The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DANIEL LONERGAN, Case No. 1:24-cv-02067-PAB
Plaintiff,
-vs- JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER
GALLAGHER SHARP, LLP,
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Defendant.
Pending before the Court is Defendant Gallagher Sharp, LLP’s (“Defendant” or “Gallagher
Sharp”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Motion”). (Doc. No. 7.) For the following reasons,
Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I. Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Daniel Lonergan (“Plaintiff” or “Lonergan”) sets forth the following factual
allegations in his Complaint. (Doc. No. 1.)
Defendant is an interstate law firm with its principal place of business in Cleveland, Ohio.
(Id. at PageID #2.) Lonergan is a practicing attorney who resides in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. (Id.)
Lonergan is a “36 year old man who struggles with severe Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.”
(Id.) Lonergan graduated from law school in May of 2020, “right as much of America shut down due
to the COVID-19 pandemic … [and] began [his] legal career at a prestigious downtown Cleveland
law firm, but was forced to step away to address mental health concerns.” (Id.)
On July 24, 2023, “[a]fter taking a year to recover and heal, … [Lonergan] started with
Gallagher Sharp as a general litigation associate.” (Id.) “Despite initial optimism, [Lonergan] quickly
found that [his] disability created a barrier for [him].” (Id. at PageID #3.) Specifically, Lonergan
“struggled to bill hours in the manner the firm desired.” (Id.)
Lonergan alleges that “[s]eeking a workable solution, [he] informed upper management of
[his] disability and that it was interfering with [his] performance,” but “was told that this was not their
problem, and that [he] should have figured out how to deal with [his] own disability by this point in
[his] life.” (Id.) Lonergan also alleges that he “repeatedly approached partners at the firm and
suggested accommodations that [he] believed would allow [him] to accomplish [his] position’s
necessary tasks,” but that “[i]n each instance, [he] was told that [his] suggestions simply would not
work, and that [he] needed to figure it out on [his] own.” (Id.)
In its Answer, Defendant attaches numerous email examples of Lonergan’s communications
with upper management.1 For example, on September 6, 2023, Lonergan sent an email to his
“assigned internal mentor”2 Maia Jerin (“Jerin”) titled “August Time (I’m a disaster)” that indicated
the following:
1 The Court finds that it may rely upon the emails attached to Defendant’s Answer. Under Sixth Circuit case law, a court
may consider documents that “[are] referred to in the [plaintiff’s] complaint and [are] central to the plaintiff’s claim”
without converting the Rule 12(c) motion to one for summary judgment. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co., 177 F.3d 507, 514
(6th Cir. 1999); see also Showman v. Q Corporate Holdings, LLC, 2024 WL 2083518, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 9, 2024)
(Barker, J.). The Court agrees with Defendant that each of these emails is referred to in the Complaint, either explicitly
or implicitly, in relation to Lonergan’s allegations of: (i) informing Defendant of his disability’s “interfer[ence] with [his]
performance”; (ii) “being placed on probation” on December 6, 2023 and the relevant emails associated therewith; (iii)
emailing with Monica Sansalone on February 7, 2024; and (iv) correspondence and subsequent termination on April 9,
2024. (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID #3–4.) Moreover, Lonergan does not contest the authenticity of these emails or
meaningfully challenge their inclusion—rather, he too relies upon them in his Opposition. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 8 at PageID
#64 (“In this instance, Defendant’s own exhibits document my continued communication with management, desperately
searching for an accommodation that would suit both parties.”).) Finally, with respect to Lonergan’s Complaint describing
the content of certain emails that were later attached to Defendant’s Answer, the Court finds it appropriate to rely on the
exact language of the emails rather than Lonergan’s characterization of them. See Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson County
Metro Government, 135 F.4th 1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[W]hen an exhibit contradicts the complaint, the exhibit
trumps the allegations.”).
2 Defendant indicates in its Answer that Maia Jerin was Lonergan’s “assigned internal mentor.” (Doc. No. 6 at PageID
#21.) Lonergan does not appear to dispute this in his Opposition. (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #62.)
2
“Hi Maia,
I am working to get my time entered this morning, but realize I’ve not left myself in a great
spot. I wanted to give you a heads up that my time this month is a little bit of a mess, but that
I’m working to make sure that does not happen again. Happy to discuss later, after I get
through this slog.
Nothing to be super worried about, just wanted to make sure you had a heads up.
Best,
Dan.”
(Doc. No. 6-1 at PageID #33.) Similarly, on October 4, 2023, Lonergan emailed various individuals
the following:
“Good afternoon,
My September time has not been properly entered. I am working to release it all right now.
I understand that this is a problem and I have made significant changes to make sure my time
will be released Friday evening every week going forward.
I apologize for any difficulties I’ve caused. I am happy to discuss further if you wish.
Thank you for your patience as I get this taken care of,
Dan.”
(Doc. No. 6-2 at PageID #35.)
Lonergan alleges that “[o]n December 6, 2023, [he] was told [he] was being placed on
probation until [he] showed that [he] could properly bill hours.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #3.)
Defendant attaches numerous emails from December 6, 2023, in relation to this allegation. On the
morning of December 6, 2023, Lonergan received an email from Defendant’s Chief Administrative
Officer inquiring: “Dan – Where is your time? It was due by 5:00 p.m. yesterday and we need to
close the month. Please advise.” (Doc. No. 6-3 at PageID #39.) Lonergan responded shortly
afterwards: “Working on that first thing. Will let you know as soon as possible.” (Id. at PageID #38.)
3
Later that morning, Lonergan sent a follow-up email as follows: “I have released all the time entries
I have for November. I sincerely apologize for holding things up.” (Id. at PageID #38.)
That same afternoon, Lonergan received an email from Defendant’s Managing Partner
Monica Sansalone (“Sansalone”) that provided: “Dan, *** Attached is the spreadsheet I showed you.
I recommend using it, and keeping it open on your computer so you can capture your time as you
go.”3 (Doc. No. 6-4 at PageID #41.) The next day, on December 7, 2023, Lonergan received an
email from Jerin inquiring: “How is the excel sheet working out?” (Doc. No. 6-5 at PageID #43.)
Lonergan responded: “A step in the right direction. I dunno. I’m struggling, but I realize there’s a
limited amount anyone else can do. I could really use the weekend to reset and get myself together
to start fresh.” (Id.) In response, Jerin replied: “Sounds good. You have to find what works for you.
If I can help in any way, please let me know. Remember – don’t let perfect be the enemy of good.”
(Id.)
Lonergan alleges that “[w]ith the start of the new year, [he] was desperate to meet
expectations,” so he “put forward an unmaintainable effort, making sure to timely enter [his] hours
each week, logging hours significantly above the standard required.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #3.) “On
January 24, 2024, [Lonergan] received [his] yearly evaluation … [and] was informed [he] would not
be receiving any adjustment to [his] pay, based on [his] failure to accord with company practice, and
that [his] probation would continue until [he] showed constant improvement.” (Id.)
“On February 7, 2024, an email was sent to the entire firm, alerting the firm’s attorneys that a
number of hours had not been ‘released’ to the system.” (Id.) Following this email, Lonergan
3 This email was presumably sent following Lonergan being placed on probation and in relation thereto. (Doc. No. 1 at
PageID #3; Doc. No. 6 at PageID #22.)
4
“promptly checked [his] account and discovered that there were four (4) hours that [he] had worked
on a Saturday that [he] had failed to release.” (Id.) According to Lonergan, “[t]his amounted to just
more than 3% of the more-than one-hundred-eighty (180) hours [he] had logged for the month.” (Id.)
Lonergan alleges that “[w]ithin the hour, [he] received a sharply critical email from
[Sansalone].” (Id.) Sansalone’s email provided as follows:
“Dan,
I understand that each month you are behind in entering and releasing time. This is entirely
unacceptable. If one lawyers fails to timely enter time, it backs up our entire system which
among other things is entirely unfair to our accounting department as directly impacts [sic]
their ability to do their job. Accounting can’t generate BIMS and thus invoices don’t go out.
This creates problems with clients who have strict guidelines in terms of deadlines for invoice
submission and could result in the firm not being paid. This then impacts firm revenue and
thus attorney compensation. You need to remedy this asap.”
(Doc. No. 6-6 at PageID #46.) Lonergan responded to Sansalone as follows:
“Monica,
My hours were released timely every week this month. I had a single entry, 4 hours that I
worked on a Saturday, that was not released as of this morning. I billed 182.9 hours in
January, 178.9 of which had been released before[.]
Please let me know if you misunderstood something about this situation, or if this is indeed
what you would consider entirely unacceptable.
Best,
Dan.”
(Id. at PageID #45–46.) Thereafter, Sansalone replied as follows:
“Dan,
Yes your time has improved, but we need to get time in by the deadlines imposed by
accounting because as I said it backs up the entire system even if it is just one time entry. It
is not a discretionary deadline. There are downstream consequences of one time entry which
impacts the entire firm. I do see progress, but lawyers need to understand the impact on others
and the firm in general.”
5
(Id. at PageID #45.) Lonergan alleges that “[f]rom that point on, everything felt hopeless: my best
effort was simply not good enough” and that “[t]he everyday difficulty caused by my disability
compounded with despondence.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #4.)
Lonergan alleges that “[b]y April, [he] had all but checked out,” and that “[i]n [his] final email
to the firm management, [he] expressed [his] despair that the firm had refused to work with [him] to
address [his] issues.” (Id.) Specifically, on the morning of April 9, 2024, Lonergan sent an email to
numerous individuals (including Sansalone) indicating as follows:
“Good morning,
As you are likely aware, I was not able to release my March time.
I’m frustrated. I have tried to explain that this system does not work for me. It is not that I
don’t care or don’t want to track my time. My brain does not work like that.
I have brought up a number of possible adaptations that would be more manageable for me.
Each of these has been shot down. I do not feel there has been any attempt to meet me halfway.
I don’t have an answer at this point. You have told me that this is unacceptable. At the same
time, I’m miserable. I want things to work, but I can’t work like this.
-Dan.”
(Doc. No. 6-8 at PageID #50.) Approximately two hours later, one of Defendant’s billing specialists
(who was not a recipient of Lonergan’s previous email) sent Lonergan an email inquiring: “The
system is showing that you have unreleased time in March. Can you please release that time?” (Doc.
No. 6-7 at PageID #48.) Lonergan responded: “That time is not complete or properly recorded and
is not ready to be released. I’m not sure how to handle that at the moment.” (Id.)
That day, on April 9, 2024, “Monica Sansalone and Tim Brick arrived at [Lonergan’s] office,”
“informed [him] that [he] was terminated, watched [him] pack [his] things, and escorted [him] directly
to the elevators.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #4.)
6
II. Procedural History
On November 26, 2024, Lonergan filed his Complaint against Defendant. (Doc. No. 1.)
Therein, Lonergan alleges two claims: (i) Violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and (ii) Violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02. (Id.) On January
31, 2025, Defendant filed a Verified Answer to Lonergan’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 6.) That same day,
Defendant filed its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. No. 7.) On February 3, 2025,
Lonergan filed his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion (“Opposition”). (Doc. No. 8.) On February
18, 2025, Defendant filed its Reply in Support of its Motion (“Reply”). (Doc. No. 9.) Accordingly,
Defendant’s Motion is ripe for review.
III. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early
enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the
pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the
moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget,
510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting S. Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)).
The same standard for deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
applies to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603,
605 (6th Cir. 2011). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
(1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,’ (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a
cause of action’s elements,’ and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative
7
level.’” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)).
The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—whether the complaint raises a right to relief above
the speculative level— “does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a “context specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
Consequently, the examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in
conjunction with the “well-established principle that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires
only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Specific
facts are not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nonetheless, while “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper technical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
8
IV. Analysis
A. Discrimination Claims4
In its Motion, Defendant contends that Lonergan is not a “qualified individual with a
disability” because he cannot perform the essential functions of his position with or without
reasonable accommodation. (Doc. No. 7-1 at PageID #57.) Specifically, Defendant asserts that a
suggested accommodation is not reasonable if it requires eliminating an “essential” function of the
job, and that employers are not required to shift an essential job function onto others. (Id. at PageID
#58.) Thus, Defendant argues that recording and releasing billable time in compliance with client fee
agreements is an essential function of the associate attorney position, and that Lonergan explicitly
advised that Gallagher Sharp’s billing guidelines do not work for him.5 (Id.) Defendant also contends
that tracking time is a function that only Lonergan could perform, as no one else (including his legal
assistant) could reasonably monitor or document the time Lonergan devoted to performing client
services. (Id.) Finally, Defendant maintains that any accommodation Lonergan could have proposed
would have required Defendant to either modify its fee agreements with clients, bill outside the
guidelines of existing fee agreements, or charge clients an inaccurate fee—all of which Defendant
4 “Both federal and Ohio discrimination actions require the same analysis.” Hazen v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 2022
WL 3083027, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2022) (Barker, J.). Accordingly, the Court will evaluate Lonergan’s claims under
the ADA and Ohio law together.
5 In its Motion, Defendant cites to Lonergan’s Complaint and the April 9, 2024, emails to assert that Lonergan indicated
on his final day of employment that “Gallagher Sharp’s billing guidelines do not work for me.” (Doc. No. 7-1 at PageID
#58.) The Court briefly notes that this quote does not appear in either source. Rather, in his April 9, 2024, email, Lonergan
provides: “I have tried to explain that this system does not work for me.” (Doc. No. 6-8 at PageID #50) (emphasis added).
The Court thus relies on this exact quote in its analysis, as opposed to Defendant’s assertion that Lonergan “explicitly
advised Gallagher Sharp on his final day of employment that ‘Gallagher Sharp’s billing guidelines do not work for me.’”
(Doc. No. 7-1 at PageID #58.)
9
submits is per se unreasonable and/or illegal under the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct. (Id. at
PageID #59.)
In his Opposition, Lonergan primarily argues that Defendant’s arguments are premature at
this stage. (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #62.) Lonergan alludes to numerous arguments, including that: (i)
the emails provided show that he had been communicating his difficulties from early on in his
employment; (ii) flat fee billing is not prohibited by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct; (iii)
rejecting ideas and proposing nothing in return is not participating in a good-faith interactive process
required by the ADA; and (iv) “Gallagher Sharp’s position here reads as though the firm is suggesting
that the very reason the occupation of ‘lawyer’ exists is to bill hours,” which “[t]o [Lonergan], that
definition is so reductive it is insulting to the entire profession.” (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #61–62.)
However, Lonergan does not develop any of these arguments further because he contends that a
“Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is not the appropriate setting to litigate the entire matter.”
(Id. at PageID #62.)
Instead, Lonergan points to his allegations that he “repeatedly approached partners at the firm
and suggested accommodations that [he] believed would allow [him] to accomplish [his] position’s
necessary tasks … [and] [i]n each instance, [he] was told that [his] suggestions simply would not
work, and that [he] needed to figure it out on [his] own.” (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #63.) Lonergan also
points to his allegations that Gallagher Sharp “violated the ADA by taking adverse employment
actions against a disabled employee while failing to provide any reasonable accommodations” and
“by failing to engage in a good-faith discussion to determine possible accommodations.” (Id.)
Finally, Lonergan contends that the “Sixth Circuit recognizes claims where the plaintiff alleges the
ability to perform the job with an alleged essential job requirement eliminated,” and that Defendant
10
will bear the burden at trial of showing the challenged job criteria is essential or that a proposed
accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon the employer. (Id. at PageID #64.)
In its Reply, Defendant submits that Lonergan’s opinion about billing by the hour being
“beneath the true essence of lawyering … does not alter the fundamental fact that Gallagher Sharp is
a private civil litigation defense firm whose entire ability to operate depends on billing its clients, in
most cases by the hour, for its work.” (Doc. No. 9 at PageID #66.) Next, Defendant contends that
Lonergan misconstrues Sixth Circuit precedent, and that “courts in the Sixth Circuit have repeatedly
held that employers need not eliminate an essential job function to accommodate an employee’s
alleged disability.” (Id. at PageID #67–69.) Defendant thus asserts that Lonergan, in his emails,
conceded that Defendant’s “billing practices did not ‘work’ for him because his ‘brain does not work
that way’ … [and] that there was ‘very little anyone else could do’ to ensure he properly entered and
released his time.” (Id. at PageID #69–70.) Accordingly, Defendant argues these tasks are essential
to an associate attorney’s role in private practice, and that Lonergan’s request to be exempt from them
is per se unreasonable. (Id. at PageID #71.)
The ADA prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). An employer discriminates under the ADA when it does “not
mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
To assert a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that they are
(1) disabled, yet (2) otherwise qualified for the position despite their disability: (a)
without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged essential job
requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation; (3) that
11
their employer was aware of their disability; (4) that they requested an
accommodation; and (5) that their employer failed to provide the requested reasonable
accommodation.
Schobert v. CSX Transp. Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 753, 791-92 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Tchankpa
v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 811 (6th Cir. 2020)).
“A ‘qualified individual’ is an employee with a disability who can perform the ‘essential
functions’ of his job ‘with or without reasonable accommodation.’” Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 93
F.4th 360, 368 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing § 12111(8)). “The term essential functions means the
fundamental job duties of the employment position … [and] does not include the marginal functions
of the position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). In other words, “[a] job function is essential if its removal
would fundamentally alter the position.” Davis v. Larry’s IGA, 2010 WL 746433, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2001)).
“Failure-to-accommodate cases typically fall into two broad categories: (1) cases where the
plaintiff does not want an accommodation but instead makes ‘the straightforward claim’ that he can
do his job ‘as it exists’; and (2) ‘those in which the plaintiff challenges a particular job requirement
as unessential or claims that he can do the job with reasonable accommodations on the part of the
employer.” Id. at 369 (citing Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1182 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Under the second category, “[i]f the employer claims [] that the disabled individual would be
unqualified to perform the essential functions of the job even with the proposed accommodation, the
disabled individual must prove that he or she would in fact be qualified for the job if the employer
were to adopt the proposed accommodation.” Preston v. Great Lakes Specialty Finance Inc., 724
Fed. App’x. 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Cooper, 93 F.4th at 371. “[A]n ADA plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that accommodation is objectively
12
reasonable.” Bernau v. Architectural Stainless, Inc., 2017 WL 2831518, at *4 (E.D. Mich. June 30,
2017) (citing Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Adams
v. The Vanderbilt Univ., 2024 WL 1182861, at *19 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2024) (applying this initial
burden at pleading stage); Easter v. Transport Service, Co., 2007 WL 4260809, at *4 (E.D. Tenn.
Nov. 30, 2007) (same).
The Court finds that Lonergan’s Complaint fails in numerous respects. First, Lonergan’s
Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations detailing the “reasonable accommodations” he claims
to have requested. The only relevant allegation on this point is that Lonergan “repeatedly approached
partners at the firm and suggested accommodations that I believed would allow me to accomplish my
position’s necessary tasks.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #3.) Yet this allegation is wholly conclusory.
Lonergan includes no details indicating what he even suggested, let alone how that related to his
position. Indeed, Lonergan concedes as much in his Opposition, noting that the “obviously
unreasonable” proposals referenced by Defendant “are noticeably absent from the Complaint and the
provided emails.”6 (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #61–62.) And even then, Lonergan does not clarify or
elaborate as to what his actual proposed accommodations were (to the extent that he even challenges
that Defendant’s referenced proposals are incorrect). Moreover, with no information regarding what
6 Despite expressly conceding that the “‘objectively unreasonable’ proposals” referenced by Defendant are absent from
the provided emails, Lonergan—in the same paragraph—contradictorily alludes that “the emails Gallagher Sharp has
provided show … [t]hat I offered multiple ‘proposed accommodations.’” (Doc. No. 8 at PageID #61.) Notwithstanding
Lonergan’s own concession that the alleged accommodations “are noticeably absent from … the provided emails,” the
Court’s independent review reveals that the emails do not contain any details regarding accommodations that Lonergan
may have requested. (See Doc. Nos. 6-1, 6-2, 6-3, 6-4, 6-5, 6-6, 6-7, 6-8.) Rather, the emails instead show the various
instances in which Lonergan failed to record his hours on time. (See id.) The only reference to accommodations exists
in Lonergan’s email dated April 9, 2024, in which he provides: “I have brought up a number of possible adaptations that
would be more manageable for me.” (Doc. No. 6-8 at PageID #50.) Again, however, this does not include any details as
to what Lonergan requested. In short, Lonergan’s Complaint wholly fails to provide this Court with any details to permit
it to conclude that he has alleged that he requested an objectively reasonable accommodation.
13
his proposed accommodation would be, the Court cannot conclude that Lonergan has pled that he
would “in fact be qualified for the job if the employer were to adopt the proposed accommodation.”
Preston, 724 Fed. App’x. at 455; see also Cooper, 93 F.4th at 371. The Court thus finds that
Lonergan’s sole conclusory allegation in his Complaint falls short of Rule 8 standards.7
In similar fashion, the Court rejects Lonergan’s arguments regarding the failure to engage in
a good-faith discussion. First, Lonergan again references conclusory allegations on this point.8
Notwithstanding this fatal deficiency, however, the Sixth Circuit has held that “[a]lthough mandatory,
failure to engage in the interactive process is only an independent violation of the ADA if the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie showing that he proposed a reasonable accommodation.” Rorrer v. City of
7 Notwithstanding the Court’s conclusion that Lonergan fails to sufficiently plead that he requested a reasonable
accommodation, the Court finds that even if he had pled the accommodations referenced by Defendant, it would find that
such accommodations were not reasonable. Defendant’s Answer references various proposed accommodations involving
estimating and working on a fixed-fee rate, and that such accommodations would be unreasonable because they would
run afoul of the client fee agreements entered into. In response, Lonergan indicates that “[t]he idea that flat-fee billing is
expressly prohibited by the ethical rules themselves will come as an unpleasant surprise to many.” (Doc. No. 8 at PageID
#62.) Yet Lonergan misses the mark. It is not that flat fee billing itself is expressly prohibited by the ethical rules. Rather,
it is that billing for work outside the agreed-upon scope of representation without prior client approval is prohibited by
the ethical rules, as “[a]ny change in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses … shall promptly be communicated to the
client.” See Ohio Prof. Cond. Rule 1.5(b). And to the extent that Lonergan suggests that it would be reasonable to require
Defendant to alter its currently existing fee agreements with every client that Lonergan would be involved with so that
Lonergan could work on a flat fee basis or “estimate” his fees, the Court rejects that argument. See Tchankpa v. Ascena
Retail Group, Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir. 2020) (“The ADA is not a weapon that employees can wield to pressure
employers into … reconfiguring their business operations. Instead, it protects disabled employees from disability-related
mistreatment—no more, no less.”). Finally, the Court rejects the notion that eliminating the billing requirement all
together would be a reasonable accommodation. Indeed, Lonergan’s Complaint appears to reference billing as one of his
“position’s necessary tasks.” (Doc. No. 1 at PageID #3.) Lonergan offers no meaningful argument in response to
Defendant’s assertion that billing hours is a “fundamental function of his role as an associate attorney.” (Doc. No. 7-1 at
PageID #59.) As indicated in Defendant’s Reply, Defendant’s “entire ability to operate depends on billing its clients, in
most cases by the hour, for its work.” (Doc. No. 9 at PageID #66.) Lonergan offers no explanation, nor can the Court
find any, to even suggest that removing the billing requirement would not fundamentally alter his position. See Davis,
2010 WL 746433, at *2 (“A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position.”); Cooper, 93
F.4th at 372 (“Nor does a reasonable accommodation require employers to eliminate or reallocate an essential job
function.”).
8 (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID #4 (“Defendant violated the ADA by failing to engage in a good-faith discussion to determine
possible accommodations.”).)
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Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1041 (6th Cir. 2014). Because Lonergan fails to even allege as much here, his
argument fails for the same reasons stated above.
Therefore, the Court finds that Lonergan has failed to plead facts to plausibly support that he
was a “qualified individual” who could perform the essential functions of his job with or without
reasonable accommodation—including a lack of any allegations detailing what accommodations were
even requested, let alone whether they were reasonable. Cooper, 93 F.4th at 368. Accordingly, the
Court concludes that Lonergan has failed to state a claim under both the ADA and Ohio law and
hereby dismisses his claims.
B. Lonergan’s Request for Leave to Amend
Finally, in one sentence at the end of his Opposition, Lonergan requests “if the Court should
deem it proper, … leave to amend [his] Complaint to add the specific allegation that [he] would be
capable of performing the job ‘without accommodation from the employer, with an alleged ‘essential’
job requirement eliminated; or with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” (Doc. No. 8 at PageID
#65.)
The Sixth Circuit has held that “a bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss—
without any indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is sought … does not constitute
a motion within the contemplation of Rule 15(a).” Louisiana School Employees’ Retirement System
v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 622 F.3d 471, 486 (6th Cir. 2010); see also Alexander v. Eagle Manufacturing
Company, LLC, 714 Fed. App’x. 504, 511 (6th Cir. 2017).
The Court rejects Lonergan’s request to amend for two reasons. First, Lonergan has not
properly made a motion for leave to amend accompanied by a proposed amended complaint that
indicates “the particular grounds on which amendment is sought.” See id. Moreover, Lonergan does
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not even indicate the specific allegations that he would seek to include. Instead, he merely reiterates
the conclusory standard under the ADA. Second, even if Lonergan had included specific factual
allegations or a proposed amended complaint, the Court would decline to permit amendments at this
stage. Defendant filed its Motion on January 31, 2025. It has since been over five months, and at
any point Lonergan could have filed a motion to amend and proposed amended complaint but did not.
See, e.g., Detrick v. KCS International Inc, 2025 WL 1697482, at *5 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2025)
(Barker, J.) (declining request to amend where plaintiff waited over six months to formally request
leave to amend and instead “made the strategic decision to wait for the Court to rule on Defendants’
Motion to dismiss”). Accordingly, the Court declines to permit Lonergan to amend his Complaint at
this juncture.9
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 10, 2025 s/ Pamela A. Barker
PAMELA A. BARKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
9 In any event, the Court notes that any amendments would likely be futile for the same reasons previously discussed in
this Opinion. See, e.g., supra note 7. Regardless, the Court independently rejects Lonergan’s request to amend for the
reasons stated above.
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