Donald Brooks v. William J. Laurie and Crown Center Farms, Inc.

In the

Missouri Court of Appeals

Western District



DONALD BROOKS,  WD85031



Appellant,  OPINION FILED:

v. 



 November 22, 2022

WILLIAM J. LAURIE AND 

CROWN CENTER FARMS, INC., 



Respondents. 

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, Missouri

The Honorable Scott Alan Hayes, Judge

Before Division Two:

Lisa White Hardwick, P.J., Thomas N. Chapman and Janet Sutton, JJ.

Plaintiff Donald Brooks (“Brooks”) appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Randolph

County, which granted a joint motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Crown Center

Farms, Inc. (“Crown Center Farms”) and William Laurie (“Laurie”). The grant of summary

judgment was based on the circuit court’s determination that Crown Center Farms was Brooks’s

statutory employer under section 287.0401 and that Laurie was an employee of Crown Center

1

With regard to the Workers’ Compensation Law, “the statute in effect at the time of injury is generally the

applicable version.” Kayden v. Ford Motor Co., 532 S.W.3d 227, 229 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (citing Anderson v.

Veracity Research Co., 299 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)). Accordingly, statutory citations are to RSMo

2000, as supplemented through August 31, 2015, which is the date of injury in this case.

Farms, such that the Workers’ Compensation Law2 provided Brooks’s exclusive remedy against

Crown Center Farms or Laurie pursuant to section 287.120.

In his first two points, Brooks contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary

judgment to Crown Center Farms on the basis of Crown Center Farms being Brooks’s statutory

employer because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding (1) whether Brooks was

injured on or about the premises of Crown Center Farms, and (2) whether the injury occurred

during the performance of work that was within Crown Center Farms’ usual course of business.

In his third point, Brooks argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to

Laurie on the basis of Laurie being an employee of Brooks’s statutory employer, Crown Center

Farms. In his fourth point, Brooks argues that the circuit court erred in granting summary

judgment to Laurie on the basis of the corporate existence of Crown Center Farms. The

judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Background3

On August 31, 2015, Brooks suffered an injury while he was employed as a

superintendent for Little Dixie Construction Company (“Little Dixie Construction”), and while

Brooks was performing work cutting down trees at Big Buck Resort, Inc. (“Big Buck”), a

hunting resort located near Cairo, Missouri. Brooks alleges that he was injured when a tree that

was cut by Defendant Laurie fell down on Brooks causing injuries to his head, neck, chest, arm,

and ribs, including numerous fractures.

2

Section 287.010 provides that Chapter 287 RSMo “shall be known as ‘The Workers’ Compensation Law’.”

3

The record is viewed in the light most favorable to Brooks – the non-movant in the summary judgment

proceedings. Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 116 (Mo. banc 2020). In this matter, the background facts

are taken primarily from what was uncontroverted in the parties’ statements of fact.

2

At the time of the incident, Defendant Laurie was a shareholder/member of Big Buck.4

Members of Big Buck were not assigned particular plots of land on Big Buck, but members

could unofficially select a designated hunting area by telling other members that the selected area

is where the member would hunt. Laurie had authority to cut trees on the portion of Big Buck

that was his designated hunting area.

Laurie co-owns Crown Center Farms with his wife. Crown Center Farms is located in

Columbia, Missouri. Crown Center Farms was created as a horse breeding operation and to care

for and maintain the various property interests of the Lauries. Crown Center Farms employs one

full-time ranch hand, Tim Cullen (“Cullen”). Cullen assists with maintaining and caring for

Crown Center Farms and various properties owned by the Lauries, including to help manage

Laurie’s hunting area at Big Buck.

Plaintiff Brooks was a superintendent for Little Dixie Construction and was a salaried

employee. On the date of Brooks’s injury, Brooks was working as an employee of Little Dixie

Construction, which was primarily a commercial construction company. Little Dixie

Construction regularly performed services for Crown Center Farms and Laurie.

As an employee of Little Dixie Construction, Brooks performed an assortment of general

maintenance and construction services for Crown Center Farms over a period of ten years.

These tasks varied and included plumbing, electrical, painting, and tile work, brush-hogging

Laurie’s pastures, working on Laurie’s pool, assisting with Laurie’s daughter’s wedding, and

once burying Laurie’s dog. Brooks regularly went to Crown Center Farms, Big Buck, and the

Lauries’ other properties to perform work for Crown Center Farms and Laurie. When

4

The summary judgment record is not altogether clear as to what is meant by the fact that Laurie is a “member” of

Big Buck; however, that fact is uncontested.

3

performing tasks for Crown Center Farms through his employment with Little Dixie

Construction, Brooks would report his time to Little Dixie Construction. Little Dixie

Construction would then bill Crown Center Farms. Brooks’s payment for these tasks came

through his salary from Little Dixie Construction. Brooks had been to Big Buck approximately

ten times prior to the day of the incident.

On the day of the incident, Laurie contacted Brooks and requested his assistance at Big

Buck. On that day, the people working at Big Buck included Plaintiff Brooks, Laurie, Cullen,

two additional laborers not identified by name in the record, and Eddie Brooks (“Eddie”),5 who

was the brother of Plaintiff Brooks and also an employee of Little Dixie Construction. On the

date of the incident, Brooks and Laurie were cutting down trees with chainsaws, while Eddie was

running a “bobcat.” Cullen and the two unidentified laborers were cleaning up and clearing

brush as the trees came down. Laurie instructed which trees were to be cut up into firewood and

which trees were to be disposed of in a ditch by placing dots on the trees. Brooks and Laurie

were the only two persons who were cutting down trees on the day of the incident.

Following the incident, Crown Center Farms continues to utilize a Little Dixie

Construction employee named Billy to perform an assortment of property maintenance tasks that

had previously been performed by Brooks, but these tasks do not extend to the cutting down and

clearing of trees on the Big Buck property. Big Buck now contracts with a professional logger to

clear the Big Buck property.

Following the incident, Brooks filed a workers’ compensation claim against Little Dixie

Construction for the injuries sustained while working at Big Buck. Brooks had received a partial

5

To avoid potential confusion due to the shared last name of Plaintiff Donald Brooks and his brother Eddie Brooks,

we refer to Eddie Brooks as “Eddie.” No disrespect is intended.

4

disability award under Little Dixie Construction’s workers’ compensation policy, but his

workers’ compensation claim had not been fully resolved by the time the summary judgment

motion was filed.

On October 9, 2018, Brooks filed a three-count Petition for Damages, which named

Laurie, Crown Center Farms, and Big Buck as defendants. The Petition alleged that, on August

31, 2015, Brooks was injured while working at Big Buck for his employer, Little Dixie

Construction Company. Brooks alleged that, through no fault of his own, a tree cut by

Defendant Laurie fell on Brooks and caused Brooks injury. Defendants Laurie and Crown

Center Farms filed answers to the petition and asserted as an affirmative defense that Brooks

may be deemed a statutory employee of Crown Center Farms, Laurie, or Big Buck so as to be

barred from recovery against these defendants.

On May 20, 2020, Laurie and Crown Center Farms filed a Joint Motion for Summary

Judgment along with a statement of uncontroverted facts and a memorandum in support. The

motion asserted that Crown Center Farms was Brooks’s statutory employer pursuant to section

287.040.1 such that Brooks’s exclusive remedy was provided under The Workers’ Compensation

Law. Further, the motion argued that Laurie was an employee of Crown Center Farms so as to

be shielded from liability under The Workers’ Compensation Law.

Brooks filed a response to the motion and the statement of uncontroverted facts along

with a separate statement of uncontroverted facts and a memorandum in opposition to the

motion. The Defendants thereafter filed a reply along with a response to Brooks’s separate

statement of uncontroverted facts.

5

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion on July 27, 2020. On November 13, 2020,

the trial court entered an order6 which granted summary judgment to Defendants Crown Center

Farms and Laurie. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Crown Center Farms

was based on the trial court’s determination that Crown Center Farms was a statutory employer

of Brooks so as to trigger the exclusive remedy provisions of The Workers’ Compensation Law.

The trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Laurie was based on the trial court’s

determination that Laurie was an employee of Crown Center Farms so as to shield Laurie from

liability under The Workers’ Compensation Law.

Brooks now appeals to this court.

Standard of Review

The trial court makes its decision to grant summary judgment based on the

pleadings, record submitted, and the law; therefore, this Court need not defer to the

trial court's determination and reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. In

reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same

criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper.

Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no

genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. The facts contained in affidavits or otherwise in support of a party's

motion are accepted as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response

to the summary judgment motion. Only genuine disputes as to material facts

preclude summary judgment. A material fact in the context of summary judgment

is one from which the right to judgment flows.

6

The November 13, 2020 order was denominated a “Judgment.” However, the order did not dispose of all claims

between all parties, as the order did not dispose of Brooks’s claims against Big Buck Resort. Rule 74.01(b)

provides: “When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-

claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may enter a judgment as to one or more

but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay. . .

.” In this matter, no such express determination was included in the order, such that the order, although

denominated a judgment, was not at that time (and in that form) a judgment. The order, therefore, did not

“terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties . . . .” Rule 74.01(b). On November 3, 2021, Brooks

dismissed his claims against Big Buck Resort, which left nothing for future determination in the case. As the thirty-

day window under Rule 81.05(a)(1) governing when a judgment becomes final did not begin to run until the claims

against Big Buck Resort were dismissed, Brooks’s notice of appeal filed on December 6, 2021 was filed timely. See

BV Capital, LLC v. Larry Hughes, 437 S.W.3d 391, 392 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014) (citing Bailey v. Innovative Mgmt.

& Inv., Inc., 890 S.W.2d 648, 649-50 (Mo. banc 1994)).

6

....

The record below is reviewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom

summary judgment was entered, and that party is entitled to the benefit of all

reasonable inferences from the record. However, facts contained in affidavits or

otherwise in support of the party's motion are accepted as true unless contradicted

by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion.

Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115-116 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Goerlitz v. City of

Maryville, 333 S.W.3d 450, 452-53 (Mo. banc 2011)).

Analysis

“Under Missouri’s workers’ compensation laws, in exchange for providing mandatory

workers’ compensation coverage – without regard to fault – employers and their employees are

granted immunity from civil lawsuits arising out of workplace injuries.” State ex rel. Beutler,

Inc. v. Midkiff, 621 S.W.3d 491, 493 (Mo. banc 2021) (citing § 287.120). One method of

establishing that a person or entity is an “employer” under The Workers’ Compensation Law is

by establishing that the person or entity is a “statutory employer” pursuant to section 287.040. 7

“Section 287.040 extends the workers’ compensation obligations (and civil immunity

protections) to ‘statutory employers.’” Id. (citing § 287.040). “If an injured employee qualifies

as a ‘statutory employee’ of the ‘statutory employer,’ their right to recover under workers’

compensation laws excludes all other rights and remedies the employee might have.” Id.

7

On appeal, the Defendants contend that there are additional bases that would establish that Crown Center Farms

was Brooks’s employer so as to entitle the Defendant’s to summary judgment under the exclusivity provisions of

The Workers’ Compensation Law. However, appellate review of a decision to grant summary judgment is limited

to the issues put before the trial court.” Rapp v. Eagle Plumbing, Inc., 440 S.W.3d 519, 523 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)

(quoting Sheedy v. Mo. Highways and Transp. Comm’n, 180 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005)). Accordingly, in

this appeal we address “only those issues properly raised in the [Defendants’] motion for summary judgment and the

responses thereto.” Id. (quoting Heffernan v. Reinhold, 73 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002)). In this matter,

the summary judgment motion contended that Brooks’s claims were barred because Crown Center Farms was

Brooks’s statutory employer and that Laurie was an employee of Brooks’s statutory employer (Crown Center

Farms). Accordingly, we address only these grounds which were raised in the summary judgment motion.

7

Section 287.040 “is designed to prevent employers from evading [The Workers’ Compensation

Law’s] requirements by hiring independent contractors to perform work the employer otherwise

would hire ordinary employees to perform.” McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298

S.W.3d 473, 480 (Mo. banc 2009).

Section 287.040.1 provides a definition for “statutory employer”:

Any person who has work done under contract on or about his premises which is

an operation of the usual business which he there carries on shall be deemed an

employer and shall be liable under this chapter to such contractor, his

subcontractors, and their employees, when injured or killed on or about the

premises of the employer while doing work which is in the usual course of his

business.

Accordingly, a person or entity is a statutory employer of the statutory employee if: (1) the work

is performed under a contract; (2) the injury occurs on or about the premises of the purported

statutory employer; and (3) the work is an operation of the usual business of the statutory

employer. “The party asserting the existence of statutory employee status bears the burden of

proving that the injured person was a statutory employee of the purported statutory employer.”

McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 480.

In this matter, the Defendants raised the affirmative defense that Crown Center Farms

was Brooks’s statutory employer such that The Workers’ Compensation Law provided Brooks’s

exclusive remedy. As the movants for summary judgment on this issue, the Defendants had the

burden of establishing “that there [was] no genuine issue as to the material facts and that [they

were] entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115. “In the workers’

compensation context, where ‘the facts are not in dispute as to the nature of the agreement and

the work required by it, the existence or absence of statutory employment is a question of law for

8

the courts to decide.’” McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 476 (quoting Bass v. Nat’l Super Mkts., 911

S.W.2d 617, 621 (Mo. banc 1995)).

In Brooks’s first two points on appeal, he challenges the grant of summary judgment in

favor of Crown Center Farms, arguing that Crown Center Farms failed to establish as a matter of

law that it was Brooks’s statutory employer. He contends that there were genuine issues of

material fact regarding (1) whether the injury occurred on or about Crown Center Farms’

premises, and (2) whether Brooks was injured while performing work in the usual business of

Crown Center Farms. In his third point, Brooks contends that if Crown Center Farms was not

Brooks’s statutory employer under section 287.040.1, then Laurie would not be protected by

immunity as the employee of Brooks’s statutory employer. In his fourth point, Brooks argues

that the trial court erred in determining that the corporate status of Crown Center Farms

protected Laurie from being personally liable for his own conduct.8

We begin by analyzing Brooks’s second point, as it is dispositive of whether the grant of

summary judgment was appropriate with respect to Crown Center Farms. We then proceed in

addressing Brooks’s third and fourth points.

Point Two

In his second point on appeal, Brooks argues that the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Crown Center Farms because there were genuine issues of

material fact regarding whether Brooks was injured while doing work in the usual course of

Crown Center Farms’ business, as required for Crown Center Farms to qualify as a statutory

8

There is some confusion on appeal between the parties regarding the contours of the trial court’s determination

regarding the protections conveyed by the corporate status of Crown Center Farms. We address this confusion and

the scope of the trial court’s determination in our analysis of Brooks’s fourth point on appeal.

9

employer of Brooks. More specifically, Brooks contends that he worked at the Big Buck

property annually at most, that the cutting of trees at Big Buck was not performed annually, and

that Big Buck now employs a professional logger to clear the entire property.

For a person to be a statutory employer, the work done under the contract on his premises

must be “an operation of the usual business which he there carries on . . . .” § 287.040.1. In

Bass v. National Super Markets, Inc., 911 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. banc 1995), the Missouri Supreme

Court defined the phrase “usual business” as used in section 287.040. Id. at 621. The Bass

Court found it necessary to do so because Missouri courts had struggled with the concept of what

constitutes the “usual business” of a purported statutory employer. Id. at 620-21. The Bass

Court identified two lines of cases that had analyzed the term “usual business.” Id. at 620.

Under the first line of cases, a company’s “usual business” entailed all of the activities that were

“essential and integral to the statutory employer’s business.” Id. (collecting cases where courts

had taken this analytical approach). Under the second line of cases, Missouri courts had taken

the approach of placing a greater focus on the routine and frequent nature of the independent

contractor’s work to determine whether such work fell within the usual business of the putative

statutory employer. Id. at 620-21 (collecting cases where courts had taken this analytical

approach). The Bass Court noted that the holdings relying on the essential/integral test (the first

line of cases referenced) had produced uneven results because “any activity undertaken or

service contracted for is arguably essential and integral to the usual business of the putative

employer no matter how removed from the work its employees regularly perform [in] its day-to-

day operation.” Id. at 621. The Bass Court concluded that the essential/integral test swept too

broadly, likely a result of courts liberally extending the coverage of The Workers’ Compensation

10

Law so as to permit compensation where it would not otherwise have existed.9 Id. The Bass

Court then noted that the routine/frequent test (the second line of cases) was narrower and

possessed the virtues of accommodating the purpose of section 287.040.1 while not operating so

broadly as to sweep within its reach work that was not within the employer’s usual business as

performed by its employees. Id.

In light of the precedent analyzed in Bass, the Bass Court defined a putative employer’s

“usual business” as used in section 287.040 as

those activities (1) that are routinely done (2) on a regular and frequent schedule

(3) contemplated in the agreement between the independent contractor and the

statutory employer to be repeated over a relatively short span of time (4) the

performance of which would require the statutory employer to hire permanent

employees absent the agreement.

Id. In so defining “usual business,” the Bass Court specifically sought to exclude from its

definition “specialized or episodic work that is essential to the employer but not within the

employer’s usual business as performed by its employees.” Id.10 “Whether a particular sort of

work is within a party’s usual course of business is a fact-driven inquiry; there is no ‘litmus

paper’ test.” McCracken, 298 S.W.3d at 480 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

9

Specifically, the Bass Court indicated that the cases utilizing the essential/integral test were likely written broadly

so as to accommodate the common law contributory fault system. See id.

10

Bass was decided at a time when The Workers’ Compensation Law was construed liberally in favor of workers’

compensation coverage. See Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 621. In 2005, the General Assembly amended section 287.800 so

that now “any reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of [The Workers’ Compensation Law] strictly.” §

287.800. Thus, following the effective date of the amendment, prior cases applying The Workers’ Compensation

Law liberally may be limited somewhat in their precedential value. However, in defining the phrase “usual

business” as used in section 287.040.1, the Bass Court was construing the statutory language in a manner that sought

to narrow coverage under The Workers’ Compensation Law. See Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 621. Because the test

delineated in Bass was written to restrict rather than extend coverage under The Workers’ Compensation Law, and

because the goal of the test was to accurately define “usual business” as used in section 287.040.1, the test

delineated in Bass was not altered by the 2005 amendment.

11

As an initial matter, we must properly frame what activity or activities must fall within

Crown Center Farms’ “usual business.” Brooks contends that section 287.040 makes clear that it

is the work being done at the time and location of the injury that must be within the usual

business of the purported statutory employer. We agree. Section 287.040.1 provides that the

work done under the contract on the purported statutory employer’s premises must be “an

operation of the usual business which he there carries on . . . .” § 287.040.1. Further, section

287.040.1 applies only when the statutory employee is “injured or killed on or about the

premises of the employer while doing work which is in the usual course of his business.” §

287.040.1. See also Hayes v. Ginger C, LLC, 582 S.W.3d 140, 152 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (“By

its plain terms, the inquiry required to determine statutory employment status is tied to the

activity that resulted in injury.”).

The Defendants contend that Crown Center Farms was created to maintain the Lauries’

various property interests, thus the scope of Crown Center Farms’ “usual business” extended to

“whatever Mr. Laurie needed to have done to his properties.” However, that conception is at

odds with the plain language of the statute. Moreover, such a conception would sweep within

the usual business of a putative statutory employer “any activity undertaken or service contracted

for [that] is arguably essential and integral to the usual business of the putative employer no

matter how removed from the work its employees regularly perform [in] its day-to-day

operation.” See Bass, 911 S.W.2d at 621. This conception of “usual business” was specifically

rejected by the Bass Court as having produced uneven results, leading to the adoption of the

four-prong test set forth in Bass. Id.

In this matter, the work being performed at Big Buck that resulted in Brooks’s injury was

the cutting down and clearing of trees. However, none of the facts stated in the Defendants’

12

statement of uncontroverted facts was directed at the frequency that Crown Center Farms cleared

trees. Yet, some of the citations to deposition materials provided in support of the stated facts

provide some indication of when Crown Center Farms engaged in the activity of clearing trees.

Defendants cited to the deposition of Crown Center Farms employee Cullen in which Cullen

stated that he was employed by Crown Center Farms for four or five years with the official title

of “laborer.” Cullen’s biggest responsibility as an employee of Crown Center Farms was

“running the greenhouse.” Laurie testified in his deposition that Cullen helps Laurie with work

at Laurie’s house, at the Columbia Performing Arts Center, and that Cullen “occasionally” helps

Laurie at Big Buck. With respect to Big Buck, Cullen indicated that he had been to Big Buck

two or three times previously, and that his visits to Big Buck occurred approximately once per

year to prep for deer season. Cullen indicated that sometimes the trips to Big Buck required him

only to “weed eat” or “run the lodge.” In Laurie’s deposition, Laurie was asked whether clearing

trees on his hunting area was an annual thing, to which Laurie responded: “We’ve done it several

times over a certain amount of years.” In Plaintiff Brooks’s deposition, Brooks stated that, in

past years, Brooks would go up with Laurie to prepare for deer camp, but this testimony did not

reference the work that was done in preparing for deer camp. These cited portions of deposition

testimony represent the extent of the evidence in the summary judgment record regarding the

frequency that Crown Center Farms engaged in the work of clearing trees.

With respect to the first two elements of the Bass test (whether the activity was routinely

done and whether the activity is done on a regular and frequent schedule), from the summary

judgment record it remains disputed whether the cutting down and clearing of trees was an

activity that was routinely done by Crown Center Farms on a regular and frequent schedule.

None of the Defendants’ facts in the statement of uncontroverted facts address the frequency

13

with which trees were cleared at Big Buck with any specificity. With respect to Crown Center

Farms’ performance of the cutting down and clearing of trees, the summary judgment record

indicates that the clearing of trees at Big Buck occurred “several times over a certain amount of

years.” In the cited materials attached to the statement of facts, it appears that some sort of work

on the Big Buck property occurred roughly once a year prior to deer hunting season, though the

summary judgment record is rather generic as to the scope of what occurred. The summary

judgment record fails to establish with any precision how frequently or regularly trees were cut

down at Big Buck by Crown Center Farms’ employees.

Moreover, and most significantly, based on the record before us, there is no indication

from the summary judgment record that Crown Center Farms would have been required to hire

permanent employees to cut down trees at Big Buck in the absence of an agreement between

Crown Center Farms and Little Dixie Construction. From the record before us, there are no facts

supporting a conclusion that the performance of a roughly annual task at an area within a

recreational hunting area would require the hiring of permanent employees in the absence of the

agreement between Crown Center Farms and Little Dixie Construction. Thus, under the Bass

test, the summary judgment record fails to establish that the clearing of trees at Big Buck was

within the usual business of Crown Center Farms.

The Defendants had the burden to establish as a matter of law that Crown Center Farms

was Brooks’s statutory employer. However, even accepting the Defendants’ stated version of the

facts and the citations in support as true, Defendants’ motion failed to establish that Crown

Center Farms was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis that Crown Center Farms

was Brooks’s statutory employer. See Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115 (“Summary judgment is only

proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and

14

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”) (emphasis added).11 Accordingly,

the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Crown Center Farms.

Point Three

In his third point, Brooks essentially contends that Laurie was entitled to the protections

of The Workers’ Compensation Law only if Crown Center Farms was Brooks’s statutory

employer so as to provide immunity to Laurie as an employee of Crown Center Farms.

Conversely, if the trial court erred in determining that Crown Center Farms was Brooks’s

statutory employer, then Brooks asserts that the grant of summary judgment in favor of Laurie

(as an employee of a statutory employer) was also erroneous. We agree.

The summary judgment motion argued that Laurie was entitled to summary judgment as

an employee of Brooks’s statutory employer, Crown Center Farms. If Crown Center Farms was

Brooks’s statutory employer, then Laurie, as Crown Center Farms’ employee, would be entitled

to be released from liability according to section 287.120.1. However, the immunity asserted

was contingent on Crown Center Farms being Brooks’s statutory employer. As we have

determined that the grant of summary judgment to Crown Center Farms on the basis that Crown

Center Farms was Brooks’s statutory employer was in error, we likewise find the grant of

summary judgment in favor of Laurie (which was contingent on the statutory employer status of

Crown Center Farms) to be in error.

11

This is not to say that the affirmative defense necessarily fails, as that question is not before this court. Rather,

based on the summary judgment record before us, the Defendants failed to establish that they were entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. The Defendants could conceivably put forth additional evidence in support of the

defense. However, irrespective of any factual disputes, if the moving party’s own version of the facts fails to

establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment is inappropriate.

See Green, 606 S.W.3d at 115. In this matter, the Defendants’ own version of the facts fails to establish that Crown

Center Farms was Brooks’s statutory employer as a matter of law.

15

Point Four

In his fourth point, Brooks asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

to Laurie based solely on the corporate existence of Big Buck or Crown Center Farms. Brooks

argues that such grounds were not raised in the summary judgment motion, and that, even if such

grounds had been raised, Laurie could potentially still be liable for his own negligence.

This argument appears to arise in response to language in the trial court’s judgment

which addressed separately the liability of “Big Buck William Laurie,” “Crown Center Farms

William Laurie,” and “William Laurie, the individual.” At one point in the trial court’s

judgment, the trial court indicated that “William Laurie, as principal of Crown Center Farms, has

every bit of protection . . . afforded him by the formation of the corporate entity, as those of its

employees.” The trial court then indicated that Laurie, as an employee, could not be held

individually liable absent a showing of purposeful, wanton conduct that would remove Laurie

from the protections of the “co-employee” immunity afforded him pursuant to section 287.120

due to being an employee of Brooks’s statutory employer.

The parties’ briefing indicates that the parties had some confusion regarding some of the

language in the trial court’s judgment. In his reply brief, Brooks indicated that it was incumbent

on him to challenge any alternative basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See

MFA, Inc. v. HLW Builders, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (failure to

challenge one of two alternative bases for trial court’s grant of summary judgment requires

appellate court to affirm the judgment on the unchallenged ground). Thus, Brooks wanted to

make sure that he challenged any possible alternative ground for the grant of summary judgment.

Although the language in the trial court’s judgment is not a model of clarity, we have

determined that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Laurie was based on the

16

trial court’s determination that Laurie was an employee of Crown Center Farms and therefore

was not individually liable for Brooks’s injuries due to the trial court’s conclusion that Crown

Center Farms was Brooks’s statutory employer. Accordingly, the corporate status of Crown

Center Farms was not an alternative basis for the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in

favor of Laurie. However, lest there be confusion on remand, to the extent that the trial court

was intending to grant summary judgment in favor of Laurie on an alternative basis not raised in

the motion for summary judgment (which asserted that Laurie was an employee of Crown Center

Farms which was Brooks’s statutory employer), such action was in error.

Conclusion

The trial court’s judgment is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

All concur.

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