Rose v. City of West Frankfort

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TINA ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-845-JPG

CITY OF WEST FRANKFORT, TIMOTHY A.

ARVIEW, THAD SNELL, and WEST

FRANKFORT POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff Tina Rose’s “Motion for Protective

Relief” pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) (Doc. 19). The defendants have

responded to the motion (Doc. 21), and Rose has replied to that response (Doc. 22). In her

motion, she asks the Court to issue an order prohibiting the defendants from threatening to

demolish her home, from enforcing the West Frankfort building code in retaliation against her,

from taking “retaliatory property actions,” from contacting her “outside of legal procedures,”

from approaching her home, pets, or property, and from obstructing her access to city services or

zoning board reviews. She also seeks an order prohibiting an associate of the defendants from

threatening violence and intimidating her. She also asks the Court to refer her case to federal law

enforcement agencies to protect her. Her reply brief raises additional matters not addressed in

her original motion, but since those matters were first raised in a reply brief, the Court does not

consider them. Wright v. United States, 139 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1998) (matters raised for the

first time in a reply brief are waived).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) does not authorize the type of relief Rose requests.

The rule is designed to protect litigants and third parties from discovery that is an “annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” It is not designed to provide personal

protection of litigants during the course of litigation. The Court further declines to exercise its

inherent authority where an appropriate legal mechanism, a preliminary injunction, is designed to

address the problems Rose raises.

To the extent Rose may also be asking the Court to issue a preliminary injunction

protecting her from the defendants, the Court will deny that request. “[T]he purpose of a

preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the

merits can be held,” Benisek v. Lamone, 585 U.S. 155, 161 (2018) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must make a threshold showing that: (1)

absent preliminary injunctive relief, he will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a final

resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he has a reasonable likelihood of

success on the merits.” Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015). If the

moving party is able to establish these three factors, the Court must then balance the harms to

both parties using a “sliding scale” analysis, also taking into consideration the effect that

granting or denying the injunction will have on the public interest. Id. “[T]he more likely he is

to win, the less the balance of harms must weigh in his favor; the less likely he is to win, the

more it must weigh in his favor.” Id. “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable

remedy that is available only when the movant shows clear need.” Id. at 661.

In her original motion, Rose has not addressed any of the factors relevant to the decision

whether to enter a preliminary injunction. She attempts to address the factors in her reply, but

that is too late since the defendants do not have a fair opportunity to respond to her allegations.

See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 1998). She has not established

that such extraordinary equitable relief is warranted.

The Court notes that the defendants are already on notice to preserve evidence relevant to

this case, so no additional order is required. The Court further sees nothing wrong with the same

counsel representing all defendants in this case and trusts that, if such representation conflicts

with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, counsel, as a professional and officer of the

Court, will take appropriate action. Rose has not asserted any good reason for the Court to take

action in this regard.

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Rose’s “Motion for Protective Relief” (Doc. 19).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 8, 2025

s/ J. Phil Gilbert

J. PHIL GILBERT

DISTRICT JUDGE