In Re: Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding

07/08/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

April 1, 2025 Session

IN RE: TENNESSEE BONDING COMPANY, INC.,

d/b/a ACTION BAIL BONDING

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

Nos. C-23-185, C-23-189 Donald H. Allen, Judge

No. W2024-01063-CCA-R3-CD

Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding (“the Bonding Company”),

appeals from the trial court’s denial of its petitions to obtain bonding privileges in the

Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The Bonding Company contends that (1) the trial court

improperly held a hearing without counsel present, (2) the trial court erroneously

considered certain evidence without the required necessary authentication or identification

in violation of the Rules of Evidence, and (3) the evidence did not support the trial court’s

denial of approval to write bonds. After review, we affirm.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(d) Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

KYLE A. HIXSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY,

JR., and TOM GREENHOLTZ, JJ., joined.

Cayley J. Turrin, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tennessee Bonding Company,

Inc., d/b/a Action Bail Bonding.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Edwin Alan Groves, Jr., Assistant

Attorney General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; and Matthew Floyd,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 12, 2023, the Bonding Company and its agents, Brian Cole, Kenneth

Holmes, and Jessica Cerniglia, petitioned the Madison County Circuit Court for approval

to write bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District at a capacity of fifty million dollars.

The petition indicated that Mr. Cole and Mr. Holmes maintained “a financial or managerial

interest” in the Bonding Company and that, in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-11-317, affidavits from each agent were attached thereto. Separately, Ms.

Cerniglia filed a petition with the trial court on July 14, 2023, seeking approval for her to

write bail bonds as an agent of the Bonding Company. This petition also indicated that

Ms. Cerniglia would submit the required documentation. Additionally, various certificates

for each of the Bonding Company’s agents reflecting compliance with continuing

education requirements were attached to these petitions. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-11-402.

The first hearing held on these petitions took place on November 27, 2023. At the

outset of the hearing, the trial court said that it would “hear whatever proof” the Bonding

Company had to offer. Counsel for the Bonding Company indicated that it was content to

“rely on [its] petition[s,]” but noted that the co-owners of the Bonding Company, as well

as Ms. Cerniglia, were present in the courtroom if the trial court had any questions for

them. The trial court indicated that it wanted to hear from both owners of the Bonding

Company.

Mr. Cole was placed under oath and testified that he was the president and co-owner

of the Bonding Company, which was headquartered in Knox County. Mr. Cole said that

he had worked in the bonding industry for thirty years and had no criminal history. Mr.

Cole denied that he had “any civil judgments” entered against him or that he had “ever

declared bankruptcy.”

Mr. Cole stated that Action Bail Bonding, which was headquartered in Covington,

was a subsidiary of the parent company, Tennessee Bonding Company, Inc., and that it

maintained a local office in Madison County. According to Mr. Cole, the Bonding

Company had multiple agents writing bonds in various judicial districts throughout the

state, in both the name of the parent and its subsidiaries. Mr. Cole maintained that the

Bonding Company filed the required semiannual reports in the judicial districts where it

was approved to write bonds.

Then, Mr. Holmes, also a co-owner of the Bonding Company, stated under oath that

he had worked in the bonding industry for approximately twelve years and had no criminal

history. According to Mr. Holmes, the Bonding Company was authorized to write bonds

in most of the judicial districts in the state, being approved in approximately eighty-five of

Tennessee’s ninety-five counties. Mr. Holmes averred that, in some districts, the parent

company wrote bonds under the name of a subsidiary, either Action Bail Bonding or Free

At Last, given that those subsidiaries had “local notoriety” before being purchased by the

parent company. Mr. Holmes affirmed that, although the Bonding Company had “a whole

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bunch of different fictitious name filings with the Secretary of State[,]” the Bonding

Company was not using any other names besides these three to write bonds. He also

informed the trial court that the Bonding Company wrote approximately fifteen thousand

bonds a year and that the Bonding Company filed the required semiannual reports in every

district where it was authorized. He denied that the Bonding Company had any “final

forfeitures outstanding anywhere across the State.”

Counsel for the Bonding Company indicated that the Bonding Company was

presently approved in the Twenty-First Judicial District to write bonds at a capacity of fifty

million dollars and was requesting the same in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The trial

court noted that the maximum to be issued for a single bond in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial

District was two-hundred thousand dollars.

Counsel averred that the Bonding Company had attached to its original petition a

letter of good standing for most of the districts where it did business, but for those districts

where it was unable to obtain a letter, it had included the most recent semiannual reports

in lieu thereof. The trial court asked counsel if she could obtain letters of good standing

from each judicial district where the Bonding Company operated, but she said that she

could not because some districts had refused to issue such a letter. The trial court indicated

that the Bonding Company would, nonetheless, be required to submit these letters because

it needed them to assess the Bonding Company’s “overall” liability, such as how many

bonds were outstanding and how many were in either conditional or final forfeiture status.

The trial court stated that it would provide an order to counsel that she could give to the

various court clerks of those districts to facilitate obtaining the letters. Although Mr. Cole

and Mr. Holmes had attached to their petition certificates indicating continuing education

compliance for 2022, the trial court requested that they file updated certificates for 2023.

The court clerk noted that the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”) criminal

background report had been received for Mr. Holmes. According to the court clerk, Mr.

Holmes had a previous charge for “assault with bodily harm” on April 11, 2022, in

Knoxville but that those charges had been dismissed on August 27, 2023. She had not

received a report on Mr. Cole.

The trial court asked the Bonding Company to submit the requested information by

the end of December and took the case under advisement. The trial court also stated that

it wanted the State to file a response to the petitions because it had not done so yet. The

matter was reset for January 29, 2024, and the trial court indicated that the Bonding

Company’s owners and Ms. Cerniglia should again be present at that time in case the need

for additional information arose.

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The State filed its response to the petitions on November 30, 2023. The response

indicated that the District Attorney’s Office had “no opposition” to the Bonding

Company’s request and that it would leave the determination of the Bonding Company’s

approval to the discretion of the trial court.

The next hearing took place as scheduled on January 29, 2024. The trial court

indicated that it had received “a packet of information” from the Bonding Company “last

Friday” but that it had not had a chance to review the documents. 1

Counsel for the Bonding Company indicated that they had encountered “a great deal

of problems” getting the requested letters of good standing. She noted that the president

of the Bonding Company “got yelled at by a number of courts.” She said she had received

“a talking to politely from a judge’s assistant on how another judge can[not] order clerks

to do work,” to which she responded, “I’m between a rock and a hard place. That’s above

my pay grade.” Counsel asserted that the Bonding Company had “provided as much as [it]

could” within the given timeframe. According to counsel, all of the letters that had been

received from the districts willing to provide them indicated that the Bonding Company

was in good standing in the various judicial districts. Counsel also indicated that she had

tendered more letters that had arrived after the submission of the packet. The trial court

asked if counsel had a list of the districts where she was unable to obtain the letters, and

she replied that the “talking to” she received came from a judicial assistant in Putnam

County. Counsel said she could compile a list and email it to the court, and the trial court

expressed a desire for her to do so.

Upon questioning by the trial court, counsel confirmed that the Bonding Company

wrote bonds in three different company names throughout the State, all of which were

licensed. The trial court asked that the Bonding Company also submit information relating

to these companies so that the trial court could obtain a comprehensive assessment of the

Bonding Company’s financial condition.

The trial court stated that it needed time to review the information and reset the

matter for February 26, 2024. The trial court confirmed that all interested parties would

still need to appear at the next hearing. Counsel then noted that the Bonding Company’s

president was traveling from Knoxville for the various hearings and asked the trial court if

it was amenable to conducting the hearing via Zoom. The trial court indicated its dislike

for virtual hearings and relayed its desire for people to be present in the courtroom “because

it’s serious business.” Counsel said, “That is fine,” and that concluded the hearing.

1

It does not appear that this “packet of information” was filed with the trial court clerk because it

is not a part of the record on appeal.

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The next hearing took place on March 18, 2024, later than originally scheduled.

Counsel for the Bonding Company indicated that she had complied with the trial court’s

previous request and had emailed a list of all the judicial districts that refused to provide

letters of good standing.2 The trial court indicated that affidavits from Mr. Cole and Mr.

Holmes, as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-317 setting forth their

criminal history, as well as declarations that they had never filed for bankruptcy, were not

attached to the original petition and were absent from any of the additional materials

submitted. Counsel averred that the affidavits had been provided, but she said she would

resubmit them.

Counsel noted that Mr. Holmes had a previous criminal charge in Knoxville, which

was later dismissed, and that she had discussed this information with the Madison County

Court Clerk. The court clerk noted that the TBI reports for both Mr. Cole and Mr. Holmes

had been received and that only Mr. Holmes’s aforementioned assault charge was

referenced therein. Counsel also said that the dismissed assault charge had been referenced

in the original affidavit by Mr. Holmes. Counsel offered, “[B]oth individuals can testify

that they do not have any criminal history. . . . And that they are all in compliance with the

educational requirements and not in any bankruptcy proceedings. They don’t have any

civil judgments against them.” However, the trial court declined the offer and requested

for documentation purposes that counsel file with the court clerk new affidavits “stating all

of the information that’s required under the statute[.]”

The trial court then stated that, according to documents it had reviewed from the

Tennessee Secretary of State, the Bonding Company was writing bonds in eight different

names across the State. Those documents reflected eight “active assumed names”—the

parent company, “Tennessee Bonding Company,” as well as its subsidiaries, “A All [t]he

Time Bail Bonds”; “Action Bail Bonding”; “Pride Bail Bonds”; “Free At Last Bonding”;

“Nashville Bail Bonds”; “Mr. Bail, Inc.”; and “A-1 Bonding.” Counsel confirmed that this

information was accurate, but she explained, “Now, they may not be writing on the bonding

slips each of those names, but they have bought those companies.” The trial court noted

that the judicial district’s local rules state that one could “only have [a] . . . financial interest

in one bonding company.” Counsel said one of the owners could explain the company

structure, but the trial court told counsel to have him include the information in the

affidavit.

The trial court reset the matter for April 22, 2024, to await submission of the

affidavits. The trial court asked that the owners and Ms. Cerniglia return to court for the

2

Again, we note that this information is not contained in the appellate record.

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hearing. The trial court mentioned that, if counsel received any additional letters of good

standing, then to submit them because “that’s what [the judicial district] require[d].”

Thereafter, the Bonding Company filed the requested affidavits from Mr. Cole and

Mr. Holmes. In those affidavits, Mr. Cole affirmed that he had not “committed any act of

professional misconduct as described in T[ennessee] C[ode] A[nnotated section]

40-11-126”; had “not been convicted of any criminal offenses in the United States”; was

“aware and ha[d] read the applicable bonding statutes, the Rules Governing Professional

Bondsmen and Requirements for Continuing Education, and the Rules of the Court

governing bonding companies”; and had “never declared bankruptcy under T[ennessee]

C[ode] A[nnotated section] 40-11-317(c).” Mr. Holmes made all of the same affirmations

except that his was worded, “I have never declared bankruptcy[,]” without reference to any

Code section. No additional information was contained therein.

On April 19, 2024, the State filed an amended response to the petitions; this time

opposing the Bonding Company’s request for approval to write bonds in the Twenty-Sixth

Judicial District. Thereafter, the Bonding Company filed a written response on April 22,

2024, to the State’s complaints against the company.

At the April 22, 2024 hearing, Mr. Cole, Mr. Holmes, and Ms. Cerniglia, along with

counsel, were present. The trial court stated that it wanted to hear from the prosecutor first

to discuss the information in the State’s amended response. The prosecutor relayed that

the State’s investigators had discovered that Mr. Cole had twice filed for bankruptcy in

Virginia and that he had state and federal tax liens, which were directly contrary to Mr.

Cole’s testimony at the November 27, 2023 hearing on those topics. Counsel for the

Bonding Company objected, stating that, “at this point in time, [she did not] know what

[the prosecutor was] referring to[,]” because she had not received “any proof” from the

State of these bankruptcies or tax liens, and noting that the State had not attached any

documents to its amended response.

The prosecutor replied that, although the District Attorney’s Office had “sent off for

certified copies of the bankruptc[ies] from the Eastern District of Virginia[,]” the State had

not yet received those documents. The prosecutor likewise noted that he was still “in the

process of getting certified copies of” documents from the Internal Revenue Service related

to Mr. Cole’s tax liens. Additionally, the prosecutor informed the trial court that the State

had also learned that the Bonding Company was either “currently suspended or ha[d] been

suspended recently” in other judicial districts. The State’s amended response referenced a

suspension in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. At the hearing, the prosecutor also

mentioned a suspension in the Tenth Judicial District “due to the fact that [the Bonding

Company] owed two final forfeitures that had not been paid.” The prosecutor averred that

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he had only just become aware of much of this information and had not yet “had time to

get certified copies of those orders[.]” The prosecutor requested a continuance for time to

obtain the necessary documentation.

Counsel for the Bonding Company stated that she was unable to recall with certainty

what Mr. Cole testified to at the November 27, 2023 hearing because she had not “been

provided any transcripts” of the prior proceedings. Counsel argued that, pursuant to the

wording of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-317(c), Mr. Cole had not “been

discharged . . . in a bankruptcy proceeding leaving unsatisfied outstanding forfeitures”

either as a bondsman individually or a corporation owner; therefore, he had not lied when

he said he had never filed for bankruptcy. The trial court asked, “He’s never declared

bankruptcy as a bondsman?” to which counsel answered, “Correct.” Regarding the tax

liens, counsel contended that it “is not considered a civil judgment against [a person] if it

is discharged.” Counsel also claimed that, without proof from the State, she was unable to

confirm the Bonding Company’s suspension in the Tenth Judicial District. As for the

Bonding Company’s suspension in the Twenty-Fourth District, counsel acknowledged that

the Bonding Company had been suspended in that district, but she attached to her response

an order of that suspension’s being lifted. Counsel claimed that the suspension was due to

“a clerical error that was resolved over [Z]oom.” The order stated that Ms. Cerniglia

“submitted the wrong form for” a defendant’s bond by using an Action Bail Bonding form,

rather than a Tennessee Bonding Company form, that Action Bail Bonding was not

licensed in that district, and that the error was to be rectified.

Counsel again noted that the State had not provided any proof of its allegations, and

she said that she would like to see this documentation so that the Bonding Company could

“subpoena [those sources] and have them cross-examined if [the parties were] wanting to

go forward.” However, counsel submitted that, regardless, these issues had no bearing on

“approving the bonding company under the statute[,]” and she asked that the State’s request

for a continuance be denied. She noted that the Bonding Company had been compliant

and appeared before the court multiple times, that the State had sufficient time at this point

to investigate this matter, and that continuing to come to court was a waste of company

resources. Specifically, counsel argued, “So, respectfully at this time I think with almost

a year of this case pending, we would request an order from Your Honor saying whether

you grant or deny it because the State’s listed objections in their response are not relevant

to anything in the [C]ode.” She later reiterated, “And, you know, we’ve been coming here

for several times and we’re honestly asking just for an order granting or denying us.”

Despite counsel for the Bonding Company’s protestations, the trial court granted

the prosecutor’s request for a continuance, noting the State’s obligation to the citizens of

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Tennessee to investigate these matters. The following colloquy between the trial court and

the Bonding Company’s counsel then took place:

[COUNSEL]: And, Judge, I would ask that I understand you’re opposed to

[Z]oom. I’m a high[-]risk pregnancy and I might be told to stop traveling at

any point in time. If that comes about, I would respectfully request I be able

to do that.

I don’t have an email. I’m clearly able to but, my doctor says it’s

week-to-week.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I mean, if I set another date, I’m going to expect

you to be here unless you just physically can’t be here.

[COUNSEL]: Correct. And I would attach a letter from my doctor saying

that I’m not able to be here in person and I would ask that we be able to do

it over [Z]oom.

THE COURT: No. I’m not doing that. I’m not going to do it over [Z]oom.

I mean, if we’re going to have a hearing, we’re going to do it here in open

court with everybody who has an interest being here.

[COUNSEL]: Okay.

THE COURT: I mean, you know. But, I’ll work with you. I mean, obviously

if you tell me that you’re a high[-]risk pregnancy, I don’t want to jeopardize

your health.

[COUNSEL]: Well, I understand that, Judge. I’m not due until November

and then I won’t be able to travel until January so it’s, you know, that’s why

I asked about [Z]oom, but I’ll let the Court know.

Upon agreement, the case was then reset for June 10, 2024.

On May 20, 2024, the State filed another amended response opposing the Bonding

Company’s petitions to write bonds. In the response, the State alleged the following

evidence contradicted previous assertions from the Bonding Company. First, Mr. Cole had

filed for bankruptcy individually on April 27, 1999, in the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia. Then, on November 11, 2011, Mr. Cole had filed for

bankruptcy as debtor Brian Cole Bail Bonds, LLC in the United States Bankruptcy Court

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for the Eastern District of Virginia, and Mr. Cole was the debtor designee in that petition.

Next, on January 19, 2022, the Bonding Company’s privilege to write bonds had been

suspended in the Twenty-Third Judicial District, and that suspension remained in place as

of March 9, 2024. Finally, on October 2, 2023, the Bradley County Circuit Court had

issued a final forfeiture order against the Bonding Company for a fifteen-thousand-dollar

bond; that the notice of final forfeiture had been served on the Bonding Company on

October 24, 2023; and that the bond remained unpaid as of March 7, 2024, resulting in

suspension of the Bonding Company’s privileges in the Tenth Judicial District. In the

response, the State also cited a local rule that stated, “All new bonding companies and

agents must have a letter of good standing from all the surrounding counties.”

Attached to this response was a transcript of the November 27, 2023 hearing; a copy

of both bankruptcy proceedings; and a copy of both suspension orders. The April 1999

bankruptcy petition filed by Mr. Cole individually listed as an unsecured debt a “bail bond

premium while employed at Bail America” in the amount of five thousand dollars. The

suspension order from the Tenth Judicial District also referenced another unpaid bond in

the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars and indicated that the Bonding Company

was emailed about this matter on January 30, 2024, and this bond likewise remained unpaid

as of March 7, 2024. The Dickson County Circuit Court “Order of Termination,”

representing the Twenty-Third Judicial District, stated as follows:

The State’s proof . . . established numerous final forfeitures on

appearance bonds made by Respondent Tennessee Bonding Company and

that many of those forfeitures remained unpaid as of the date of the hearing.

While the Respondent offered testimony by Kenneth Holmes, president of

Tennessee Bonding as to the efforts made to try to resolve the many final

forfeitures, the Court finds that the proof demonstrates a lack of attention to

its business activities within this District.

The order went on to provide examples of the Bonding Company’s lack of attention to

detail, including its failure to follow up on faxed requests for extensions, its obtaining a

court order for three exonerations and one extension without informing the trial judge that

those forfeitures were a basis for a pending motion to suspend its bond writing privileges,

and its failure to report its suspension in the Tenth Judicial District.

On June 7, 2024,3 the Bonding Company filed a written response to the State’s

filing. The Bonding Company averred that, because Mr. Cole’s bankruptcies had been

3

To place certain matters in context that are discussed later in this opinion, we note that the

certificate of service reflects that counsel for the Bonding Company emailed a copy of this response to

Assistant District Attorney General Matthew Floyd on June 4, 2024.

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discharged without leaving any unsatisfied outstanding forfeitures unpaid, they did not fall

under the statutory language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-317(c), and “thus

d[id] not matter in these proceedings.” Regarding its suspension in Bradley County, a part

of the Tenth Judicial District, the Bonding Company asserted,

[T]he Company was never served with the forfeiture order and thus had no

knowledge of this matter. Judge Donaghy of their Circuit Court investigated

and discovered that a clerk signed for the final forfeiture instead of proper

notice being given to the company. We are awaiting a letter from her stating

such but in the meantime any questions regarding this matter should be

directed to her office. The company has been reopened there for a couple of

months.

The Bonding Company noted that, in its original petition, it addressed its suspension in the

Twenty-Third Judicial District and had “attached the Court of Criminal Appeals ruling on

this matter.” According to the Bonding Company, it “ha[d] been trying for a year and [a]

half since the ruling to be opened back up, but hearings ke[pt] getting moved [six] months

at a time.” The Bonding Company further noted that it had “submitted the semiannual

report for this district to show the still pending bonds that the company [was] still liable

for.” The Bonding Company concluded, “At this time, all matters have been addressed

and we would respectfully request that an order in this matter be handed down

immediately.”

On Monday, June 10, 2024, the hearing took place as scheduled. At the outset of

the hearing, the trial court noted that neither counsel for the Bonding Company nor its

agents were present despite the trial court’s previous order to return to court in person for

further argument and proof. The trial court then discussed an email from counsel for the

Bonding Company that was sent to the court on Friday, June 7, 2024. The trial court

seemingly read the email for the record:

[U]nfortunately I will not be able to travel on Monday . . . . Please let me

know if [the trial judge] will do a [Z]oom [proceeding] as soon as

possible. . . . I talked to my clients and since I have been on this matter since

the beginning if the Judge cannot accommodate with a virtual option, . . . I

will not be able to come to court until after next year.

The trial court noted that it was “[o]bviously . . . not going to hear this matter by [Z]oom

or any type of virtual option.” It continued, “She knew to be here today . . . to present

further proof on behalf of her client in order of whether or not the Court would approve or

not approve the petitions.” The trial court then returned to reading counsel’s email: “At

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this point in time, . . . I do think it is appropriate that we get an order granting or denying

our company’s approval.” In the end, the trial court decided, “I do want to go forward and

at least make some kind of a ruling. I guess that’s what she’s asking the Court to just make

a ruling either approving or denying their petition[s].” Thereafter, the State presented proof

in opposition to the petitions.

The State made exhibits to the hearing the same documents attached to its May 20,

2024 response. Additionally, the State submitted a January 4, 2024 notice from the

Twenty-Fourth Judicial District, signed by a trial judge, suspending Ms. Cerniglia’s and

the Bonding Company’s approval to write bonds in that judicial district. The notice

provided that Ms. Cerniglia had written a bond in the name of Action Bail Bonding in an

amount of one-hundred thousand dollars, but that Ms. Cerniglia was not a listed agent of

that company, and that Action Bail Bonding did not have privileges to write bonds in that

district. The State also submitted an order from the Hickman County Circuit Court in the

Thirty-Second Judicial District, signed by a trial judge and dated January 2, 2024, imposing

a thirty-day suspension on the Bonding Company due to its failure to comply with a local

rule “by making a bond exceeding $100,000.00 without having knowledge of whether or

not the District Attorney General waived a source hearing.” For a period of one year, the

Bonding Company was also prohibited in that district from making bonds in an amount of

one-hundred thousand dollars or more “until an order approving the bond ha[d] been

entered by the Circuit Court Judge.”

The State observed that Mr. Cole’s and Mr. Holmes’s licenses to write bonds that

were attached to the Bonding Company’s original petition had now expired, and new

licenses had not been submitted. The State also noted that the Bonding Company’s

approval to write bonds in the Twenty-Third Judicial District remained terminated.

The State called Gail Mooney, the Madison County Circuit Court Clerk, who

testified that she was responsible for investigating the Bonding Company’s request for

approval to write bonds in the district. According to Ms. Mooney, she learned that the

Bonding Company’s “privileges had been suspended in about seven judicial districts,” so

she reached out to court clerks of other districts to obtain additional information. Ms.

Mooney confirmed that she had received orders from all seven districts and that some of

those orders had been entered into evidence. Ms. Mooney also became aware that, in

March 2022, the Seventeenth Judicial District had denied the Bonding Company approval

to write bonds.

Ms. Mooney investigated the bonding agents’ financial solvency, which was her

regular practice. She discovered that Mr. Cole had a federal tax lien for “small business”

activities against him in the amount of $266,585.00 and that Mr. Cole had declared

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bankruptcy in 1999 and 2011. Ms. Mooney was asked if she had documentation of the tax

lien, and she stated she had “a print screen” and that she obtained “a custom comprehensive

report” showing Mr. Cole’s tax “liens and judgments against him.” These documents

included a case number, Mr. Cole’s name, his social security number, the amount of the

lien, and reflected a recording date of March 2019. Ms. Mooney stated that she had verified

the federal tax lien “to be true and correct . . . [t]o the best of [her] knowledge.” These

documents also noted multiple “judgment[s]” and “civil suit[s]” against Mr. Cole, as well

as specifically a “civil judgment” in the amount of one thousand dollars. When asked if

Mr. Cole had a financial interest in more than one bonding company, Ms. Mooney said that

she had been in contact with the Tennessee Secretary of State’s office and learned that he

was “connected to about” eight different company names.

A copy of both the “print screen” and the “custom comprehensive report” Ms.

Mooney had obtained regarding Mr. Cole’s tax liens and “judgments” were entered as an

exhibit. The documents Ms. Mooney had acquired from the Tennessee Secretary of State,

as well as the TBI report prepared for Mr. Cole verifying his identifying information, were

also made exhibits. The trial court further admitted as an exhibit the circuit court order

establishing the local rules governing bonding companies in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial

District. The order reflects that Local Rule 6 requires, “All new bonding companies and

agents must have a letter of good standing from all the surrounding counties. The letter

should also inform our Clerk[’]s Office if they have any outstanding Conditional or Final

Forfeitures and if their bonding privileges have been suspended.” The order further

establishes Local Rule 10: “A bondsman or agent can only have a financial interest in one

bonding company.”

Thereafter, the trial court denied the Bonding Company’s petitions seeking approval

to write bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The trial court noted Ms. Mooney’s

testimony that the Bonding Company had been suspended in seven other judicial districts.

The trial court also noted its consideration of the Tennessee Secretary of State documents

indicating that the Bonding Company was writing bonds throughout the State using eight

different names, which was “misleading” and “problem[atic]” for regulation. It found that

Mr. Cole was “untruthful” when he testified at the November 2023 hearing that he had

never declared bankruptcy and had no civil judgments against him, noting the two

bankruptcies—one under the name of a bonding company—and the tax liens, specifically,

the 2019 federal tax lien of $266,585.00. The trial court found that Mr. Cole’s affidavit

was also “untruthful” and “inaccurate[,]” even though it purported to clarify that he had

never declared bankruptcy under the relevant statute. Referencing Tennessee Code

Annotated section 40-11-317, the trial court observed that if an affidavit is found to be

inaccurate, then the professional bondsman was to be immediately disqualified from

writing bonds. Additionally, it found that Mr. Holmes testified falsely that the Bonding

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Company had no outstanding final forfeitures at the time of the November 2023 hearing,

noting the October 2, 2023 final forfeiture of fifteen thousand dollars in Bradley County,

which was served on the Bonding Company on October 24, 2023, and remained unpaid.

The trial court noted that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125 permitted the trial

court to withdraw or suspend approval for a professional bondsman to write bonds due to

any unpaid final forfeiture.

The trial court also noted that it had not heard any “sworn testimony from” Ms.

Cerniglia. It stated that, based upon the documents submitted, she “apparently . . . had

issues with other judicial districts of not being truthful” and that she had been recently

suspended in another district. Accordingly, the trial court denied her petition as well.

The written order memorializing the trial court’s findings, as prepared by the

Assistant District Attorney General per the trial court’s request, was filed on June 20, 2024.

Thereafter, on July 3, 2024, the Bonding Company filed a “Request to Modify the Court’s

Order to Correct Inaccuracies.” The Bonding Company again averred that pursuant to the

statutory language, Mr. Cole was not required to disclose the bankruptcies. Relative to

proceedings in the Tenth Judicial District, the Bonding Company alleged that “the final

forfeiture was never served on an employee of the [B]onding [C]ompany but on a clerk of

the Bradley County Court[,]” and regardless, the final forfeiture had been paid. According

to the Bonding Company, because of these service issues, Mr. Holmes was unaware of the

forfeiture at the time he testified in November 2023. Moreover, the Bonding Company

contended that it “ha[d] not seen any proof” of Mr. Cole’s federal tax lien.

Regarding the Bonding Company’s failure to appear, counsel noted the issues with

her ability to travel due to her high-risk pregnancy and stated her exception for the record.

On this point, she relayed,

[B]ack at the last hearing, Counsel informed the Court that she is high[-]risk

pregnant and may not be able to appear at future hearings and would request

a [Z]oom option. The Court denied Counsel[’]s request at that time. On June

4, 2024, Counsel emailed Matthew Floyd of the District Attorney’s Office

and the Judge’s assistant with a Response to a State filed Motion and

informed the two individuals, “Unfortunately, my high[-]risk pregnancy

came with some complications these past couple of weeks. I am still hopeful

that I will be able to appear in person on the 10th but am asking if the Judge

would consider [Z]oom as a possibility if I [cannot] travel. I understand that

he is against that but these are extenuating circumstances out of my control.

I will of course inform you both on Friday if I am unable to travel as well.”

Counsel never received a reply. On June 7, 2024, Counsel emailed the same

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two individuals and stated, “Hi all. Unfortunately I will not be able to travel

on Monday. Please let me know if [the] Judge will do [a Z]oom [meeting]

as soon as possible. I talked with my clients and since I have been on this

matter since the beginning, if the judge cannot accommodate with a virtual

option I will not be able to come to court until after the new year.” Again,

Counsel received no reply.

. . . Unfortunately, during this pregnancy Counsel is very high risk and

not able to travel for more than two hours in a car. If Counsel were to drive

to Court, her pregnancy would have put her and her baby’s life in risk of a

blood clot or stroke. It saddens Counsel that she is having to disclose her

personal health information in a filing since this has been put in a Court order.

The Bonding Company also argued that its agents were “prohibited from appearing from

hearings on their own behalf by statute.” The Bonding Company requested that the matter

be set for a hearing in the new year. On July 19, 2024, the Bonding Company filed a notice

of appeal with this court.

The trial court held a hearing on the Bonding Company’s request for modification

on August 19, 2024, and again neither counsel for the Bonding Company nor its agents

were present. According to the trial court, counsel had again sent the court an email

“indicating that she wasn’t sure she was going to be able to make it due to some pregnancy

issues,” and requesting the hearing to be held over Zoom. The trial court said that it had

“explained [to counsel] that this was a matter that needed to be heard in open court and that

[the court] was not willing to hear this by [Z]oom or conference call.” Thereafter, the trial

court denied the request for modification, and a written order was entered to that effect on

August 22, 2024.

II. ANALYSIS

The Bonding Company now appeals from the trial court’s denial of approval for its

agents to write bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. Tennessee Code Annotated

section 40-11-125(a) provides that a professional bondsman’s “approval” to write bonds

may be summarily “withheld, withdrawn or suspended by any court if, after investigation,

it appears that a bondsman”:

(1) Has been guilty of violating any of the laws of this state relating to bail

bonds;

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(2) Has a final judgment of forfeiture entered against the bondsman which

remains unsatisfied;

(3) Is guilty of professional misconduct as described in § 40-11-126; or

(4) If applying for approval as a professional bondsman, has been convicted

in any state of the United States of two (2) or more misdemeanors which are

equivalent to Tennessee Class A or Class B misdemeanors; provided,

however, that the misdemeanor convictions shall have occurred within five

(5) years of the date the application for approval is filed.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(a) (Repl. 2018).4 Regarding a hearing and notice, the statute

provides for the following:

Any court withholding, withdrawing or suspending a bondsman or other

surety under this section shall notify the bondsman in writing of the action

taken, accompanied by a copy of the charges resulting in the court’s action.

If, within twenty (20) days after notice, the bail bondsman or surety files a

written answer denying the charges or setting forth extenuating

circumstances, the court shall call a hearing within a reasonable time for the

purpose of taking testimony and evidence on any issues of fact made by the

charges and answer. The court shall give notice to the bail bondsman, or to

the insurer represented by the bondsman, of the time and place of the hearing.

The parties shall have the right to produce witnesses, and to appear

personally with or without representation by counsel. If, upon a hearing, the

court determines that the bail bondsman is guilty as alleged in the charges,

the court shall thereupon withhold, withdraw or suspend the bondsman from

the approved list, or suspend the bondsman for a definite period of time to be

fixed in the order of suspension.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-125(b) (Repl. 2018). We review the trial court’s denial of

approval for a bonding company to write bonds in its jurisdiction de novo. Id. § -125(d)

(Repl. 2018).

4

Effective January 1, 2026, the newly established Board of Professional Bondsmen will begin to

regulate and license professional bondsmen. See 2025 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 491. This board, overseen by

the Department of Commerce and Insurance, will take over much of the regulation of bondsmen from the

courts, and the various Code sections have been amended accordingly. Id. For the purposes of our opinion,

we will cite to the Code sections in effect at the time these proceedings took place.

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We observe that, according to the very terms of Code section 40-11-125, the State,

through its courts, has a responsibility to the citizens of this state to investigate matters

concerning a bonding company’s ability to write bonds. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-11-125(a) (stating that “approval of a professional bondsman or other surety

may be withheld, withdrawn or suspended by any court if, after investigation, it appears

that a bondsman” has engaged in any of the enumerated prohibited behaviors) (emphasis

added)). Moreover, a court in which a bonding company executes bonds has specific

authority, at any time, to inquire as to the solvency of any bondsman and to investigate the

value of a bondsman’s assets and liabilities. Id. § -305.

If, after its investigation, the court finds that the bondsman:

(1) Is insolvent;

(2) Is not financially able to discharge the obligations of the bondsman’s

liabilities as surety;

(3) Has failed, refused or neglected to make the semiannual reports of assets

and liabilities as required in § 40-11-303;

(4) Has made and filed false semiannual reports; or

(5) Has failed to furnish the court with information touching upon solvency,

when called for[,]

then the court has the power to prohibit a bondsman from executing bonds until the court

becomes satisfied that the bondsman has become financially solvent. Id. § -306 (Repl.

2018). The court can also impose reasonable limitations on the total liability of the

bondsman’s undertakings in its court. Id.

A. Right to Representation

The Bonding Company argues that the trial court erred by proceeding with the June

10, 2024 hearing without its chosen counsel present. The Bonding Company also argues

that, even if its agents had been present at that hearing, they would have been unable to

represent themselves due to statutory proscription. The State replies that the Bonding

Company waived its right to participate in the June 10, 2024 hearing by failing to appear,

either through counsel or its agents, or move for a continuance after the trial court denied

its request for a Zoom hearing.

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1. Statutory Argument

First, we address the Bonding Company’s argument that, even if its agents had been

present at the June 10, 2024 hearing, they would have been unable to represent themselves

before the court. The Bonding Company contends that, even if its agents were present at

the hearing, “they would not have been permitted by law to address the Court” without

legal representation because this was not one of the limited enumerated circumstances

listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-302(f). The State replies that “[t]his

argument is puzzling because the trial court specifically asked the bonding agents ‘to

answer court’ by giving testimony in support of their petition[s,]” which is one of said

enumerated circumstances.

The State, quoting Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b), avers that,

regardless, the Bonding Company “completely ignores the statute authorizing bondsmen

‘to appear personally with or without representation by counsel’ at a hearing on a petition

to write bonds.” In response, the Bonding Company submits that Code section -125(b)

only applies “when a company has already been approved and that approval is being

withheld, withdrawn or suspended.”

The Bonding Company’s arguments in this regard are unpersuasive. First,

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-302 provides “general provisions” for

professional bondsmen. Subsection (f), the statutory provision relied upon by the Bonding

Company, provides as follows:

An individual sole proprietor professional bondsman, or the bondsman’s

agent, as an officer of the court, shall be permitted to answer court, surrender

a defendant based upon one (1) or more of the grounds set forth

in § 40-11-132, obtain an extension of time, or respond to a court’s request

for information without the necessity of obtaining legal counsel.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-302(f). By its explicit terms, the subsection enumerates four

settings when a professional bondsman may appear without the necessity of obtaining legal

counsel: (1) answer court; (2) surrender a defendant based upon one or more of the grounds

set forth in Code section -132; (3) obtain an extension of time; or (4) respond to a court’s

request for information.

In the present case, the trial court specifically asked the bonding agents to return to

court on June 10, 2024, and if necessary, for the agents “to answer court” or respond to the

“court’s request for information” by providing additional evidence in support of their

petitions—both of which are circumstances specifically recognized by subsection (f) as

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permissible without the necessity of obtaining counsel. Thus, contrary to what the Bonding

Company suggests, the appearance of its agents without counsel and their ability to address

the court were permitted by this statutory provision.

Next, we agree with the State that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125

lends further support for the proposition that the Bonding Company’s agents could have

appeared at the June 10, 2024 hearing with or without counsel present. Code section -125

is specifically applicable to a trial court’s summary decision to withhold approval, in the

first instance, to a professional bondsman to write bonds in its jurisdiction. See Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-11-125. If a bondsman’s approval to write bonds is summarily withheld, then

the trial court must provide the bondsman written notice “of the action taken, accompanied

by a copy of the charges resulting in the court’s action.” Id. § -125(b). If the bondsman

files a written answer within twenty days of the notice denying such charges, the trial court

is required to hold “a hearing within a reasonable time for the purpose of taking testimony

and evidence on any issues of fact made by the charges and answer.” Id. At this hearing,

“[t]he parties shall have the right to produce witnesses[] and to appear personally with or

without representation by counsel.” Id. (emphasis added). Certainly, if a bondsman may

appear without counsel at the hearing after approval has been summarily withheld, then

they logically may also appear during investigatory proceedings undertaken by the court

with or without counsel.

Accordingly, we conclude that both of these statutory provisions confirm that the

agents of the Bonding Company were permitted to appear before the court at the June 10,

2024 hearing with or without the representation of counsel. Even if the Bonding

Company’s chosen counsel was unavailable to attend the hearing, the Bonding Company’s

agents failed to either appear at the hearing as ordered by the trial court or seek other

counsel to represent them. Moreover, neither the Bonding Company’s agents, nor its

counsel, ever formally moved for continuance of the hearing, a matter which we discuss in

greater detail below.

2. Due Process

Next, we address the Bonding Company’s argument that the trial court erred by

proceeding with the June 10, 2024 hearing without its chosen counsel present. In this

regard, the Bonding Company notes that its counsel notified the trial court via email that

she was medically unable to travel due to her high-risk pregnancy and requested the trial

court to reconsider a virtual option; however, the trial court did not respond to either of her

emails. The State replies that the Bonding Company’s “argument sounds in due process”;

“it is unclear whether the company had a constitutionally protected property interest in

seeking approval to write bonds”; and regardless, the Bonding Company “received all the

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process that was conceivably due” in accordance with Code section 40-11-125(b). The

Bonding Company responds that “[t]his is a case where due process should be flexible[,]”

again noting the circumstances surrounding its counsel’s high-risk pregnancy, including

that she was ultimately physically unable to travel to attend the hearing, and that she chose

to email the trial court rather than document her health issues in the public record.

The Bonding Company’s argument in the present case focuses on the fairness of the

adjudicatory process itself that took place at the June 10, 2024 hearing, i.e., whether it was

afforded procedural due process protections when the hearing proceeded without the

Bonding Company’s counsel present. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution prohibit the federal and state governments from depriving any person

“of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V, amend.

XIV, § 1. Article 1, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution provides, “[N]o man shall be

taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or

exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the

judgment of his peers or the law of the land.”

These constitutional provisions “embody similar procedural protections and

guarantees.” State v. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, Inc., 993 S.W.2d 81, 85

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (first citing Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1988);

then citing State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tenn. 1980); and then

citing Daugherty v. State, 393 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tenn. 1965)). Those protections and

guarantees “prevent the government from infringing upon significant property or liberty

interests without first providing notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time

and in a meaning[ful] manner.” Id. (first citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470

U.S. 532, 542 (1985); and then citing Cooper v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 803 S.W.2d

200, 202 (Tenn. 1990)).

Before these procedural safeguards may be invoked, the allegedly aggrieved party

must possess a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Bd. of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-78 (1972). The right to engage in a chosen business, occupation,

or profession, including the bail bonds industry, without unreasonable governmental

interference may implicate both liberty and property interests subject to due process

protection. AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds, 993 S.W.2d at 85 (citing Loudermill,

470 U.S. at 543). However, there must also be a deprivation of that interest by the

government. Id. (citing Rowe v. Bd. of Educ., 938 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tenn. 1996)). For

procedural due process claims, “the deprivation by state action of a constitutionally

protected interest in ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not in itself unconstitutional; what is

unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (citations omitted). Thus, we must first

- 19 -

determine what process is due, if any, and whether such process has been afforded. In

determining the adequacy of the process due, courts weigh (1) the private interest affected

by the deprivation; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest in the process

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or alternative precautions; and (3) the

governmental interest involved, including the burden of additional safeguards. Mathews

v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

However, in this regard, the Bonding Company makes only one argument supported

by citation to legal authority: the Bonding Company cites to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.

471, 481 (1972), in its reply brief, for the conclusory proposition that “due process is

flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” The

Bonding Company makes no legal argument regarding what protected liberty or property

right was infringed upon by the trial court; whether the overall statutory process provided

for in Code section 40-11-125, which includes a provision for a post-deprivation hearing,

complies with constitutional mandates; or whether the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test

affords it more procedural process than it was given. The lack of argument, coupled with

the lack of connection to any specific supporting authority or relevant law, inhibits

meaningful appellate review in this case. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7) (“The brief of the

appellant shall contain . . . [a]n argument . . . with citations to the authorities and appropriate

references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on[.]”); Tenn. Ct. Crim.

App. R. 10(b) (“Issues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or

appropriate references to the record will be treated as waived in this court.”).

The Bonding Company has failed to include any argument whatsoever in these

regards, and it is not our role to construct the argument for it or undergo a multifaceted

procedural due process analysis unsupported by the briefs. See State v. Bristol, 654 S.W.3d

917, 924 (Tenn. 2022) (“In our adversarial system, the judicial role is not ‘to research or

construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her[.]’” (quoting Sneed v. Bd. Pro. Resp.,

301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010))); see also State v. Matthews, No. M2005-00843-CCA-

R3-CD, 2008 WL 2662450, at *17 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 8, 2008). Accordingly, an

appellate court “may decline to consider issues that a party failed to raise properly.” Id. at

923 (quoting State v. Harbison, 539 S.W.3d 149, 165 (Tenn. 2018)). We thus confine our

analysis to the limited due process issue as presented, that being whether the Bonding

Company had an adequate opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and manner.

The Bonding Company’s due process argument on appeal focuses on the trial

court’s denial of a virtual option to conduct the June 10, 2024 hearing, given its counsel’s

inability to travel due to her high-risk pregnancy. The Bonding Company first requested a

virtual option for these proceedings at the January 29, 2024 hearing, when counsel noted

that the Bonding Company’s president was traveling to court from Knoxville and indicated

- 20 -

that a Zoom hearing would be preferable for convenience. The trial court clearly expressed

its dislike for Zoom hearings at that time and indicated that such would not be permitted.

At the April 22, 2024 hearing, counsel first argued against the continuance requested

by the State, saying, “And, you know, we’ve been coming here for several times and we’re

honestly asking just for an order granting or denying us.” After the State was granted a

continuance, counsel noted that, although the court was “opposed to [Z]oom[,]” her doctor

might, at some point in time, require her to quit traveling long distances due to her

high-risk pregnancy. Counsel indicated that, if that occurred, she “would attach a letter

from [her] doctor saying that [she was] not able to be [present] in person” and, at that time,

request a hearing via Zoom. The trial court stated it would not hold a Zoom hearing, but it

qualified that it “would work with [her,]” as it had no interest in “jeopardiz[ing] [her]

health.” Counsel indicated that she would “let the Court know” about her health as time

progressed.

At the beginning of the Monday hearing on June 10, 2024, the trial court stated for

the record that counsel for the Bonding Company had sent an email to the court on Friday,

June 7, 2024, relaying that she was unable to travel, again requesting a Zoom hearing, and

noting that she would be unavailable to appear in the trial court until the following year.

Counsel concluded her email by stating, “At this point in time, . . . I do think it is

appropriate that we get an order granting or denying our company’s approval.”

The trial court here specifically denied the Bonding Company’s several requests to

hold any hearing via Zoom and mandated appearance by the Bonding Company at the June

10, 2024 hearing. In short, “the trial court put down a clear order, and [the Bonding

Company] failed to abide by it.” In re Daxleigh F., No. E2023-00749-COA-R3-PT, 2024

WL 864773, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 29, 2024) (rejecting claim that the trial court

violated a mother’s due process rights by denying her request to appear via Zoom at the

final hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights), no perm. app. filed. Despite these

clear instructions, counsel continued to send emails to the trial court at the last hour

requesting for the trial court to reconsider its decision and provide her with an option to

appear virtually. However, these emails were often ambiguous, including counsel’s email

to the trial court as late as June 4, 2024, that she was still hopeful that she would be able to

attend the June 10 hearing in person.

Importantly, this matter is not before us for review of the denial of a motion to

continue based upon counsel’s health issues. Counsel never at any time during this

correspondence sought a continuance of the proceedings due to her health issues or for any

other reason. See Padilla v. Capital One, N.A., 392 So.3d 797 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024)

(“Although a notice of unavailability is a useful pleading for apprising the court and the

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parties of potential scheduling conflicts and for assisting them in efforts to accommodate

counsel, it is not an adequate substitute for obtaining a continuance order.” (citation

omitted)). Instead, counsel persistently asked for an order either granting or denying the

Bonding Company’s petitions.

To be clear, we are not holding that attorneys should be required to provide

extensive documentation to the court regarding their health issues. Although, if for some

reason such is deemed necessary to the resolution of a proceeding, attorneys may request

the court to file such information under seal. In addition, while some courts may utilize

email communications to communicate with the parties, such communications are not a

substitute for formal motions filed with the clerk and properly served on opposing counsel.

In this case, counsel filed no such motion seeking relief from the trial court’s clear

preference for in-person hearings, nor did counsel file a motion seeking a continuance of

the hearing. Accordingly, the hearing properly commenced on the scheduled date.

Although the Bonding Company seemingly argues that a full evidentiary and

adversarial hearing was due prior to the trial court’s withholding its approval to write

bonds, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that “something less than an

evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Mathews, 424 U.S.

at 343; see also In re Blankenship, No. W2024-00425-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 882187, at

*4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 20, 2025) (noting same in the context of the proceeding

suspending a bail bondsman’s ability to write bonds), no. perm. app. filed. Here, the

Bonding Company had notice that a hearing would take place on June 10, 2024, during

which the State would presumably offer proof in support of its allegations requesting denial

of the Bonding Company’s petitions. In fact, proof was specifically requested by the

Bonding Company at the April 22, 2024 hearing. The Bonding Company was also already

aware of much of the State’s proof submitted in its absence at the June 10, 2024 hearing.

Several of the documents admitted at the hearing had been attached to the State’s May 20,

2024 written response, and the Bonding Company had filed a written reply to this response.

Nonetheless, neither the Bonding Company’s counsel nor its agents appeared at the June

10, 2024 hearing, and at that point, less than a year had passed from the time the Bonding

Company had filed its petitions in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District seeking approval to

write bonds.

As observed above, the State has an obligation to investigate the financial solvency

of the Bonding Company before giving approval to write bonds, and we cannot say that

this is an unreasonable amount of time for the trial court to continue the case to determine

the financial status of the Bonding Company. See AAA Aaron’s Action Agency Bail Bonds,

Inc., 993 S.W.2d at 85 (noting the highly regulated nature of the bonding business).

Moreover, the Bonding Company had participated in prior investigatory hearings, and its

- 22 -

agents had even testified before the trial court regarding their petitions. We conclude that

the Bonding Company had already been afforded more than one adequate opportunity to

be heard in a meaningful time and manner when the trial court proceeded with the June 10,

2024 hearing despite the Bonding Company’s seemingly voluntary absence. Cf. State v.

Nelvis, No. W2024-00622-CCA-R3-CO, 2025 WL 1627676, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June

9, 2025) (holding that the surety, which had received notice of the final forfeiture hearing,

“lost an opportunity to show that it was entitled to relief from the forfeiture” when it failed

to appear at the hearing or offer excusable reasons for its absence), pet. to rehear denied

(June 24, 2025). Because the Bonding Company simply “ignored” the trial court’s decision

to hold an in-person hearing on June 10, 2024, “there is no due process violation.” In re

Daxleigh F., 2024 WL 864773, at *7.

We also note that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b) does not require

the trial court to allow participation by the bondsman in the first instance prior to its

decision to withhold approval. It only provides that once approval is summarily withheld,

the bondsman is required to receive notice and hearing. As indicated above, the Bonding

Company does not raise any issue on appeal, due process related or otherwise, relating to

anything that occurred after the trial court’s decision to withhold approval on June 10,

2024. Accordingly, the issue is waived. See Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7); Tenn. Ct. Crim.

App. R. 10(b); State v. Ruzicka, No. W2023-00134-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 3387294, at

*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 12, 2024), no perm. app. filed. For all these reasons, the

Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Evidentiary Objections

The Bonding Company contends that the trial court improperly considered evidence

in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 901 (regarding authentication) and 1002

(regarding the “best evidence” rule). Specifically, the Bonding Company submits that

“[t]here was no determination by the Court on authentication or identification as a

condition to admissibility” of either of the two bankruptcy petitions from the Eastern

District of Virginia or the “print screen” of Mr. Cole’s tax liens. The State responds that

the Bonding Company waived its evidentiary objection by failing to raise it in the trial

court.

First, we note that without argument or citation to authorities, the parties assume

that the trial court’s strict adherence to the Rules of Evidence was required during the June

10, 2024 hearing. From our perspective, that conclusion is not obvious because, as

observed in the preceding section, the Supreme Court has recognized that “something less

than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” Mathews,

424 U.S. at 343. “By their own terms, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence do not apply to

- 23 -

administrative hearings, but rather to court appearances.” Davis v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dept, 278 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Tenn. R. Evid. 101 (“These rules shall

govern evidence rulings in all trial courts of Tennessee except as otherwise provided by

statute or rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.”)). But cf. In re A-Action Bonding Co.,

No. M2013-01526-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 5242607, at *8-10 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15,

2014) (analyzing Rules 901 and 1002 in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit an

altered videotaped and finding reversible error in suspension of the bonding company’s

privileges for misconduct). For the purposes of our analysis here, we assume, without

deciding, that strict adherence to the Rules of Evidence was required in this circumstance.

Turning to the State’s argument of waiver, the Bonding Company replies that “[i]t

is hard to raise objections in a hearing when no counsel is present to [do so],” again noting

counsel’s medical issues due to her high-risk pregnancy and that she could not physically

be present under doctor’s orders. However, as discussed above, the trial court did not err

in proceeding with the hearing despite the Bonding Company’s absence, or the absence of

its counsel. Generally, a party’s failure to make a contemporaneous objection results in

waiver of the issue on appeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a); State v. Thompson, 36 S.W.3d

102, 108 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). Such is the case here.

Despite the waiver, the parties disagree whether the Bonding Company is entitled

to relief under the plain error doctrine. While the cases of State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274,

282 (Tenn. 2000), and State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994),

set forth the requirements of plain error relief in criminal cases, it is unclear whether those

requirements apply in the instant context. See Carman v. Kellon, No. M2019-00857-COA-

R3-CV, 2020 WL 7422071, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2020) (noting that the use of

the term “accused” in Smith and Adkisson “suggests that [the plain error] doctrine is

generally applicable to criminal cases rather than to civil cases”). Nevertheless, the

appellate rules allow us to consider issues that not properly preserved for appeal “(1) to

prevent needless litigation, (2) to prevent injury to the interests of the public, and (3) to

prevent prejudice to the judicial process.” Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b). Further, in the context

of unpreserved claims, “[w]hen necessary to do substantial justice, an appellate court may

consider an error that has affected the right substantial rights of a party at any time[.]”

Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). As we will demonstrate, the Bonding Company is not entitled to

relief under these principles.

The Bonding Company’s argument simply relies upon the fact that the trial court

did not make any determination “on authentication or identification” as a condition

precedent to the admissibility of the bankruptcy petitions or the “print screen” of Mr. Cole’s

tax liens. The Bonding Company makes no substantive evidentiary argument that these

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documents were not what they purported to be or that they contained incomplete or

inaccurate information.

The copy in the record of the 2011 bankruptcy petition filed by Mr. Cole on behalf

of Brian Cole Bail Bonds, LLC bears an official verification from a deputy clerk that it is

“a true copy.” The 1999 copy appears almost identical in nature. Also, Ms. Mooney, the

Madison County Court Clerk, testified that she investigated the Bonding Company’s

solvency, which was her regular practice, and that she obtained “a print screen” and a

“custom comprehensive report” regarding Mr. Cole’s tax liens and “judgments.” These

documents included a case number, Mr. Cole’s name, his social security number, the

amount of the lien, and reflected a recording date of March 2019. Ms. Mooney also stated

that she had verified this tax lien “to be true and correct[.]”

For these reasons, the Bonding Company has failed to show that correction of any

error is necessary to avoid prejudice to the judicial process or necessary to do substantial

justice. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b), 36(b). The Bonding Company is not entitled to the

relief it seeks on this issue.

C. Denial Decision

We now turn to review the trial court’s denial of approval to the Bonding Company

for its agents to write bonds in the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District. The Bonding Company

argues that the trial court’s decision relying on “inaccuracies in the affidavits” was in error.

In this regard, the Bonding Company simply argues that Mr. Cole’s affidavit stating that

he never declared bankruptcy as outlined in Code section 40-11-317(c) is accurate because

he “did not have any bankruptcies involving outstanding forfeitures” that were unsatisfied.

The State responds that the trial court’s denial was proper because (1) the Bonding

Company “failed to obtain letters of good standing, as required by local rule”; and (2) Mr.

Cole “falsely testified about prior bankruptcies and federal tax liens.” The Bonding

Company replies that this court should reject the State’s argument because the State did

not rely on the lack of letters of good standing as a reason in support of denial in the trial

court and the trial court did “not list the failure to obtain letters at all” in its decision to

deny the Bonding Company approval.

It is well-established that “[a] trial court has full authority to determine who should

be allowed to make bonds in its court. . . . [And,] a trial court has the inherent power to

administer its affairs, including the right to impose reasonable regulations regarding the

making of bonds.” Hull v. State, 543 S.W.2d 611, 612 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (first citing

Gilbreath v. Ferguson, 260 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tenn. 1953); and then citing Taylor, 334

S.W.2d at 736). The statutory requirements for bondsmen “do[] not by any stretch of the

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imagination attempt to cover the whole field of what is necessary for a bondsman before

he is allowed to make bonds in the various courts.” Taylor, 334 S.W.2d at 736. Therefore,

the legislature’s enactment of statutes addressing bail bondsmen and their regulation does

not interfere with the trial court’s inherent powers of regulation in addition to the statute.

In re Hitt, 910 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); see also In re Int’l Fid. Ins. Co.,

989 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (noting that the statutory authority of the

executive branch to regulate insurance companies does not preempt the inherent power of

the judiciary to regulate the making of bail bonds underwritten by such insurance

companies).

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 18 authorizes the judges in each judicial district to

adopt and publish local rules. However, local rules cannot be “inconsistent with the

statutory law, the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Rules

of Civil Procedure, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, and

the Rules of Evidence.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 18(a); see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-3-407; In

re Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d at 729. While we review the exercise of a trial court’s

authority to regulate bonding companies through local rules for an arbitrary, capricious, or

illegal determination, Memphis Bonding Co. v. Criminal Court of Tennessee 30th District,

490 S.W.3d 458, 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015), the statute mandates that this court review a

trial court’s action in withholding approval for a bonding company to obtain privileges

under a de novo standard of review; see Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(d).

Here, in issuing its oral ruling at the June 10, 2024 hearing, the trial court first noted

Ms. Mooney’s testimony that the Bonding Company had been suspended in seven other

judicial districts and that documents from the Tennessee Secretary of State indicated the

Bonding Company was writing bonds throughout the state using eight different names,

making regulation difficult. The trial court then specifically found that (1) Mr. Cole was

“untruthful” when he testified at the November 27, 2023 hearing that he had never declared

bankruptcy and had no civil judgments against him; (2) Mr. Cole’s affidavit was also

“untruthful” and “inaccurate”; and (3) Mr. Holmes falsely testified that the Bonding

Company had no outstanding final forfeitures at the time of the November 27, 2023

hearing; all of which were memorialized in the trial court’s written order. The Bonding

Company’s argument to the contrary—that the trial court, in its written order, only listed

one reason for its denial, which was due “to inaccuracies of the affidavits[,]” and did not

rely on testimony from the November 27, 2023 hearing—is simply inapposite. Moreover,

we emphasize that our review is de novo.

Mr. Cole specifically testified at the November 27, 2023 hearing that he had never

had “any civil judgments” entered against him, nor had he “ever declared bankruptcy.”

The State submitted proof that Mr. Cole had twice filed for bankruptcy in the Eastern

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District of Virginia, once individually in 1999, and then again in 2011 on behalf of Brian

Cole Bail Bonds, LLC. Moreover, the State introduced, through Ms. Mooney, who had

been tasked by the court to investigate the solvency of potential bonding companies, “a

print screen” and a “custom comprehensive report” that she had obtained regarding Mr.

Cole’s tax liens and “judgments.” These documents showed a federal tax lien against the

Defendant in the amount of $266,585.00, which Ms. Mooney testified she had verified “to

be true and correct[.]” These documents also reflected additional tax liens against Mr.

Cole, both federal and state, and simply because these liens were later released, does not

mean that Mr. Cole had never had “any civil judgments” entered against him. We note that

also referenced in these documents were multiple “judgment[s]” and “civil suit[s]” against

Mr. Cole, as well as specifically a “civil judgment” in the amount of one thousand dollars.

To the extent that the Bonding Company’s argument is based upon Mr. Cole’s

testimony that he simply misunderstood what was being asked, we note that the trial court

did not credit that testimony. See In re Tennessee Bonding Co., No. M2021-01423-CCA-

R3-CD, 2022 WL 17587864, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 13, 2022) (noting the same

when Mr. Holmes testified that he misunderstood the question when the Bonding Company

made a present-tense representation in its semiannual reports that it wrote bonds in the

Tenth Judicial District, although its privileges were actually suspended in that district).

The trial court in this case aptly determined that Mr. Cole gave untruthful testimony at the

November 27, 2023 hearing. See id. (agreeing, upon de novo review of Mr. Holmes’s

testimony, with the trial court’s credibility assessment based upon the transcript, exhibits,

and record as a whole).

In addition, in the 1999 bankruptcy petition, Mr. Cole listed as an unsecured debt a

“bail bond premium while employed at Bail America” in the amount of five thousand

dollars, and that debt was later discharged. He had also filed for bankruptcy in 2011 as the

owner of a bail bond corporation. While we need not say with certainty that these matters

violate the express statutory directive of Code section 40-11-317(c), they are clearly

contrary to the assertions Mr. Cole made to the trial court during these proceedings.

Moreover, counsel was asked if Mr. Cole had ever “declared bankruptcy as a bondsman?”

to which she inaccurately answered in the negative. Relative to the affidavit, the trial court

requested that Mr. Cole submit an affidavit declaring that he had never filed for bankruptcy

of any kind. As the trial court noted, Mr. Cole’s affidavit was also “untruthful” and

“inaccurate[,]” even though it purported to clarify that he had never declared bankruptcy

under the relevant statute.

As for Mr. Holmes, he testified at the November 27, 2023 hearing that there were

no outstanding final forfeitures against the Bonding Company. But the State later

introduced proof that, at the time of that hearing, the Bonding Company had an outstanding

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final forfeiture of fifteen thousand dollars in Bradley County, the Tenth Judicial District,

which was served on the Bonding Company on October 24, 2023, and remained unpaid as

of March 7, 2024. Regarding its forfeitures in the Tenth Judicial District, the Bonding

Company indicated that it was awaiting a letter from the trial judge in that district

explaining the circumstances surrounding this situation and that Mr. Holmes was unaware

of the forfeitures at the time of his testimony. However, no such letter is included in the

record on appeal, and it has never been produced in any fashion. See In re Tennessee

Bonding Co., 2022 WL 17587864, at *5 (noting that “[n]o party ha[d] sought to supplement

the record with post-judgment facts for our consideration in this de novo review showing

that” the forfeiture had been satisfied or that other relief had been granted (citing Tenn. R.

App. P. 14(a)). Accordingly, the trial court’s determination that Mr. Holmes gave

untruthful testimony at the November 27, 2023 hearing is objectively supported by the

record.

Mr. Cole’s and Mr. Holmes’s lack of candor with the trial court, as well as their

apparent untruthfulness, supports the trial court’s denial of approval for bonding privileges.

See In re Sparta Bail Bonds, No. M2012-02619-CCA-R3-CO, 2013 WL 6055244, at *3

(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2013) (affirming that former employee was not qualified to

serve as a bonding company owner because the trial court reasonably questioned whether

the petition was an attempt by the former employee to circumvent the prior order revoking

the old company’s bonding privileges); Izevbizuaiyamu v. State, No. W2012-00017-CCA-

R3-CD, 2012 WL 6115092, at *5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 10, 2012) (concluding that,

while the appellant met the statutory requirements for a bonding company owner, the trial

court was justified in denying her petition to obtain bonding privileges based upon her lack

of candor and apparent untruthfulness). Although the Bonding Company attempts to

minimize its intent in making these statements to the trial court, certainly this is a situation

where a prudent, truthful person would err on the side of caution and fully disclose the

information to the trial court.

“So long as the bondsman complies with the [relevant] statutes . . . and meets a fair

and reasonable standard in the conduct of his business before these courts then there is no

one going to prevent him from practicing his profession therein.” Taylor, 334 S.W.2d at

737. We cannot say the Bonding Company’s business conduct, as evidenced in the record

before us, meets this fair and reasonable standard.

According to Ms. Mooney, she reached out to other court clerks and learned that the

Bonding Company’s “privileges had been suspended in about seven judicial districts.” Ms.

Mooney confirmed that she had received orders from all seven districts and that some of

those orders had been entered into evidence. Orders reflecting suspensions for various

behaviors, either temporary or permanent, were entered into evidence from the Tenth,

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Twenty-Third, Twenty-Fourth, and Thirty-Second Judicial Districts. As of March 2024,

the Bonding Company’s privileges remained suspended in the Tenth and Twenty-Third

Judicial Districts. Ms. Mooney also testified that she learned that the Seventeenth Judicial

District had denied the Bonding Company’s request to write bonds.

The Dickson County Circuit Court previously observed that the proof before it

demonstrated a lack of attention by the Bonding Company “to its business activities[,]” a

problem which apparently continues to occur. If any of these outstanding issues have been

resolved, as the Bonding Company claims, then the Bonding Company should have

exercised reasonable diligence by presenting evidence of those resolutions beyond the mere

assertions of its counsel, which it, thus far, has failed to do. Moreover, this court on appeal

has previously agreed that it was objectively reasonable for the trial court to determine that

Mr. Holmes had testified falsely in the proceedings in the Twenty-Third Judicial District

regarding statements contained in the Bonding Company’s semiannual reports. See In Re

Tennessee Bonding Co., 2022 WL 1758764, at *6-7.

Finally, the Bonding Company has failed to comply with Local Rule 6 of the

Twenty-Sixth Judicial District, requiring all new bonding companies to “have a letter of

good standing from all the surrounding counties,” and for the letter to inform the clerk’s

office if the new bonding company has any outstanding conditional or final forfeitures and

if their bonding privileges have been suspended. This clearly was not done in this case.

And documents from the Tennessee Secretary of State, as testified to by Ms. Mooney,

indicated that the Bonding Company was writing bonds throughout the state using eight

different names, which, according to the trial court, made it difficult to regulate. It also

appears that Local Rule 10, which requires that “a bondsman or agent can only have a

financial interest in one bonding company[,]” was not complied with in this case. See also

In re Lewis Bonding Co., No. W2016-02171-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 2211396, at *3

(Tenn. Crim. App. May 19, 2017) (concluding that the plain language of the local rules

adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District requiring bail bonding companies to post

cash collateral in the clerk’s office, and which did not include a provision allowing for the

posting of unencumbered real property instead, was properly within the province of the

trial court).

For all of these reasons, the evidence supports the trial court’s order denying the

Bonding Company’s petitions to write bail bonds in its district. 5 To hold otherwise, under

these circumstances, would usurp the Twenty-Sixth Judicial District’s inherent authority

to regulate bonding matters within its jurisdiction.

5

We note that the Bonding Company makes no separate argument on appeal regarding the trial

court’s denial of Ms. Cerniglia’s petition.

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III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing and consideration of the record as a whole, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

s/ Kyle A. Hixson .

KYLE A. HIXSON, JUDGE

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