The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION
MEGHAN LEATH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 25-cv-2319-MSN-tmp
)
NELNET, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the court is pro se plaintiff Meghan Leath’s
complaint.1 Because Leath is proceeding in forma pauperis, the
undersigned must screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2).2 For the reasons below, the undersigned recommends
that Leath’s complaint be dismissed.
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Leath filed her complaint on March 20, 2025, alleging a
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1681 et seq. (ECF No. 2.) Leath alleges that she has multiple
student loan accounts serviced by defendant Nelnet, Inc.
1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been
referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of
all pretrial matters for determination or report and
recommendation, as appropriate.
2The undersigned granted Leath leave to proceed in forma pauperis
on June 9, 2025. (ECF No. 8.)
(“Nelnet”). (Id. at PageID 2.) According to Leath, in January
2025, Nelnet “incorrectly reported [her] student loan accounts
as 90 days past due, despite a consistent history of timely
balances and no past due amounts prior to this date.” (Id.)
Leath then produced a chart summarizing the balances of her
eleven student loans. (Id. at PageID 3.) She claims that each
loan is serviced under one account, and that by reporting each
loan as past due, Nelnet “create[d] multiple derogatory marks on
[her] credit report for what should be reported as a single
account in good standing.” (Id.)
Leath seeks to bring a single count under 15 U.S.C. §
1681s-2(a). (Id. at PageID 4.) She alleges that Nelnet
“negligently and/or willfully furnished inaccurate information
by reporting [her] accounts as 90 days past due despite no
evidence supporting this claim,” and that she “has suffered
harm, including damage to her credit reputation, emotional
distress, and financial loss.” (Id.) She asks that the court
order Nelnet to remove the inaccurate information, as well as
award actual damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, and
costs and attorneys’ fees pursuant to the FCRA. (Id.)
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This court is required to screen in forma pauperis
complaints and must dismiss any complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the action: (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii). To avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), 12(b)(6). “A
claim is plausible on its face if the ‘plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Ctr.
for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Without
factual allegations in support, mere legal conclusions are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are thus liberally
construed. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)
(citing Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Even so, pro se litigants must adhere to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, see Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.
1989), and the court cannot create a claim that has not been
spelled out in a pleading, see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x
836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003).
Leath seeks to bring a FCRA claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-
2(a). “[The] FCRA exists ‘to ensure fair and accurate credit
reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect
consumer privacy.’” Boggio v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 611,
614 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S.
47, 52 (2007)). “[Section] 1681s–2 is designed to prevent
‘furnishers of information’ from spreading inaccurate consumer-
credit information.”3 Id. Section 1681s-2(a) imposes a duty on
furnishers “to provide [credit reporting agencies] with accurate
information about their consumers.” Id. But it does not create a
private cause of action where furnishers fail to comply. Id. at
615 (“This is because § 1681s–2(c) expressly precludes consumers
from enforcing the requirement that furnishers, under § 1681s–
2(a), initially provide complete and accurate consumer
information to a [credit reporting agency].”); see also Carter,
2025 WL 1065379, at *4 (“The law is clear that there is no
private cause of action for consumers against furnishers of
3“While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have
defined the term as ‘any entity which transmits information
concerning a particular debt owed by a particular customer to
consumer reporting agencies.’” Carter v. Holzman L., PLLC, No.
CV 24-11990, 2025 WL 1065379, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2025),
report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 868615 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 20, 2025) (quoting LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bureau, 2016
WL 6927454, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016)).
information for failure to comply with § 1681[s-2(a)].” (citing
Boggio, 696 F.3d at 615)). Because § 1681s-2(a) does not supply
a right of action, Leath cannot state a claim under that
provision, and the undersigned recommends that her complaint be
dismissed.
III. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the above, it is recommended that Leath’s
complaint be dismissed in its entirety under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Respectfully submitted,
s/Tu M. Pham
TU M. PHAM
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
June 9, 2025
Date
NOTICE
WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE
SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S
OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A
COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.
72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS
MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,
EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.