Kelly v. 18th Judicial District Court

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HAYLEE CHRISTYNE KELLY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-970-SDD-RLB

18TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ET AL.

NOTICE

Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the

Clerk of the United States District Court.

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served

with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of

law and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,

conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon

grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and

legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.

ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE

WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 10, 2025.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

HAYLEE CHRISTYNE KELLY CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-970-SDD-RLB

18th JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, ET AL.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Complaint (R. Doc. 1). The undersigned has performed a

review, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), to determine whether the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s

Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

I. Background

On November 25, 2024, Haylee Christyne Kelly (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se,

commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain relief for alleged violation of her

civil rights by the 18th Judicial District Court and her aunt, Robin Lotz Rills (“Rills”), for the

alleged mishandling of the estate of her father, Robert Michael Lotz, in 2005. (R. Doc. 1).

The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, and

ordered the U.S. Marshal’s service to serve the summons and complaint on the defendants

wherever found. (R. Doc. 3).

Plaintiff seeks relief for alleged violations of her rights to due process, equal protection,

and property under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and for alleged

violations of various state laws governing the rights of minors in legal proceedings, the fiduciary

duties of administrators or guardians in managing estates, and the appointment of guardians and

legal counsel. (R. Doc. 1 at 3-6). Plaintiff asserts that she was a minor at the time of her father’s

probate case and that Rills was improperly appointed as administratrix by the presiding judicial

officer. (R. Doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff alleges that Rills “acted negligently by failing to protect the

estate’s value for the Plaintiff’s benefit and excluding the Plaintiff’s legal guardian from critical

decisions.” (R. Doc. 1 at 19). “Specifically, the Plaintiff seeks damages for the sale of land

appraised at over $800,000, which was negligently sold in a private sale for $175,000, resulting

in the Plaintiff receiving only just over $4,000 from the ill-appointed administratrix, who should

never have been entrusted with managing the minor Plaintiff' s estate.” (R. Doc. 1 at 19).

Plaintiff further alleges that “Judge William Dupont1 and the 18th Judicial District Court failed

to ensure proper oversight, procedural safeguards, or compliance with Louisiana law to protect

the Plaintiff’s rights as a minor heir.” (R. Doc. 1 at 19).

On January 30, 2025, the 18th Judicial District Court filed a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Procedural Capacity. (R. Doc. 10). After receiving no opposition, the Court

granted this motion and dismissed all claims against the 18th Judicial District Court. (R. Docs.

11, 12).

The record indicates that Rills was served on January 13, 2025. (R. Doc. 9). Rills has not,

however, made an appearance in this action. Plaintiff has not moved for a default judgment.

Accordingly, the Court has reviewed the Complaint to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims

against Rills are subject to dismissal.

1 Judge Dupont was not named as a defendant in this action. It appears that any claim against Judge DuPont based

on the allegations in the Complaint would be subject to dismissal based on absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).

II. Law and Analysis

A. Legal Standards

While the Court construes complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs liberally, even the most

liberally construed IFP complaint can be dismissed at any time, regardless of service or the filing

of an answer, if the court determines the case:

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 Dismissal under § 1915(e) may be made before service of process.

Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

An IFP complaint is properly dismissed as frivolous if the plaintiff’s claims lack an

arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1995). A court

may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts are clearly baseless, a category

encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional. Denton, 504 U.S. at 33;

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Ancar v. SARA Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992)

(“A complaint is factually frivolous if the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly

incredible”). Pleaded facts which are merely improbable or strange are not frivolous. Denton,

504 U.S. at 33; Ancar, 964 F.2d at 468.

2 While Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis in this case, the payment of the filing fee would not preclude this

review. See Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1989)

(“Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers. Section 1915(d), for example, authorizes courts

to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the

absence of this statutory provision.”); see also Doe v. City of Baton Rouge, No. 20-514, 2021 WL 304392, at *2

(M.D. La. Jan. 29, 2021) (“[R]egardless of whether Plaintiff were to pay the filing fee, this Court has the inherent

power to screen a pleading for frivolousness.”), appeal dismissed, No. 21-30061, 2022 WL 881753 (5th Cir. Mar.

24, 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Doe v. City of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 143 S. Ct. 376 (2022).

To determine whether the complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii),

courts apply the same standard used for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Hart v. Harrison, 343 F.3d 762, 763-64 (5th Cir. 2003). When reviewing a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.

1996); Benton v. United States, 960 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In most circumstances, a court should allow a plaintiff at least one chance to amend the

complaint under Rule 15(a) before dismissing the action with prejudice. See Great Plains Trust

Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 329 (5th Cir. 2002) (plaintiffs

generally given one chance to amend before dismissal unless “it is clear that the defects are

incurable”). However, a court should deny leave to submit futile amendments that are

“insufficient to state a claim.” Jamieson v Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1985). In other

words, “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6),” and by extension

§ 1915(a)(2)(B)(ii), applies to futility. Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3D 863, 873

(5th Cir. 2000).

B. Analysis

Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

custom, or usage . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to

the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal]

laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983,

“a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” Lauderdale v. Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, 512 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A person acts under color of state law

when “he engages in the [m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible

only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law. . . .” Bryant v. Military

Dep’t of Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff cannot establish that Rills acted under color of state law because of her

appointment as an administratrix by a state judicial officer in a probate proceeding. Rill’s

appointment as administratrix merely designated her as the representative of the succession and

imposed upon her the “duty of collecting, preserving, and managing the property of the

succession in accordance with law.” La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 3191. It did not establish that she

was clothed with the authority of state law.

The Fifth Circuit has specifically recognized that a private party in the position of

administratrix is not a person to whom Section 1983 is applicable unless that person was “jointly

engaged with a state official” to deprive an individual of his or her Constitutional rights.

Alexander v. Reese, 702 Fed. App’x 223, 228 (5th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts

which indicate that Rills and any judicial officer of the 18th Judicial District engaged or

cooperated to any degree to violate Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights. In short, Plaintiff has not

alleged any conspiracy between Rills, a private actor, and any state official. At most, Plaintiff

alleges only that a judicial officer of the 18th Judicial District negligently appointed Rills as

administratrix of the estate, and that Rills then made decisions as administratrix which were to

Plaintiff’s detriment. (R. Doc. 1 at 13). This allegation is insufficient to establish that Rills acted

under color of state law for the purposes of Section 1983 liability.

Because Rills cannot be held liable under Section 1983, Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim against Rills under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court further concludes that any attempt at

amendment would be futile.

In addition to her Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff arguably raises at least two state law

claims against Rills based on violation of a statutory “Right to a Guardian or Proper

Representation” and “Mismanagement of Trust or Estate.” (R. Doc. 1 at 5).3

The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining state

law claims. Where the Court has original jurisdiction, it may generally exercise “supplemental

jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part

of the same cause or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). The Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, however, under Section

1367(c), which provides:

The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim

under subsection (a) if--(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances,

there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

3 Plaintiff has attached to the complaint what appears to be a filing or prospective filing with the Louisiana Supreme

Court raising similar state law claims. (R. Doc. 1-1). The Court also notes that there is no diversity of citizenship

between Plaintiff and Defendant Rills.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Given that all of Plaintiff’s federal claims are subject to dismissal, the

Court can properly exercise its discretion in declining supplemental jurisdiction over all

remaining state law claims.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s federal claims against Robin Lotz Rills be

DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s state law claims against Robin

Lotz Rills be DISMISSED without prejudice.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on June 10, 2025.

S

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.

U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE