plausible to infer “extreme pain”, i.e., serious bodily injury, where victim had “broken rib, bruised buttocks, and cuts behind the ears”
How later courts described this case
- plausible to infer “extreme pain”, i.e., serious bodily injury, where victim had “broken rib, bruised buttocks, and cuts behind the ears”
- pointing weapon at specific individuals qualifies as “otherwise used” under Sentencing Guideline § 2A4.1 cmt. n.2
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 24-40645 Document: 57-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/09/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 24-40645
FILED
July 9, 2025
Summary Calendar
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Juan Manuel Moreno-Martinez,
Defendant—Appellant.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:19-CR-2337-1
______________________________
Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Juan Manuel Moreno-Martinez challenges his within-Guidelines 333-
months’ sentence, imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for
conspiracy to kidnap two victims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c). He
contends the district court miscalculated his advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range by erroneously applying the following enhancements under Guideline
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 24-40645 Document: 57-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/09/2025
No. 24-40645
§ 2A4.1(b): six-level increase for a ransom demand ((1)); two-level increase
for serious bodily injury ((2)(B)); two-level increase for use of a dangerous
weapon ((3)); and one-level increase for keeping a victim more than seven
days ((4)(B)).
Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, the district
court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51
(2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved objection to
an ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 51; United States v. Delgado-Martinez,
564 F.3d 750, 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues preserved in
district court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo; its factual
findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517
F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
Moreno contends that Guidelines § 2A4.1(b)(1) (ransom demand),
(b)(2)(B) (serious bodily injury), and (b)(4)(B) (keeping victim more than
seven days) do not apply because he is not accountable for the third-party
conduct on which the enhancements are based. Determinations of what
constitutes relevant conduct are factual findings reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Barfield, 941 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2019). “Under the
clearly erroneous standard, we will uphold a finding so long as it is plausible
in light of the record as a whole.” United States v. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d
398, 400 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
To the extent Moreno maintains he was unaware of the larger
conspiracy to demand ransom money, the record contradicts him. At
rearraignment, he admitted he was aware that the purpose of transporting the
victims to Mexico was “to obtain from them some sort of payment or
compensation”. The record also shows that he threatened to kill the victims
2
Case: 24-40645 Document: 57-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/09/2025
No. 24-40645
and was involved in their being held at gunpoint at his ranch. Moreno does
not explain why, on this record, it is not plausible to conclude that the
conduct at issue was within the scope of, in furtherance of, and reasonably
foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity that he and others jointly
agreed to undertake. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (defining “relevant
conduct”). He accordingly fails to show that the district court clearly erred
in finding the acts of his co-conspirators constituted relevant conduct in
applying the disputed enhancements. See Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 400.
Alternatively, Moreno challenges the application of the serious
bodily-injury enhancement under Guideline § 2A4.1(b)(2)(B), contending
the record does not sufficiently establish the severity of a victim’s injuries.
The Guidelines define “serious bodily injury” to include injury requiring
medical intervention or involving either “extreme physical pain” or the
protracted impairment of a bodily or mental function. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt.
n.1(M).
The presentence investigation report (PSR), relied on by the district
court, provides that a co-conspirator beat one of the victims with “a 2x4
wooden stick” causing “significant bruising to his back, right arm, right leg
and buttock area as well as swelling to his right arm and hand”. Although the
PSR does not explicitly state that the victim was in “extreme physical pain”,
the district court was, of course, “permitted to draw reasonable inferences
from the facts”. Ramos-Delgado, 763 F.3d at 400 (citation omitted); see
United States v. Garza-Robles, 627 F.3d 161, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2010) (plausible
to infer “extreme pain”, i.e., serious bodily injury, where victim had “broken
rib, bruised buttocks, and cuts behind the ears”). In short, it is plausible to
infer that the injuries in question qualified as serious bodily injuries.
Finally, Moreno challenges the dangerous-weapon enhancement
under Guideline § 2A4.1(b)(3) on the ground that there is no evidence he
3
Case: 24-40645 Document: 57-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/09/2025
No. 24-40645
personally used a firearm. This contention fails because, even if Moreno did
not personally threaten the victims with a firearm, at least one of his
co-conspirators did in a manner warranting the enhancement, and Moreno
does not dispute that he is accountable for that conduct. See United States v.
Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2009) (pointing weapon at specific
individuals qualifies as “otherwise used” under Sentencing Guideline
§ 2A4.1 cmt. n.2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
AFFIRMED.
4