“In construing the charter[,] we seek the intent of the drafters from the language used, give effect to that intent if possible, and consider the words in light of their plain and ordinary meaning.”
How later courts described this case
- “In construing the charter[,] we seek the intent of the drafters from the language used, give effect to that intent if possible, and consider the words in light of their plain and ordinary meaning.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the Missouri Court of Appeals
Eastern District
DIVISION FOUR
JOSHUA LASLEY, ) No. ED112661
)
Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) St. Louis County
vs. )
) Honorable Ellen H. Ribaudo
ST. LOUIS COUNTY, ET AL., )
)
Appellants. ) Filed: March 4, 2025
Introduction
This appeal concerns whether the St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners can
delegate its duty to hear disciplinary appeals initiated by St. Louis County police officers to a
hearing officer. St. Louis County, the St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners, and
Commissioners Thomasina Hassler, Brian Ashworth, Richard Banks, and Michelle Schwerin
(collectively, the “Board”) appeal the trial court’s issuance of a permanent writ of prohibition. The
writ prohibited the Board from delegating its duty to hear Joshua Lasley’s (“Lasley”) disciplinary
appeal to a hearing officer.
The Board raises two points on appeal. In Point I, the Board contends the trial court erred
in issuing a permanent writ of prohibition because the St. Louis County Charter (the “Charter”)
does not require disciplinary appeal hearings to be heard before the Board. Specifically, the Board
contends the Charter and the St. Louis County Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) authorize the Board
“to establish its own rules and procedures for police disciplinary matters.” In Point II, the Board
contends the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because the issue in the underlying
case was moot after the St. Louis County Chief of Police (the “Chief” or “the superintendent of
police”) rescinded Lasley’s disciplinary action.
Regarding Point I, this Court holds the Board does not have explicit authority to delegate
its duty to hear disciplinary appeals to a hearing officer. As to Point II, this Court holds the matter
is not moot as there is still a justiciable controversy.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
Lasley, a police officer with the St. Louis County Police Department (“Police
Department”), received a disciplinary notice from the Chief “related to some actions where
[Lasley] would have been involved in some secondary employment[.]” The discipline required
Lasley to give up twenty-four hours of paid time off (“PTO”)/vacation time. Lasley appealed the
disciplinary action to the Board. On June 10, 2022, Lasley was informed his appeal would be heard
before a hearing officer instead of the Board.
On June 22, 2022, Lasley filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent writ of
prohibition. Therein, he argued the Board exceeded its authority by delegating its duty to hear his
disciplinary appeal to a hearing officer, and requested the trial court issue a writ barring the Board
from assigning a hearing officer to hear the appeal. The Board filed a motion to dismiss Lasley’s
petition for failure to state a claim. The Board argued both the Charter and Ordinance authorized
it to “set forth rules and procedures for police disciplinary matters” and delegate its duty of hearing
disciplinary appeals to a hearing officer. Specifically, the Board contended the authority to hear
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disciplinary appeals, granted to it by the Charter, did not expressly require appeals be heard “before
the Board.” The trial court denied the Board’s motion to dismiss and, in pertinent part, found:
2. The St. Louis County Charter provides specifically that the Board of Police
Commissioners … hear appeals from disciplinary decisions, see section 4.270(1)
and (5) of the Charter. In allowing the Board to make policies or rules to implement
these processes the Charter does not speak to giving the Board the authority to
assign their duty to hear appeals.
3. The Board of Police Commissioners adopted a policy or rule by which the Board
may appoint a hearing officer to act as its designee for all pre-trial matters and
to review evidence presented in any hearing and make recommendations to
the Board. The rule or policy speaks specifically to pre-hearing matters, not the
actual hearing, and permits the hearing officer to be present with the Board and to
make a recommendation to the Board but it is the Board who must decide the
appeal.
(emphasis in original).
On January 23, 2024, Lasley received a notice related to the disciplinary action against
him. The notice stated Lasley’s twenty-four hours of PTO/vacation balance was reinstated by the
Chief. However, the determination Lasley violated the general orders of the Police Department
remained in his Bureau of Professional Standards (“BPS”) file. Following the notice, the Board
filed a second motion to dismiss and argued Lasley’s petition was moot.
On March 7, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the Board’s motion to dismiss. At the
hearing, the Board provided that it had removed any reference to the previously imposed discipline
from Lasley’s personnel file and noted the status change in his BPS file from suspension to no
discipline. The Board also argued its intention to hear Lasley’s appeal before the Board rendered
the case moot as that was the relief Lasley sought. Conversely, Lasley argued a live controversy
existed because the fact he was sent a notice of a status conference for his hearing was a clear
indication the matter was pending before the Board and not fully resolved. After hearing the
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parties’ respective arguments, the trial court denied the motion and found a live controversy was
present.
The trial court then held a hearing on Lasley’s petition for a permanent writ of prohibition.
Lasley argued the Board has a duty to hear disciplinary appeals under the Charter. He also pointed
to the Charter’s express language providing a police officer has a right to have their appeal heard
by the Board. In response, the Board argued it has the authority to assign hearing officers on the
same basis it argued in its motion to dismiss.
On March 25, 2024, the trial court issued a permanent writ of prohibition, which barred the
Board from assigning a hearing officer to hear Lasley’s disciplinary appeal. In its order, the trial
court concluded “there is no express authority in the Charter allowing the Board … to assign [its]
duty to hear an appeal of [Lasley’s] disciplinary matter to a hearing officer nor does the Charter
allow the Board … to unilaterally take away [Lasley’s] right to have his appeal heard by the
Board[.]”
This appeal follows.
Standard of Review
“The standard of review for writs of mandamus and prohibition … is abuse of discretion,
and an abuse of discretion occurs where the [trial] court fails to follow applicable statutes.” State
ex rel. Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Messina, 331 S.W.3d 662, 664 (Mo. banc 2011) (citations omitted).
“Where, as here, the question of whether an abuse of discretion has been committed depends on
the interpretation of a statute, this Court reviews the statute’s meaning de novo.” State ex rel.
Nothum v. Walsh, 380 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
In making its determination, this Court is mindful a writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy
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“to be used with great caution and forbearance and only in cases of extreme necessity.” State ex
rel. T.J. v. Cundiff, 632 S.W.3d 353, 355 (Mo. banc 2021) (citations omitted).
Discussion
The Board asserts two points on appeal. In Point I, the Board argues the trial court erred in
issuing a permanent writ of prohibition because the Charter and Ordinance authorized the Board
to delegate its duty to hear disciplinary appeals to a hearing officer. In Point II, the Board argues
the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Lasley’s petition because there was no
justiciable controversy after his discipline was rescinded. We find both points are without merit.
For ease of analysis, we first discuss the issue of mootness. We then turn to the trial court’s
issuance of a permanent writ of prohibition.
A. Mootness
“[A] cause of action is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment
upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon
any then existing controversy.” State ex rel. Reed v. Reardon, 41 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Mo. banc 2001)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). “When an event occurs that makes a court’s decision
unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by the court impossible, the case is moot and
generally should be dismissed.” Grzybinski v. Dir. of Revenue, 479 S.W.3d 742, 745 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2016) (citations omitted).
Pursuant to § 4.280 of the Charter, “[a]ll cases of disciplinary action shall be subject to
each employee’s right of appeal to the board of police commissioners[.]” (emphasis added).
Although the Chief rescinded the discipline imposed against Lasley, the determination Lasley
violated the general orders of the Police Department was not redacted from his BPS file. This
determination can still be appealed and, in future incidents, can be considered by the Board in
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disciplinary proceedings against Lasley. As such, there is a justiciable controversy regarding the
violation in Lasley’s BPS file to which he has not been afforded a hearing. Therefore, the matter
is not moot.
B. Board’s authority to delegate its duty to hear appeals to a hearing officer
We now turn to the Board’s contention the trial court erred in granting the permanent writ
of prohibition because the Charter does not expressly prohibit it from delegating its duties to a
hearing officer.
The Board is created by the Charter and endowed with specific powers and duties. See ST.
LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, §§ 4.270.2, 4.270.7. The Ordinance also grants the Board
additional powers and duties. See ST. LOUIS COUNTY ORDINANCE, § 701.050. Relevant to
this appeal are §§ 4.270 and 4.280 of the Charter and § 701.050 of the Ordinance. This Court
applies the same rules used in construing a state statute when ascertaining the meaning of a city
ordinance and charter. See Boles v. City of St. Louis, 690 S.W.3d 592, 600 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024);
Associated Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. City of Springfield, 793 S.W.2d 517, 523 (Mo. App. S.D. 1990)
(“In construing the charter[,] we seek the intent of the drafters from the language used, give effect
to that intent if possible, and consider the words in light of their plain and ordinary meaning.”).
“The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine the intent of the [drafters] from the
language used by considering the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute.”
Dubinsky v. St. Louis Blues Hockey Club, 229 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007). “This Court
presumes ‘the [drafters] intended that every word, clause, sentence, and provision of a statute have
effect and [should] be given meaning.’” Boles, 690 S.W.3d at 600 (quoting City of Bridgeton v.
Titlemax of Mo., Inc., 292 S.W.3d 530, 536 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). Equally, we presume the
drafters did not include excess verbiage in a statute. Id. This Court must give effect to the language
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as written and not engage in statutory construction when the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous. Id.
In pertinent part, under § 4.270.7(3) of the Charter, the Board has a duty “to hear and
determine appeals from the decisions of the superintendent of police on disciplinary matters arising
within the department[.]” Pursuant to § 4.280, “[a]ll cases of disciplinary action shall be subject to
each employee’s right of appeal to the board of police commissioners, whose findings and orders
shall be final and conclusive.” The Charter and Ordinance, respectively, authorize the Board “to
promulgate … a manual of rules and regulations for the … discipline of personnel of the
department of police” and “[h]ear and determine appeals from the Superintendent on disciplinary
matters in accordance with the rules of procedure set forth in the manual promulgated by the
Board.” ST. LOUIS COUNTY CHARTER, § 4.270.7(5); ST. LOUIS COUNTY ORDINANCE,
§ 701.050.4. These provisions are clear and unambiguous. It is clear to this Court the drafters of
the Charter and Ordinance intended to impose a duty on the Board to hear all cases involving an
employee’s appeal of disciplinary action taken against them.
Furthermore, despite the Charter and Ordinance’s clear and unambiguous language, the
Board maintains it is permitted to appoint a hearing officer because it can promulgate its own rules
to hear and determine disciplinary appeals. We find this argument unpersuasive. The Board
correctly asserts its rules of appellate procedure provide it “may appoint a Hearing Officer to act
as its designee for all pre-hearing matters and to review the evidence presented in any hearing
and make recommendations to the Board.” (emphasis added). But, the disciplinary proceeding at
issue is not a pre-hearing matter, it is the final disciplinary appeal hearing. Fatal to the Board’s
argument is the absence of express authority in the Charter, Ordinance, and even its own rules of
appellate procedure granting it the authority to delegate its duty to hear disciplinary appeals to a
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hearing officer. It is well-established “[t]his court ‘may not engraft upon the statute provisions
which do not appear in explicit words or by implication from other language in the statute.’” See
State ex rel. Rogers v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of Kansas City, 995 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. App. W.D.
1999) (quoting Schuettenberg v. Bd. of Police Comm’rs of City of St. Louis, 935 S.W.2d 712, 714
(Mo. App. E.D. 1996)). Therefore, this Court holds Lasley’s disciplinary appeal hearing must be
heard before the Board, as the Board does not have explicit authority to delegate its duty to hear
disciplinary appeals to a hearing officer. See id. at 6–7 (holding the board of police commissioners
needed explicit statutory authority to appoint hearing officers to act in its place).
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its permanent writ of
prohibition.
Points I and II are denied.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
_______________________________
Michael S. Wright, Judge
John P. Torbitzky, P.J. and
Robert M. Clayton III, J. concur.
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