The opinion
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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13408
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
TIMOTHY O'NEIL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
VICTOR HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-04173-AT
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13408
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Timothy O’Neil filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights
action against the former sheriff of Clayton County, Victor Hill, in
his individual capacity, arising from O’Neil’s pretrial detention at
the Clayton County Jail in October 2019. O’Neil claimed that Hill
violated his constitutional rights by ordering, for punitive reasons,
that he be placed in a restraint chair for five hours, and then held in
a suicide watch cell for weeks, where he was exposed to prolonged
low temperatures without bedding, clothing, or hygiene items.
The district court denied Hill’s motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, and Hill appeals. After careful re-
view, we affirm the denial of qualified immunity.
I.
In early October 2019, law enforcement officers in Nebraska
obtained a warrant for O’Neil’s arrest for making terroristic
threats. 1 State and federal law enforcement went to execute the
warrant at the home of O’Neil’s sister in Georgia. O’Neil barri-
caded himself inside the house, firing multiple rounds, threatening
1 We present the facts in the light most favorable to the O’Neil, the nonmovant
in the district court, recognizing that these may or may not be the actual facts.
See Patterson v. Ga. Pacific, LLC, 38 F.4th 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2022) (stating
that, at summary judgment, we are required to view the evidence and all fac-
tual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and
to resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in his favor).
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 3
to kill officers if they entered, and attempting to commit suicide by
swallowing oxycodone pills. But he eventually surrendered with-
out incident. Hill ordered that I-75 be shut down during the stand-
off because the house abutted the interstate.
After being taken into custody, O’Neil was transported and
booked into the Clayton County Jail, where he soon fell uncon-
scious. After a brief hospital stay, O’Neil was discharged and re-
turned to the jail, with a recommendation from the treating physi-
cian to place O’Neil on suicide watch and “closely monitor [him]
for safety.” That same day, a jail physician, Dr. Charles Clopton,
Jr., ordered that O’Neil be admitted to suicide watch.
On October 11, 2019, Hill visited O’Neil at his cell with “two
extraction team members.” Upon entering, Hill said, “You know
who the F— I am? . . . I’m Victor Hill. . . . I had to shut down 75
South and 75 Northbound because of you. I want you out of my
fucking county.” Hill then asked O’Neil, “Why did you do what
you did?,” and when O’Neil turned to respond, Hill ordered the
extraction team members to take him down and strap him to a re-
straint chair, which was outside the cell door in the hallway.
O’Neil was strapped to the restraint chair for at least five
hours, wearing nothing but a paper gown. O’Neil testified that he
was strapped to the chair so tightly that he could not feel his hands,
he still had marks on his wrists the following day, and he continues
to feel a tingling sensation in his left wrist a couple of times per
month, which he attributes to his incident. O’Neil was not evalu-
ated by medical or nursing staff while restrained, and he was forced
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13408
to urinate on himself when no one released him to use the re-
stroom.
The next day, October 12, 2019, Hill returned to O’Neil’s
cell with two extraction team members and said, “Okay, let’s start
this over.” O’Neil testified that he “was freaked out” and “shaking
because [he] didn’t want to go back in the restraint chair,” and he
“knew the restraint chair was out back in the hallway.” As Hill
entered the room, another detainee looked at O’Neil, and, appar-
ently in response, Hill ordered that detainee to be strapped to a re-
straint chair. O’Neil testified that he told Hill, “Look, I’ll leave
your—your city, your town. Just let me leave,” and Hill replied,
“Well, get used to this. You’ll be here for a while.” After these
events, O’Neil had no further interaction with Hill.
Treatment notes suggest that the jail’s medical staff cleared
O’Neil to return to general population on October 12, 2019. But,
according to a nurse’s note, he “can’t be released by [mental
health], just cleared,” because O’Neil was “on nutraloaf for 5 days
and may be on security.”
O’Neil remained in a suicide watch cell for nearly three
weeks. The temperature in his cell was allegedly “in the 50s,” but
all O’Neil had for warmth or comfort was a paper gown, which he
would put between himself and the cold concrete floor, since he
lacked a mattress or bedding. He “couldn’t feel [his] feet” and
“couldn’t sleep because [he] was so cold, shaking.” He also had no
hygiene items or means of cleaning himself, and was forced to use
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 5
his paper gown for toilet paper. As a result, he was often naked in
his cell and visible to female jail staff.
II.
O’Neil sued Hill in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, al-
leging that Hill violated his constitutional rights as a pretrial de-
tainee. After preliminary proceedings not relevant to this appeal,
Hill moved for summary judgment, asserting the defense of quali-
fied immunity.
A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
(“R&R”), concluding that Hill’s motion should be denied. The
magistrate judge first concluded that there was a genuine dispute
of fact as to whether Hill’s use of a restraint chair was objectively
reasonable. The magistrate judge rejected Hill’s argument that the
force was reasonable because O’Neil failed to comply with a jail
rule that inmates must face the wall with their hands behind their
backs while in the presence of an officer. Applying the factors
courts use when assessing the reasonableness of force in this con-
text, the judge concluded that a reasonable jury could find the fol-
lowing: (a) the force was disproportionate to any need for it; (b) no
effort was made to limit the amount of force used; (c) the force
could not be justified by O’Neil’s pre-confinement behavior; and
(d) O’Neil was not actively resisting when Hill ordered that he be
placed in the restraint chair.
The magistrate judge also reasoned that it was clearly estab-
lished that the use of force, including the use of a restraint chair,
against a nonresistant detainee violated the Constitution.
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13408
Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended denying qualified
immunity as to O’Neil’s claim based on use of a restraint chair.
Second, the magistrate judge concluded that O’Neil “pre-
sented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that,
despite [Hill’s] denials, [Hill] ordered that [O’Neil] remain on sui-
cide watch after medical staff had determined that he could be re-
leased to general population.” The judge noted evidence of a “se-
curity” hold on O’Neil’s medical release, as well as O’Neil’s testi-
mony that a jail nurse told him that he was being held under a “spe-
cial restriction hold” that only “Victor Hill can sign off on.” Alt-
hough Hill argued that the nurse’s statement was inadmissible
hearsay, the judge reasoned that it could be reduced to non-hearsay
at trial.
Thus, in the judge’s view, “a reasonable jury could conclude
that defendant overruled medical staff’s decision that plaintiff could
be released from suicide watch,” and that Hill “did so as punish-
ment for plaintiff’s pre-confinement actions.” The judge reasoned
that the conditions were severe and violated O’Neil’s constitu-
tional rights, citing O’Neil’s testimony “that he was in the suicide
watch area for three weeks; that the temperature of his cell was in
the 50s; that he was not provided toilet paper, toothpaste, or a
shower; that his requests for those items were ignored; and that he
only had a paper gown, which he had to tear to use as toilet paper.”
The judge rejected Hill’s argument that these extremely restrictive
conditions were necessary, stating that a reasonable jury could find
otherwise based on evidence that O’Neil had been medically
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 7
cleared at the outset of his weeks-long stay in the suicide-watch
cell.
The parties were notified that the failure to file objections
within 14 days “waived any challenge to factual and legal findings
to which there was no objection, subject to interests-of-justice plain
error review.”
Hill filed limited objections to the magistrate judge’s R&R.
First, he contended that the R&R improperly relied on other civil
and criminal cases against Hill, including this Court’s opinion af-
firming Hill’s criminal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for using
restraint chairs against unresisting pretrial detainees. And second,
Hill maintained that there was no clearly established law providing
fair notice that his use of a restraint chair in the circumstances of
this case was unconstitutional. Hill raised no other objection.
The district court overruled Hill’s objections and adopted
the R&R. The court reasoned that it was clearly established that
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishing pretrial detainees
and that excessive force amounts to punishment. Because the evi-
dence supported a finding that Hill “employed substantial force
against [O’Neil] by having him tightly restrained to a chair for five
hours simply to punish [O’Neil] for his behavior prior to his arrest,”
the court concluded that Hill’s alleged conduct violated clearly es-
tablished law. The court did not address the magistrate judge’s
findings as to O’Neil’s extended stay on suicide watch, except to
note that the magistrate judge “did not clearly err in the portions
of the R&R to which [Hill] lodged no objection.” Hill now appeals.
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13408
III.
We ordinarily review the denial of qualified immunity at
summary judgment de novo. Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289,
1295 (11th Cir. 2024). Summary judgment is warranted only if the
evidence, “viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judg-
ment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party.” Caldwell v.
Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014).
Qualified immunity protects government officials from “the
costs of trial and the burdens of broad-reaching discovery, as long
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Hall v. Flournoy, 975 F.3d 1269, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up). If a government official broadly acted within the
scope of his discretionary duties, the plaintiff must make two show-
ings: (1) the official violated a federal statutory or constitutional
right; and (2) “the violation contravened clearly established statu-
tory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Id. at 1275 (quotation marks omitted).
“Whether we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the
denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds de-
pends on the type of issues involved in the appeal.” English v. City
of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
omitted). “We lack jurisdiction where the only issues appealed are
evidentiary sufficiency issues—that is, fact-related disputes about
whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 9
conduct occurred.” Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1295. But if, in contrast,
“the parties debate not only evidentiary sufficiency issues but also
an abstract issue of law related to qualified immunity,” such as
whether the right was clearly established, “we may decide both
questions.” Id. at 1296 (quotation marks omitted). Even so, we
may choose to “accept the district court’s findings of fact if they are
adequate.” Id.
IV.
Hill maintains that he is entitled to qualified immunity. As
to O’Neil’s extended stay on suicide watch, Hill contends that
(1) the evidence fails to support a finding that Hill ordered O’Neil
to be kept on suicide watch, and (2) no law clearly established that
the conditions of O’Neil’s confinement were unconstitutional. Re-
garding the use of a restraint chair, Hill maintains that (3) the evi-
dence shows that the use of a restraint chair was objectively rea-
sonable, and (4) the use of the restraint chair did not violate clearly
established law.
At the outset, we note that Hill failed to preserve arguments
(1), (2), and (3) for appeal because he did not object to the relevant
portions of the magistrate judge’s R&R addressing these issues. Ac-
cording to this Circuit’s rules, if a party fails “to object to a magis-
trate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation,” the party “waives the right to challenge on
appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object.”
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11th Cir. R. 3-1. Hill was so informed. We can still “review the
unobjected-to findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge for
plain error or manifest injustice,” Smith v. Marcus & Millichap, Inc.,
106 F.4th 1091, 1097 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks omitted),
but plain error “rarely applies in civil cases,” Leford v. Peeples, 657
F.3d 1222, 1258 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Accordingly, we review
arguments (1)–(3) for plain error and argument (4) de novo.
A. Suicide Watch
Here, Hill has made no showing of extraordinary circum-
stances calling for review to correct plain error or to prevent man-
ifest injustice with regard to the denial of qualified immunity on
O’Neil’s suicide-watch claim. In fact, Hill’s appeal of this matter
falls outside the scope of our limited jurisdiction in interlocutory
appeals from the denial of qualified immunity because he raises is-
sues of evidentiary sufficiency only.
The magistrate judge concluded that the evidence sup-
ported a reasonable finding that Hill “overruled [the] medical staff’s
decision that plaintiff could be released from suicide watch.” Hill
asserts that this finding has no basis in the record and that the mag-
istrate judge relied solely on “some hearsay and confusing jail med-
ical records.” But we generally lack jurisdiction to review such
“fact-related disputes about whether the evidence could support a
finding that particular conduct occurred.” Nelson, 89 F.4th at 1295.
And Hill does not present any “abstract issue of law related
to qualified immunity” that would permit us to “decide both ques-
tions.” Id. at 1296. His argument about clearly established law is
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 11
really an argument about evidentiary sufficiency. He does not dis-
pute the magistrate judge’s conclusion that it violates clearly estab-
lished law to impose relatively harsh conditions of confinement on
a pretrial detainee as punishment. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson,
576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (stating that a pretrial detainee can “prevail
by showing that the actions are not rationally related to a legitimate
nonpunitive governmental purpose or that the actions appear exces-
sive in relation to that purpose”) (quotation marks omitted; em-
phasis added). Instead, Hill contends that the mental-health unit’s
restrictive conditions were for O’Neil’s own protection. But the
magistrate judge found that a reasonable jury could reject that
claim based on the evidence.
Because Hill’s challenge on this point is limited to “the de-
termination of facts a party may, or may not, be able to prove at
trial,” Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000), we lack
jurisdiction to reach that issue in this interlocutory appeal. See Eng-
lish, 75 F.4th at 1156 (dismissing an interlocutory appeal where the
officers raised only “issues of evidentiary sufficiency” about
whether the plaintiff posed an immediate threat of serious physical
harm). So there are no grounds to invoke plain-error review.
B. Restraint Chair
As for the use of a restraint chair, Hill preserved his argu-
ment that it was not clearly established that the use of a restraint
chair violated O’Neil’s constitutional rights. Notably absent from
his briefing, however, is any reference to our decision affirming
Hill’s criminal convictions arising from the use of restraint chairs
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13408
on six other pretrial detainees at the Calhoun County jail. United
States v. Hill, 99 F.4th 1289 (11th Cir. 2024).
In Hill, we rejected the bulk of the arguments Hill presents
here, relying on the “longstanding principle that force, including
passive restraint, is excessive if it is not rationally related to a legit-
imate nonpunitive governmental purpose.” Id. at 1304 (quotation
marks omitted). We reasoned that Hill’s use of force was excessive
because he “had no legitimate purpose for ordering compliant,
nonresistant detainees who were in the secure jail environment
into restraint chairs for at least four hours.” Id. Accordingly, we
held that “Hill had fair warning that his conduct violated the de-
tainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from excessive
force.” Id. at 1305. In doing so, we recognized that “the standard
for determining the adequacy of that warning is the same as the
standard for determining whether a constitutional right was clearly
established in civil litigation under § 1983.” Id. at 1300 (cleaned up).
Our decision makes clear that, for purposes of this § 1983 case, Hill
had fair warning that the use of restraint chairs on compliant, non-
resistant detainees, with no legitimate nonpunitive purpose, in-
flicted excessive and thus unconstitutional force. Id. at 1304–05. 2
Hill also challenges whether O’Neil can prove a constitu-
tional violation, contending that a need for force existed because
O’Neil violated a prison rule after engaging in violent and unstable
behavior, and that his injuries were de minimis. But Hill failed to
2 The events at issue in Hill occurred between December 2019 and May 2020,
around the same time as O’Neil’s detention in October 2019.
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24-13408 Opinion of the Court 13
raise any argument along these lines in his objections to the magis-
trate judge’s R&R, which addressed these matters.
Nor has Hill shown good reason for us to consider this for-
feited issue on appeal. Hill resolved the legal issue of clearly estab-
lished law in these circumstances, and the remaining issues are fact-
bound disputes about what the evidence could prove. See Nelson,
89 F.4th at 1295. The district court reasoned that summary judg-
ment was not appropriate because a jury could conclude that
O’Neil “was not resisting, being disruptive, nor displaying any sort
of threatening behavior when Defendant forced him into the re-
straint chair and that, despite the fact that there was no need to do
so, Defendant employed substantial force against Plaintiff by hav-
ing him tightly restrained to a chair for five hours simply to punish
Plaintiff for his behavior prior to his arrest.” Those findings would
support a constitutional violation. See Hill, 99 F.4th at 1304–05.
Although Hill disputes these findings, he has made no showing that
they are plainly erroneous or that allowing this case to proceed
would cause manifest injustice. See Smith, 106 F.4th at 1097.
V.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s order denying qualify-
ing immunity to Hill in this § 1983 action.
AFFIRMED.