The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT term #14/22
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:25-cv-02191-HDV-PDx Date July 8, 2025
Title Jane Doe v. John Roe, et al.
Present: The Honorable Hernán D. Vera, United States District Judge
Wendy Hernandez Not Reported
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter
Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):
Not Present Not Present
Proceedings: IN CHAMBERS—ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
REMAND [22]
On April 29, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pseudonymously as Jane Doe, filed
the instant motion to remand (“Motion”) [Dkt. No. 22]. For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she was hired as a tenure track professor at the
University of Central Florida (“UCF”) in 2016. First Amended Complaint
(“FAC”) ¶ 19 [Dkt. No. 25]. At the time, Plaintiff was also working as a non-
tenure track professor at the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”). Id.
¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that UCF was fully aware of her dual affiliation. Id. ¶¶ 20–
22.
On April 1, 2022, Plaintiff resigned from her position at UCLA at the
conclusion of her grant-funded work, but was told she could maintain an “honorary
appointment.” Id. ¶ 28. Also in 2022, Plaintiff submitted her tenure dossier to
UCF for review, with positive letters from external reviewers. Id. ¶ 27. On
October 20, 2022, however, UCF issued Plaintiff a notice of intent to terminate.
Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff submitted a written response detailing her belief that UCF’s
decision was biased, but she was terminated on November 1, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
Several months later, Florida Politics LLC (“Florida Politics”) published an
allegedly defamatory article suggesting that Plaintiff’s dual employment was
hidden from her employers and otherwise suspicious. Id. ¶ 32. Also in January of
2023, College Fix, a web-based publisher, issued an online article perpetuating the
allegedly defamatory narrative that Plaintiff was leading a “double life” by holding
clandestine professorships at multiple universities. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that
unspecified Defendants and Defendant University of Central Florida Board of
Trustees (“BOT”)1 provided information that formed the basis for the articles and
that BOT subsequently disseminated the defamatory article, all resulting in harm to
Plaintiff’s reputation and career. Id. ¶¶ 38–43, 47–49.
On January 19, 2024, Plaintiff Jane Doe filed the original complaint in Los
Angeles Superior Court. Notice of Removal (“NOR”), Ex. A [Dkt. No. 1]. The
case was removed to this Court on March 12, 2025. See NOR. On April 29, 2025,
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion.2 On May 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed the FAC. The
Court heard oral argument on June 26, 2025, and took the Motion under
submission.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of
different states where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Section 1332 requires complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be diverse
from each defendant. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
553 (2005) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (1806)). Any doubts about
removal are resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir.
1979)). “Th[is] ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the
defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id.
1 Defendant BOT suggests that it was erroneously sued in UCF’s stead. The Court need not
resolve the issue for purposes of this Motion.
2 The instant Motion supersedes Plaintiff’s original motion to remand that failed to redact
identifying information [Dkt. No. 14] and was ordered sealed by the Court [Dkt. No. 15].
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), an improperly removed case must be remanded to
state court.
III. DISCUSSION
The central issue here is whether the amount-in-controversy threshold is
met.3 One of Plaintiff’s alleged harms is the injury to potential career
opportunities that was sustained as a result of the alleged defamation. FAC ¶ 34
(“After leaving UCF, Plaintiff had invitations to interview at other universities,
including Stanford, University of Miami, and was also engaged in discussions
about formally returning to teach at UCLA.”), ¶ 48 (“However, the Article
negligently published by Florida Politics based on information provided by Roe 1
and Roe 2 of UCF was devastating to Plaintiff’s career and reputation. Plaintiff’s
invitations to interview at the University of Miami and Stanford were rescinded.
She was also unable to obtain a teaching position in the UCLA Psychology
Department.”). Plaintiff contends that she does not specify an exact amount of
damages, and that BOT therefore must carry the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
Motion at 5.
While it is true that the removing party has the burden, Plaintiff herself
provides sufficient evidence for the Court to find that the threshold is met. Plaintiff
provides an excerpt to the allegedly defamatory article as an exhibit to her FAC,
which lists Plaintiff’s annual salary from her position at UCF at $113,651. See
FAC, Ex. G (“UCF fired [Plaintiff] from her $113,651-a-year job….”).
Presumably, the job opportunities Plaintiff was being considered for would be in
that same ballpark. Moreover, BOT provided evidence that shows positions at
Stanford in Plaintiff’s field command at least six figures. Defendant BOT
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (“Opposition”) [Dkt. No. 41], Declaration of
Bryan Miller in Support of Opposition (“Miller Decl.”), Ex. A [Dkt. No. 41-1]. At
the hearing, Plaintiff did not disclaim the veracity of BOT’s claims that Plaintiff’s
salary in any of the opportunities she lost out on would have been greater than the
amount in controversy. Nor does Plaintiff disclaim the ability to seek damages in
excess of $75,000. Motion at 5 (“Nothing in this motion should be construed as
limiting Plaintiff’s right to seek damages in excess of $75,000 if supported by the
evidence and consistent with California law.”).
3 Plaintiff concedes that there is diversity between the parties. Motion at 2 (“While the parties
may be diverse, Defendants have failed to establish…that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 as required for federal jurisdiction.”)
In summary, Plaintiff allegedly lost career opportunities, which would have
paid an annual six figure salary. The amount in controversy is easily met here.
The Motion is denied.4
IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 BOT included arguments contesting personal jurisdiction in its opposition. Opposition at 4–5.
The proper vehicle for these arguments is a motion to dismiss, which BOT has also filed [Dkt..
No. 37], to be heard on July 17, 2025. The Court will consider the issue at that time.