DEANNA (HALEY) BROWN, Petitioner-Respondent v. JOHN PATRICK HALEY

Missouri Court of Appeals

Southern District

In Division

DEANNA (HALEY) BROWN, )

)

Petitioner-Respondent, )

)

v. ) No. SD37223

) Filed: March 18, 2024

JOHN PATRICK HALEY, )

)

Respondent-Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY

Honorable James Ronald Carrier, Associate Circuit Judge

AFFIRMED

John Haley (Father) appeals from a judgment of modification entered in a

dissolution action on June 11, 2021. 1 This judgment resolved many pending issues

between Father and his former spouse, Deanna Haley Brown (Mother). Only one of the

issues is relevant in this appeal. In decretal paragraph XVII of the modification judgment,

Father was ordered to pay Mother “$141,283.52 for payment of medical expenses,

expenses for extracurricular activities and college expenses.” In Point 1, Father contends

1

On October 15, 2021, the trial court entered a judgment of modification nunc pro

tunc, which corrected a typographical error in paragraph 36 of the June 2021 modification

judgment.

the trial court misapplied the law by enforcing an open-ended and vague support judgment

because Father was required to pay half of the medical, extracurricular, and college

expenses “without limitation as to dollar amount or otherwise.” In Point 2, Father contends

the trial court’s award of post-secondary education expenses to Mother was against the

weight of the evidence. Finding no merit in either point, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The marriage between Father and Mother was dissolved on May 21, 2008, in a

judgment of dissolution filed in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Missouri

(hereinafter, the 2008 judgment). 2 The parties had three daughters: M.H., born in March

2001; S.T.H., born in June 2002; and G.E.H., born in May 2004. The matter was submitted

by the parties on Affidavits for Judgment. Father and Mother were granted joint legal and

joint physical custody of their three daughters. The 2008 judgment made Father and

Mother each liable for 50% of the uninsured medical or dental expenses of the children.

This judgment also stated: “The parties shall share equally all expenses for extracurricular

activities of the children such as private lessons, sports activities, etc., including sign up

costs as well as uniforms, etc.” No post-trial motions were filed by either party challenging

this language in the judgment, and no one appealed from the judgment. Father paid $250

toward his share of such expenses in 2012, but that still left an arrearage. On April 24,

2013, Father sent Mother a check for $2,500 with a notation that it was for: “All the

medical expenses.” On advice of counsel, Mother did not cash the check because it might

have foreclosed her right to collect a larger and more accurate amount.

2

Father’s current counsel only represented him in this appeal. At all prior times,

Father was represented by different counsel.

2

On February 6, 2014, a judgment of modification was entered by the Circuit Court

of Greene County, Missouri (hereinafter, the 2014 judgment). Mother was granted sole

legal custody of the three girls, but Father and Mother were granted joint physical custody

of their daughters. The trial court adopted its own parenting plan, which was attached to

and incorporated into the 2014 judgment. The court made a finding that “the issue of

extraordinary expenses should be addressed as set forth on page 6 paragraph c of the court’s

parenting plan[.]” In the “Support” portion of the parenting plan, Paragraph A addressed

education expenses. This paragraph required Father and Mother to each pay “50% of the

cost each year for each child attending private school, post-secondary college, university,

or vocational/technical school, state or private[.]” This obligation to pay was subject to

several limitations, including one which stated “[t]he maximum cost which the parties shall

be responsible for in any given school year will be their respective portion of [the] cost for

tuition, fees, books and dormitory costs for room and board at the University of Missouri-

Columbia regardless of what institution the child attends.” Regarding extraordinary

expenses, Paragraph C stated, in relevant part, that “Father and Mother shall each pay 50%

of the minor children’s extracurricular activities.” Paragraph F required Father and Mother

to be responsible for “one-half of the costs associated with all medical, dental, deductibles,

orthodontic, psychological or psychiatric care for the minor children not covered by

insurance.” The judgment also decided that Father owed Mother $5,994.12 for child

support and expenses incurred through March 31, 2012, and noted that those expenses

“necessarily would have continued” beyond that date. Father was ordered to pay $100 per

month to Mother toward that debt. After entry of the 2014 judgment, neither party filed a

motion to amend the judgment. No one appealed from that judgment. On May 29, 2014,

Father paid $1,753.80 toward his share of the aforementioned expenses.

3

On October 29, 2015, Father filed a motion to modify the 2014 judgment as to child

custody and child support. On December 17, 2015, Mother filed a counter-motion to

modify child custody and support. In relevant part, this motion alleged that Father “was

ordered to pay one-half of private schooling, extraordinary expenses and health care costs

and has not done so[.]” Mother alleged that, as of the date of the motion, Father owed

$44,865.49. On May 1, 2018, Father requested leave to file a first-amended motion to

modify. The trial court sustained the motion and allowed the amended motion to be filed

on May 24, 2018. On June 8, 2018, Mother filed an amended counter-motion. In Count 2

of this motion, Mother reiterated that Father had failed to pay one-half of private schooling,

extraordinary expenses and healthcare costs, as required by the 2014 judgment. Mother

alleged that, as of the date of that motion, Father owed $90,485.46. Mother requested that

Father be held in contempt.

Trial on the competing motions was held on five days between January 9, 2019,

and April 20, 2021. The record was held open for some financial information to be

provided by Father. The evidence closed on May 4, 2021, and the case was taken under

advisement. Insofar as relevant to the issue on appeal, the following testimony was

presented at trial.

The trial court took judicial notice of the entire file, which included both the 2008

and 2014 judgments. According to those judgments, Father was obligated to pay one-half

of the expenses for education, extracurricular activities, and uninsured medical, dental,

deductibles, orthodontic, psychological or psychiatric care for the minor children. Father

testified that he had made three payments for these expenses since 2012:

Q. As I understand it, but for the expenses, the 1,750 and the 250 that you

sent to [Mother] that she cashed, along with the $2,500 check that you sent

her that she didn’t cash, over the course of nine years – or almost nine years,

4

that’s been the only expenses that you’ve reimbursed her for, for these girls;

would that be correct?

A. Yes.

Mother testified that Father did not pay his one-half share of the cost of such expenses,

which included college costs for M.H. and S.T.H. at the University of Arkansas and John

Brown University, respectively, as well as medical, dental, vision, music, dance,

gymnastics, arts, and summer camp expenses. With respect to college costs, Mother

testified that:

1. The 2014 judgment used the cost of college at the University of

Missouri-Columbia as the benchmark, with each parent paying half of

that amount.

2. The cost per year to attend the University of Missouri-Columbia was

$30,252.

3. One daughter went to the University of Arkansas business school, which

cost $27,826 per year to attend.

4. The other daughter went to John Brown University, which cost $23,078

per year to attend.

Mother’s Exhibit 81-A showed that Father’s unpaid half of all of the foregoing expenses

(through April 11, 2021) totaled $142,567.24. The college expenses alone were

summarized in Mother’s Exhibit 81-B. Aside from the three payments Father mentioned

in his testimony, he had not paid anything else toward his one-half share of those expenses

during the prior nine years.

On June 11, 2021, the trial court issued its judgment of modification. The trial

court noted that it treated Mother’s contempt motion as requesting declaratory relief by

determining the sum certain owed to Mother by Father. In relevant part, the court made

the following findings in the judgment:

5

14. The Court has prepared its own parenting plan which is attached

hereto as Exhibit 1. The Court finds that Court’s Exhibit 1 is in the

best interest of the minor children.

….

34. Having subtracted $1,283.72 from the total amount claimed by

[Mother] for medical expenses and expenses for extracurricular

activities the Court finds that [Father] owes [Mother] $141,283.52.

35. The above referenced judgment amount includes college expenses

incurred on behalf of the two older children. The Court finds that

the college expenses requested by [Mother] do not exceed the

maximum amount payable under the Court’s prior judgment.

Decretal paragraph XVII entered judgment in favor of Mother and against Father “in the

amount of $141,283.52 for payment of medical expenses, expenses for extracurricular

activities and college expenses.” Court’s Exhibit 1 contained the following relevant

paragraphs:

N. MEDICAL, DENTAL AND VISION EXPENSES. Mother and Father

shall each pay 50% of all expenses of co-pays and deductibles not paid

through insurance or health plan coverage for medical, dental, orthodontic,

mental-health and vision care of the minor children during the periods in

which the children are not emancipated. These obligations shall continue

until there is no further duty to support said children.

O. COLLEGE EXPENSES. Father and Mother shall each pay 50% of the

minor children’s college expenses. The “costs” each year for the children

to attend a post-secondary college, university, or vocational/technical

school, state or private, subject to the following limitations:

1. “Cost[”] shall include tuition, fees, books, dormitory cost for

room and board. It does not include room and board while residing

with either parent.

2. The “cost” shall be the actual cost of attending the institution, i.e.

if the child receives a scholarship, grant, or other assistance, which

reduces the cost of attending the institution, the “cost” shall be

reduced by this amount, but shall not be reduced by any loan, which

must be repaid.

3. The maximum cost will be the actual cost for tuition, fees, books,

and dormitory costs for room and board for an in-state student at

6

University of Missouri-Columbia, regardless of the institution the

children attend.

4. The parents shall not be responsible for paying for more than 10

semesters at a college or university.

P. EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES: The Court recognizes that

extracurricular activities are important to a child’s social and educational

development. The parties shall cooperate with each other and make every

effort to allow the minor children to participate in extracurricular activities.

Mother shall pay 50% and Father shall pay 50% of the cost of

extracurricular activities. Father’s financial obligation for payment of

extracurricular activities is capped at $250.00 per month. Father shall be

allowed to attend such events should he so desire.

In post-trial motions for rehearing and to amend the judgment, Father argued for

the first time that the trial court erred by “determining that Father was required to pay

extraordinary and extracurricular activity expenses that are uncollectible under Missouri

law as those expenses did not have limitations or a payment cap.” Those motions were

denied, and this appeal followed.

Standard of Review

A judgment is presumed correct, and the party challenging the judgment bears the

burden of proving it erroneous. Brackney v. Walker, 670 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Mo. App.

2023). In this court-tried case, our review is governed by Rule 84.13(d) and Murphy v.

Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 31-32 (Mo. banc 1976). 3 We are required to affirm the trial court’s

judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the

evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189,

198-99 (Mo. banc 2014). “We review questions of law decided in a court-tried case de

novo.” O’Connell v. Deering, 631 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Mo. App. 2021).

3

All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2021).

7

In addition, an issue presented on appeal must be preserved for appellate review.

In re Marriage of Adams, 414 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Mo. App. 2013). Issues relating to the form

or language of a judgment must have been presented in a Rule 78.07(c) motion to amend

the judgment in order to be preserved for appeal. Adams, 414 S.W.3d at 37.

Discussion and Decision

Point 1

In Father’s first point, he contends the trial court erred by ordering Father to pay

$141,283.52 in educational, extracurricular, and uninsured healthcare expenses. Father

argues that the specific terms in the 2014 judgment relating to these expenses are

unenforceable because there is no limitation as to dollar amount or otherwise. As support

for this argument, Father cites Echele v. Echele, 782 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. App. 1989); Fulton

v. Adams, 924 S.W.2d 548 (Mo. App. 1996); and Pratt v. Ferber, 335 S.W.3d 90 (Mo.

App. 2011). Therefore, we must examine these decisions to see what principles they

authoritatively espouse.

In Echele, the original dissolution decree was issued in November 1985. In the

spring of 1988, cross-motions to modify were filed. The wife’s motion asked that the

husband be responsible for the payment of reasonable college expenses for both sons.

Echele, 782 S.W.2d at 432. 4 In the January 1989 modification decree, the trial court

ordered the husband to pay one-half of the cost of a vocational or technical school, one-

half of the cost of post-secondary education at a state supported college or university, or

one-third of the cost of post-secondary education at a private college or university. The

4

The Echele court’s analysis of the attorney-fee issue was abrogated in Rallo v.

Rallo, 477 S.W.3d 29, 44 (Mo. App. 2015), but that has no bearing on the college-expense

matter under consideration here.

8

husband appealed from the judgment. Id. at 433. On appeal, the husband argued that the

trial court erred by ordering him to pay any post-secondary educational expenses because

those provisions of the judgment were void and unenforceable. Id. The eastern district of

this Court agreed:

We find this particular order too uncertain and vague to be enforceable. The

order allows the children to attend any vocational/technical school, or any

state supported college or university, and the husband is required to pay

one-half of the costs of tuition, books, and room and board. Or the children

can choose to attend a private college or university, and [the husband] is

then responsible for one-third the costs. Presumably, [the wife] in

collaboration with the children, has the choice to select any particular

vocational, technical, state or private institution. We have no quarrel with

the children and [the wife] having that right. The difficulty with the trial

court’s order is that it is too indefinite and uncertain.

Id. at 436-37. Therefore, the appellate court reversed this portion of the judgment and

remanded for further proceedings.

In Fulton, the first-amended dissolution decree was entered in December 1987. In

August 1993, the wife filed a motion to modify. One changed circumstance was that the

oldest daughter was attending college and needed assistance with the cost. In March 1995,

the trial court entered a modification judgment that ordered the husband to pay one-half of

the daughter’s college costs for a state school or one-fourth of the daughter’s college costs

for a private college or university. On appeal, the husband argued that this provision was

too vague, indefinite and uncertain to be enforceable. Fulton, 924 S.W.2d at 550-51.

Citing Echele, the western district of this Court agreed because the judgment “provides no

limiting criteria, leaving the amount owed a matter of speculation.” Id. at 552. Therefore,

the appellate court reversed this portion of the judgment and remanded to the trial court to

fashion a proper order. Id. at 553-54.

9

In Pratt, the original dissolution decree was entered in January 2005. The judgment

ordered that the husband and wife divide equally the cost of their daughter’s educational,

athletic, social and cultural development, with each party to pay no more than $50 per

month. In October 2007, the wife filed a motion to modify because the husband had not

been paying his share of the daughter’s extraordinary expenses and non-covered medical

expenses. The trial court entered an amended modified judgment that allowed the wife to

solely determine which extracurricular activities were appropriate for the daughter,

required wife and husband to share the expenses for such activities equally, and removed

the $50 monthly maximum for these expenses. Pratt, 335 S.W.3d at 92-93. On appeal,

the husband contended the trial court erred by removing the $50 monthly cap on each

party’s expenses. The husband argued that requiring him “to pay for half of those activities

with no limitation as to the amount” makes the judgment “so vague and uncertain as to be

void and unenforceable[.]” Id. at 93. The western district of this Court agreed because the

trial court should have used limiting language to define the scope of the activities covered

by the judgment or, alternatively, placed a cap on the extraordinary expenses that the

husband had to pay for the daughter’s extracurricular activities. Id. at 97. Therefore, the

appellate court amended the judgment, pursuant to Rule 84.14, to impose an upper limit of

$200 per month on the amount of extracurricular expenses each parent had to bear. Id.

After reviewing these decisions, we conclude that they are authoritative for the

principle that a trial court’s failure to use appropriate limiting language in the judgment for

these types of expenses can be corrected in a direct appeal from that judgment. Here,

however, Father does not complain that the June 11, 2021 modification judgment fails to

include such limiting language. What Father argues is that the trial court, as a matter of

law, could not rely upon the language in the 2008 judgment or the 2014 modification

10

judgment (which did not include such limitations) to adjudicate the amount of money owed

by Father to Mother to reimburse her for such expenses. Father argues that he can

collaterally attack those earlier judgments in this appeal because Echele, Fulton, and Pratt

stated that the trial courts’ errors in omitting the limitations made those terms of the

judgments void and unenforceable. All three decisions say that, but those statements are

not authoritative because they conflict with controlling precedent from the Supreme Court

of Missouri for the following reasons. 5

The first reason Father’s reliance on Echele, Fulton and Pratt is misplaced involves

the statements in those opinions that the absence of limitation language renders an expense

provision in a judgment void and unenforceable. This language is a holdover from an era

when many Missouri appellate decisions described mere legal errors as jurisdictional,

which was then used to evade existing limitations on appellate review. This rationale is no

longer valid in Missouri.

Beginning in 2006, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the label of

jurisdictional defect had no application to mere legal errors. In re Marriage of Hendrix,

183 S.W.3d 582, 590 (Mo. banc 2006); see also State ex rel. State v. Parkinson, 280

S.W.3d 70, 75 (Mo. banc 2009). Our high court further clarified that principle in J.C.W.

ex rel. Webb v. Wyciskalla, 275 S.W.3d 249 (Mo. banc 2009), which held that the Missouri

Constitution specifies only two jurisdictional limits on a court’s power to act: personal

jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 252-254. 6 All non-jurisdictional errors

5

This Court is constitutionally bound to follow the latest controlling decisions

from our Supreme Court. MO. CONST. art. V, § 2; Potter v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 560 S.W.3d 598,

605 (Mo. App. 2018); Inman v. Dominguez, 371 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Mo. App. 2012).

6

Aside from these two jurisdictional limits, the only other reason a judgment can

be void is if it was rendered without due process of law. E.A.P. ex rel. V.C.I. v. J.A.I.,

11

are subject to routine appellate review, and legal errors can be waived. Parkinson, 280

S.W.3d at 75; Treasurer of State v. Van Horn, 652 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Mo. App. 2022).

Consistently with the foregoing precedent, Rule 74.06(b)(4) also authorizes a court

to relieve a party from a final judgment that is void. Pursuant to this rule, a judgment is

void if “the court that rendered it lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or acted in

a manner inconsistent with due process of law.” Forsyth Fin. Grp., LLC v. Hayes, 351

S.W.3d 738, 740 (Mo. App. 2011); Smith v. Smith, 524 S.W.3d 95, 99 (Mo. App. 2017). 7

The concept of a void judgment is narrowly restricted to protect the strong public policy

interest in the finality of judgments. In re Formation of Neosho Transp. Dev. Dist., 416

S.W.3d 326, 333 n.7 (Mo. App. 2013). A judgment is not void simply because it is

erroneous. State ex rel. Zahnd v. Van Amburg, 533 S.W.3d 227, 231 (Mo. banc 2017);

Hendrix, 183 S.W.3d at 590; Van Horn, 652 S.W.3d at 684; Baxi v. United Technologies

Auto. Corp., 122 S.W.3d 92, 96 (Mo. App. 2003). As the eastern district of this Court

explained in State ex rel. Franklin v. Burlison, 469 S.W.3d 498 (Mo. App. 2015):

Even though we find that the transfer order was erroneous because it relied

on the wrong venue statute, that error does not mean that the order was void

or invalid such that it was a legal nullity. In general, a judgment is void or

invalid only where the trial court lacked jurisdiction or the judgment was

rendered without due process of law; a judgment is not void or invalid

merely because it is erroneous.

421 S.W.3d 460, 463 (Mo. App. 2013); Franken v. Franken, 191 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Mo.

App. 2006).

7

As our Supreme Court explained in J.C.W., “circuit courts shall have original

jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.” J.C.W., 275 S.W.3d at 253

(italics in original).

12

Id. at 500; see also E.A.P. ex rel. V.C.I. v. J.A.I., 421 S.W.3d 460, 463 (Mo. App. 2013)

(trial court’s decision to delegate judicial authority to parenting coordinator was a matter

of trial court error and did not render that provision, or the entire judgment, void).

In the case at bar, the trial courts that issued the 2008 and 2014 judgments involving

Father and Mother had subject matter jurisdiction over this dissolution action, personal

jurisdiction over the parties, and complied with their rights to due process. Therefore, the

2008 and 2014 judgments were not void and, consequently, are not subject to collateral

attack in this appeal. In In re Marriage of Cornella, 335 S.W.3d 545 (Mo. App. 2011),

the husband complained about one provision from the original judgment, which the

husband did not appeal. This Court held that the husband could not collaterally attack the

prior provision in a later appeal:

The argument advanced here is not an attack upon the validity of the entire

original judgment, but only an attack upon one provision therein that is

claimed to be void. It is undisputed that the trial court had jurisdiction over

the parties and the subject matter when the original judgment was entered.

That judgment became final and was not appealed by Husband. Unless the

original judgment was reversed or annulled in some proper proceeding, its

provisions are not open to contradiction, impeachment or modification in

any collateral proceeding. A collateral proceeding is an attempt to impeach

the judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of

annulling the judgment. [A] judgment rendered by a court with jurisdiction

over the parties and subject matter is not open to collateral attack with

respect to its validity or the conclusiveness of the matters adjudicated. The

aggrieved party’s remedy is by appeal, rather than by a motion to modify.

Id. at 556 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133, 140 (Mo.

banc 2020) (if a circuit court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction, the appropriate

remedy for any error in the judgment is a direct appeal). Cornella is directly on point here.

Father did not appeal from either the 2008 or the 2014 judgments, and thus, did not present

the expense issue for decision. Accordingly, it is too late to do so in this appeal from the

June 2021 judgment.

13

The second reason Father’s reliance on Echele, Fulton and Pratt is misplaced

involves our Supreme Court’s adoption of Rule 78.07(c) in 2005. This subsection states

that “[i]n all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment,

including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to

amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review.” Id.; see also Int. of

J.C.S., 658 S.W.3d 260, 264 n.4 (Mo. App. 2023) (noting that this subsection became

effective on January 1, 2005). The purpose of Rule 78.07(c) is to ensure that complaints

about the form and language of a judgment are brought to the trial court’s attention where

they can be easily corrected, alleviating needless appeals, reversals, and rehearings.

Mercer v. State, 512 S.W.3d 748, 753 (Mo. banc 2017).

As discussed above, the error identified in Echele, Fulton and Pratt is the failure

of the judgment to include appropriate limiting language in the relevant expense provisions.

This is axiomatically an error relating to the form or language of the judgment. The fact

that the error must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved

for appellate review confirms, consistently with our foregoing discussion, that legal errors

in a judgment must be remedied by direct appeal. More importantly, it is well settled that

the failure to file a motion to amend constitutes a waiver of the alleged error. See, e.g.,

Sneil, LLC v. Tybe Learning Ctr., Inc., 370 S.W.3d 562, 574 (Mo. banc 2012);

Schumacher v. Stalder, 644 S.W.3d 573, 579 n.5 (Mo. App. 2022); Great W. Cas. Co. v.

Carr, 642 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Mo. App. 2022); Southside Ventures, LLC v. La Crosse

Lumber Co., 574 S.W.3d 771, 788 (Mo. App. 2019); Fastnacht v. Ge, 488 S.W.3d 178,

188 (Mo. App. 2016); In re Marriage of Bottorff, 221 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Mo. App. 2007).

Both Echele and Fulton were decided before Rule 78.07(c) became effective. The

modification judgment in Pratt, however, was entered after August 2009. Pratt, 335

14

S.W.3d at 92-93. There is no indication in the opinion that the husband, who appealed,

filed a motion to amend the judgment to challenge the removal of the limiting language

from the expense provision. Accordingly, that issue was not preserved for appeal and

should have been treated as waived by the appellate court, rather than being addressed on

the merits. Thus, the opinion in Pratt is not authoritative for this additional reason.

For all of these reasons, Father’s first point is not preserved for appellate review,

and he waived the issue of whether the 2008 and 2014 judgments lacked appropriate

limiting language in the expense provisions. Point 1 is denied.

Point 2

In Father’s second point, he contends the trial court erred by awarding Mother the

total amount she requested for the children’s post-secondary education expenses, as

summarized in Mother’s Exhibit 81-B. Father argues that the trial court’s calculation was

against the weight of the evidence because these expenses were greater than each party was

required to pay under the terms of the 2014 modification judgment.

An against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge requires the completion of four

sequential steps:

(1) identify a challenged factual proposition, the existence of which is

necessary to sustain the judgment;

(2) identify all of the favorable evidence in the record supporting the

existence of that proposition;

(3) identify the evidence in the record contrary to the belief of that

proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial

court’s credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit; and,

(4) demonstrate why the favorable evidence, along with the reasonable

inferences drawn from that evidence, is so lacking in probative value, when

considered in the context of the totality of the evidence, that it fails to induce

belief in that proposition.

15

Houston v. Crider, 317 S.W.3d 178, 187 (Mo. App. 2010).

The first step of this analysis is to identify a challenged factual proposition in the

judgment. Father contends he was being required to pay too much for his half of the post-

secondary education expenses. As he acknowledges in his brief, however, the 2021

modification judgment does not state the exact amount Father owes. The trial court

awarded Mother $141,283.52 for all expense reimbursement, which included college

expenses for the two older children. The court found “that the college expenses requested

by [Mother] do not exceed the maximum amount payable under the Court’s prior

judgment.” To the extent Father is complaining that the judgment does not contain the

exact amount he owes for college expenses, that issue was waived because it was not raised

in a motion to amend the judgment. See Rule 78.07(c); Schumacher, 644 S.W.3d at 579

n.5.

The second step of the analysis is to identify all of the favorable evidence in the

record supporting the existence of the proposition “that the college expenses requested by

[Mother] do not exceed the maximum amount payable under the Court’s prior judgment.”

Father has failed to do so because he ignores Mother’s testimony on this issue. As noted

above, she testified that: (1) the 2014 judgment used the cost of college at the University

of Missouri-Columbia as the benchmark, with each parent paying half of that amount; (2)

the annual cost to attend the University of Missouri-Columbia was $30,252; (3) M.H. went

to the University of Arkansas business school, which cost $27,826 per year to attend; and

(4) S.T.H. went to John Brown University, which cost $23,078 per year to attend. Thus,

the favorable evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding “that the college

expenses requested by [Mother] do not exceed the maximum amount payable under the

Court’s prior judgment.”

16

The third step in the analysis is to identify the evidence in the record contrary to the

belief of that proposition, resolving all conflicts in testimony in accordance with the trial

court’s credibility determinations, whether explicit or implicit. This is where Father’s

argument fails. First, he argues that the trial court failed to identify the amount of college

expenses assessed to Father. As noted above, this issue was waived due to Father’s failure

to include that issue in a motion to amend the judgment. Second, Father argues that the

trial court failed to include any numbers or calculation to show that Mother’s requested

expenses were appropriate. This argument fails because Father did not file a motion to

amend the judgment to include such information. It also ignores Mother’s testimony on

this issue, which the trial court had a right to believe. Father’s reliance on Exhibit 81-B is

misplaced because: (1) the trial court could believe Mother’s oral testimony; and (2) there

is nothing in the judgment showing the trial court awarded a sum greater than the yearly

cost of attending the University of Missouri-Columbia. Because Father’s argument fails

to demonstrate that the trial court’s findings were against the weight of the evidence on the

college-expense issue, Point 2 is denied.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCUR

JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, J. – CONCUR

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