The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
KYRA L. PARDUE )
)
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) No. 2:23-cv-00332-LEW
)
ANDREW RAYMOND, )
THOMAS SAYRE, )
CHRISTOPHER BROWN, )
AMY GAGNE, TRAVIS BELLEARD, )
ERIC BILODEAU, ERIC SMALL, )
& CRAIG ANDERSON )
)
Defendants )
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
Pro se plaintiff Kyra L. Pardue brings constitutional and state law claims against
several members of the Sanford Police Department stemming from two separate arrests.
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 101). For the following reasons,
Plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
A full factual background is not necessary for a ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Strike. I leave that more detailed backdrop to my companion order on Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 87) and provide a less lengthy but relevant procedural
background here.
Last year, Ms. Pardue filed suit against the City of Sanford, the Mayor of Sanford,
the City Manager of Sanford, the Sanford Police Department, the Chief of Police, the
Deputy Chief, and several police officers. Ms. Pardue alleged Defendants violated her
constitutional rights and Maine law when Sanford police arrested her on two separate
occasions. Sanford and its Mayor, City Manager, Police Department, Chief of Police, and
Deputy Chief filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26). I granted that motion in part,
dismissing Sanford and its Mayor, City Manager, and Police Department from this case.
Order on Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 38).
Following my order on the Motion to Dismiss, the only remaining defendants were
certain named Sanford police officers, the Chief of Police, and the Deputy Chief.
Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 87). Per Local Rule
56(b), Defendants also filed a Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 86), with citations to
the underlying record.
Ms. Pardue requested, and was granted, two extensions to file her response to
Defendants’ summary judgment motion (ECF Nos. 88-89, 90-91). Ms. Pardue then filed
her Response (ECF No. 92) but, four days later, filed a third Motion to Extend Time (ECF
No. 93). I dismissed this motion as moot (ECF No. 94). This caused some confusion. Ms.
Pardue filed a Motion to Dispute (ECF No. 97) my dismissal of her motion. I denied this
motion and explained that I would consider Ms. Pardue’s response arguments in ruling on
the motion for summary judgment. Ms. Pardue sent the Court a Letter (ECF No. 99)
apologizing for the confusion and requesting I ignore her Motion to Dispute.
Once the confusion cleared, Defendants filed their summary judgment Reply (ECF
No. 100). In it, Defendants pointed out some procedural defects in Ms. Pardue’s
Response.1 Ms. Pardue then filed a Motion to Strike her own Response and requested I
allow her to submit a new response. Defendants object and request I deny the Motion to
Strike and rule on the summary judgment papers as they were originally submitted.
DISCUSSION
I am mindful that Ms. Pardue is proceeding on her own and without the assistance
of counsel. The procedural rules can be complex even to attorneys. “Courts are generally
more relaxed about compliance with procedural rules when a litigant is acting pro se.”
Fusco v. Rogers, No. 18-cv-00290, 2019 WL 1387686, at*3 (D. Me. Mar. 27, 2019). For
instance, the Supreme Court has directed that pro se complaints should be construed
liberally. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Nonetheless, the First Circuit has
“consistently held that a litigant’s pro se status [does not] absolve him from compliance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” F.D.I.C. v. Anchor Props., 13 F.3d 27, 31 (1st
Cir. 1994). “This applies with equal force to a district court’s procedural rules.” Id.
The rules of procedure allow a party to move for the Court to “strike from a pleading
an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis added). Those same rules make clear a response in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is not a pleading but falls into the category
of “Motions and Other Papers.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7. This is grounds to deny a motion to
1 Those defects are addressed in my companion order on summary judgment.
strike summary judgment materials. See United States v. H&S Realty Co., 647 F.Supp.
1415, 1418 (D. Me. 1986).2
Ms. Pardue’s response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment will not
be struck.3 I have extended some generosity to Ms. Pardue and have considered her request
to reissue her response as a motion to file a surreply (i.e., a response to Defendants’ latest
summary judgment arguments). But after consideration, I do not find a surreply is
warranted.
“Neither the Federal Rules nor the Local Rules permits a party to file a surreply to
the moving party’s reply. Local Rule 7 instead reflects the Court’s need for finality and
only allows parties to file a motion, a response, and a reply ‘strictly confined to replying to
new matter raised in the objection or opposing memorandum.’” Aero Union Corp. v.
Aircraft Deconstructors Intern. LLC, 2012 WL 3679627, at *9 (D. Me. Aug. 24, 2012)
(quoting D. Me. Loc. R. 7). “A surreply is appropriate where a party has not had the
opportunity to contest matters introduced for the first time in the opposing party’s reply.”
Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 588 F.Supp.2d 70, 81 (D. Me. 2008). But the issue “must
be truly new.” Id.
2 Moreover, this Court’s Local Rules expressly forbid motions to strike statements of material fact. D. ME.
LOC. R. 56(e).
3 In her Motion to Strike, Ms. Pardue cites some significant personal and family medical and mental health
issues. I sympathize with those struggles, and I do not refuse to strike her response lightly. However, the
more appropriate course of action would have been for Ms. Pardue to continue requesting extensions, which
she was clearly capable of. Instead, Ms. Pardue filed a response then attempted to strike it once Defendants
had replied. That abuse of the procedural rules cannot be forgiven, even under the relaxed enforcement
The issue here is not “new” for purposes of warranting a surreply. Defendants’ only
new argument in its reply was to point out Ms. Pardue had failed to follow this Court’s
local rules and therefore Defendants’ statement of facts should be deemed admitted. As I
cover in my companion order, the First Circuit expects Ms. Pardue to comply with this
Court’s rules surrounding summary judgment papers. Her compliance with those rules is
not a “new matter” requiring more argument. In fact, this Court has asked Ms. Pardue
twice to review the Handout for Self-Represented (Pro Se) Parties after she failed to follow
procedural rules. See Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(B) (ECF No. 83); Order
Denying Mot. to Compel (ECF No. 81).
In any event, it does not appear that Ms. Pardue wants to respond to Defendant’s
arguments substantively or to correct any procedural defects. Much of Ms. Pardue’s
arguments for a new filing focus on personally attacking Defendants’ counsel and her law
firm. Even the most generous readings of Ms. Pardue’s filings indicates a surreply would
not address any of Defendants’ summary judgment arguments beyond calling the
Defendants liars. That is not how facts are disputed at the summary judgment stage and
the “right of self-representation is not a license not to comply with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.” Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st
Cir.1985) (internal quotations omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons Ms. Pardue’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 101) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated this 8th day of July, 2025.
/S/ Lance E. Walker
Chief U.S. District Judge