Clear Imaging Research LLC v. Google LLC

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 CLEAR IMAGING RESEARCH LLC, Case No.: 25-cv-00221-GPC-BLM

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

13 v. PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS

14 GOOGLE LLC,

[ECF No. 13]

15 Defendant.

16

17 On April 7, 2025, Defendant Google LLC (“Google”) filed a partial motion to

18 dismiss Plaintiff Clear Imaging Research LLC (“CIR”)’s complaint pursuant to Federal

19 Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”)1 12(b)(6). ECF No. 13. On April 30, 2025, CIR filed a

20 response in opposition to Google’s motion to dismiss. ECF No. 20. On May 9, 2025,

21 Google filed a reply. ECF No. 21. The Court held a hearing on the motion on June 13,

22 2025. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Google’s partial motion to dismiss

23 CIR’s complaint.

24 / / /

25

26

1 “Rule” or “Rules” refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.

27

1 BACKGROUND

2 On January 30, 2025, CIR filed a complaint against Google, alleging infringement

3 of U.S. Patent Nos. 9,800,788 (the “’788 Patent”), 9,860,450 (the “’450 Patent”),

4 9,013,587 (the “’587 Patent”), 11,595,583 (the “’583 Patent”), 10,171,740 (the “’740

5 Patent”), 11,165,961 (the “’961 Patent”), and 11,457,149 (the “’149 Patent”)

6 (collectively, the “asserted patents”). Compl., ECF No. 1. Specifically, CIR alleges that

7 Google has infringed the asserted patents by utilizing CIR’s digital camera technology in

8 numerous Google products, specifically Google Pixel smartphones. Compl. ¶¶ 9-18, 22-

9 98. CIR further alleges that Google induces infringement of the claims of the asserted

10 patents by “encourag[ing] and instruct[ing] its customers and end users” to use its

11 products “in ways that directly infringe” the asserted patents. Id. ¶¶ 27, 38, 49, 60, 71,

12 82, 93.

13 The ’583 Patent, ’961 Patent, and ’149 Patent are all entitled “method and

14 apparatus for capturing digital video.” Compl. ¶¶ 56, 78, 89; see also ECF No. 1-23

15 (’583 Patent) at 2;2 ECF No. 1-28 (’961 Patent) at 2; ECF No. 1-32 (’149 Patent) at 2.

16 The ’587 Patent is entitled “method and apparatus to correct digital image blur by

17 combining multiple images.” Compl. ¶ 45; see also ECF No. 1-17 (’587 Patent) at 2.

18 The ’740 Patent is entitled “method and apparatus to correct blur in all or part of a digital

19 image by combining plurality of images.” Compl. ¶ 67; see also ECF No. 1-25 (’740

20 Patent) at 2. The ’450 Patent is entitled “method and apparatus to correct digital video to

21 counteract effect of camera shake.” Compl. ¶ 34; see also ECF No. 1-15 (’450 Patent) at

22 2. And the ’788 Patent is entitled “method and apparatus for using motion information

23 and image data to correct blurred images.” Compl. ¶ 23; see also ECF No. 1-11 (’788

24 Patent) at 2.

25

26

2 Page numbers refer to CM/ECF pagination.

27

1 The asserted patents all share the same specification. See, e.g., ’587 Patent at 1:01-

2 12:22. The invention disclosed in the shared specification “processes image data in order

3 to correct an image for distortion caused by imager movement or by movement of the

4 subject being imaged. ’587 Patent at 2:27-29; see also id. at 1:22-26 (“More specifically,

5 this invention relates to processing of digitized image data in order to correct for image

6 distortion caused by relative motion between the imaging device and the Subject at the

7 time of image capture, or by optical distortion from other sources.”).

8 In describing the background of the inventions, the specification explains that

9 “current techniques for increasing the sharpness of an image do not really ‘correct’ the

10 blur that results from relative motion between a camera and a subject being

11 photographed. In fact, the data loss from increasing the sharpness can result in a less

12 accurate image than the original.” Id. at 2:03-07. Accordingly, there is a need for “a

13 technique that corrects for distortion in photographs without adding excessively to the

14 price, robustness or weight of a camera or other imaging device, or adversely affecting

15 image quality.” Id. at 2:20-23. To address this need, the asserted patents teach

16 inventions that “process[] image data in order to correct an image for distortion caused by

17 imager movement or by movement of the subject being imaged.” Id. at 2:27-29.

18 As an example of the claimed inventions, Independent Claim 15 of the ’587 Patent

19 recites:

20 15. An apparatus comprising:

21 a viewfinder configured to display an image;

22 a processor configured to designate a main subject in the image in the viewfinder;

a recording medium configured to capture a plurality of photographic images,

23

wherein the plurality of images includes the designated main subject; and

24

a processor configured to combine the plurality of photographic images to generate

25 a corrected image, wherein the processor determines, for each image point in the

main subject of the corrected image, a pixel value for the image point based on

26

pixel values in the plurality of photographic images at the image point.

27

1 Id. at 13:24-36.

2 On April 7, 2025, Google moved to dismiss part of CIR’s complaint for failure to

3 state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 13. Specifically, Google argues that

4 CIR cannot allege claims for infringement of the ’587 Patent, the ’740 Patent, the ’961

5 Patent, and the ’149 Patent (collectively, the “Combined-Image Patents”) because all the

6 claims in the Combined-Image Patents claim patent-ineligible subject matter, and,

7 therefore, are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See generally id.

8 LEGAL STANDARDS

9 I. Rule 12(b)(6)

10 Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can

11 be granted.” Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint fails to

12 state a cognizable legal theory or allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal

13 theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

14 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

15 matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

16 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

17 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

18 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

19 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

20 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

21 When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts alleged in the

22 complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.

23 Chubb Custom Inc. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013).

24 Although the general rule prohibits a district court from considering evidence outside the

25 pleadings in reviewing a motion to dismiss, it may properly consider “documents

26 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or

27

1 matters of judicial notice[.]” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

2 In the realm of patents “a court need not accept as true allegations that contradict matters

3 properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit, such as the claims and patent

4 specification.” Secured Mail Sols., LLC v. Universal Wilde, 873 F.3d 905, 913 (Fed. Cir.

5 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

6 II. Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101

7 Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as “any new and

8 useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful

9 improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. There are “three specific exceptions to § 101’s

10 broad patent-eligibility principles: laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract

11 ideas.” Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010). These exceptions ensure “that patent

12 law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building

13 blocks of human ingenuity.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)

14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., 40

15 F.4th 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“These exceptions exist because monopolizing the

16 basic tools of scientific work ‘might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend

17 to promote it.’”) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566

18 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)).

19 “The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for evaluating patent

20 eligibility under § 101.” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th 1371,

21 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Alice, 587 U.S. at 217; Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70–73). Under

22 step one, the court “determine[s] whether the claim is ‘directed to’ a ‘patent-ineligible

23 concept,’ such as an abstract idea.” Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th

24 127, 130 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 217). If so, the court proceeds to

25 step two and “examine[s] ‘the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an

26 “inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract idea into a patent-

27

1 eligible application.’” Id. (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 221). At step two, the court

2 determines “whether the claim elements, individually and as an ordered combination,

3 contain an inventive concept, which is more than merely implementing an abstract idea

4 using ‘well-understood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the

5 industry.’” Id. (quoting Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank,

6 Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

7 “Patent eligibility under § 101 is a question of law that may contain underlying

8 issues of fact.” CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc, 955 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020).

9 “Thus, patent eligibility may be resolved at the Rule 12 stage only if there are no

10 plausible factual disputes after drawing all reasonable inferences from the intrinsic and

11 Rule 12 record in favor of the non-movant.” Coop. Ent., 50 F.4th at 130. Indeed, the

12 Federal Circuit has “repeatedly recognized that in many cases it is possible and proper to

13 determine patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,” Genetic

14 Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1373–74 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted),

15 specifically “where the undisputed facts, considered under the standards required by that

16 Rule, require a holding of ineligibility under the substantive standards of law,’”

17 PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation

18 omitted). “In many cases, too, evaluation of a patent claim’s subject matter eligibility

19 under § 101 can proceed even before a formal claim construction.” Genetic Techs., 818

20 F.3d at 1373–74 (citations omitted); see TriDim Innovations LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc.,

21 207 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“In this case, parties do not dispute the

22 proper construction of any terms in the asserted claims, and so the Court finds it

23 unnecessary to engage in claim construction before addressing the validity of the patents

24 under Section 101.”).

25 / / /

26 / / /

27

1 DISCUSSION

2 To prove that the claims in the Combined-Image Patents claim ineligible subject

3 matter and are invalid under § 101, Google relies on four representative claims:

4 independent claim 15 of the ’587 Patent, independent claim 20 of the ’740 Patent,

5 independent claim 8 of the ’961 Patent, and independent claim 21 of the ’149 Patent

6 (collectively, the “exemplary claims”). ECF 13 at 9. In light of this, the Court will first

7 analyze the subject matter eligibility of these four specific claims, and the Court will then

8 analyze whether these four claims are properly representative of the remaining claims.

9 I. Alice Step One

10 To determine whether the claims are patentable under § 101, the Court begins with

11 Alice step one. “At step one, the district court evaluates whether patent claims are

12 directed to an abstract idea.” Splunk Inc. v. Cribl, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040 (N.D.

13 Cal. 2023) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 218). The step one inquiry asks “what the patent

14 asserts to be the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art.” Yu v. Apple Inc., 1

15 F.4th 1040, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Because “[a]t some level, ‘all

16 inventions … embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural

17 phenomena, or abstract ideas,” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71), a

18 patent is not ineligible merely “because it involves an abstract concept,” id. (citing

19 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)). Rather, “[if] the focus of the claim is a

20 specific and concrete technological advance, for example an improvement to a

21 technological process or in the underlying operation of a machine, … the claim is

22 eligible.” Adasa Inc. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 55 F.4th 900, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2022); see

23 also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“For an

24 application of an abstract idea to satisfy step one, the claim's focus must be on something

25 other than the abstract idea itself.”).

26

27

1 In conducting the step one inquiry, courts “must focus on the language of the

2 asserted claims themselves, considered in light of the specification.” Yu, 1 F.4th at 1043

3 (cleaned up); see also CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1371–73 (“In determining what the claims

4 are directed to and whether they are directed to an abstract idea, a court may well consult

5 the plain claim language, written description, and prosecution history.”). Further, courts

6 must “be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims by looking at them generally and

7 failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.” Id. at 1371; Enfish, LLC v.

8 Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“describing the claims at such a

9 high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims all but ensures

10 that the exceptions to § 101 swallow the rule”).

11 In its motion to dismiss, Google contends that the exemplary claims “are directed

12 to the abstract idea of combining images to enhance each other,” and that the claims are

13 not directed to “any improvement in digital camera functionality.” ECF No. 13 at 15–19.

14 CIR argues that Google oversimplifies the exemplary claims and fails to instead consider

15 them “as a whole”—an inquiry that would reveal that the claims “resolve technological

16 problems related to reducing unwanted blur in a main subject when capturing images or

17 video with a digital camera.” ECF No. 20 at 15–23.

18 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2021), is

19 instructive here. In Yu, the Federal Circuit recognized that “the idea and practice of using

20 multiple pictures to enhance each other has been known by photographers for over a

21 century,” and that this idea is abstract. Id. at 1043. In Yu, the claim at issue recited a

22 digital camera, comprising “(1) a first and a second image sensor closely positioned with

23 respect to a common plane … (2) two lenses … (3) said first image sensor producing a

24 first image and said second image sensor producing a second image … (4) an analog-to-

25 digital converting circuitry coupled to said first and said second image sensor … (5) an

26 image memory … and (6) a digital image processor ... producing a resultant digital

27

1 image from said first digital image enhanced with said second digital image.” Id. at

2 1042 (emphasis added). The claim at issue in Yu is substantially similar to the exemplary

3 claims at issue in this case.

4 For example, independent claim 20 of the ’740 patent recites:

5 • “[A] user interface configured to display an image” that “includes a first subject

6 and a second subject”;

7 • “[A] processor configured to receive user input designating the first subject …

8 to be kept blur free”;

9 • “[A] memory configured to store” the images, which “include the first subject

10 and the second subject”;

11 • A processor “configured to combine” the images so that “the combined image

12 includes the first subject and the second subject,” with the first subject being

13 “blur free” and the second subject being comparatively “blurred”;

14 • A user interface “configured to display the combined image”; and

15

• “[A] memory configured to store the combined image.”

16

ECF No. 1-25 at 20.

17

Thus, the Federal Circuit’s decision in Yu supports the conclusion that the

18

exemplary claims are similarly directed to the abstract idea of combining pictures to

19

enhance each other. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1334 (finding that it is “sufficient to compare

20

claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous

21

cases”); see also Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“In any event, we need not labor to delimit the

22

precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case. It is enough to recognize that

23

there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging in Bilski and the

24

concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.”).

25

In addition to finding the idea of combining pictures to enhance each other to be

26

abstract, the Yu court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the claim was directed to a patent-

27

1 eligible application of that idea. Yu, 1 F.4th at 1043–45. The Federal Circuit reasoned

2 that the claim recited “only conventional camera components … perform[ing] only their

3 basic functions” “to effectuate the resulting ‘enhanced’ image[.]” Id. Therefore, the

4 claim “is simply a generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea.” Id. As

5 shown above, independent claim 20 of the ’740 Patent merely recites conventional digital

6 camera components (such as a user interface, processor, and memory) performing basic

7 functions to achieve the combined blur/blur free image. See ’740 Patent at 14:33-52.

8 Similarly, independent claim 8 of the ’961 Patent and independent claim 21 of the ’149

9 Patent merely recite conventional digital camera components (such as a user interface,

10 lens, image sensor, processor, and memory) performing basic functions to achieve the

11 combined blur/blur free image or video. See ’149 Patent at 15:28-16:5; ’961 Patent at

12 13:34-61. Under Yu, these claims are directed to an abstract idea because they simply

13 provide a “generic environment in which to carry out the abstract idea” of combining

14 images (one blurred and one blur free). Yu, 1 F.4th at 1043 (citation omitted).

15 CIR does not dispute that the exemplary claims are directed to the abstract idea of

16 combining pictures to enhance each other. Rather, CIR argues that Google’s analysis

17 ignores other key aspects of the exemplary claims which show that the claims are

18 directed to patentable subject matter. ECF No. 20 at 16–23. For instance, CIR argues

19 that the ‘587 patent “is directed to an improved imaging apparatus that captures a

20 plurality of photographic images, accepts user input to designate a main subject, and

21 combines the images to generate a corrected image (i.e., one that is blur free) based on a

22 pixel-by-pixel determination of each image point in the designated main subject.”3 Id. at

23

24

25 3 In making this point, and throughout its analysis, CIR discusses claims from the asserted patents which

Google does not analyze as “exemplary claims” in its motion to dismiss. See, e.g., ECF No. 20 at 17

26 (discussing ‘587 patent claim 23). For efficiency, and for reasons further discussed supra Discussion

Section III, the Court will focus its analysis on the exemplary claims only.

27

1 16–17. And CIR argues that the ’740, ‘149, and ‘961 Patents are directed to improved

2 devices that capture multiple images and combines them into a final image “where the

3 subject is blur-free or sharp and the background is blurred, such as based on ‘pixel

4 values’ of the main subject or by first ‘aligning’ the main subject prior to combining.”

5 ECF No. 20 at 19. The problem with CIR’s arguments, however, is that the exemplary

6 claims are not limited to these advancements, nor are they limited in any meaningful way

7 at all.

8 For example, the limitations in independent claim 20 of the ’740 Patent,

9 independent claim 8 of the ’961 Patent, and independent claim 21 of the ’149 Patent say

10 little by way of specifically how the claim arrives at the blur free image or video. See

11 ’740 Patent at 14:33-52; ’149 Patent at 15:28-16:5; ’961 Patent at 13:34-61. Moreover,

12 the claims say nothing about pixel values or alignment of the main subject prior to

13 combining. Those limitations are simply not in the claims. See id. Instead of describing

14 a specific method for arriving at the end result, the claims merely describe using a digital

15 camera with conventional components to combine images and arrive at a final, blur free

16 image or video. Such results-oriented claims are insufficient under Alice step one.

17 Independent claim 15 of the ’587 Patent similarly fails to provide any meaningful

18 limitations. See ’587 Patent at 13:24-36. While the claim states that a “processor

19 determines, for each image point in the main subject of the corrected image, a pixel value

20 for the image point based on pixel values in the plurality of photographic images at the

21 same image point,” it still fails to explain how the processor makes this determination.

22 Without more than this results-oriented language, the claim does not recite more than the

23 abstract idea itself. See Mobile Acuity Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., 110 F.4th 1280. 1292–93

24 (Fed. Cir. 2024) (finding that claims “directed to the abstract idea of receiving

25 information, associating information with images, comparing the images, and presenting

26 information based on that comparison … consist[ed] solely of result-oriented, functional

27

1 language and omit[ted] any specific requirements as to how these steps of information

2 manipulation are performed”); Longitude Licensing Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 2024-1202,

3 2025 WL 1249136, at *2–3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (finding that claim directed to “the

4 abstract idea of ‘improving image quality by adjusting various aspects of an image based

5 on features of the main object in the image’” failed at step one because it merely

6 “functionally describes a mere concept without disclosing how to implement that

7 concept”) (citation omitted).

8 To combat this line of reasoning, CIR invokes the specification’s teachings. CIR

9 notes, for instance, that the specification teaches that “the camera combines the images

10 into a single image by aligning them such that each pixel corresponding to the same

11 image point in each image is combined pixel-by-pixel into one pixel by adding pixel

12 values, averaging them, or using any other appropriate operation to combine them.” ’587

13 patent at 9:65-10:03. However, “[w]hile step one requires that ‘we consider the claims in

14 light of the specification, we avoid importing concepts from the specification into the

15 claims.” Longitude Licensing, 2025 WL 1249136, at *4; see also Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc.

16 v. Neapco Holdings LLC, 967 FF.3d 1285, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“features that are not

17 claimed are irrelevant as to step 1 or step 2”); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315,

18 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is improper to read limitations from a preferred embodiment

19 described in the specification—even if it is the only embodiment—into the claims absent

20 a clear indication in the intrinsic record that the patentee intended the claims to be so

21 limited.”). Here, the exemplary claims are not limited to the specification’s teachings

22 regarding pixel value shifting. Further, the specification’s teachings regarding pixel

23 value shifting merely describe a preferred embodiment of the claimed invention. See

24 ’587 Patent at 9:54-55 (“This third embodiment . . . .”). The exemplary claims are much

25 broader than this preferred embodiment: they claim the entire abstract idea of combining

26 images with a digital camera. See ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759,

27

1 766 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (explaining that reliance on the specification “must always yield to

2 the claim language in identifying th[e] focus” of the claims).4

3 The exemplary claims are not specific improvements in computer functionality, as

4 CIR suggests, either. Instead, they take an abstract idea and carry it out using

5 conventional camera components, including a user interface, digital image processor, an

6 image memory, and lenses. See Yu, 1 F.4th 1043 (holding similar components to be

7 conventional camera components). Contrary to CIR’s assertions, the exemplary claims

8 are “directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invokes generic

9 processes and machinery rather than a specific means or method that improves the

10 relevant technology.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Plotagraph, Inc v. Lightricks, Ltd., No.

11 2023-1048, 2024 WL 223185, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2024) (finding no claimed

12 technological advance or improvement where “the claims merely employ generic

13 computers to perform animation,” an abstract idea).

14 CIR can find no help in its reliance on Contour IP Holding LLC v. GoPro, Inc.,

15 113 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2024). There, the Federal Circuit found that the representative

16 claim of the asserted patents, which related to portable, point-of-view (“POV”) video

17 cameras, was “directed to a specific means that improves the relevant technology.” Id. at

18 1379. Specifically, the court found that the claim “requires specific, technological

19 means—parallel data stream recording with the low-quality recording wirelessly

20

21

22 4 CIR also argues that the patent examiner’s determination that the exemplary patents were sufficiently

novel and included “uniquely distinct features” indicate that the patents are “non-abstract improvements

23

over the prior art.” ECF No. 20 at 18–19, 22–23. But these arguments are not persuasive because

24 “[e]ligibility and novelty are separate inquiries.” Two-Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns,

LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Even if the Court assumes that the claimed features are

25 novel, that “does not avoid the problem of abstractness” that plagues the exemplary claims. Affinity

Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also SAP Am., Inc. v.

26 InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed Cir. 2018) (“The claims here are ineligible because their

innovation is an innovation in ineligible subject matter.”) (collecting cases).

27

1 transferred to a remote device—that in turn provide a technological improvement to the

2 real time viewing capabilities of a POV camera’s recordings on a remote device.” Id.

3 CIR contends that the exemplary claims here are similarly limited in scope such that they

4 “do not cover other ways that a processor may remove distortion from an image.” ECF

5 No. 20 at 24–25. For two reasons, CIR’s reliance on Contour fails. First, the court in

6 Contour reasoned that Contour was distinct from Yu because, in Yu, there was “a

7 longstanding, fundamental practice in photography” of using multiple pictures to enhance

8 each other, whereas that was not the case in Contour. 113 F.4th at 1380. The instant

9 case is distinct from Contour for the same reason: there has been a longstanding and

10 well-known practice of combining images to enhance each other, and the exemplary

11 claims are directed to that abstract idea. Second, the exemplary claims are much closer in

12 scope to the analogous claims in Yu than the specific claims in Contour. While Yu

13 involved similar limitations surrounding the broad idea of combining images to enhance

14 each other, the claims in Contour specifically teach the use of multiple streams in parallel

15 to enable users to view their POV recordings in real time. Id. at 1375–76, 1379–80.

16 Accordingly, Google has demonstrated that the exemplary claims are directed to an

17 abstract idea under Alice step one.

18 II. Alice Step Two

19 The Court now turns to Alice step two. Under the second step of the analysis, the

20 Court asks “whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe the abstract

21 method and thus transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter.” Affinity

22 Labs, 838 F.3d at 1262 (cleaned up). The inventive concept “may arise in one or more of

23 the individual claim limitations or in the ordered combination of the limitations,” Bascom

24 Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2016),

25 but it “must be evident in the claims” themselves, RecogniCorp LLC v. Nintendo Co.,

26 Ltd., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “It is well-settled that mere recitation of

27

1 concrete, tangible components is insufficient to confer patent eligibility to an otherwise

2 abstract idea. Rather, the components must involve more than performance of well-

3 understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.” In re TLI

4 Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S.

5 at 225) (cleaned up).

6 Google argues that the exemplary claims merely “recite well-known, routine,

7 conventional components and functions,” and that they apply the abstract idea itself,

8 which is insufficient to provide an inventive concept. ECF No. 13 at 19–24. CIR

9 responds that an ordered combination of the claims “recite[s] new digital imagine devices

10 that are capable of blur correction and selection of a subject for blur correction.” ECF

11 No. 20 at 25–27. CIR further contends that Google has not demonstrated that the

12 components “were in fact well-known, routine, and conventional” as of the priority date.

13 Id. at 26–28. On reply, Google responds that CIR relies on steps that the exemplary

14 claims do not recite and benefits that the claims do not require. ECF No. 21 at 6–9.

15 The exemplary claims merely recite concrete, tangible components to implement

16 the abstract idea with well-understood, conventional activities. The Federal Circuit’s

17 reasoning in Yu is directly applicable here. There, the court found that “two image

18 sensors, two lenses, …an image memory, and a digital imaging processor” were “well-

19 known” and “conventional camera components.” 1 F.4th at 1043. And the court further

20 reasoned that the patent in suit merely recited these components performing “basic

21 functions … at a high level of generality,” such as image sensors producing images and

22 an image memory storing digital images. Similarly, here, the claims recite substantially

23 similar, if not the same, conventional camera components, including a digital “camera,”5

24

25

26

5 In addition to the digital camera, other claimed conventional apparatuses include an “imaging

27 apparatus for capturing digital video,” (’961 patent claim 8), an “imaging device,” (’740 patent claim

1 a “lens,” an “image sensor,” a “processor,” a “memory,” a “user interface,” and a

2 “viewfinder.” See ’740 Patent at 14:33-52; ’149 Patent at 15:28-16:5; ’961 Patent at

3 13:34-61; ’587 Patent at 13:24-36. What is more, the claims similarly recite these

4 components performing their generic, well-known functions, such as:

5 • A “user interface … display[s] an image” and “receive[s] … user input” (’149

6 patent claim 21; ’961 patent claim 8; ’740 patent claim 20);

7 • A “memory” that “stor[es] digital images and … instructions” (’149 patent

8 claim 21; ’961 patent claim 8; ’740 patent claim 20);

9 • A “processor” that “receiv[es] user input,” (’740 patent claim 20), and

10 “execut[es]” instructions, (’149 patent claim 21; ’961 patent claim 8), such as

11 by combining images to “generate a final image,” (’149 patent claim 21; ’961

12 patent claim 8; ’740 patent claim 20; ’587 patent claim 15); and

13 • A “camera” or “imaging apparatus” with an “image sensor” and “lens” which,

14 together, “captur[e] digital images,” (’149 patent claim 21), or “captur[e] a

15 sequence of images,” (’961 patent claim 8).

16 Because the limitations at issue here do nothing beyond reciting conventional

17 hardware performing basic functions at a high level of generality, Alice step two cannot

18 save the claims. See, e.g., In re Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 991 F.3d

19 1245, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“it is hard to imagine a patent claim that recites hardware

20 limitations in more generic terms than” a claim that “recit[es] method steps carried out by

21 a ‘computer system’ with a ‘processor’ and a ‘memory’”).

22 CIR argues that “Google fails to demonstrate that many of the components it

23 deems ‘generic’ and ‘routine’ were in fact well-known, routine, and conventional as of

24

25

26 20), and a photographic “apparatus” with “a recording medium configured to capture … photographic

images,” (’587 patent claim 15).

27

1 the March 2004/2005 priority date.” ECF No. 20 at 27–28. CIR does not cite any case

2 law that mandates such a showing as of the priority date. Nonetheless, the Federal

3 Circuit’s decision in Yu forecloses CIR’s premise. There, the patent in suit was issued to

4 Yu on August 26, 2003. Yu v. Apple Inc., 611 F. Supp. 3d 908, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2020),

5 aff’d, 1 F.4th at 1040. Thus, the Federal Circuit found similar components to be well-

6 known and conventional when considering a patent that was issued before the priority

7 date for the instant patent in suit. CIR’s argument therefore fails as a matter of law.

8 Finally, CIR argues that the claims, when “considered as an ordered combination,

9 … recite new digital imaging devices that are capable of blur correction and selection of

10 a subject for blur correction”—a tangible improvement beyond just applying the abstract

11 idea. ECF No. 20 at 26–27. But the claims are much broader than the ordered

12 combination that CIR suggests. CIR suggests that the claimed combination “record[s] a

13 burst of images, determin[es] the main subject of each image, align[s] the main subject of

14 each image of the burst on a pixel-by-pixel basis, combin[es] the pixel values, and

15 thereby achiev[es] a blur-free image of the main subject.” Id. But, as explained above,

16 none of the exemplary claims actually include that specific ordered combination. None of

17 the exemplary claims include the limitation of aligning the main subject on a pixel-by-

18 pixel basis. “The main problem that [CIR] cannot overcome is that the claim—as

19 opposed to something purportedly described in the specification—is missing an inventive

20 concept.” Two-Way Media, 874 F.3d at 1338; Yu, 1 F.4th at 1045.

21 For this same reason, CIR’s appeal to an “improvement” in “terms of signal-to-

22 noise power ratio (SNR)” in the final, combined image fails. ECF No. 20 at 27. Again,

23 the exemplary claims do not include a limitation requiring an improved signal-to-noise

24 ratio. Instead, the specification discusses signal-to-noise ratios only in the context of a

25 “third embodiment,” which addresses the specific problem of fast shutter speed reducing

26 the ratio, and how a combination of multiple images can overcome this problem and

27

1 increase the ratio. See ’740 Patent at 9:49–10:54. Whether this improvement in signal-

2 to-noise power ratio is sufficient under step two—a determination the Court does not

3 make here—is immaterial because the claims do not say anything about signal-to-noise

4 power ratio. In fact, as previously mentioned, the claims are so broad that they merely

5 apply the abstract idea of combining images to enhance each other. See Two-Way Media,

6 874 F.3d at 1338; Yu, 1 F.4th at 1045.

7 Accordingly, there is no inventive concept in the exemplary claims that saves the

8 claims at step two. The exemplary claims are therefore not patent-eligible under Alice.

9 III. Representativeness

10 Google argues that the exemplary claims are representative of all the claims in the

11 Combined-Image Patents. ECF No. 13 at 25–27. “Limiting the analysis of a § 101

12 challenge to representative claims is proper when the claims at issue are substantially

13 similar and linked to the same ineligible concept.” Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at 1290

14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a court may treat claims as

15 representative where “the patentee does not present any meaningful argument for the

16 distinctive significance of any claim limitation not found in the representative claim or if

17 the parties agree to treat a claim as representative.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d

18 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).

19 Where representativeness is disputed, the patent challenger “bears the initial

20 burden to make a prima facie showing that the group of claims are substantially similar

21 and linked to the same ineligible concept.” Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at 1290 (internal

22 quotation marks and citation omitted). If the patent challenger makes the required

23 showing, “the burden shifts to the patent owner to present non-frivolous arguments as to

24 why the eligibility of the identified representative claim cannot fairly be treated as”

25 representative, such as by “articulat[ing] why a claim limitation not found in the

26 representative claim has ‘distinctive significance’ that would have a material impact on

27

1 the eligibility analysis.” Id. (quoting Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1365). If the patent owner

2 successfully presents non-frivolous arguments against representativeness, the patent

3 challenger bears the ultimate burden “to prove either that (i) the representative claim is,

4 in fact, representative, in that any differences among the claims are not material to the

5 eligibility analysis …; or (ii) each separate claim … is ineligible for patenting.” Id. at

6 1291.6

7 The Court must first address whether Google has made prima facie showing of

8 representativeness. Google argues that each of the claims in the four Combined-Image

9 Patents are substantially similar and linked to the same abstract concept, and that any

10 differences CIR identifies in the claims are immaterial to the § 101 analysis under Alice.

11 ECF No. 13 at 25–27. Indeed, Google is correct that many of the claims recite either the

12 same process or an apparatus with substantially similar features as the exemplary claim.

13 See ’740 Patent claims 1, 10; 961 Patent claims 1, 15; ’149 Patent claims 1, 11; ’587

14 Patent claims 1, 8, 23. These claims merely recite the same abstract idea of combining

15 images to enhance one another using conventional digital camera components performing

16 their basic functions. See Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at 1291 (finding other claims

17 substantially similar where they merely added conventional components or conventional

18 computer activities and were still directed to the same abstract idea).

19 Further, both parties’ briefs identify differences between the exemplary claims and

20 other claims, but these are not differences that are substantial enough to divorce them

21

22

6 CIR relies heavily on PPS Data, LLC v. Jack Henry & Associates, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1021 (E.D.

23

Tex. 2019), to argue that treating claims as representative is not favorable. ECF No. 20 at 10–12. But,

24 aside from the fact that this out-of-district case is not binding on the Court, CIR ignores that PPS applied

the same burden-shifting framework that the Court applies below. What is more, the Federal Circuit has

25 never expressed a similar discontent with treating one or a few claims as representative for Alice

purposes. In fact, the Federal Circuit often treats one or a few claims as representative when

26 appropriate. See, e.g., Mobile Acuity, 110 F.4th at 1290–92; Longitude Licensing, 2025 WL 1249136, at

*4 (treating one claim as representative of 66 claims).

27

1 from the underlying abstract concept. See, e.g., ’740 Patent claim 11 (adding a second

2 memory); ’740 Patent claims 1, 4, 12, 14 21–22, 24 (describing different end products,

3 such as multiple images or specific blur qualities); ’149 Patent claims 6, 10, 16, 20, 26,

4 30 (same); ’961 Patent claims 6, 16, 19 (same). While adding a second memory slightly

5 changes the claimed process, it is not a limitation that changes the fact that the claim is

6 directed to an abstract idea. And a result of multiple images or specific blur qualities

7 does not change the fact that the result was reached by combining images to enhance one

8 another. Therefore, CIR’s arguments as to many of the identified differences fail.

9 The closest CIR comes to identifying materially different claims is its mention of

10 claims that are limited to the relative shift and alignment of pixels between multiple

11 images. Specifically, several claims in the Combined-Image Patents include limitations

12 regarding a processor that “takes into account a relative shift between the sequence of

13 digital images” to either “designate[]” a subject and background or generate the final

14 image. See, e.g., ’149 Patent claims 3–4, 8, 13–14, 18, 23–24, 28. The specification

15 teaches that taking this shift into account assists with the alignment of pixels in the final

16 combined image. See ’149 Patent at 11:28–11:45. The claims recite the alignment of

17 multiple images to arrive at a final enhanced image. Despite this more specific

18 limitation, the claims are still directed to the same abstract idea of combining images to

19 enhance each other. And, in a similar context, the Federal Circuit has held that shifting

20 pixels to change the appearance of the final image, such as by creating the appearance of

21 movement (i.e., animation), “is clearly an abstract idea.” Plotagraph, 2024 WL 223185,

22 at *3. While CIR argues that Plotagraph is inapposite because “‘animation’ is not

23 relevant to the claims at issue here,” ECF No. 20 at 13 n.5, this conclusory argument fails

24 because it ignores that the claims in Plotagraph and the claims at issue here both deal

25 with combining images to reach a desired result. Therefore, CIR fails to show that the

26

27

1 claims have a distinctive significance from the exemplary claims that would have a

2 material impact on the eligibility analysis.

3 Accordingly, Google has met its burden to show that the exemplary claims are

4 representative of all other claims in the Combined-Image Patents.

5 IV. Leave to Amend

6 CIR requests leave to amend the complaint to address any factual shortcomings in the

7 Alice step two analysis. ECF No. 20 at 28–29.

8 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

9 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

10 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

11 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture

12 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would

13 be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber,

14 806 F.2d at 1401.

15 CIR seeks leave to amend for three reasons: (1) to supplement its allegations

16 regarding the state of the art as of the priority date; (2) to supplement its allegations

17 regarding “the inventive concepts embodied by specific claim limitations”; and (3) to

18 address the benefits of the Combined-Image Patents’ technical advances in order to show

19 that the inventions were not “well-understood, routine, and conventional.” ECF No. 20 at

20 29. However, as the Court discussed, supra Discussion Section II, the Federal Circuit’s

21 decision in Yu forecloses (1) and (3) as a matter of law. There, the court found that

22 claims similarly directed at the abstract idea of combining images to enhance each other

23 failed at step two because they relied on similar conventional components that were

24 “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional.” 110 F.4th at 1043, 1045. Notably, the

25 patent at issue in Yu was issued before the priority date of the Combined-Image Patents

26 here. Yu, 611 F. Supp. 3d at 911, aff’d, 1 F.4th at 1040. Thus, CIR’s proposed

27

1 amendments that fall under (1) and (3) would be futile, because Yu forecloses CIR’s

2 arguments.

3 Moreover, amendments regarding the purported inventive concepts of the

4 exemplary claims would be futile too. Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in the

5 exemplary claims with factual allegations because the claims, as written, do not support

6 any possible finding that they supply an inventive concept. As the Court found, the

7 claims are too broad and lack any meaningful limitations that would lead to a finding that

8 they supply any inventive concept beyond the abstract idea itself. See Sanderling Mgmt.

9 Ltd. v. Snap Inc., 65 F.4th 698, 706 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“No amendment to a complaint can

10 alter what a patent itself states.”); Semiconductor Design Techs., LLC v. Cadence Design

11 Sys., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 3d 1162, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“No amendment to the FAC

12 would cure the validity problems with the underlying patents.”).

13 At the hearing on the motion, CIR requested leave to amend the complaint to

14 narrow its claims regarding the Combined-Image Patents to “just the [five] claims from

15 each patent that are specifically written to the third embodiment.” ECF No. 25 at 12:7–

16 12:13. CIR did not make this request in its briefing, see ECF No. 20 at 28–29 (absence),7

17 and it is not clear which five claims it was referring to at the hearing. The Court deduces

18 that CIR is referring to the claims regarding a processor that “takes into account a relative

19 shift between the sequence of digital images” to either “designate[]” a subject and

20 background or generate the final image, see, e.g., ’149 Patent claims 3–4, 8, 13–14, 18,

21 23–24, 28, which assists with aligning pixels in the final combined image, see ’149

22 Patent at 11:28–11:45. In other words, these are the dependent claims that focus on

23 “pixel shifting.”

24

25

7 While “the Court need not consider an issue raised for the first time at oral argument,” Rice Corp. v.

26 Grain Bd. of Iraq, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 2008), the Court will address Plaintiff’s

request here in the interests of judicial economy.

27

1 The Court declines to grant CIR the leave to amend it requested at the hearing. As

2 || the Court discussed supra, Discussion Section HI, the Federal Circuit has held that

3 || shifting pixels to change the appearance of the final image, such as by creating the

4 || appearance of movement (i.¢e., animation), “is clearly an abstract idea.” Plotagraph, 2024

5 || WL 223185, at *3; see also id. at *4 (finding no claimed technological advance or

6 ||improvement where “the claims merely employ generic computers to perform

7 || animation,” an abstract idea). For this reason, the Court found the exemplary claims to

8 || be representative of the claims that are limited to “pixel shifting.” For the same reason,

9 || limiting the complaint to these claims would not change the Court’s conclusion under §

10 Thus, amendment to limit the complaint to these claims would be futile.

1] Accordingly, the Court DENIES CIR leave to amend the complaint.

12 CONCLUSION

13 For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Google’s partial motion to dismiss

14 || without leave to amend.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16

17 ||Dated: July 7, 2025 2 st

18 Hon. athe Coke

19 United States District Judge

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27 23

28 25-cv-00221-GPC-BLM