Mo. App. W.D. 2023). We will affirm the judgment “unless it is not supported

by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously

declares or applies the law.” Kaderly v. Kaderly, 656 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Mo. App.

W.D. 2022) (quoting Reichard v. Reichard, 637 S.W.3d 559, 569 (Mo. App. W.D.

2021)). When determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court “will accept

as true the evidence and inferences from the evidence that are favorable to the

[circuit] court's decree and disregard all contrary evidence.” Wright v.

Buttercase ex rel. Buttercase, 244 S.W.3d 174, 176 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)

(quoting T.B.G. v. C.A.G., 772 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Mo. 1989)).

Discussion

In her sole Point on appeal, Mother argues that the circuit court abused its

discretion by arbitrarily changing Child’s surname.

Section 210.841.3(5), RSMo provides that a circuit court’s judgment in a

paternity action “may contain . . . provision[s] . . . concerning: . . . [a]ny matter in

the best interest of the child.” Section 210.841.3(5) “grant[s] authority to the

circuit court to order a name change.” Jenkins v. Austin, 255 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Mo.

App. W.D. 2008) (citing Cobb by Webb v. Cobb, 844 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Mo. App. W.D.

1992)); cf. Neal v. Neal, 941 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Mo. 1997) (holding that circuit

courts have authority to change a child’s name during marital dissolution

proceedings, based on “the court's equitable powers to enter judgment on any

matter in the best interests of the child”).

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In Missouri, no legal presumption exists that a child born out of wedlock

should bear a particular parent's surname. Wright, 244 S.W.3d at 177-178. In

particular, “[t]he law does not presume it is in the child’s best interest to carry the

father’s surname.” C.R.F. ex rel. C.R.C. v. B.M.F., 174 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Mo. App.

E.D. 2005) (emphasis added; citing Brown v. Shannahan, 141 S.W.3d 77, 82

(Mo. App. E.D. 2004)); accord Blechle v. Poirrier, 110 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Mo.

App. E.D. 2003). “‘Neither parent has the absolute right to confer his or her

name upon the child.’” Jenkins, 255 S.W.3d at 27 (quoting Brown, 141 S.W.3d at

82).

In determining the appropriate surname for a child born out of wedlock,

the circuit court “has wide discretion and should be guided by what is in the best

interests of the child.” Blechle, 110 S.W.3d at 855 (quoting B.L.W. by Ellen K. v.

Wollweber, 823 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Mo. App. S.D. 1992)); see also M.R.H. v. J.N.P.,

385 S.W.3d 494, 497 (Mo. App. E.D. 2012). The burden is on the parent seeking

to change the child’s surname to prove such a change is in the child’s best

interests. Wright, 244 S.W.3d at 177. The factors the circuit court should

consider include “(1) the child's age, (2) the potential embarrassment or

discomfort the child might experience when his or her surname is different from

the custodial parent, and (3) how the name change will affect the child's

relationship with his parents.” M.R.H., 385 S.W.3d at 498 (citing Wright, 244

S.W.3d at 177, which in turn cites M.L.H. by D.R.H. v. W.H.P., 831 S.W.2d 677,

679 (Mo. App. W.D. 1992)).

A parent’s bare request that the child’s surname be changed to match the

parent, or conclusory testimony that the parent believes the child “should carry

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on [the parent’s] name,” are insufficient to satisfy the parent’s burden to prove

that a name change is in the child’s best interest. C.R.F., 174 S.W.3d at 92

(reversing circuit court judgment ordering name change); see also Perkins v.

Delmont ex rel. Delmont, 254 S.W.3d 899, 900 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008) (reversing

order for name change where the only testimony concerning the issue was

father’s request that the court change child’s surname to match his own); Blechle

v. Poirrier, 110 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (same). Similarly, a

parent’s conclusory testimony that it would be in the child’s best interest to have

the parent’s surname, without elaboration, is insufficient to justify a name

change. Brown, 141 S.W.3d at 82.

On the other hand, this Court has affirmed judgments ordering a name

change where a child was in their infancy, and where the evidence indicated that

a name change would foster the child’s relationship with a parent who would be

substantially involved in the child’s upbringing. Thus, in Wright v. Buttercase ex

rel. Buttercase, 244 S.W.3d 174 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008), this Court affirmed a

judgment ordering that a child’s surname be changed to the father’s, where there

was evidence that the father “was trying to build a relationship with the child.”

Id. at 178. Further, the father testified “that every child in the surrounding

community carried his or her Father's surname and that the name change would

help the child identify with Father's family.” Id. The Court also noted that the

child was only approximately two years old at the time of the circuit court’s

judgment, and that, “since the child was so young, the name change would not

alter his relationship with Mother.” Id. Based primarily on these considerations,

the Court found that “[t]he decision to order the child's surname to be changed

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was within the court's wide discretion and was supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. at 179; see also Jenkins, 255 S.W.3d at 28 (affirming circuit court’s

ordering of a name change where child was less than one year old, “Father was

heavily involved in [the child’s] life,” and Father testified that change of surname

would foster the relationship between the child and Father’s family); Cobb, 844

S.W.2d at 9 (affirming circuit court judgment changing child’s surname to match

father’s, based on evidence that child “would be set apart from the other children

in his community if he did not bear his father's surname,” and that father “has

attempted to build a relationship with” the child).

We emphasize, however, that evidence of a child’s infancy, and that a name

change would assist a parent’s efforts to foster a substantial long-term

relationship with the child, does not mandate a name change. Instead, whether

to grant a name change in such circumstances falls within a circuit court’s “wide

discretion” as it assesses a child’s best interests. We note that this Court affirmed

a circuit court’s refusal to order that a child bear a hyphenated name, in factual

circumstances similar to Wright, in M.R.H. v. J.N.P., 385 S.W.3d 494 (Mo. App.

E.D. 2012). M.R.H. emphasized that “[t]his Court's sole function . . . is to assess

whether the trial court's decision was outside the bounds of the wide discretion it

is afforded when ruling on name changes in paternity actions.” Id. at 498.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a name change in

the circumstances of this case. Child was less than one year old at the time the

circuit court ordered the name change. There was no testimony that the Child

was aware of, or attached to, her existing surname; moreover, because Child was

not yet in school, she would not have become known by her existing surname

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among her peers. Father also testified that it was “very important” to him that

Child’s name reflect a connection to him and to his family’s history. Further,

Father evidently desires to maintain a significant ongoing parental relationship

with Child, since he initiated this paternity action within weeks of Child’s birth in

order to formalize their relationship. The parties agreed to a parenting plan

which recognizes that Father was a suitable parent to exercise joint legal and

physical custody over Child. The joint parenting plan provides Father with

substantial parenting time. Father also agreed to assume substantial financial

responsibility for Child: he agreed to pay $1,000 per month in child support; to

maintain health insurance for Child if necessary; and to reimburse Mother for a

share of Child’s uninsured medical and dental expenses, and expenses of

extracurricular activities.

The circuit court also heard testimony that Mother failed to inform Father

of her pregnancy-related medical appointments or her labor, that she denied him

the opportunity to participate in the selection of Child’s name at birth, and that

she did not identify him as Child’s natural father on Child’s birth certificate (even

though there was apparently no question concerning Child’s paternity). The

evidence supported the conclusion that Mother took these actions due to her own

animosity toward Father because of his deception and infidelity, rather than

based on any consideration of Child’s best interests. Mother’s actions of

unilaterally naming Child, without input from Father, is in tension with the

principle that “‘[n]either parent has the absolute right to confer his or her name

upon the child.’” Jenkins, 255 S.W.3d at 27 (emphasis added; citation omitted).

While Father bore the burden of proving that a change of Child’s surname was in

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Child’s best interest, the circuit could justifiably conclude that any presumption

in favor of Child’s existing name was diminished where Mother denied Father

any influence over the initial selection of Child’s name. See Interest of C.M.V.,

479 S.W.3d 352, 359 (Tex. App. 2015) (listing among factors court may consider

in addressing a name-change request: “whether either parent is motivated by

concerns other than the child's best interest – for example, an attempt to alienate

the child from the other parent”).

In her testimony, Mother claimed that Child would be stigmatized by

carrying Father’s surname, because it was purportedly well-known in the

community that Father, and Father’s father, had been unfaithful to their

romantic partners, and that members of Father’s family had some unspecified

“criminal history.” In its role as finder of fact, the circuit court was entitled to

discount this testimony. See Wright, 244 S.W.3d at 179 (holding that circuit

court, as fact-finder, was entitled to reject Mother’s claims “that Father's past

irresponsible behavior and bad reputation in the community support a finding

that it is in the best interests of the child to keep Mother's surname”).

Thus, sufficient competent evidence supported the circuit court’s

conclusion that it was in Child’s best interest to change her surname to reflect her

relationship to Father. It is also significant that, in this case, the circuit court

ordered that Child bear a hyphenated surname which incorporates the surnames

of both Father and Mother. Notably, in Wright, Jenkins, R.W.B. and Cobb, this

Court affirmed circuit court orders which changed a child’s surname to that of the

father alone, in circumstances similar to the present case. Here, by contrast,

Child’s surname will reflect her relationship to both of her parents.

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The circuit court could properly conclude that use of a hyphenated

surname would prevent the confusion which would result if Child bore the

surname of only one of the two parents who share custody over her. Among the

factors which the circuit court may consider in addressing a name change request

is “the potential embarrassment or discomfort the child might experience when

his or her surname is different from the custodial parent.” M.R.H., 385 S.W.3d at

498. “As the child custody statutes now read, in cases where joint physical

custody has been awarded – both parents are considered ‘custodial’ parents.”

Gaudreau v. Barnes, 429 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014). Thus, in this

case, Child has two “custodial parents,” with different surnames.

We have previously recognized that, where a child has two custodial

parents who live apart with different surnames, giving the child either parent’s

surname, to the exclusion of the other parent’s name, may present problems for

the child and for the parents.

[T]here are inherent difficulties likely to arise when a child bears a

different surname from a parent, but where the biological parents do

not share the same surname and are opposed to using a hyphenated

surname for the child, it is an unavoidable consequence that the

child must bear a different surname from at least one of his or her

biological parents and that one parent may experience difficulties as

a result.

Jenkins, 255 S.W.3d at 28.

Hyphenated surnames may avoid some of the inherent difficulties of

recognizing only one-half of a child’s lineage in their surname. In this case, the

circuit court could decide in its discretion that giving Child a hyphenated last

name which incorporated the surnames of both of her custodial parents would

avoid “the potential embarrassment or discomfort” if her surname were not to

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match the surname of either of her parents. As explained by the Supreme Court

of Ohio,

[a] combined surname is a solution that recognizes each parent's

legitimate claims and threatens neither parent's rights. The name

merely represents the truth that both parents created the child and

that both parents have responsibility for that child.

In re Wilhite, 706 N.E.2d 778, 782 (Ohio 1999) (citations omitted). Other courts

have likewise recognized that the use of a hyphenated surname may help

maintain a child’s relationship with both parents, and thus may be in the best

interest of the child.1 In this case, any potential that the name change might

adversely affect Mother’s relationship with Child is diminished by the fact that

Child will continue to carry Mother’s surname as part of her own. The circuit

court did not abuse its wide discretion in this case when it ordered that Child be

given a hyphenated surname reflecting her relationship to both of her parents.

Conclusion

The circuit court acted well within its wide discretion in concluding that a

name change was warranted in this case, and that decision was supported by

sufficient competent evidence. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

________________________

Alok Ahuja, Judge

All concur.

1 See, e.g., Velasquez v. Chavez, 455 P.3d 95, 98-99 (Utah App. 2019); In re

J.P.H., 865 N.W.2d 488, 491 (S.D. 2015); In re Eberhardt, 920 N.Y.S.2d 216, 222 (App.

Div. 2011); In re A.C.S., 171 P.3d 1148, 1153-54 (Alaska 2007); In re Andrews by and

through Andrews, 454 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Neb. 1990); In re Marriage of Douglass, 252

Cal.Rptr. 839, 844-45 (App. 1988).

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