The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No. 2025-Ohio-2406.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2025-OHIO-2406
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HUNTER.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, Slip Opinion No.
2025-Ohio-2406.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Two-
year suspension with six months conditionally stayed.
(No. 2024-1720—Submitted February 11, 2025—Decided July 9, 2025.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
Court, No. 2023-035.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by DEWINE, DETERS, HAWKINS,
and SHANAHAN, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with
an opinion. FISCHER, J., concurred in part and dissented in part, with an opinion.
BRUNNER, J., did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jeffrey Dwight Hunter, of Pickerington, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0061364, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1993. He
was suspended for a day in 2009 for his failure to register and pay his attorney-
registration fee. See In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Hunter, 2009-Ohio-
5786. In this case, Hunter acknowledges that while representing three different
criminal defendants in postconviction matters, he failed to exercise the diligence
required of a lawyer, failed to reasonably communicate with his clients,
mismanaged client funds, and lied to his clients. He admits that he lied to the
tribunal and failed to refund unearned fees in one of those cases and that he failed
to provide competent representation in two of the cases. At a hearing before a three-
member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, Hunter admitted that his
misconduct violated at least 11 professional-conduct rules, for a total of 19
violations.
{¶ 2} After Hunter and relator, disciplinary counsel, stipulated to all
relevant facts, the charged misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, the
panel and board found by clear and convincing evidence that Hunter had committed
the charged misconduct. Based on the panel’s recommendation, the board urges us
to suspend Hunter from the practice of law for two years but stay the last six months
of the suspension on the conditions that he return unearned funds in two of his cases
and pay the costs of this proceeding. The board also recommends as an additional
condition of his reinstatement that Hunter be required to submit to an assessment
by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and comply with any resulting
treatment and counseling recommendations. Although we granted Hunter’s motion
to extend his time to file objections, no objections have been filed. For the reasons
that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and its recommended
sanction.
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I. HUNTER’S MISCONDUCT
{¶ 3} The parties stipulated to, and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence, facts showing that Hunter engaged in a series of acts of misconduct
between November 2020 and March 2024 while representing three separate clients.
A. Hunter committed numerous infractions while representing Wills
{¶ 4} In November 2020, Kerry Hanawalt retained Hunter to file a motion
seeking the early release of her incarcerated brother, James T. Wills. Hunter
accepted a flat fee of $2,500 for the representation, but the fee was not designated
as “earned upon receipt,” nor did Hunter tell Hanawalt that she would be able to
get a refund if the work was not completed. Hunter did not deposit the check
Hanawalt sent into a designated client trust account, because he did not have one at
the time.
{¶ 5} Hunter inaccurately advised Hanawalt as to when Wills would be
eligible to file a motion for early release, failed to tell Hanawalt that the time for a
direct appeal had already expired, and falsely suggested that Wills’s sentence could
be reduced if the victim’s family agreed. Hunter did not file a notice of appearance
or any motion on Wills’s behalf until April 5, 2023—more than two years after
Hanawalt hired him.
{¶ 6} Meanwhile, from December 2020 through April 2021, Hanawalt sent
Hunter four text messages seeking an update on the case. Hunter responded to the
first two texts by reassuring Hanawalt that he was still planning to visit Wills in
prison but that COVID-19 restrictions had prevented him from doing so. Hunter
never responded to the third text. In response to Hanawalt’s fourth text, Hunter
lied, claiming that he was waiting to receive discovery before visiting Wills.
Thereafter, on May 10, Hanawalt asked Hunter for a refund; two weeks later,
Hunter responded that he had been busy with another matter and that he wanted to
meet Hanawalt within seven days. They scheduled a meeting for 4:00 p.m. on June
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1 at Hanawalt’s residence. On that day, Hunter arrived for the meeting four hours
late.
{¶ 7} Two months later, in August 2021, Hanawalt received from Hunter’s
phone a text message purportedly sent by a paralegal named “Yolanda Harris.” The
message falsely asserted that Hunter had filed an unspecified motion on Wills’s
behalf. Hunter admits that he authored the message purportedly sent by “Harris,”
and relator could find no evidence indicating that a Yolanda Harris ever worked for
Hunter. The next month, after Hanawalt texted Hunter requesting another update,
Hunter lied again, stating that he had convinced the prosecutor not to oppose the
supposed motion.
{¶ 8} Between that September 21, 2021 response and April 4, 2023, Hunter
failed to provide Hanawalt with any updates; she texted him three times but
received no response. On December 28, 2022, she filed a grievance with relator,
who then sent Hunter a letter of inquiry.
{¶ 9} Finally, on April 4, 2023, Hunter left Hanawalt a lengthy voicemail
message in which he gave a series of excuses for his long delay and informed her
that he had already filed a motion for reconsideration of Wills’s sentence. The next
day, the clerk of courts accepted Hunter’s motion, which was six sentences long
and bereft of any legal citations. Thereafter, Hanawalt informed Hunter that she
and her brother wanted to terminate Hunter’s representation, and she reiterated her
May 2021 request for a full refund. Hunter promptly replied that he had already
filed the motion but would send the refund anyway as soon as she provided her
address. Hanawalt immediately provided her address to Hunter, but he did not issue
the promised refund.
{¶ 10} Relator followed up with Hunter on September 20, 2023, asking
whether he was willing to provide Hanawalt with a refund. The next day, Hanawalt
received from Hunter’s phone a text message purportedly sent by “Harris” alleging
that Hunter had sent a check “a couple of years ago” but that it had been returned
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January Term, 2025
because Hanawalt had not signed for it. The message asked for Hanawalt’s address
so that a new check could be issued. Six days later, Hunter responded to relator’s
request that he issue a refund, stating that he had tried to send a check to Hanawalt
by certified mail but that it was returned by the postal service. He stated that he
had texted and called Hanawalt as soon as the check was returned but that he had
received no response. On September 30, 2023, Hunter finally provided Hanawalt
with a full refund.
{¶ 11} Based on these facts, the parties stipulated, and the board found, that
Hunter’s actions violated six professional-conduct rules: Prof.Cond.R. 1.1.
(requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (requiring
a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3)
(requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter), 1.15(a) (requiring a lawyer to hold the property of clients in an interest-
bearing client trust account, separate from the lawyer’s own property), 8.1(a)
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact in
connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). We
adopt these findings of misconduct.
B. Hunter committed additional misconduct while representing Gibson
{¶ 12} Lillian Lancaster hired Hunter in June 2023 to defend her son, Miles
Gibson, in two separate cases against charges of murder, aggravated murder,
aggravated robbery, tampering with evidence, and possession of a weapon while
under a disability. Hunter charged Gibson $12,500. The flat fee was not designated
as “earned upon receipt.” Lancaster paid by check toward the end of the month,
but Hunter did not deposit the check into a client trust account.
{¶ 13} Hunter entered an appearance on Gibson’s behalf but did not appear
at Gibson’s first hearing, scheduled for July 10, or at the rescheduled hearing on
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August 22. At the August 22 hearing, the court ordered Hunter to appear at a show-
cause hearing on September 20.
{¶ 14} On August 23, Hunter appeared in court with the excuse that he had
missed the previous day’s hearing because he was out of town at his mother-in-
law’s funeral. The court continued the cases until October 11 and rescheduled the
show-cause hearing for September 5. The bailiff and the order both informed
Hunter that at the hearing, he would need to provide proof of his travel or funeral
attendance.
{¶ 15} Hunter initially stipulated that he did not appear at the September 5
show-cause hearing, though at the hearing before the panel, he walked back this
stipulation, claiming that he appeared but the judge was not there. The court
rescheduled the hearing for September 20. After Hunter also failed to appear at a
September 13 psychiatric hearing for Gibson, the court sent Hunter a letter
informing him that his attendance at the September 20 show-cause hearing was
mandatory.
{¶ 16} At the September 20 show-cause hearing, Hunter alleged that he had
last met with Gibson a week earlier. When the court confronted Hunter with proof
that he had not visited the jail since July 10, he alleged that the sheriff’s records
were inaccurate. Though Hunter still takes issue with them, the prison records show
that Hunter visited Gibson on three dates before the September 20 hearing: June
17, June 27, and July 10. The court ordered Hunter to provide proof by October 11
of any additional visits to Gibson. The court also reiterated that Hunter would have
to provide proof that he had attended the out-of-town funeral as he had claimed.
Hunter agreed but stated that it was actually his friend’s, not his mother-in-law’s,
funeral.
{¶ 17} Hunter failed to provide proof of his travel, funeral attendance, or
additional jail visits by October 11 as ordered. The court gave him two more days.
But Hunter ultimately provided nothing more than a photograph of his wife’s
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January Term, 2025
luggage tag from an August 21 flight. On November 16, the court disqualified
Hunter from Gibson’s cases and filed a grievance with relator.
{¶ 18} Two weeks later, Lancaster received notice that the court had
removed Hunter from Gibson’s cases. When Hunter next spoke with Lancaster, he
did not tell her why he was removed. He later told her that he would file a motion
to be reinstated as Gibson’s counsel, but he never did so. He also never told Gibson
that he no longer was representing him. And at the time of his disciplinary hearing,
he had not refunded any of the $12,500 fee.
{¶ 19} Based on these facts, the parties stipulated, and the board found by
clear and convincing evidence, that Hunter’s actions in this matter violated seven
professional-conduct rules: Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(c) (requiring a lawyer
to deposit advance legal fees and expenses into a client trust account, to be
withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred), 1.16(e)
(requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the lawyer’s
withdrawal from employment), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly
making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting
a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice). We adopt these findings of misconduct.
C. Hunter’s pattern of misconduct continued
while representing Derek Shaffer
{¶ 20} Vicki Deitenbeck and Jack Shaffer hired Hunter in March 2021 to
assist with postconviction matters for their son, Derek C. Shaffer, who was
convicted of multiple offenses in October 2018. They paid Hunter $2,500 in cash.
Hunter did not deposit the fee into a client trust account, nor did he provide a written
fee agreement. Hunter failed to explain to Derek’s parents that the time for direct
appeal had expired. Rather, he assured Derek’s parents that he would appeal the
case “all the way to the Supreme Court” because he was so convinced of their son’s
innocence.
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{¶ 21} After Hunter received the case file from Derek’s former lawyer on
June 25, 2022, Hunter stopped communicating with Derek’s parents. Between July
13, 2022, and February 7, 2024, Deitenbeck sent Hunter a series of text messages
seeking updates on the case. Hunter failed to respond at all to at least 12 of these
messages. Though Hunter occasionally responded appropriately, the vast majority
of his responses to Deitenbeck’s texts were severely deficient for several reasons.
First, at least one response expressed anger toward her. Second, in at least three
texts, Hunter lied about actions he had taken in the case. Finally, at least nine texts
were purportedly sent by “Harris,” but Hunter later admitted that he had sent them.
{¶ 22} Hunter repeatedly assured Derek’s parents that he would meet with
Derek. Although he ended up visiting Derek five times in person, those visits did
not begin until May 18, 2023—over two years after Hunter accepted payment for
the representation. In addition, while prison call logs show that Derek placed 1,283
calls to Hunter in the course of Hunter’s representation, Hunter accepted only eight
calls, for a total of 38 minutes. Ultimately, Hunter did not file an appearance in
Derek’s case until 18 months after he agreed to represent Derek. Hunter filed no
other pleading in the case.
{¶ 23} On February 7, 2024, Deitenbeck filed a grievance against Hunter
with relator. After relator sent Hunter a letter of inquiry, Hunter still failed to
respond to one text message from Deitenbeck. At the end of February, Hunter
called Deitenbeck. After discussing the case, he asked Deitenbeck to contact
relator’s office to withdraw her grievance. At the time of his disciplinary hearing,
Hunter had not refunded any portion of the $2,500 he had accepted to represent
Derek.
{¶ 24} The parties stipulated, and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence, that Hunter’s actions in this matter violated six professional-conduct
rules: Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(a), 8.4(c), and—based on his attempt
to have Deitenbeck withdraw her grievance—8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from
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January Term, 2025
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).
We adopt these findings of misconduct and agree that Hunter’s request that
Deitenbeck withdraw her grievance falls within the catchall provision of
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h). See Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 2013-Ohio-3998, ¶ 21.
II. ASSESSING THE SANCTION
{¶ 25} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the attorney violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
{¶ 26} There is no doubt that Hunter’s long list of lies and deficiencies in
communication with his clients violated the ethical duties articulated in several
professional-conduct rules. His failures to act promptly or seek help from other
lawyers while representing Wills, Gibson, and Derek Shaffer reflect a serious lack
of the competence and diligence that are cornerstones of the legal profession. His
frequently delayed or entirely nonexistent communication with clients and his
outright lies both to them and to a court harm the trust that is at the core of any
client relationship and the public perception of the legal profession. See A
Lawyer’s Creed, Gov.Bar R. Appendix V (“I recognize that my actions and
demeanor reflect upon our system of justice and our profession, and I shall conduct
myself accordingly.”). Based on his admissions, we find that Hunter is aware of
and rightly embarrassed by the gravity of his misconduct.
{¶ 27} In addition to Hunter’s misconduct, the parties stipulated and the
board found that six aggravating factors exist. First, Hunter has been disciplined
before: we suspended him for a day for his failure to register and pay his attorney-
registration fee in 2009. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1). Second, Hunter stipulated
that he had acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2).
Third, Hunter committed multiple infractions. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4).
Fourth, those infractions display a pattern of misconduct stretching over several
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years. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3). Fifth, Hunter stipulated that he had made false
statements and acted deceptively during the disciplinary process. See Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(B)(6). Finally, Hunter stipulated that his clients were vulnerable at the time
of his misconduct and that his actions harmed them. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8).
Balancing against these aggravating factors, the board found just one mitigating
factor: Hunter cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings. See Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(C)(4).
{¶ 28} “[A]ttorneys who engage in a course of conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation will be actually suspended from the
practice of law for an appropriate period.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Proctor, 2012-
Ohio-684, ¶ 18, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 1995-Ohio-261, ¶ 16.
It takes an “abundance of mitigating evidence” to “justify a lesser sanction.”
Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, ¶ 8.
{¶ 29} The board recommends that Hunter be suspended from the practice
of law in Ohio for two years with the final six months of his suspension stayed on
the conditions that he repay Derek Shaffer’s parents the $2,500 they paid him, repay
Lancaster the $12,500 she paid him, and pay the cost of these proceedings. The
board also recommends that as a condition of reinstatement, we require Hunter to
submit to an OLAP assessment and comply with any treatment and counseling
recommendations resulting from that assessment.
{¶ 30} In reaching its recommended sanction, the board considered three
cases that each involved misconduct similar to Hunter’s—that is, a pattern of
violations involving serious shortcomings in competence, diligence, care of client
funds, and/or truthfulness. We agree that these cases serve as apt, if imperfect,
comparisons.
{¶ 31} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, 2019-Ohio-5286, we
suspended Cheselka for two years with one year conditionally stayed. Cheselka
committed 19 rule violations, which included his failures to timely appeal a client’s
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January Term, 2025
judgment of conviction, file a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, return the
client’s phone calls, timely respond to requests to discuss the case, and deposit the
fee in an appropriate client trust account. Cheselka, unlike Hunter, did not
cooperate in the disciplinary proceedings. See id. at ¶ 29. On the other hand,
Hunter, unlike Cheselka, has been disciplined before and has not presented
evidence of his good character and reputation. See id. at ¶ 30.
{¶ 32} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Talikka, 2013-Ohio-1012, we suspended
another attorney for two years, with one year conditionally stayed, and required
him to serve one year of monitored probation upon reinstatement. Talikka
committed 38 violations of a nature similar to those here. Unlike Hunter, Talikka
had no prior discipline and presented evidence of his good character. See id. at
¶ 14.
{¶ 33} Finally, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaaban, 2023-Ohio-3671, we
suspended an attorney for two years, with one year conditionally stayed, and
required him to serve 18 months of monitored probation upon his reinstatement.
Shaaban had committed 26 violations largely similar to the 19 at issue in this case.
In contrast to Hunter, however, Shaaban demonstrated no dishonest motive and had
not previously been disciplined. See id. at ¶ 37.
{¶ 34} Hunter’s case is similar to, but slightly more serious than, Cheselka,
Talikka, and Shaaban. Hunter lied not only to his clients but also to a court. His
actions included a pattern of using a fictitious paralegal’s identity when sending
text messages responding to clients’ requests for updates on the status of their cases.
Hunter’s choice to lie to a judge about his whereabouts when he should have been
present for a criminal hearing demonstrates a patent lack of fitness to practice law.
Although we will entertain a sanction less severe than an actual suspension when
mitigating factors abound, Hunter presented just one mitigating factor: his
cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding, and the weight of that factor is limited
by his equivocating and attempting to walk back one of his stipulations at the
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disciplinary hearing. The six aggravating factors present here suggest the need for
a sanction more severe than those imposed in other cases involving similar
misconduct in order to protect the public from future acts of dishonesty.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 35} Accordingly, Jeffrey Dwight Hunter is suspended from the practice
of law in Ohio for two years with the last six months stayed on the conditions that
he (1) pay Vicki Deitenbeck and Jack Shaffer restitution of $2,500 within 90 days,
(2) pay Lillian Lancaster restitution of $12,500 within 90 days, and (3) pay the costs
of these proceedings. If Hunter fails to comply with any of these conditions, the
stay will be revoked and he will serve the full two-year suspension. In addition to
the requirements for reinstatement set forth in Gov.Bar R. V(24), Hunter shall be
required to submit proof that he has submitted to an OLAP assessment and has
complied with any treatment and counseling recommendations resulting from that
assessment. Costs are taxed to Hunter.
Judgment accordingly.
__________________
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 36} Respondent, Jeffrey D. Hunter, committed 19 violations of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, including a pattern of lying to and stealing from
vulnerable clients over several years and lying to a tribunal. For those violations,
the Board of Professional Conduct recommends that we suspend Hunter from the
practice of law for two years with six months conditionally stayed. A majority of
this court agrees.
{¶ 37} I agree with the majority’s findings of fact, except for the finding
that Hunter cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings. The majority adopts the
board’s contradictory findings that Hunter cooperated in the disciplinary
proceedings and that he lied to relator, disciplinary counsel. In my view, a finding
that an attorney lied to the relator during its investigation precludes a finding that
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the attorney cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings. I also agree with the
majority that Hunter should repay his clients the money he stole.
{¶ 38} However, I part ways with the majority when it comes to the sanction
it imposes. Based on this court’s precedent—and our responsibility to protect the
public—the appropriate sanction in this case is permanent disbarment.
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
I. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
{¶ 39} “Each disciplinary case involves unique facts and
circumstances.” Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). When reviewing cases involving similar
attorney misconduct and similar aggravating and mitigating factors, we apply our
precedent to ensure a fair and equitable disciplinary system. Disciplinary Counsel
v. Nowicki, 2023-Ohio-3079, ¶ 35 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). “The primary purpose of attorney discipline ‘is not to punish the offender,
but to protect the public.’” Nowicki at ¶ 82 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 2004-Ohio-4704, ¶ 53.
Accordingly, we must determine whether the person this court has admitted to the
bar “‘is a proper person to be continued on the roll.’” Disciplinary Counsel v.
Trumbo, 1996-Ohio-386, ¶ 12, quoting Ex parte Brounsall, 98 Eng.Rep. 1385
(1778).
B. Our Applicable Precedent
{¶ 40} Hunter committed 19 violations of 11 professional-conduct rules,
resulting in a pattern of misconduct affecting three clients over more than three
years. He accepted payment from vulnerable clients without performing the work
they had paid him to perform, lied to his clients about the work he had done in their
cases, lied to a court, and failed to deposit client funds into an Interest on Lawyers’
Trust Account (IOLTA). Additionally, while defending himself during the
disciplinary process, he submitted false evidence.
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{¶ 41} In each of the cases discussed below, this court disbarred attorneys
for committing misconduct similar to Hunter’s.
1. Neglect of Client Matters that is Tantamount to Theft from a Client
{¶ 42} Over 40 years ago, this court recognized that the “failure on the part
of an attorney to do the work for which a client has paid him a fee is tantamount to
theft of that fee from the client.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sigall, 14 Ohio St.3d 15,
17 (1984); accord Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Weaver, 2004-Ohio-2683, ¶ 16 (“Taking
retainers and failing to carry out contracts of employment is tantamount to theft of
the fee from the client.”). This court has also consistently held that “the normal
sanction for misappropriation of client funds coupled with neglect of client matters
is disbarment.” Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Glatki, 2000-Ohio-354, ¶ 16; accord
Weaver at ¶ 16. Whether that “normal sanction” is appropriate in a particular case
depends on “not only the duty violated, but also the lawyer’s mental state, the injury
caused, and whether mitigating factors exist,” Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Komarek,
1998-Ohio-312, ¶ 32, and, if so, the strength of the mitigating evidence, see
Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, ¶ 8. For example, attorneys
with no prior misconduct whose actions would otherwise support disbarment might
show that their commitment to community service indicates their potential for
rehabilitation. See Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 2002-Ohio-3998, ¶ 7.
{¶ 43} On the other hand, disbarment may be warranted even when the
failure to return payment followed the neglect of just one or two client matters. For
example, in Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Helfgott, an attorney committed misconduct in
two client matters. 2006-Ohio-2579. One client had hired Helfgott to file a
foreclosure action. Helfgott accepted payment and told the client to expect a
judgment within a couple of months. In reality, Helfgott never filed the complaint,
did not respond to the client’s inquiries about the status of the case, and then failed
to return his fee to the client. The other client, who suffered from multiple sclerosis,
hired Helfgott to represent her in a bankruptcy matter. Helfgott sent her a different
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client’s bankruptcy petition and never ended up filing a petition for her.
{¶ 44} The board found multiple aggravating factors, and we adopted the
board’s findings that Helfgott had acted with a selfish motive, displayed a pattern
of misconduct, failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process, harmed a vulnerable
client, and failed to make restitution. Id. at ¶ 14. The failure-to-cooperate
aggravating factor was based on the facts that Helfgott never answered the relator’s
letters of inquiry and that he failed to appear for a deposition in connection with the
investigation. As for mitigating factors, we adopted the board’s finding that
Helfgott did not have a disciplinary record. Id. Based on these circumstances, this
court permanently disbarred him. Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 45} In cases of neglect, disbarment is warranted even in the absence of a
failure to repay fees paid by clients for work not done. For example, in Toledo Bar
Assn. v. Auwaerter, we disbarred an attorney who neglected multiple client matters.
69 Ohio St.2d 85 (1982). Auwaerter’s neglect included failing to timely file a claim
for workers’ compensation; to timely file a personal-injury complaint; to take
actions necessary in a corporate-acquisition matter; to amend a medical-
malpractice complaint, resulting in its dismissal; and to give a client her settlement
check in a personal-injury matter. This court adopted the board’s recommendation
to disbar Auwaerter for failing to “‘maintain a degree of personal and professional
integrity that meets the highest standard.’” Id. at 86, quoting Cleveland Bar Assn.
v. Stein, 29 Ohio St.2d 77, 81 (1972).
2. Dishonesty
{¶ 46} Disbarment is also “the presumptive sanction for misappropriation
of client funds and dishonesty.” Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Maybaum, 2006-Ohio-
6507, ¶ 24, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. France, 2002-Ohio-5945, ¶ 11. For
example, in Disciplinary Counsel v. Lentes, the relator charged an attorney with six
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct committed in three client matters.
2008-Ohio-6355. In the first matter, Lentes falsely told his client that he had filed
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a complaint on the client’s behalf. He even went so far as to bring the client to a
fictitious hearing where he instructed the client to wait outside the courtroom.
Lentes also faked a judgment entry and forged a judge’s signature in an attempt to
show a ruling in the client’s favor.
{¶ 47} In another matter, a couple hired Lentes to assist them in adopting
their teenaged grandson. Lentes’s secretary told the clients in November 2005 that
Lentes had filed the adoption petition, but Lentes did not actually file the petition
until the next August. Lentes also gave his clients a date for a fictitious hearing,
which they appeared for, but he did not. Eventually, the probate court scheduled a
real hearing but had to cancel it because Lentes never served a necessary party. The
clients asked for a refund, and Lentes mailed them a check that was dishonored. At
the time of his disciplinary hearing, Lentes had not refunded the fee to the clients.
Because their grandson had turned 18, the clients were unable to collect Social
Security benefits—money that they would have received before the grandson’s
18th birthday, which they wanted to put toward his college education.
{¶ 48} In the final matter, a client hired Lentes to obtain an easement on her
neighbor’s property. He instructed the client to attend multiple fictitious hearings
and falsely told her that her case could not go forward because the opposing party
had appealed.
{¶ 49} This court held that Lentes failed to cooperate in the disciplinary
process, making disbarment “the only appropriate sanction for [his] multiple acts
of dishonesty and his callous disregard of responsibility to his clients, the judicial
system, and the legal profession,” id., 2008-Ohio-6355, at ¶ 33.
C. Applying Our Precedent to this Case
{¶ 50} Hunter’s violations are similar to the violations committed in
Helfgott, 2006-Ohio-2579, Auwaerter, 69 Ohio St.2d 85, and Lentes.
{¶ 51} Hunter stole from clients. Like Helfgott, Hunter, after accepting fees
from clients, failed to perform the work clients had paid him to do—which is theft.
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Also, like Helfgott, Hunter had a selfish motive, harmed a vulnerable client, and
failed to make restitution. See Helfgott at ¶ 14. But unlike Helfgott, who harmed
only two clients, Hunter harmed three clients over three years.
{¶ 52} And although the board found as a mitigating factor that Hunter had
cooperated in the disciplinary process, it contradicted itself in also finding that he
had lied to the board. Hunter’s violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct
exceed Helfgott’s, further justifying Hunter’s disbarment.
{¶ 53} Similarly, like Auwaerter, Hunter repeatedly neglected client
matters. After noting in Auwaerter that the attorney had failed to perform work
that clients hired him to do in five separate matters, this court held—without noting
aggravating or mitigating factors—that his violations warranted disbarment. 69
Ohio St.2d at 87. This case presents aggravating factors that provide additional
support for disbarment: Hunter has been disciplined before, see Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(B)(1); had a selfish motive, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4); committed multiple
infractions, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3), engaging in a pattern of misconduct, see
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3); harmed vulnerable clients, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(8);
and lied during the disciplinary process, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(6). Moreover,
at the time of his disciplinary hearing, Hunter had not refunded some of his clients
for the work they originally hired him to perform, see Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(9). The
aggravating factors elevate the egregiousness of Hunter’s misconduct beyond
Auwaerter’s, warranting Hunter’s disbarment.
{¶ 54} Finally, like Lentes, Hunter neglected three client matters, lied to his
clients, and failed to return fees he charged clients for work that he did not perform.
See Lentes, 2008-Ohio-6355. And neither Hunter nor Lentes cooperated in the
disciplinary process. See id. at ¶ 34. This court disbarred Lentes because of his
pattern of dishonesty and neglect of client matters. Id. at ¶ 33. Likewise, we should
disbar Hunter.
{¶ 55} The above cases establish the proposition that disbarment is the
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presumptive and appropriate sanction for accepting fees despite failing to perform
the work and for neglecting client matters and lying to clients. Hunter
misappropriated funds, neglected client matters, and repeatedly lied, warranting his
disbarment. See Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Schwartz, 2003-Ohio-1635, ¶ 15 (holding
that an attorney’s “conduct of neglecting entrusted legal matters, engaging in a
continuous course of deceit involving the misappropriation of clients’ funds, failing
to make restitution, and failing to cooperate in the investigation of
grievances warrants disbarment”); Greene Cty. Bar Assn. v. Fodal, 2003-Ohio-
5852, ¶ 32 (disbarring attorney who “routinely took his clients’ money and
provided nothing in return,” failed to present compelling mitigating evidence, and
disregarded the disciplinary process).
{¶ 56} “The appropriate analysis when this court has established a
presumptive sanction for certain misconduct is to ‘begin with the presumptive
sanction’ and determine whether there is any reason not to impose it.” Disciplinary
Counsel v. Ferfolia, 2022-Ohio-4220, ¶ 41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoting
Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Harris, 2002-Ohio-2988, ¶ 9 (Cook, J., dissenting). Hunter
has not presented any mitigating evidence that suggests that this court should
temper the presumptive sanction of disbarment.
D. The Majority’s Cases Are Distinguishable
{¶ 57} The majority relies on three cases to reach Hunter’s sanction:
Disciplinary Counsel v. Cheselka, 2019-Ohio-5286, Disciplinary Counsel v.
Talikka, 2013-Ohio-1012, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaaban, 2023-Ohio-3671.
{¶ 58} In Cheselka, the relator charged the attorney with 19 rule violations
for misconduct that included filing a motion and a notice of appeal late. This court
suspended Cheselka from the practice of law for two years with the second year
conditionally stayed. Cheselka at ¶ 37. Although Hunter committed some of the
same violations and many of the same aggravating factors exist here, see id. at
¶ 29, Cheselka presented significant mitigating evidence: the absence of prior
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discipline, letters commending his good character and service to his community as
a low-cost criminal-defense attorney, and the stress he experienced in caring for his
parents, see id. at ¶ 30. Hunter, in contrast, has not presented any mitigating
evidence.
{¶ 59} The majority also relies on Talikka, in which the attorney violated
12 professional-conduct rules by failing to diligently represent clients, mishandling
client funds, and failing to have contingency-fee clients sign closing statements.
This court suspended Talikka from the practice of law for two years, conditionally
staying one year. Talikka at ¶ 21.
{¶ 60} Talikka performed some of the work clients had hired him to do.
Hunter, on the other hand, completely failed to perform work clients had hired him
to perform, lied to those clients, lied to a court, and lied to disciplinary counsel.
Additionally, unlike Hunter, Talikka presented evidence of several mitigating
factors by submitting letters attesting to his good character as well as proof that he
had voluntarily participated in the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program, suffered
from health problems, undergone a psychological evaluation, and taken
responsibility for his actions. Id., 2013-Ohio-1012, at ¶ 14, 20-21. In contrast,
Hunter—as the majority concedes—“walked back” at least one of his stipulations.
Majority opinion, ¶ 15.
{¶ 61} Lastly, the majority relies on Shaaban, 2023-Ohio-3671. Shabaan
violated 26 professional-conduct rules—like here, rules involving neglecting client
matters, lying to opposing counsel, and lying to a tribunal. Ultimately, this court
suspended him from the practice of law for two years with one year conditionally
stayed. Id. at ¶ 56.
{¶ 62} There are multiple differences, however, between Shaaban and this
case. For example, Shaaban lied to a court once, stating that he needed to continue
a hearing because the client had a surgery scheduled for that day, but Hunter lied
to a court twice when explaining his failure to attend a hearing, stating first that he
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had been at his mother-in-law’s funeral, then changing his story by stating that he
actually had been at a friend’s funeral. Furthermore, Hunter submitted fabricated
evidence to attempt to support his lie; Shaaban did not. Finally, there is no evidence
here indicating that outside factors affected Hunter’s conduct, that he took
responsibility for his misconduct, or that he is taking steps to prevent future neglect
of client matters.
II. CONCLUSION
{¶ 63} The record does not justify departing from the presumptive sanction
that we impose when an attorney failed to perform work in client matters, failed to
repay the clients the fees they paid for that work, and lied to clients and tribunals.
Therefore, although I generally agree with the majority’s findings of fact, I dissent
in part and would permanently disbar Hunter from the practice of law.
__________________
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 64} I join the first opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
except for Parts I(C) and II. Based on my reading of the case law, I would impose
an indefinite suspension rather than permanent disbarment in this case.
Accordingly, I concur in part and dissent in part.
__________________
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Melanie J. Williamson,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
Jeffrey Dwight Hunter, pro se.
__________________
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