distinguishing official immunity from high public official immunity
How later courts described this case
- distinguishing official immunity from high public official immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kathleen G. Sheehan Vello :
:
v. : No. 526 C.D. 2024
: Argued: February 4, 2025
Daniel DeMarco, :
Appellant :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge (P.)
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE FILED: July 10, 2025
Daniel DeMarco (DeMarco) appeals from the order dated April 18, 2024, by
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (Common Pleas), which denied
his motion for judgment on the pleadings in the lawsuit filed against him by Kathleen
G. Sheehan Vello (Vello), alleging defamation and false light invasion of privacy.
DeMarco, who serves as the President of the Ross Township (Township) Board of
Commissioners, argues he is entitled to judgment under the doctrines of high public
official immunity and judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. After careful review, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
We take the alleged facts from Vello’s complaint, admissions in her reply to
DeMarco’s new matter, and her brief opposing DeMarco’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings. Vello is a licensed attorney who resides with her husband, Matthew
Vello (collectively, the Vellos), in the Township. The Vellos live adjacent to a parcel
(Transvaal parcel) that was previously owned wholly or in part by Richard Quigley,
Jr. (Quigley). Quigley used the Transvaal parcel to operate a landscaping and supply
contracting business. In approximately 2019, Quigley began land clearing, grading,
and unpermitted excavation activity on the Transvaal parcel, resulting in “excessive
disturbance of dirt, dumping of unknown solid waste and debris, landslides, and raw
sewage contamination of the stream that runs through the Vello parcel.” Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 7a-8a. He began using the Transvaal parcel as an unpermitted solid
waste disposal facility in approximately 2020. Quigley placed unpermitted shipping
containers on the Transvaal parcel and operated a tree-cutting service, which caused
excessive noise.
Because of these activities, the Township cited Quigley for violating the local
zoning ordinances. Quigley applied for variances, and the case proceeded before the
Ross Township Zoning Hearing Board (Board). The Vellos and other community
members opposed Quigley’s applications before the Board, which ultimately denied
the requested variances on May 11, 2022. Quigley appealed to Common Pleas but
later discontinued his appeal. In August 2022, Quigley began moving his business
operations to a different parcel less than one quarter of a mile away (Bascom parcel).
Quigley leased, rather than owned, the Bascom parcel. The Township once again
cited Quigley for violating the zoning ordinances because of shipping containers he
placed on the Bascom parcel. Quigley applied for variances, and Vello and others
opposed Quigley’s applications at a Board meeting on February 8, 2023. The Board
tabled Quigley’s applications pending a site visit and scheduled the case to continue
at a meeting on March 8, 2023. Quigley died one day before the meeting, on March
7, 2023.
2
Despite Quigley’s death, the Board “untabled” his applications for variances
at its March 8, 2023 meeting. R.R. at 395a. According to a transcript of the meeting,
Quigley’s uncle, Kevin Quigley, stated his family intended to continue pursuing the
variances. The Board’s solicitor explained the family would need to file amended
applications on behalf of Quigley’s estate. The solicitor also explained the owner of
the Bascom parcel would need to lease it to the family. The Board swore in Kevin
Quigley, who revealed his nephew committed suicide and blamed the Vellos for the
death. The Board then took testimony via teleconference from one of the owners of
the Bascom parcel, Christopher Ketterer, who explained he gave permission for the
requested variances and intended to work with the family and amend the lease so the
applications could proceed.
The Board asked if anyone else wished to speak regarding the matter, while
cautioning it would not tolerate repetitious testimony or “out of line” behavior and
was soliciting testimony “specifically to the variance . . . . It’s not a credibility fight
between folks that is a result of bad feelings generally towards each other.” R.R. at
406a. The Board swore in DeMarco, who testified as follows:
[DeMarco]: Mr. Chairman, this relates to ZHB-2-23. In almost
20 years if service -- or 24 years -- I’m sorry, 24 years of service as an
elected official, I have never witnessed the amount of misinformation,
false innuendo and lack of respect and knowledge of procedural due
process involving an issue to be ruled upon by the appropriate
decision[-]making bodies of the Township . . . .
In the United States, every individual or entity has a right to
ownership and the use of private property. However, the government
can regulate the use of private property to protect the health, safety and
welfare of the citizens within the borders of its jurisdiction.
. . . Quigley had a right to use the property for his business, which
he owned. One of the primary duties of this governmental body is to
determine what, if any, violations of regulations set forth in the Zoning
3
Ordinances of [the] Township exist regarding legal use -- legal use of
this property.
The law also provides for exceptions more commonly known as
variances. And he, like any other individual or entity, was entitled to
be here this evening to convince this body that a legal basis existed for
variances.
The individuals employed by the Township . . . know the law and
had followed all the laws as it related to this issue. Any accusations of
nefarious activity by employees and . . . Quigley regarding the use of
the property and the regulation of the same are outrageous and baseless.
Again, if any regulation is violated, this body will make that
determination. Additionally, any alleged error in such a determination
can be further reviewed by the courts of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
What is frightening to me in this situation is that respect for the
law and in particular knowledge of the law and in particular an
individual who purports to be or is apparently a licensed attorney in
Pennsylvania and the right to an individual to legal use of private
property is of no concern.
Most bothersome is that many people believe they have such
rights. But because they simply do not like the use of another’s
property, that individual should summarily be prohibited from the use
of the property. This flies in the face of the constitutional right that
everyone is afforded equal protection of the laws.
. . . Quigley unfortunately was driven into a state of hopelessness
because of the disgraceful lack of respect for the Constitution and the
laws of this Commonwealth. And this lack of respect is only getting
worse. It’s disgusting. I’m fed up with it. I’m fed up with people like
[the] Vello[s] and others. I’m fed up with it. I’m tired of it. It’s
ridiculous.
[Board Chairman]: Order. Please.
[DeMarco]: I ask that everyone pray for . . . Quigley and his
family tonight. His untimely and unnecessary death is a devastating
and tragic loss. And I know that at this moment it’s not a priority, but
at some point pray that our great experiment of democracy will
4
continue. Because, unfortunately, on a daily basis and in this situation
with the people who have acted so outrageously -- unreasonably
outrageous and so on and so forth, there are many in this country that
have a desire to see that experiment fail. Thank you.
Id. at 407a-09a.
Vello attempted to testify immediately after DeMarco, but the Board directed
her to sit because she “spoke at the last meeting.” R.R. at 410a. What happened
next is difficult to decipher, although the transcript indicates the meeting broke down
into “[s]houting from [the] audience” and repeated pleas for order from the Board.
Id. In her complaint, Vello alleged DeMarco “raised his voice loudly and gestured
wildly” at the Vellos, which “had the effect of whipping the crowd . . . into a frenzy,”
resulting in threats against the Vellos. Id. at 14a. Ultimately, the Board confirmed
it would not allow Vello to testify again until “some other time” and tabled Quigley’s
applications for variances. Id. at 411a-14a. Board member Tara Howey (Howey)
explained:
[Howey]: It’s not imperative tonight. . . . Quigley is gone. The
estate will take over the property. At that time there will be discussion
regarding the variances. And if you’re here, you can speak then for five
minutes or less. But you have had more than one opportunity to speak
on this issue.
No one is really discussing the issue. Actually, we’re paying
homage to . . . Quigley and his family and explaining to them the proper
procedure for them to move forward with this, as [Kevin Quigley]
extended that they are interested in going forward with the business.
So at this point I think we can table it, members; and we can let
the family go home, [and] be together.
Id. at 411a-12a.
Vello filed her complaint against DeMarco on August 24, 2023. Count I of
Vello’s complaint alleged defamation, while Count II alleged false light invasion of
5
privacy. Vello alleged DeMarco’s testimony on March 8, 2023, included false and
defamatory statements regarding her advocacy in opposition to Quigley’s variance
applications and her knowledge and abilities as a lawyer. As a result, Vello alleged
she suffered emotional distress and harm to her reputation before the public and the
legal community. Vello alleged she and her family were receiving ongoing threats,
including threats to her husband, mother, and pet dog. Moreover, Vello maintained
there were “vehicles continuously driving by and loitering in front of the Vello home
to intimidate [her].” R.R. at 18a.
DeMarco filed his motion for judgment on the pleadings on February 2, 2024,
arguing, in relevant part, that he was immune from suit based on high public official
immunity, official immunity under the Judicial Code,1 and judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity. Significantly, DeMarco described his testimony at the Board’s meeting
on March 8, 2023, as a rebuttal to Vello’s statements “before the . . . Board and in
other public forums, which had impugned the competence of Township employees
and the integrity of the Township’s zoning enforcement procedures relating to the
Bascom and Transvaal parcels.” R.R. at 197a. On April 11, 2024, Vello filed a brief
opposing DeMarco’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Common Pleas summarily denied DeMarco’s motion by order dated April 18,
2024, and DeMarco timely appealed to this Court. In its opinion filed pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b), Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), Common
Pleas rejected DeMarco’s contention that he was entitled to high public official
immunity. Common Pleas explained DeMarco’s testimony at the March 8, 2023
Board meeting was not a part of his official duties or within his jurisdiction.
Common Pleas Op., 6/10/24, at 5. Common Pleas observed the Board is
1
See Sections 8545-50 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8545-50.
6
independent from the Township commissioners. Id. In addition, Common Pleas
described DeMarco’s testimony as “his personal commentary on the Vellos[, which]
did not relate to DeMarco’s duties as president of the commissioners.”2 Id.
Common Pleas further rejected DeMarco’s claim of judicial or quasi-judicial
immunity, reasoning it was “questionable” whether the meeting on March 8, 2023,
was a quasi-judicial hearing. Common Pleas Op, 6/10/24, at 4. Common Pleas
noted Quigley was deceased at the time of the meeting, which resembled a memorial
service and “invitation for those present to vilify [the] Vellos,” rather than a hearing
on Quigley’s variance applications. Id. Even assuming the meeting qualified as a
quasi-judicial hearing, Common Pleas concluded DeMarco’s testimony was “little
more than a speech designed to call the Vellos liars, to question . . . Vello’s status as
an attorney, and to accuse the Vellos of causing . . . Quigley’s suicide.” Id. at 5.
Common Pleas explained it could not conclude DeMarco’s testimony was pertinent
and material to the issue of whether variances should have been granted. Id.
2
Common Pleas did not separately consider whether DeMarco was entitled to official immunity
under the Judicial Code, likely because DeMarco treated official immunity and high public official
immunity as a single doctrine in his motion for judgment on the pleadings and concise statement
of errors complained of on appeal. See Feldman v. Hoffman, 107 A.3d 821, 826 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2014) (distinguishing official immunity from high public official immunity). DeMarco continued
to conflate the two doctrines in his initial appellate brief before apparently abandoning any claim
of official immunity in his reply brief. See DeMarco’s Br. at 42-43; DeMarco’s Reply Br. at 7-9.
We note DeMarco’s initial reliance on official immunity brought this appeal within our appellate
jurisdiction under Section 762(a)(7) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(7), which provides
us with authority to decide appeals from final orders in certain “[i]mmunity waiver matters.” See
also Section 702(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(a) (“An appeal authorized by law from
an interlocutory order in a matter shall be taken to the appellate court having jurisdiction of final
orders in such matter.”).
7
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
We begin by addressing whether this Court has jurisdiction over DeMarco’s
appeal.3 We may hear appeals from only final orders, unless a statute or rule directs
otherwise. Mahoning Twp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 320 A.3d 861, 867 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2024). Generally, a final order “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” See Rule
341(b)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1).
At issue in this case is Rule 313 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Pa.R.A.P. 313, which provides for appeals from collateral orders. This rule applies
to any order that is “separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where
the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is
such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be
irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b).
In Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court
concluded an order denying summary judgment on sovereign immunity grounds was
appealable under Rule 313. Brooks alleged she suffered injuries “when she walked
into an unmarked glass wall while . . . attempting to exit the Family Court building
in Philadelphia.” Id. at 361. Brooks filed an action against the Family Court, among
other entities. Id. The Family Court moved for summary judgment under sovereign
immunity, contending the Judicial Code’s exceptions to sovereign immunity did not
apply because it was not a “Commonwealth party.”4 Id. The court of common pleas
denied summary judgment, and the Family Court appealed. Id. at 362.
3
On May 31, 2024, this Court directed the parties to address whether the April 18, 2024 order was
appealable in their principal briefs.
4
See Section 8522 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522.
8
Our Supreme Court concluded the issue of whether the Family Court qualified
as a “Commonwealth party” satisfied Rule 313’s separability requirement because
it was a legal question and there was no need to consider the merits of Brooks’ claim.
Brooks, 259 A.3d at 372. The Supreme Court explained this issue “does not require
a court to find any facts regarding the Family Court’s alleged negligence nor does it
require a court to determine the scope of the Family Court’s potential liability.” Id.
The Supreme Court concluded the issue satisfied Rule 313’s importance requirement
because sovereign immunity “is deeply rooted in public policy, as it is both secured
by the Constitution and has been preserved by the legislature.” Id. at 372. Moreover,
the Supreme Court explained the applicability of sovereign immunity to the Family
Court had implications beyond that particular case, reasoning the doctrine applies to
all branches of government, and “resolution of the scope of sovereign immunity also
has implications for other individuals’ ability to sue the Commonwealth’s courts by
invoking an exception to immunity.” Id.
As a final matter, our Supreme Court concluded the issue satisfied Rule 313’s
irreparability requirement. Brooks, 259 A.3d at 373. The Supreme Court explained
the sovereign immunity doctrine “protects government entities from a lawsuit itself.”
Id. Permitting a lawsuit to proceed without appellate review would contravene this
purpose by requiring government entities to expend taxpayer dollars and employees’
time mounting a defense. Id. The Supreme Court reasoned lawsuits would also have
a “chilling effect on government policymaking” by exposing those in policymaking
positions to litigation. Id. Our Supreme Court noted its analysis was consistent with
precedent of the United States Supreme Court, holding orders denying immunity are
immediately appealable. Id. at 373-74 (collecting cases).
9
Our Supreme Court’s rationale in Brooks applies with equal force in this case.
DeMarco’s immunity claims satisfy Rule 313’s separability requirement because it
is unnecessary for us to determine whether DeMarco defamed Vello or invaded her
privacy to analyze whether immunity applies. DeMarco’s claims satisfy Rule 313’s
importance requirement because high public official immunity and judicial or quasi-
judicial immunity are deeply rooted in public policy. High public official immunity
protects “society’s interest in the unfettered discussion of public business and in full
public knowledge of the facts and conduct of such business.” Doe v. Franklin Cnty.,
174 A.3d 593, 603 (Pa. 2017) (quoting Lindner v. Mollan, 677 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa.
1996)). In relevant part, judicial or quasi-judicial immunity “ensure[s] that all issues
pertinent to the litigation are aired and explored in a manner that is unfettered by the
threat of defamation lawsuits.” Huhta v. State Bd. of Med., 706 A.2d 1275, 1276
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). These claims may have implications beyond this dispute, given
that our holding could be used in other cases involving testimony before zoning
hearing boards.
We also conclude these claims satisfy Rule 313’s irreparability requirement.
As the Supreme Court observed in Brooks, immunity doctrines protect the defendant
from a lawsuit itself, not merely the damages resulting from a lawsuit. See 259 A.3d
at 373; Guarrasi v. Scott, 25 A.3d 394, 405 n.11 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). Contrary to
this purpose, permitting a lawsuit to proceed against a person with immunity would
expose him or her to “the expense, publicity, and danger of defending the good faith
of his public actions before a jury.” Brooks, 259 A.3d at 373 (quoting Montgomery
v. City of Phila., 140 A.2d 100, 103 (Pa. 1958)). Accordingly, the order on appeal
is a collateral order under Rule 313, and we may proceed to review DeMarco’s issues
on the merits.
10
II. Judgment on the pleadings
Judgment on the pleadings should be granted “where, on the facts averred, the
law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Emerich v. Phila. Ctr. for Hum.
Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1034 n.1 (Pa. 1998). In reviewing Common Pleas’ order,
we consider “the pleadings and documents properly attached thereto. Accordingly,
[we] must accept as true all well[-]pleaded statements of fact, admissions, and any
documents properly attached to the pleadings presented by the party against whom
the motion is filed, considering only those facts which were specifically admitted.”
Foust v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 305 A.3d 1128, 1132 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023)
(quoting Angino & Rovner v. Jeffrey R. Lessin & Assocs., 131 A.3d 502, 507 (Pa.
Super. 2016)).
A. High public official immunity
Initially, we consider whether high public official immunity shields DeMarco
from Vello’s lawsuit. This doctrine “exempts high public officials from lawsuits for
defamation provided the statements made by the official are made in the course of
her official duties and within the scope of her authority.”5 Matta v. Burton, 721 A.2d
1164, 1166 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). High public official immunity applies even when
the statements at issue were false or motivated by malice. Id. Our case law identifies
two factors relevant to whether a high public official’s statements are immune: “(1)
the formality of the forum in which the alleged defamatory words were spoken and
(2) the relationship of the legitimate subject of governmental concern to the person
5
To determine whether an individual is a high public official, our courts analyze “the nature of
[an official’s] duties, the importance of [the] office and particularly whether or not [the official]
has policy-making functions.” Doe, 174 A.3d at 603 n.10 (quoting Montgomery, 140 A.2d at 105).
Vello concedes DeMarco is a high public official as President of the Township commissioners.
Vello’s Br. at 33; see Appel v. Twp. of Warwick, 828 A.2d 469, 472 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (en banc)
(recognizing township supervisor is a high public official).
11
seeking damages for the defamatory utterance.” Azar v. Ferrari, 898 A.2d 55, 60
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
At this stage of the litigation, in the absence of discovery, we cannot foreclose
the possibility that high public official immunity will ultimately bar Vello’s lawsuit.
Nonetheless, our review is limited to the facts Vello specifically admits. See Foust,
305 A.3d at 1132 n.3. Because we conclude the facts averred do not establish with
certainty that immunity applies, we affirm Common Pleas’ decision. DeMarco
argues he testified in a formal forum regarding a legitimate subject of governmental
concern. DeMarco’s Br. at 45-48. Further, DeMarco insists he was merely rebutting
Vello’s criticisms of Township employees and zoning enforcement procedures. Id.
at 46-51. To the extent this testimony rebutted Vello’s criticisms of the Township,
it did so in only a brief and conclusory manner. Most of the testimony was unrelated
to Township employees and procedures and focused on criticizing the Vellos.
DeMarco notes he and the other Township commissioners are responsible for
appointing code enforcement officers and members of the Board. DeMarco’s Br. at
48. Despite this, DeMarco does not maintain his duties include opining on zoning
matters. As Vello retorts, DeMarco has expressly disavowed any involvement in the
Board’s decision-making process. By letter dated April 2, 2022, DeMarco denied
Vello’s alleged request for a meeting with the Township commissioners, explaining
her zoning dispute with Quigley was “not within the purview” of the commissioners
because they have no control over the Board and no influence over its decision. R.R.
at 98a.
DeMarco relies on Hall v. Kiger, 795 A.2d 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (en banc),
in which we held high public official immunity applied to a borough councilman. In
that case, Hall appeared at a borough council meeting and claimed the borough chief
12
of police “had been charged with raping a young girl many years before.” Id. at 498.
Councilman Kiger investigated the matter and prepared a report, which he presented
at a subsequent meeting. Id. Councilman Kiger explained Hall’s claims “related to
a paternity matter for which the [c]hief had accepted responsibility in 1958 when he
was eighteen years old.” Id. Councilman Kiger then made accusations against Hall,
alleging he “had been physically abusive to his wife and daughter-in-law, which had
prompted family members to seek protection-from-abuse . . . orders.” Id. This Court
explained high public official immunity applied to Councilman Kiger because he
made the accusations “in the context of a public meeting while . . . performing his
duty as councilman to report on a matter of great public concern that had been
initiated by the subject of the defamatory comments.” Hall, 795 A.2d at 501.
In contrast to Hall, DeMarco’s testimony on March 8, 2023, did not occur at
a commissioners’ meeting, did not respond to any issues or disputes pending before
the commissioners, and may not have related to activities within the commissioners’
powers. Although Vello had allegedly tried to involve the Township commissioners
in her zoning dispute, DeMarco did not provide his testimony in that forum. Rather,
he sought out a forum distinct from the commissioners and spoke regarding a matter
over which he acknowledged no control and had previously refused to participate.
Accordingly, without further factual development clarifying the scope of DeMarco’s
duties and establishing that those duties would reasonably involve speaking at Board
meetings and opining on cases before the Board, we agree with Common Pleas that
DeMarco is not entitled to high public official immunity.
B. Quasi-judicial immunity
We next discuss DeMarco’s claim of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. The
doctrine of judicial immunity provides that “[s]tatements made in pleadings, as well
13
as in the actual trial or argument of a case, are absolutely privileged, and the maker
of the statements is immune from legal action as long as the statements are pertinent
and material to the litigation.” Huhta, 706 A.2d at 1276. Judicial immunity applies
to judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses. Id. In addition, the doctrine is absolute,
meaning “the declarant’s intent is immaterial even if the statement is false and made
with malice.” Schanne v. Addis, 121 A.3d 942, 947 (Pa. 2015). Vello acknowledges
this immunity applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, which includes
proceedings before zoning hearing boards. Vello’s Br. at 44 (citing Doe v. Wyoming
Valley Health Care Sys., 987 A.2d 758, 766-67 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
The facts averred do not establish with certainty that the Board’s meeting on
March 8, 2023, was a quasi-judicial proceeding. Vello argues the meeting was not
quasi-judicial because Quigley was deceased and the proceeding “was in the nature
of a memorial service,” rather than an evidentiary hearing. Vello’s Br. at 45-47. She
cites to case law declaring that “[a] dead man cannot be a party to an action and any
such attempted proceeding is completely void and of no effect.” Id. at 45 (quoting
Thompson v. Peck, 181 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1935)) (emphasis omitted). This argument
may have merit, particularly given Howey’s recognition near the end of the meeting
that Quigley’s variance applications were not being discussed, and “[a]ctually, we’re
paying homage to . . . Quigley and his family.” R.R. at 412a. Without further factual
development establishing the nature and purpose of the Board’s meeting, we agree
with Common Pleas that DeMarco is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
Even accepting for the sake of argument that DeMarco’s testimony occurred
during a quasi-judicial proceeding, it is unclear whether the testimony was pertinent
and material to the litigation. DeMarco maintains his testimony rebutted Vello’s
criticisms of Township employees and zoning enforcement procedures. DeMarco’s
14
Br. at 58-62. Once again, however, to the extent DeMarco’s testimony responded
to Vello’s criticisms of the Township, it did so in only a brief and conclusory manner.
Most of the testimony did not include discussion relevant to the variance applications
and rather focused on criticizing the Vellos.
We are mindful quasi-judicial immunity should not apply in situations where
it does not implicate the doctrine’s underlying policy goals, which include permitting
free discussion of legal claims. Schanne, 121 A.3d at 947-48. Our focus is whether
the doctrine “would promote the efficient administration of justice.” Id. at 949 n.4.
Granting DeMarco quasi-judicial immunity in these circumstances would arguably
detract from the administration of justice by allowing the Board’s public meeting to
be used as a venue for personal attacks. This is particularly true because DeMarco
did not testify subject to cross-examination but provided a speech in response to the
Board’s invitation for comment. Tellingly, DeMarco’s testimony did not facilitate
resolution of Quigley’s variance applications but contributed to the meeting breaking
down into disorder.
CONCLUSION
Because Common Pleas’ April 18, 2024 order is an appealable collateral order
under Rule 313, we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of DeMarco’s appeal. In
reaching the merits, however, we conclude further factual development is necessary
to determine whether DeMarco is entitled to high public official immunity and quasi-
judicial immunity. Therefore, we affirm the April 18, 2024 order without prejudice
to DeMarco’s right to raise the doctrines of high public official immunity and quasi-
judicial immunity again at a later stage in the proceedings.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge
15
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Kathleen G. Sheehan Vello :
:
v. : No. 526 C.D. 2024
:
Daniel DeMarco, :
Appellant :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of July 2025, the order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County dated April 18, 2024, is AFFIRMED without prejudice
to Daniel DeMarco’s right to raise the doctrines of high public official immunity and
quasi-judicial immunity again at a later stage in the proceedings.
______________________________
STACY WALLACE, Judge