BANKS v. ALAMANCE-BURLINGTON BOARD OF EDUCATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

KEISHA BANKS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV1112

)

ALAMANCE-BURLINGTON )

BOARD OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER1

This matter is before the undersigned on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Docket Entry 43; see also Docket Entry 44). Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition to the

Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entries 46, 47); Defendant has filed a Reply thereto

(Docket Entry 55). The matter is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated herein, the

undersigned will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 43).

I. BACKGROUND

a. Factual Background

Plaintiff Keisha Banks (“Plaintiff”) originally brought this action pursuant to Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), and under North

Carolina state law, seeking damages from Defendant Alamance-Burlington Board of Education

(“Defendant”) for its alleged unlawful employment discrimination against her. (See generally

1 By Order of Reference, this matter was referred to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings

in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docket Entry 29.)

Complaint (“Compl.”), Docket Entry 4.) Plaintiff, an African-American female, served as

Defendant’s Executive Director of Exceptional Children (“EC”) from August 2018 until July 20,

2022, when she was demoted2 by Defendant’s then newly appointed Chief Student Services Officer

Kristi Davis (“Ms. Davis”), a Caucasian female. (See id. ¶¶ 1, 9-11.) Defendant hired a new

Superintendent, Dain Butler (“Superintendent Butler”),3 a Caucasian male, a few weeks earlier, on

or around July 1, 2022. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to being demoted, she was one of

three African-American females serving in a leadership position within Alamance-Burlington

County School System’s (“ABSS”) leadership cabinet, and, upon information and belief, that none

remained in those positions after Superintendent Butler’s hiring. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff further

alleges, upon information and belief, that she was replaced by a Caucasian female who was

unqualified and lacked the required licensure for the position. (See id. ¶¶ 16-17.)

Plaintiff alleges that in June 2022, she received an evaluation (the “June 2022

Evaluation”) in which her performance was deemed “exemplary.” (See id. ¶ 20.) In four of

five categories, Plaintiff received the highest rating, “Distinguished[,]” and received an

“Accomplished” rating in the fifth category. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff alleges, upon information and

belief, that Ms. Davis “never evaluated Plaintiff’s job performance prior to demoting her,”

and alleges that on or around July 7, 2022, Ms. Davis began “gathering ‘data’ on the ‘state of

affairs’ within the Department of Exceptional Children.” (Id. ¶¶ 23-24.) The Complaint

2 Plaintiff characterizes this employment action as a “demotion” (see generally Compl.);

Defendant characterizes it as a “reassignment” (see generally Docket Entry 44). As discussed below, the

parties agree that this constituted an adverse employment action. (Docket Entry 55 at 8.) All citations

herein to documents filed with the court refer to the page numbers located at the bottom right-hand

corner of the documents as they appear on CM/ECF.

3 Butler’s name is listed as “Joseph Butler” in deposition filings. (Docket Entries 44-15, 54-3, 55-1.)

discusses a letter Ms. Davis addressed to Plaintiff (the “Reassignment Letter”), regarding

information from “ ‘various stakeholders’ within the district regarding Plaintiff’s leadership,”

in which Ms. Davis “cites issues with Plaintiff’s communication, professionalism, leadership,

priorities, and compliance.” (Id. ¶¶ 25-26.) Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that

the “compliance” issue referred to in the Reassignment Letter involved funds used “with no

collection of data[,]” which Plaintiff asserts “occurred during Ms. Davis’s tenure as Executive

Director of [EC], as opposed to Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 33.)

Plaintiff alleges that on or around July 19, 2022, she received the Reassignment Letter

from Ms. Davis, which demoted Plaintiff to the EC Program Specialist position effective July

20, 2022, without any discussion of the “data” gathered, or information regarding the

“stakeholders.” (Id. ¶¶ 27-29.) The Reassignment Letter further stated that “Plaintiff would

have an opportunity to work alongside staff to improve [her] knowledge base and receive

coaching from a new Executive Director.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff alleges, upon information and

belief, that “the demotion involved Plaintiff working alongside staff that she previously

supervised and evaluated.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff alleges that on July 21, 2022, she “formally

rebutted every item of [Ms.] Davis’s letter[.]” (Id. ¶ 32.)

Plaintiff alleges the following upon information and belief: no Caucasians in leadership

positions were demoted without warning like Plaintiff; several Caucasians working within the EC

Department “were evaluated and rated far less than Plaintiff;” no Caucasians in the EC Department

were demoted like Plaintiff; the demotion resulted in Plaintiff being relocated to another office; and

Plaintiff lost her longevity pay. (Id. ¶¶ 35-38, 42.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges, upon information

and belief, that if her work performance was in question, Defendant failed to follow its own policy

by not providing her with an action plan to address any deficiencies. (Id. ¶¶ 40-41.) The Complaint

asserts two claims for relief: (1) a Title VII race-discrimination claim and (2) a North Carolina

state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Id. ¶¶ 47-58.)

b. Relevant Procedural Background

Plaintiff initiated this action in Alamance County Superior Court on November 14,

2023, and petitioned for its removal to federal court on December 20, 2023. (Docket Entry

1.) This action has come before this Court previously on Defendant’s Amended Motion to

Dismiss (Docket Entry 10, see also Docket Entry 11), which the undersigned granted in part as

to Plaintiff’s IIED claim and otherwise denied, in a recommendation (Docket Entry 18) later

adopted in an order by District Judge Loretta Biggs (Docket Entry 22). Thus, Plaintiff’s only

surviving claim here is her allegation that Defendant violated Title VII. (See id.) On May 6,

2025, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry 43) and an

accompanying Memorandum (Docket Entry 44), to which it attached 18 exhibits:

• Exhibit A – July 19, 2022, Reassignment Letter

• Exhibit B – Board Determination Letter for September 20, 2022, hearing

• Exhibit C – Davis Review Summary and Findings for Board Appeal Hearing

[(“Davis Review Summary”)]

• Exhibit D – June 15, 2022, Email (Hancock to Banks)

• Exhibit E – July 27, 2022, Email (Throm to Davis)

• Exhibit F – IDEA Grant Submission Chronology

• Exhibit G – Board’s Discovery Responses; Table of Position Changes, April 10, 2025

• Exhibit H – Portions of Plaintiff’s Personnel File

• Exhibit I – EEOC Charge 435-2023-00023

• Exhibit J – 2022 Annual Evaluation [(“June 2022 Evaluation”)]

• Exhibit K – Board Hearing Exhibits

• Exhibit L – EC Director Job Description (updated 2018)

• Exhibit M – Deposition Transcript Excerpts (Banks)

• Exhibit N – Deposition Transcript Excerpts (Davis)

• Exhibit O – Deposition Transcript Excerpts (Butler)

• Exhibit P – Affidavit of Yolanda Anderson

• Exhibit Q – Banks Rebuttal Letter July 21, 2022

• Exhibit R – Index of Exhibits

(Docket Entries 44-1 through 44-18.)4 Plaintiff subsequently filed a Response in opposition to

the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entries 46 and 47), to which it attached ten exhibits:

• Exhibit A – Deposition Transcript Excerpts (Davis)

• Exhibit B – Deposition Transcript Excerpts (Banks)

• Exhibit C – June 2022 Evaluation

• Exhibit D – July 19, 2022, Reassignment Letter

• Exhibit E – Banks Rebuttal Letter July 21, 2022

• Exhibit F – Banks EC Federal Grant Concerns Letter June 26, 2019 [(“2019 Letter”)]

• Exhibit G – Banks Grievance Letter August 17, 2022

• Exhibit H – Davis Review Summary

• Exhibit I – EEOC Charge 435-2023-00023

• Exhibit J – Board’s Discovery Responses; Table of Position Changes, April 10, 2025

(See Docket Entries 46-1, 46-2, 46-3, 46-4, 47-1, 47-2, 47-3, 47-4, 47-5, 47-6.) Defendant

subsequently filed a Reply opposing said Response. (Docket Entry 55.)

II. DISCUSSION

In response to Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no direct

evidence of racial discriminatory animus, that Plaintiff cannot make a prima facie showing of

racial discrimination, and that Defendant had legitimate, non-pretextual, non-discriminatory

reasons for reassigning Plaintiff. (See generally Docket Entries 43, 44.) Accordingly, Defendant

seeks summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s claim. (Id.)

4 On June 27, 2025, Defendant filed a Correction Notice (Docket Entry 54) in which it stated

that the “original exhibits offered at DE 44-13, 44-14, 44-15 had pages that were inadvertently omitted.

… This filing simply adds the missing pages.” (Id.; see also Docket Entries 54-1, 54-2, 54-3, 55-1.)

a. Relevant Legal Standards

i. Summary Judgment Standard

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant bears the burden of establishing the absence of such

dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

In analyzing a summary judgment motion, the Court “tak[es] the evidence and all

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In other words, the nonmoving

“party is entitled ‘to have the credibility of his evidence as forecast assumed, his version of all

that is in dispute accepted, [and] all internal conflicts in it resolved favorably to him.’ ” Miller

v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (brackets in original) (quoting

Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir. 1979)). If, applying this standard,

the Court “find[s] that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for [the nonmoving party], then

a genuine factual dispute exists and summary judgment is improper.” Evans v. Technologies

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).

Nevertheless, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. Moreover, “the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture,

speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Lewis v.

Eagleton, No. 4:08-cv-2800, 2010 WL 755636, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 26, 2010) (citing Baber v.

Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992)), aff’d, 404 F. App’x 740 (4th Cir.

2010); see also Pronin v. Johnson, 628 F. App’x 160, 161 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that “[m]ere

conclusory allegations and bare denials” or the nonmoving party’s “self-serving allegations

unsupported by any corroborating evidence” cannot defeat summary judgment). Speculative

allegations made on “information and belief” and not based on personal knowledge are

insufficient to meet the evidentiary burden on summary judgment. See Murray v. Beaver, No.

3:18-CV-00641-MR, 2021 WL 3072467, at *9 (W.D.N.C. July 20, 2021) (unpublished) (citing

Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 2021)).

ii. Framework

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to discharge

… or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Johnson v. Harvey, No. 1:05CV310

(JCC), 2006 WL 325744, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2006) (unpublished). “[I]n employment

discrimination … cases where a plaintiff does not present sufficient direct or circumstantial

evidence showing that an adverse employment action was motivated by intentional

discrimination aimed at the plaintiff’s protected characteristic(s),” courts “apply[ ] the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d

208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). That

framework is comprised of three steps. Id.

First, the plaintiff must first “offer a prima facie case.”5 Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19

F.4th 643, 649-650 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Lettieri v. Equant, 478 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2007)). Id.

To do so, a plaintiff must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class;

(2) her employer took an adverse action against her; (3) she had been fulfilling

her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse action; and (4)

the adverse action occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable

inference of unlawful discrimination, including because the employer left open

the position or replaced the plaintiff with someone outside the protected class.

Id. (citing Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 n.8 (4th Cir. 2020)). “The burden at this

stage ‘is not onerous,’ and meeting it ‘in effect creates a presumption that the employer

unlawfully discriminated against the employee.’ ” Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126

F.4th 244, 255 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing Westmoreland v. TWC Admin., Inc., 924 F.3d 718, 725 (4th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54)).6

To meet the burden as to the second factor, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she “was

performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations at the time

of the adverse employment action[,]” Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,

285 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), overruled in part on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557

U.S. 167 (2009), or “by proffering evidence that demonstrates (or at least creates a question

of fact) that the employer’s expectations were illegitimate.” Ruff v. Target Stores, Inc., 226 F.

5 The undersigned notes that courts variously use the phrases “establish a prima facie case[,]” see,

e.g., Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th at 255, “set[ ]forth a prima facie case[,]” see, e.g., Stafford v. Radford Cmty.

Hosp., Inc., 120 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 1997), or “make out a prima facie case[,]” see, e.g., Lee v. Wade, No.

3:15CV37, 2015 WL 5147067, at *3 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2015) (unpublished), to refer to the requirements

a plaintiff must satisfy to meet the burden at step one of the McDonnell Douglas framework.

6 Presenting evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to the factor(s) at issue in

the prima facie case is sufficient to meet the plaintiff’s burden at step one of the McDonnell Douglas

framework. See Reyes v. AutoZone, Inc., No. CIV.A 08-847, 2009 WL 4559454, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2,

2009) (unpublished) (citing Pivorotto v. Innovative Systems, Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352–54 (3d Cir.1999)).

App’x 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2007). To meet the burden as to the fourth factor, it is sufficient for

a plaintiff to present evidence that an employer replaced the plaintiff with someone outside

the protected class who was comparably qualified. Vincent v. MedStar S. Maryland Hosp. Ctr., No.

CV TDC-16-1438, 2017 WL 3668756, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2017) (unpublished).

Second, once the plaintiff offers a prima facie case, the burden of production then

shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. See

Guessous, 828 F.3d at 216.

Third, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action was not the true

reason for said action, that it was actually a pretext, and that the true reason is discriminatory.

Id. The plaintiff “may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (citing McDonnel Douglas,

411 U.S. at 804-05 (1973)). However, “[t]he ultimate question in every employment discrimination

case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of

intentional discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).

“In cases where an employer adduces a nondiscriminatory reason for discharging the plaintiff

and comparator evidence does not exist to rebut that explanation, the plaintiff must be able

to point persuasively to some other form of evidence demonstrating that the employer’s

explanation was a mere pretext for discrimination.” Laing, 703 F.3d at 720 (4th Cir. 2013).

Defendant argues that neither Plaintiff’s Complaint nor her EEOC Charge “contain

any allegations of direct evidence of racial discrimination[,]” that she “has provided no

documents or narratives in any discovery responses that would represent direct evidence of

discrimination[,]” and that she must therefore rely on the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

framework. (See Docket Entry 44 at 7.) Plaintiff does not dispute this argument. (See Docket

Entries 46, 47.) Accordingly, the Court will begin with the McDonell Douglas analysis.7

b. Analysis

Here, although Plaintiff offers a sufficient prima facie case of discrimination, Defendant

provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for reassigning Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not

show that Defendant’s articulated reason was a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Thus, the

undersigned will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

i. Plaintiff meets her burden of showing a prima facie case of

discrimination.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class and that she experienced

an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Giles, 59 F.4th at 704 (“As [an African-American]

person, [the plaintiff] belongs to a protected class.”); Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601

U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (holding that transfer or reassignment may constitute adverse

employment action, even if the harm incurred thereby was not “significant[;]” abrogating

contrary rulings). Thus, only the second and fourth prima facie factors are at issue here.

7 “A Title VII plaintiff may survive a summary judgment motion through one of two avenues

of proof.” Dial v. Robeson Cnty., No. 1:20-CV-1135, 2023 WL 2652769, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 27, 2023),

aff’d, No. 23-1474, 2024 WL 1576806 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2024) (unpublished). A plaintiff may establish

through direct or circumstantial evidence that race, though not the sole reason, was a “motivating factor”

in the adverse employment decision. See Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th

Cir. 2005). Alternatively, a plaintiff may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id.

Because the parties proceed under said framework in their arguments, this court will proceed under said

framework in its analysis. See generally Reeves, 530 U.S. at 141.

1. There is a genuine issue regarding Plaintiff’s performance.

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot show a genuine issue of material fact regarding her job

performance. (Docket Entry 44 at 8.) Defendant argues that the Reassignment Letter

“identified various shortcomings in Plaintiff’s performance, including that she was untimely or

unresponsive in important communications, that she lacked an understanding of and did not

prioritize budget issues within the EC department, that she lacked follow-through, and that she

did not appropriately support staff.” (Id. at 9; see also Docket Entry 44-1; Docket Entry 44-3;

Docket Entry 55 at 8-10.) Defendant further argues that “[a]t Plaintiff’s grievance hearing

before the Board of Education, the district administration presented additional documentary

evidence of these issues.” (Docket Entry 44 at 9.)

Defendant submits as evidence the Davis Review Summary, a document containing notes

made by Ms. Davis in response to her receipt of concerns about Plaintiff’s performance from

“various stakeholders” including “multiple principals[,]” “ABSS District Office Administrators,”

“ABSS Building Level Administrators,” “the Department of Exceptional Children,” and

NCDPI. (Docket Entry 44-3.) Defendant argues that its evidence shows a “demonstrated

pattern” of concerns from “people that worked under Ms. Banks, people that worked

alongside her, or with her…[and] also people that worked from the [EC department] at the

State level” regarding compliance, communication, and follow-through. (Docket Entry 44 at

9; see also Docket Entry 44-1 at 3; Docket Entry 44-3 at 3; 44-14 at 4.) Defendant argues that

Dr. Davis supplied specific names associated with various quotes and

comments captured in her review, including Chief Academic Officer Ravonda

Johnson, Principal Greg Holland, EC Program Specialist April Brantley, EC

Program Specialist Kara Ballard, NCDPI consultant Casey Favasuli, and

Principal Dr. Hancock [(“Hancock”)]. Davis Dep., pp.15:8-14; 19:8-15; 38:11-

19; 40:16-20; 41:16-20; 42:11-17.

(Docket Entry 55 at 6.)

Defendant argues that Hancock stated, “[i]t takes days to get a response from

[Plaintiff]. Emails are not returned in a timely manner. Voicemails are often not returned.”

(Docket Entry 44 at 9; Docket Entry 44-3 at 1.) Defendant argues that “Principal Hancock

provided Dr. Davis with copies of specific emails demonstrating this concern[.]” (Docket

Entry 44 at 9-10; see also Docket Entry 44-4.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed in her duty to ensure compliance of programs with

federal, state and local regulations, and to follow up with state complaints for correction or

resolution. (See Docket Entry 44 at 11.) Defendant further argues that while under Plaintiff’s

leadership, there were three state complaints, one that “resulted in NCDPI finding the district in

violation of state policies and ordering corrective action;” one that “required the district to enter

into a settlement agreement to resolve;” and one that “the district had an opportunity to informally

resolve but Plaintiff failed to follow through on implementation.” (Docket Entry 44 at 10.)

Defendant also argues that Deborah Throm sent an email regarding Plaintiff’s failure

to take steps requested by a parent to resolve one of these matters. (See id.; see also Docket

Entry 44-5.) Defendant contends that “Dr. Davis was also concerned by the fact that Plaintiff

had told her that that final case was resolved and they were just awaiting results from NCDPI,

which was not true. … Dr. Butler indicated concerns were also raised to him regarding the

state complaints.” (Docket Entry 44 at 11; see also Docket Entry 44-14 at 5;8 Docket Entry

8 Defendant cites to portions of this deposition that were initially not attached to its

Memorandum in support of its Motion to Dismiss. (Docket Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-14.)

44-15 at 6.) Defendant argues that “[b]y contrast, during Dr. Davis’s tenure as Exceptional

Children’s Director there had been only one state complaint, and that one had been inherited

from the previous Director.” (Docket Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-14 at 5.)

Defendant further argues that “[a]nother area of serious concern revealed by Dr.

Davis’s review was Plaintiff’s lack of understanding and lack of proper handling of budgets

and funding issues[,]” including her “[l]ack of fiscal understanding and management.” (Docket

Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-3 at 3.) Defendant argues that a retired veteran EC director

“filled in for Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s maternity leave, and commented that Plaintiff ‘appeared

not to know the specifics about the 070 grant process’ and remarked upon ‘[t]he apparent lack

of fiscal oversight and planning in the EC department.’ ” (Id.)

Defendant contends that “[a]ccording to information Dr. Davis received from

NCDPI, Plaintiff failed to submit six Risk Pool funding applications, costing the district …

approximately $180,000.” (Docket Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-3 at 4.) Defendant further

contends that “Plaintiff failed to spend approximately $1,000,000 in emergency federal

funding during the COVID-19 pandemic.” (Docket Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-3 at 4;

Docket Entry 44-11 at 21-24.) Defendant goes on to contend that “Plaintiff’s explanation in

her deposition for this failure was that she ‘did not know that we had it,’ … which only affirms

the lack of fiscal understanding and management cited by others.” (Docket Entry 44 at 12;

Docket Entry 44-13 at 11-13.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff struggled to complete “her

required state funding grant application, which caused a delay of five months in receiving

Defendant’s Correction Notice remedies this error. (Docket Entry 54; see also Docket Entries 54-1, 54-

2, 54-3 (providing missing pages from excerpts of the depositions of Plaintiff, Ms. Davis, and

Superintendent Butler, respectively).)

approval for those critical funds. According to Dr. Davis’s conversations with NCDPI staff,

this was ‘further evidence of the concerns regarding fundamental fiscal management skills

necessary for an EC Director.’ ” (Docket Entry 44 at 11; Docket Entry 44-3 at 2; Docket

Entry 44-6; Docket Entry 44-14 at 7.) Defendant concludes that these issues demonstrate

Plaintiff’s failure to meet her employer’s expectations. (See Docket Entry 44 at 13.)

Lastly, Defendant addresses Plaintiff’s positive performance evaluation thusly:

… Plaintiff’s only performance evaluation on file, from departing Assistant

Superintendent Dr. Angela Bost [(“Bost”)], was very positive. [(Docket Entry 44-

10.)] However, Dr. Davis’s review revealed many issues that [Bost’s] evaluation

did not address and that show beyond question that Plaintiff was not performing

her job satisfactorily. As Dr. Davis stated in her deposition, “I do not know what

sources [Bost] used to prepare this evaluation. They were not consistent with the

feedback I received from people that she worked with or people at the same level.”

[(Docket Entry 44-14 at 8.)] Because the evaluation does not contradict the

feedback received from Dr. Davis in her review, it does not create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff’s performance was satisfactory.

(Id.; see also Docket Entry 55 at 9-10.) Defendant goes on to argue in its Reply that Plaintiff

incorrectly asserts that Ms. Davis’s information was collected after the reassignment decision

(Docket Entry 55 at 4-5) and that “Plaintiff fails to support [her] allegation that the employer’s

expectations were ‘illegitimate.’ ” (Id. at 6-8.)

Plaintiff argues that she “was an exemplary employee and had consistently performed in

accordance with Defendant’s expectations.” (Docket Entry 46 at 8.) It is undisputed that, in the

June 2022 Evaluation, Plaintiff received the highest rating, “Distinguished[,]” in four of the five

rating categories, and she received an “Accomplished” designation in the fifth. (Id.; Docket Entry

44-10; Docket Entry 46-3.) Plaintiff argues that Ms. Davis “never evaluated Plaintiff’s job

performance prior to demoting her and did not receive nor solicit any input from Plaintiff’s former

supervisor and evaluator[, Bost].” (Docket Entry 46 at 2-3; Docket Entry 46-1 at 11-14.) Plaintiff

contends that “Defendant’s expectations were rankly illegitimate.” (Docket Entry 46 at 9.)

Plaintiff goes on to argue that Superintendent Butler “never met with the Plaintiff prior

to demoting her.” (Docket Entry 46 at 9; see also Docket Entry 44-15 at 5.) She argues that

“[h]e noted ‘concerns’ brought to his attention by board members, principals, and parents”

but that he did not have any written correspondence from anyone who expressed concerns to

him regarding Plaintiff. (See Docket Entry 46 at 9; see also Docket Entry 44-15 at 9.) Plaintiff

argues that board members “do not have any day-to-day involvement with her program.”

(Docket Entry 46 at 9.) Plaintiff further argues that “[i]t defies common sense that no one

contacted Plaintiff’s previous supervisor about her alleged shortcomings. … Ironically, the

only complaint about the grant and budgeting process was brought by Plaintiff herself, in

2019, and included issues during Davis’s tenure.” (Id.; Docket Entry 47-2.)

Here, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has at least raised a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether she was performing her job duties at a level that met her employer’s legitimate

expectations at the time of the adverse employment action. An employee “may establish that

she was meeting her employer’s expectations by providing: (1) her employer’s concessions that

she was performing satisfactorily at the time of the adverse action; [or] (2) evidence of prior

positive performance reviews from the employer[.]” Conyers v. Va. Hous. Dev. Auth., 927

F.Supp.2d 285, 292 (E.D.Va. 2013), aff’d, 533 Fed. Appx. 342, 342 (4th Cir.2013) (citing King,

328 F.3d at 149-50; Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., No. CIV.A. DKC 06-2892, 2010 WL 5055790,

at *6-7 (D. Md. Dec. 3, 2010) (unpublished), aff’d, 440 F. App’x 220 (4th Cir. 2011)).9

In Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 649-650, the Fourth Circuit held that at the prima facie stage,

the inquiry regarding performance is not necessarily confined to the employer’s perception of

the employee’s performance, and that an employee may satisfy this factor of her prima facie

case by introducing evidence that raises a question of fact as to whether the employer’s

expectations were legitimate or genuine by pointing to positive reviews or events that took

place near the time of the adverse action. Tedder v. CareSouth Carolina, Inc., No. CV 4:20-707-

SAL-KDW, 2021 WL 8014682, at *14 (D.S.C. Dec. 15, 2021) (unpublished), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Tedder v. Care S.C., Inc., No. CV 4:20-707-SAL, 2022 WL 909397

(D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2022). Furthermore, again, “a plaintiff may [offer] a prima facie case by

[producing] evidence that demonstrates (or at least creates a question of fact) that the

employer’s expectations were illegitimate.” See Ruff, 226 F. App’x at 301; see also Warch v. Ohio

Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, (4th Cir. 2006).

First, to the extent that “the inquiry regarding performance is not necessarily confined

to the employer’s perception of the employee’s performance[,]” Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Letter

9 However, “the fact that plaintiff may have received positive performance evaluations in earlier

years [is not] dispositive of the question whether the [employer] was satisfied with plaintiff’s performance

and professional conduct during the years immediately preceding [her] termination.” Luther v. Gutierrez,

618 F. Supp. 2d 483, 492 (E.D. Va. 2009). For example, where an “employer repeatedly warned the

employee about work deficiencies occurring over an eighteen-month period prior to the employment

action” but “[t]he employee had otherwise received raises and favorable reviews for the eight-year period

she worked[,]” a prior positive performance review would be insufficient to offer a prima facie case,

because “summary judgment for the employer is appropriate where poor job performance at the time

of employment action is only contradicted by evidence the employee performed well in the past.” Holtz

v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 408 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (M.D.N.C. 2006), aff’d, 242 F. App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2007)

(citing Peele v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 328-29 (7th Cir. 2002)).

(Docket Entry 44-17) and 2019 Letter (Docket Entry 47-2) support her argument that she has

offered a prima facie case. See Tedder, 2021 WL 8014682, at *14. However, the undersigned

acknowledges that, via this approach, Plaintiff “can prove only the unremarkable fact that she

and [her employer] disagreed about the quality of her work.” Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d

274, 280 (4th Cir. 2000). Without more, Plaintiff’s contention that her employer’s expectations

were illegitimate, supported only by the Rebuttal Letter and the 2019 Letter, is insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of performance.

However, taking all evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, there is an issue of material fact as to whether her employer’s expectations at the time

of her demotion, as asserted via Ms. Davis, were legitimate or genuine. Plaintiff presented

evidence that could lead to the inference that they were not. “If an employer genuinely believed

that one of its employees was performing poorly … , it seems likely that it would at the very least

not rate the employee’s performance highly….” Sempowich, 19 F.4th 643, 650 (4th Cir. 2021).

And yet there is evidence that Plaintiff’s employer (via Bost) rated Plaintiff’s overall performance

highly only three weeks prior to her demotion. (Docket Entries 44-10; 46-3; see also Docket

Entry 46-1 at 14.) The Fourth Circuit has previously held that similar evidence was sufficient to

survive summary judgment. See Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 651 (citing Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc.,

922 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2019)). Here, as in Haynes and Sempowich, there is evidence that

Plaintiff’s employer signaled to Plaintiff that it viewed her overall performance positively. “[I]f

[Defendant] asserts that it reassigned [Plaintiff’s] position due to weaknesses she supposedly

demonstrated throughout most of her tenure, it cannot simultaneously argue that the court

should ignore evidence about her performance during that same period.” Id.

Moreover, the lack of any apparent effort by Defendant, via Ms. Davis and/or

Superintendent Butler, to seek to correct Plaintiff’s alleged shortcomings prior to her demotion or

to enable her to improve her performance by being provided with an action plan or a

performance-improvement plan (“PIP”) (Docket Entry 46 at 6, 12; Docket Entry 46-1 at 15;

Docket Entry 47-3 at 1-3; see also Compl. ¶¶ 40-41), supports a finding that Plaintiff has sufficiently

offered the second factor of her prima facie case. See Caban v. MET Lab’ys, Inc., No. CV JKB-17-

1872, 2019 WL 2146915, at *8 (D. Md. May 16, 2019) (unpublished) (collecting cases).

However, this does not mean that a factfinder will ultimately find in Plaintiff’s favor

on the disparate treatment claims. See Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 651. Rather, the undersigned

finds only that, as to first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, a court cannot grant a party

summary judgment when there are genuine issues of material fact, and here the record reveals

factual disputes as to one of the key factors of Plaintiff’s prima facie case. See id. Having

found that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff met her minimal

burden to show that she performed her job in a satisfactory manner that met her employer’s

legitimate expectations, the undersigned now turns to the fourth factor of the prima facie case.

2. Plaintiff has met her burden of producing evidence

supporting an inference of unlawful discrimination.

At the prima facie stage, evidence that a plaintiff’s job was filled by an individual outside

of her protected class supports a reasonable inference of discrimination. Wannamaker-Amos,

126 F.4th at 255 (citing Lettieri, 478 F.3d at 647); see also Dabney v. Christmas Tree Shops, 958 F. Supp.

2d 439, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It is well-settled, however, that “the mere fact that a plaintiff

was replaced by someone outside the protected class will suffice” to establish the required

inference of discrimination at the prima facie stage.”) (citing Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital

Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001)), aff’d sub nom. Dabney v. Bed Bath & Beyond, 588 F. App’x

15 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Moffat v. First Union Nat. Bank, No. 3:97CV234-MCK, 1999 WL

1940057, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 1999) (unpublished) (discussing Title VII discrimination claim

in terms of “wrongful discharge”); Tilghman v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 312 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189

(D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 154 F. App’x 221 (2d Cir. 2005) (plausible assertions of discrimination

combined with undisputed fact that plaintiff was fired by a white superintendent and a majority-

white board sufficed to complete prima facie case). The undisputed evidence in the record

shows that Plaintiff was replaced by Lessley Saenz-Mader, a Caucasian person. (Docket Entry

44-7 at 7.) This evidence suffices to meet Plaintiff’s burden to show that her demotion occurred

under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination. Thus, the

evidence in the record as to Plaintiff’s job performance and as to Plaintiff’s replacement by

Saenz-Mader is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination.10

ii. Defendant has produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

for Plaintiff’s demotion.

At the second McDonnell Douglas step, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Wannamaker-

Amos, 126 F.4th at 256-57 (ultimately quoting Hill, 354 F.3d at 286). The employer’s burden

at this stage “is one of production, not persuasion; it can involve no credibility assessment.”

Id. (citing Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (internal citation omitted)). Once “an employer articulates a

10 Accordingly, at the prima facie stage, the Court need not address Defendant’s argument

regarding comparators (Docket Entry 44 at 14-19; Docket Entry 55 at 1-4). Tedder, 2021 WL 8014682,

at *15 (declining to “delv[e] into the comparator analysis” where “the discussion of a change in status

near the time of termination is sufficient for [Plaintiff’s] relatively light prima facie burden” and finding

that “Plaintiff has set forth evidence of an inference of discrimination, thereby satisfying the fourth

[factor] of the prima facie case”).

reason for discharging the plaintiff not forbidden by law,” we do not evaluate “whether the

reason was wise, fair, or even correct.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, again, Defendant claims Plaintiff was reassigned due to “various shortcomings in

Plaintiff’s performance, including that she was untimely or unresponsive in important

communications, that she lacked an understanding of and did not prioritize budget issues within

the EC department, that she lacked follow-through, and that she did not appropriately support

staff.” (Docket Entry 44 at 9, 11-13; see also Docket Entries 44-1, 44-2, 44-3, 44-4, 44-5, 44-6,

44-11; 55-1.) Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s reassignment was one of many

personnel changes made pursuant to a management decision by Superintendent Butler to

reassign[ ] multiple … central office staff to new roles in order to reduce the size

of the leadership cabinet and because certain district leaders had no experience

as school principals, which Dr. Butler felt was essential to being a successful

supervisor of principals. [(Docket Entry 54-3 at 16; Docket Entry 44-7 at 5-6.)]

(Docket Entry 44 at 3.) The undersigned finds that Defendant has thus produced evidence

sufficient to shift the burden back to Plaintiff.

iii. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

The undersigned now turns to the third and final step under McDonnell Douglas. Here,

the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to produce evidence sufficient to create a material issue of

fact as to whether Defendant’s alleged reason for the adverse employment action was not its

true reason, but rather a pretext for discrimination. Wannamaker-Amos, 126 F.4th 244, 257

(4th Cir. 2025) (citing Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223). A plaintiff may establish pretext through two

routes. The first is offering evidence that the employer’s justification is “unworthy of

credence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256). The second is adducing

other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of discrimination. Id. at 147.

“Proof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of

circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite

persuasive.” Id. If the plaintiff makes either showing of pretext, the case must be decided by

a trier of fact and cannot be resolved on summary judgment. Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 652. For

the following reasons, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden as to pretext.

Plaintiff makes the cursory argument that “in the potential summary judgment

argument, if and when the Defendant proffers some reason other than that stated in [the

Reassignment Letter], the same, under McDonnell Douglas, would amount to pretext.” (Docket

Entry 46 at 13.) Defendant has not done so (see generally Docket Entries 44, 55), and this

argument thus fails. Plaintiff goes on to argue that

Contrary to the obfuscations of the Defendant, Davis knew nothing about the

Plaintiff nor her performance. [(Docket Entry 46-1 at 11-14.)] Davis received no

written documentation of any “concerns” she allegedly discovered after demoting

Plaintiff, and in preparation for the grievance hearing, which took place two …

months after the July 19, 2022[,] demotion. [(Docket Entry 46-1 at 11; Docket

Entry 47-4.)] Davis claims she took notes, but did not keep them. The four[-]page,

single-spaced document is replete with quotes, allegedly from “stakeholders” that

provided her with that information after the fact. Here, she admits it was in

preparation for the grievance hearing. It is undoubtedly disingenuous and self-

serving as Davis is unable to support any of the allegations at the time of the

demotion. Quite frankly, the document actually supports Plaintiff’s “pretext”

argument under McDonnell Douglas discussed more fully below.

The Defendant’s argument on this issue is specious at best. Any attempt to

manufacture support to justify a decision to demote Plaintiff, practically

immediately, should not be rewarded with the grant of a dispositive motion.

The glaring problem with Defendant’s argument on this issue, and the very

reason it fails, is that Defendant’s expectations were rankly illegitimate.

Further to the point, Butler never met with the Plaintiff prior to demoting her.

He could not identify anyone that had an issue with Plaintiff’s performance. He

noted “concerns” brought to his attention by board members, principals, and

parents. However, he could not identify any principals nor EC program

specialists that had issues with Plaintiff’s job performance. [(Docket Entry 44-15

at 9.)] Butler’s testimony about board members having issues with Plaintiff is

informative as they do not have any day-to-day involvement with her program.

Finally on the issue of job performance, it is difficult to fathom how the plethora

of issues allegedly identified by Defendant, never reached anyone at the system

capable of addressing the same. It defies common sense that no one contacted

Plaintiff’s previous supervisor about her alleged shortcomings. … Ironically, the

only complaint about the grant and budgeting process was brought by Plaintiff

herself, in 2019, and included issues during [Ms.] Davis’s tenure.

(Docket Entry 46 at 8-9.)

1. Plaintiff fails to show Defendant’s justification for the

adverse employment action is unworthy of credence.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Defendant has submitted evidence that Ms. Davis was

directed to investigate concerns about Plaintiff’s performance, that she collected a substantial

volume of information about Plaintiff and her performance, and that the assessment of said

information led her to recommend to Superintendent Bulter that Plaintiff be reassigned. (Docket

Entries 44-1, 44-3; Docket Entry 54-2 at 3-5, 6-7, 8, 10.) This includes written documentation

and notes she took. (Docket Entries 44-1, 44-3.) At least some of this evidence was collected in

support of her reassignment recommendation prior to the adverse employment action (Docket

Entry 44-3 at 1; see also Docket Entry 55 at 5), and Ms. Davis received additional negative feedback

about Plaintiff’s performance after said action (Docket Entry 44-3 at 3). As Defendant points out,

Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Ms. Davis’s statement that “July 5-18, 2022, I received

feedback from various stakeholders within the district” is untrue. (Docket Entry 55 at 4.)

Moreover, Plaintiff herself made statements in her deposition that tend to support

some of Ms. Davis’s findings as to Plaintiff’s unsatisfactory performance. For example,

regarding more than one million dollars of unspent grant funds, Plaintiff stated, “I don’t know

that I knew I had the money to spend.” (Docket Entry 54-1.) Defendant also includes a grant

timeline that outlines a series of delays and errors that resulted in the submission of a grant

more than four months after its deadline. (See Docket Entry 44-6; 44-11 at 27-34.) While not

necessarily corroborative of Ms. Davis’s finding of Plaintiff’s “lack of fiscal understanding and

management” (Docket Entry 44-1; Docket Entry 44-3 at 2; Docket Entry 44-13 at 10),

Plaintiff’s statement does not support her argument that Defendant’s justification was

unworthy of credence. Similarly, Plaintiff does not offer evidence to refute the evidence

submitted by Defendant tending to support its contention that Plaintiff was untimely or

unresponsive in important communications. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 44-4 (email from

Hancock describing unresponsive communication by Plaintiff).)

As to Superintendent Butler, Plaintiff’s argument that he never met with her before

demoting her does not establish pretext; Plaintiff’s argument that Superintendent Butler could not

identify anyone that had an issue with her performance, while technically correct (see Docket Entry

54-3 at 4) is misplaced. The contention that this could somehow establish pretext is undermined

by the fact that Superintendent Butler himself did not conduct Plaintiff’s performance review,

and that Ms. Davis, who did conduct said review, was able to supply “specific names associated

with various quotes and comments captured in her review, including Chief Academic Officer

Ravonda Johnson, Principal Greg Holland, EC Program Specialist April Brantley, EC Program

Specialist Kara Ballard, NCDPI consultant Casey Favasuli, and Principal Dr. Hancock. [(Docket

Entry 55-1 at 5-6, 11-14.)]” (Docket Entry 55 at 6.) To the extent Plaintiff attempts to call into

question the validity of the quotes from these stakeholders, she does not do so by introducing

any conflicting evidence. Moreover, Plaintiff herself stated in a deposition that she has no

evidence that Ms. Davis fabricated any of the quotes in the review summary and findings for

the board appeal hearing. (Docket Entry 54-1 at 9-10; Docket Entry 44-3.)

Plaintiff offers no evidence to support her contention that Ms. Davis’s assessment was

disingenuous and self-serving. Nor does she support with any evidence her contention that her

employer’s expectations were illegitimate. As Defendant points out, Plaintiff does not even

identify what she believes said expectations were. (Docket Entry 55 at 7.) However, Defendant

submits evidence outlining what it contends were its reasonable expectations of Plaintiff

(Docket Entry 44-12 (ABSS Executive Director of EC Job Description)), and, again, Plaintiff

offers no contradictory evidence. In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments fall far short of demonstrating

that Defendant’s justification for the adverse employment action is unworthy of credence.

2. Plaintiff fails to adduce other forms of circumstantial

evidence sufficiently probative of discrimination.

One possible means by which Plaintiff could prove pretext is by offering evidence

showing that she was held to different standards than others in similar leadership positions.

See, e.g., Laing v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 703 F.3d 713, 719 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is at [the] third step

that McDonnell Douglas identified the significance of comparator evidence: the Court explained

that ‘especially relevant’ to a showing of pretext would be evidence that other employees who

were similarly situated to the plaintiff (but for the protected characteristic) were treated more

favorably.”); Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 650. Here, however, Plaintiff provides no evidence of a

comparator who could support a showing of pretext.11 Plaintiff offers no evidence of any other

11 Plaintiff’s allegations (see Compl. ¶¶ 14-18) made “upon information and belief[,]” to the

extent they are relied on to make arguments regarding possible comparators, are insufficient to meet

her evidentiary burden on summary judgment. Murray, 2021 WL 3072467, at *9.

person who was assessed and found to have comparable performance issues and yet was not

subject to adverse employment action. In fact, Plaintiff testified that she had no knowledge

of any cabinet member outside of a protected class who was not reassigned despite having

documented performance issues. (Docket Entry 44-13 at 15-16.) Plaintiff argues that

Defendant[ ] employed approximately [21] persons in leadership roles within the

past [five] years. Of those, [four] were African-American. From August[ ] 2022,

one month from the hire date for both Butler and Davis, until May[ ]2024, [zero]

African-Americans were in leadership roles. [(Docket Entry 44-7.)] [Three]

African-Americans were employed in leadership roles in July[ ]2022.

(Docket Entry 46 at 5.) The undersigned acknowledges that “[s]tatistics can provide important

proof of employment discrimination,” both as part of a prima facie case and in showing pretext.

Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 456 (4th Cir. 1994). Courts may, however, disregard statistical evidence

“with little or no probative value.” See id. Moreover, “[s]tatistics alone are not sufficient to prove

pretext in individual disparate treatment cases” and “an employer’s overall employment statistics

will have little direct bearing on the specific intention of the employer when making a particular

adverse employment decision.” Id. (citing Bostron v. Apfel, 104 F. Supp. 2d 548, 554-55 (D. Md.

2000), aff’d, 2 F. App’x 235 (4th Cir. 2001); Luqmaan v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d

762, 771 (W.D. Va. 2015) (statistical evidence purporting to show disparate treatment could not

show that the “particular reassignment” at issue “formed part of that pattern”)).

Here, Plaintiff has offered no evidence that the statistics she proffers were relevant to

Ms. Davis’s or Superintendent Butler’s personal intentions. She makes no comparison to the

relevant labor pool and does not support her statistics with expert testimony. Furthermore,

Plaintiff does not account for the evidence in the record that Lajuana Norfleet (another African-

American woman subject to adverse employment action in July 2022)12 was replaced by Yolanda

Anderson, an African-American woman, who began serving as Executive Director for Student

and Family Services beginning on September 1, 2022. (Docket Entry 44-7 at 7.) The

undersigned therefore finds that Plaintiff’s proffered statistics, without more, fail to establish

pretext. Accord Carter, 33 F.3d at 456; Brown v. First Cmty. Bank, No. 7:18CV00404, 2019 WL

5445300, at *6 (W.D. Va. Oct. 23, 2019) (unpublished), aff’d, 814 F. App’x 788 (4th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff’s sole remaining contention with regard to comparators is that “none of the

other leadership ‘reassignments’ put members outside of the protected class in positions where

they were lateral to co-workers they formally [sic] supervised.” (Docket Entry 46 at 10.) She

argues that Richardson and Finberg, both Caucasian females, were “reassigned from a Chief’s

position to an Executive Director. However, Plaintiff was not.” (Id.) While it is undisputed

that she, Finberg, and Richardson dealt with the same supervisor, Plaintiff offers no evidence

that these three were subject to the same standards and engaged in the same conduct without

such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the

employer’s treatment of them for it. Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223-24 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up)

(quoting Haywood, 387 Fed. App’x at 359); Lightner v. City of Wilmington, N.C., 545 F.3d 260,

265 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The similarity between comparators and the seriousness of their

respective offenses must be clearly established in order to be meaningful.”). Thus, without

more, Plaintiff’s contention is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

12 Defendant produced evidence contradicting Plaintiff’s assertion (Docket Entry 46-2 at 4-5)

that another African-American woman, Valerie Andrews, was demoted. (Docket Entry 44 at 19 n.1

(“Dr. Butler corrected that point, sharing that he ‘had no concerns with Dr. Andrews’ and ‘she did a

great job’ and he ‘did not’ reassign her. [(Docket Entry 44-15 at 9.)] Dr. Davis confirmed that Dr.

Andrews was not reassigned. [(Docket Entry 44-14 at 9.)]”).)

Finberg and Richardson as comparators. Furthermore, Plaintiff offers no argument or

evidence to dispute Defendant’s contention that “the fact that Jeremy Martin (a white man

[with performance concerns]) was moved from Director of School Administration to an

assistant principal (which is a school administrator) strongly suggests that Mr. Martin was also

moved to a position where he was lateral to school administrators that he was formerly the

director over.” (See Docket Entry 44 at 3, 15, 17; Docket Entry 44-15 at 13; see also Docket

Entry 44-3 at 14; Docket Entry 55 at 2.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s comparator arguments fail.

Plaintiff argues that “[p]rior to her demotion, Plaintiff was not placed on a monitored

growth, directed growth, or mandatory improvement plan as per board policy.” (Docket

Entry 46 at 6; Docket Entry 46-1 at 15.) Reference is made in the record to ABSS “Policy

7811, Plans for Growth and Improvement of Licensed Employees.” (Docket Entry 44-14 at

8; see also Docket Entry 44-15 at 11.) Policy 7811 provides, in pertinent part, that

[i]f an employee does not meet this standard, the superintendent and

administrative staff shall address any identified performance or other deficiencies

through appropriate means, including placing the employee on a monitored

growth, directed growth, or mandatory improvement plan when required by state

law, State Board policy or this policy, or when otherwise deemed necessary.

(Docket Entry 46-1 at 15.) Plaintiff makes no argument that she was entitled to being placed

on an improvement plan under this policy. The undersigned takes judicial notice of the

subsequent paragraph of Policy 7811, which states:

Growth and mandatory improvement plans as defined by law and this policy

are valuable tools to promote the professional development of licensed

employees. The board recognizes, however, that not all conduct and performance

issues require the development of a plan. Administrators and supervisory personnel are

authorized to address … inadequate performance using such other lawful means as they may

deem appropriate. This policy shall not be interpreted to limit in any way the

authority of administrators or other supervisory personnel to direct and

reprimand licensed employees for … inadequate performance.13

Thus, the language of the policy itself suggests Plaintiff was not entitled to be placed on any

improvement plan, and that the decision was ultimately at her employer’s discretion. Even

assuming arguendo that Plaintiff was entitled to placement on such a plan, Defendant’s failure

to so place her, without more, is insufficient to establish pretext. Tweed v. Rappahannock Reg’l

Jail, No. 1:16-CV-01164, 2017 WL 6395853, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x

171 (4th Cir. 2018); see also Joyner-Pettway v. Cvent, Inc., No. 116CV892LMBTCB, 2017 WL

519860, at *6 (E.D. Va. Feb. 7, 2017) (unpublished) (plaintiff’s suggestion that employer’s

failure to put her on PIP was not sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment

where plaintiff offered no information about how often employer decides to put employees

on PIP as opposed to terminating them, and offered no evidence of what criteria employer

uses to decide whether a PIP would be appropriate); Weil v. Sunrise Senior Living Mgmt., Inc., No.

CV RDB-20-701, 2021 WL 5742383, at *9 (D. Md. Dec. 1, 2021) (unpublished) (similar) (citing

DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 298-99 (4th Cir. 1998)); E.E.O.C v. Clay Printing Co.,

955 F.2d 936, 946 (4th Cir. 1992) (“It is not for this court or any other governmental agency

to direct the business practices of any company.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s argument regarding the

lack of placement on an improvement plan is unavailing.

Plaintiff offers two letters she wrote and her single positive performance review by Bost

to refute the many performance issues identified by Defendant. (Docket Entries 44-10, 44-17;

13 ABSS Policy Manual (Policy Code 7811), https://filecabinet9.eschoolview.com/560B0526-

97E5-4B9F-BAA3-

A6B0666EA9F9/7000%20Series/7811PlansforGrowthandImprovementofLicensedEmployees.pdf

(last visited July 2, 2025) (emphasis added).

46-3; 47-1; 47-2; 47-3.) Plaintiff does not support these with testimony or affidavits from Bost,

or from any other individual who might be in a position to offer an assessment contrary to that

of Ms. Davis or Superintendent Butler. Again, the fact that Plaintiff herself disagrees with her

employer’s evaluation of her performance and its ultimate decision to reassign her, without

more, cannot meet her burden at the third McDonnell Douglas stage. The same is true as to her

contention that Bost or “anyone at the system” should have been contacted regarding her

performance issue prior to her reassignment. (See Docket Entry 46 at 9.)

Ultimately, “Plaintiff’s suspicions of ill intent and perceived superiority are insufficient

to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext.” Williamson v. Sch. Bd. of the City of

Chesapeake, No. 2:23CV224, 2025 WL 1008577, at *10 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2025) (citing Fry v.

Rand Constr. Corp., 964 F.3d 239, 248 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining that it is the “perception of the

decision maker which is relevant, not the self-assessment of the plaintiff”); Vannoy v. FRB of

Richmond, 827 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that a “plaintiff’s own assertions of

discrimination in and of themselves are insufficient to counter substantial evidence of legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons” for an employment decision); Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d

208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that, with respect to pretext, the plaintiff’s self-assessment

is irrelevant); McNaught v. Va. Cmty. College Sys., 933 F. Supp. 2d 804, 824 (E.D. Va. 2013) (finding

plaintiff’s disagreement with defendant’s decision insufficient to establish pretext and escape

summary judgment). Contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, Defendant has submitted

sufficient evidence to support its argument that the decision to demote Plaintiff was not

motivated by racial discrimination. Critically, Plaintiff has submitted insufficient evidence of her

own to dispute this argument or to otherwise create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext.

In sum, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, would not permit a

reasonable factfinder to determine that the reasons Defendant gave for subjecting Plaintiff to

the adverse employment action represented pretext for race discrimination. Accord James v. R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1:09CV552, 2013 WL 286248, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 2013)

(unpublished). Defendant has provided a non-discriminatory reason for said action. Plaintiff,

in turn, has failed to show that record evidence raises a material question of fact regarding

whether Defendant’s explanation constitutes pretext for racial discrimination.

III. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docket Entry 43) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

A judgment reflecting this Memorandum Opinion and Order will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

This the 8th day of July, 2025.

/s/ Joe L. Webster

United States Magistrate Judge