Opinion

Aucoin-Melohn v. St. Charles Parish School Board

Court
District Court, E.D. Louisiana
Filed
Jul 7, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.3%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KYLE AUCOIN-MELOHN CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 24-1676

ST. CHARLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD SECTION: “D” (5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court for expedited review is the Motion to Compel Deposition of Plaintiff

or Alternative Motion for Adverse Inference (rec. doc. 46) filed by Defendant St. Charles

Parish School Board (“Duenfetinmdealnyt” or “SCPSB”). Plaintiff opposes the motion (rec. doc. 49),

and Defendant filed an reply. (Rec. doc. 51). Having reviewed the pleadings and

the case law, the Court rules as follows.

Destrehan High School (“DHS”) employed Plaintiff as a former Talented Theater

teacher from approximately August 2017 until his alleged constructive discharge on

December 9, 2022. (Rec. doc. 1 at 2). In short, Plaintiff alleges that DefenIdda.nt discriminated,

harassed, and retaliated against him because of his sexual orientation. ( ).

At issue in these pleadings is Plaintiff’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to be

free from self-incrimination during his deposition. Defendant contends that Plaintiff

asserted a “blanket” assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege at his deposition with regard

to two criminal proceedings brought against Plaintiff in St. Charles Parish and Jefferson

Parish. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff mentions the two proceedings in his

Complaint, he has placed them at issue in this litigation, and accordingly, discovery on the

proceedings is fair game. Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff waived his Fifth

Amendment privilege by responding to Defendant’s written discovery and producing

Amendment protects Plaintiff from testifying about the two criminal proceedings, Defendant

seeks an adverse inference against him for refusing to testify to probative evidence.

Plaintiff maintains that he never asserted a “blanket” Fifth Amendment privilege.

Pointing to the transcripts of his deposition, he notes that counsel for Defendant asked his

counsel whether she would assert the privilege as to every question asked concerning the

documents from the two criminal investigations. He then notes that his counsel replied that

“[w]e will take that document-by-document.” (Rec. doc. 49-3 at 5). that is not a “blanket”

assertion of the privilege, he maintains. Plaintiff also notes that his counsel allowed Defense

counsel to ask him questions about the documents produced in connection with the twIdo.

criminal proceedings, objecting at times only that the documents spoke for themselves. (

at 6-7). Again pointing to the transcript of his deposition, Plaintiff notes that Defendant

asked him numerous questions about the documents related to the two criminal

proceedings, all of which he answered. Plaintiff contends that both criminal proceedings

remain open, as he remains on court-supervised probation in the St. Tammany Parish

proceeding, and the Jefferson Parish District Attorney has not determined how to proceed in

that Parish’s criminal investigation. Thus, Plaintiff maintains that he entitled to assert the

Fifth Amendment privilege should any question warrant it because his response may

incriminate him in either proceeding.

The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, “No person . . . shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Fifth Amendment

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination “can be asserted in any pKroacsetiegdairn gv,. cUivniilt eodr

Scrtaimteisn,al, administrative or judiciasle, ei nUvneistteidga Stotartye so rv . aRdajumdoiscatory. . .”

406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972); , 537 F.3d 439, 454 (5th Cir.

2008). The privilege against self-incrimination “protects against any disclosures which the

witness reasonably believes could Kbae sutisgeadr in a criminal proseRcaumtioosn or could lead to other

evidence that might be so used.” , 406 U.S. at 445; , 537 F.3d at 454. The

Mpruivrpilhegy ev . pWroatteecrftrso na t pCaormtym 'ang aoifn Nset ws eYlof-rikn cHraimrbionration under both federal and state law.

, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964). The privilege

covers not only responses that would support the party's criminal conviction but also

M“eamllborya vc.e Hs othgaonse which would furnish a link iHn otfhfme cahna vin. U onfi etevdid Setnactees needed to prosecute.”

, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (citing , 341 U.S. 479, 486-87

(1951)).

The Fifth Circuit has also made clear that “a party may invoke the privilege against

self-incrimination in a civil proceeding” and “may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege

during the discovery process to avoid answering questions at a depositDioanv,i sr–eLsypnocnhd, iInngc . tvo.

Minoterrernoogatories or requests for admissions, or to produce documents.”

, 667 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 2012) (footnotes omitted). The Fifth Circuit has further

noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has cautioned that the Constitution limits the iImd.position of

any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege costly.” (footnote

and internal quotation marks omitted). “Given this consideration – and because all parties

should have a reasonable opportunity to litigate a civil case fully – courts should seek out

ways to permit as much testimonIdy. as possible to be presented in the civil litigation, despite

the assertion of the privilege.” (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). “In

addition, [the Fifth Circuit] has held that, when there are competing interests posed by an

invocation of the Fifth Amendment, a court should measure the relative weights of the

pIda.rties' competing interests with a view toward accommodating those interests, if possible.”

(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).

But “while a person may refuse to testify during civil proceedings on the ground that

his testimony mighHt iinnocjroisma ivn.a Bteu thleimr . . . his refusal to testify may be used against him in a

civil proceeding.” , 547 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Thus, although a jury in a criminal case is not permitted to draw adverse

inferences based on a defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, it is well-settled

that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actioInds.

when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Relevant here, the Fifth Circuit has also held that “[a] blanket refusal to answer

questions at deposition on the ground that they are privileged is an improper invocation of

the fifth amendSm.Ee.Cn.t v, .i rFriersstp Feicnti. vGer po.f owf hTeetxh.,e Irn csu. ch a claim is made by a plaintiff, defendant,

or a witness.” , 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit “has held that such a blanket assertion of the

privilege is insufficient to relieve a party of the duty to respond to questions put to him,

stating that even if the danger of self-incrimination is great, (the party's) remedy is not to

voice a blanket refusal to produce his records or testify. Instead, he must present himself

with his records for quesItdio. ning, and as to each question and each record elect to raise or

not to raise the defense.” (internal quotation marks omitted). “Requiring a party to object

with specificity to the information sought from him permits the district court to rule on the

validity of his claim of privilege. A party is not entitled to decide for himself whether he is

protected by the fifth amendment privilege. Rather, this question is for the court to decide

after conducting a particularized inquiry, deciding, in connection with each specific area thIadt.

the questioning party seeks to explorseee, walhseot hLeorn goorr niao tv .t hCen tpyr. iovfi lDegaell aiss , wTeexll.-founded.”

(internal quotation marks omitted); , No. 3:14-CV-

3111-L, 2015 WL 3822233, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 19, 2015) (same).

While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s counsel asserted a “blanket” invocation of

the Fifth Amendment privilege at the outset of the deposition, that is not how the deposition

actually played out. As outlined above, Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to let Plaintiff answer

questions about specific documents produced in the two proceedings. (Rec. doc. 49-3 at 7).

Counsel for Plaintiff did indeed at times invoke the privilege as to specific questions. But,

from the limited portions of the transcript of the deposition attached to the pleadings, the

Court finds that these invocations were proper, as the questions related at times to matters

not reflected by the documents produced by either Plaintiff or Defendant but to the

underlying facts of the Plaintiff’s alleged offenses.

Documents speak for themselves, and both parties have produced documents related

to the two criminal proceedings. Admitting them at trial and allowing the jury to review the

documents necessitates no further information on the part of Plaintiff. For example, there is

an entire colloquy between counsel for Defendant and Plaintiff during which he confirms the

identity and contents of the documents related to the two criminal proceedings and during

which there was no objection based on the Fifth Amendment privilege. (Rec. doc. 49-3 at 35-

50). Even though he did not need to, Plaintiff confirmed the contents of the documents as

they related to his arrest and the criminal investigations. From the limited sections of the

transcripts of the deposition before the Court, it is unclear to the Court what else counsel for

Defendant needed from Plaintiff. So, despite Defendant’s protestations, Plaintiff answered

Defendant’s counsel’s questions that she posed to him regarding the two criminal

proceedings at issue in this lawsuit.

In its original memorandum and its reply, Defendant makes much of the argument

that some of its questions – none of which is represented by the sections of transcripts

produced to the Court – delve into whether Plaintiff Sweea sL eqeu va. lKifaiend. Cfiotry Sh.i sR yp. oCsoi.tion, as is

necessary for a plaintiff to prove in a Title VII lawsuit. , 574 F.3d

253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot establish that he is a

qualified individual for a Talented Teacher position because his probation forbids him from

working with individuals under the age of 18. (Rec. docs. 49-2, 51 at 8). Again, the document

entitled “Conditions of Probation” speaks for itself. (Rec. doc. 49-2). And moreover, the

sections of the transcripts submitted to the Court do not reflect what exact question

1

Defendant posed to Plaintiff on this issue and whether he asserted the privilege. When

Defendant questioned Plaintiff about the specific individuals related to the two criminal

proceedings, Plaintiff freely responded, and no objection based on privilege was asserted.

(Rec. doc. 51-1 at 12-13). Without the specific question before it about which Defendant

complains, this Court cannot conduct the paSr.Eti.cCu.larized inquiry to determine whether or not

the assertion of privilege is well-founded. , 659 F.2d at 668.

Neither does the Court find that Plaintiff waived his right to invoke the Fifth

Amendment. An individual may waive his Fifth AmeCnodlmoreandto p rvi. vSilpergien g“provided the waiver

is made volunMtairrialyn,d kan vo. wArinizgolyn aand intelligently.” , 479 U.S. 564, 572

(1987) (citing , 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). There is no indication here –

1

From the sections of the transcript of the deposition before the Court, counsel for Defendant asked Plaintiff

and Defendant does not argue – that Plaintiff voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived

his Fifth Amendment privilege. Defendant essentially asks that the Court find waiver by

default because Plaintiff responded to factual discovery and produced documents from the

two criminal investigations, most of which is already represented on the documents on

which Defendant questioned him at his deposition. The Court cannot find waiver under

these circumstances.

Neither can the Court enter an adverse inference against Plaintiff. That is an

evidentiary question for the District Judge to decide. Accordingly, and for the foregoing

reasonsI,T IS ORDERED

that the Motion to CDoEmNpIeElD Deposition of Plaintiff or Alternative

Motion for Adverse Inference (rec. do7ct.h 46) is . July

New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

MICHAEL B. NORTH

UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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