The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
CHRISTA BUSH CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-106
VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS
LOUISIANA HOMECARE OF MISS-LOU MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Louisiana Homecare of Miss-Lou, LLC, (“Defendant” or “LHC”).1 Plaintiff Christa
Bush (“Plaintiff” or “Bush”) opposed the Motion,2 and Defendant replied.3 Defendant
also filed a supplemental reply.4 After careful consideration of the law, the facts in
the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties, for the following
reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Bush, an African American, brings this action pursuant to Title VII against
her former employer, Defendant LHC, alleging race discrimination in connection with
a denial of a promotion to the role of Executive Director and retaliation.5
Bush began her employment with LHC in 2015 as a home health nurse at its
Ferriday, Louisiana agency.6 After approximately five years, she was promoted in
2020 to a Patient Care Manager (“PCM”) position, where she supervised nurses
1 R. Doc. 19.
2 R. Doc. 23.
3 R. Doc. 24.
4 R. Doc. 35.
5 R. Doc. 1.
6 R. Doc. 19-1 at 5.
providing home health services.7 In November 2021, Plaintiff reported her coworker,
Teri Troxler, for allegedly making a race-based comment suggesting that people
should not date outside their race.8 LHC investigated Plaintiff’s report in accordance
with its established procedures and counseled Troxler.9
In September 2022, Executive Director Meghan Floyd resigned, leaving the
position vacant.10 Bush applied for the position.11 Regional Vice President Spencer
Thibodeaux interviewed Bush for the role.12 During Plaintiff’s interview for the
administrative role of Executive Director, Thibodeaux discovered that Plaintiff did
not meet Louisiana’s legal requirement of three years’ management experience in
healthcare delivery, as mandated by La. Admin. Code tit. 48, pt. 1 § 9103. By contrast,
the other applicant, Lyndsie Raines, possessed over five years of management
experience overseeing 20-25 nurses.13 LHC selected Raines for the Executive Director
position.14
After the selection, LHC leadership became aware of allegations that Plaintiff
had told coworkers she was denied the promotion due to her race.15 In an October 20,
2022 meeting with Plaintiff, Thibodeaux and Chief Diversity Officer Lolanda Brown
addressed the reports, but Plaintiff denied making those statements.16 During the
meeting, Plaintiff also raised the racially insensitive comment from Troxler made
7 R. Doc. 19-1 at 5.
8 R. Doc. 19-1 at 5-6.
9 R. Doc. 19-1 at 5-6.
10 R. Doc. 19-1 at 6.
11 R. Doc. 19-1 at 6.
12 R. Doc. 19-1 at 6.
13 R. Doc. 19-1 at 7.
14 R. Doc. 19-1 at 7.
15 R. Doc. 19-1 at 7.
16 R. Doc. 19-1 at 7-8.
nearly a year earlier.17 In response, Thibodeaux conducted a review of the Standards
of Conduct for the employees in the Ferriday agency.18 Troxler was not involved in
the Executive Director hiring process.19
Plaintiff continued to serve as a PCM under Raines’s supervision.20 In
February 2023, Raines conducted an annual performance evaluation of Plaintiff.21
Dissatisfied with her evaluation scores, Plaintiff contends that she received “negative
performance evaluations, directly contradicting her prior positive performance
history.”22
On April 4, 2023, Plaintiff resigned from LHC.23 She filed a Charge of
Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on June 23,
2023,24 and subsequently initiated this lawsuit on January 25, 2024.25
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows “that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”26 “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”27
“A dispute is genuine if the summary judgment evidence is such that a reasonable
17 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
18 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
19 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
20 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
21 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
22 R. Doc. 23 at 21.
23 R. Doc. 19-1 at 8.
24 R. Doc. 19-12.
25 R. Doc. 1.
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
27 Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
jury could return a verdict for the [non-movant].”28 In evaluating a motion for
summary judgment, the court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the
evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in
favor of the non-moving party.”29
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility
of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.”30 “The moving party may meet its burden to
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the
record contains no support for the non-moving party's claim.”31 Thereafter, if the non-
movant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary
judgment is appropriate.32
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
In its Motion, Defendant raises several arguments. Defendant contends that:
(1) Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she
was not qualified for the Executive Director position; (2) Plaintiff cannot show that
Defendant’s stated reasons were pretextual; (3) Plaintiff cannot establish the
elements of a retaliation claim under Title VII; (4) Plaintiff did not suffer any adverse
28 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
29 Total E&P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal
citations omitted).
30 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247).
31 Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002).
32 Id.
employment action; (5) Plaintiff cannot show the required causation to support her
retaliation claim; (6) Plaintiff cannot establish a constructive discharge; and (7) in
the alternative, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for
wage-related damages. The Court will address Defendant’s arguments as necessary.
a. Title VII Race Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff does not allege any direct evidence of discrimination, so the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis applies.33 “To survive summary
judgment under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first present evidence of a
prima facie case of discrimination.”34 To establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, Plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she
is qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
she was replaced by someone outside her protected class or was treated less favorably
than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.35 If Plaintiff
demonstrates a prima facie case, the burden shifts to LHC to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its challenged actions.36 Finally, if LHC meets its
burden, Plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the employer's reasons are false or “unworthy of credence”
and, thus, merely a pretext for discrimination.37 Plaintiff retains the burden of
33 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
34 Id. at 317.
35 Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir.2004).
36 Pacovsky v. City of Booneville Mississippi, 347 Fed.Appx. 42, 43–44 (5th Cir.2009).
37 Id.
persuading the fact finder that impermissible discrimination motivated the adverse
employment action.38
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race
discrimination because she was not qualified for the Executive Director position
under Louisiana law.39 Specifically, Defendant contends La. Admin. Code tit. 48, pt.
1 § 9103 requires an Executive Director to have at least three years of management
experience in healthcare delivery, which it alleges Plaintiff undisputedly lacked at
the time of her application.40 Defendant maintains that this legal requirement, not
any discriminatory motive, was the reason Plaintiff was not promoted. Defendant
also points out that the successful candidate, Raines, possessed over five years of
relevant management experience, directly satisfying the statutory qualifications.41
Plaintiff responds by arguing she was qualified because “she had substantial
management experience as a Patient Care Manager (PCM) and as a Plant Nurse at
Fruit of the Loom.”42 Notably lacking from the Plaintiff’s opposition is evidence or
even the allegation that Plaintiff had the three years of management experience
required by law. La. Admin. Code tit. 48, pt. 1 § 9103 requires that administrators
“shall have three years of management experience in the delivery of health care
service[.]” It is not disputed that Plaintiff did not have three years of management
experience with LHC.43 Further, it is clear from Plaintiff’s deposition that in her
38 Id.
39 R. Doc. 19-1 at 11.
40 R. Doc. 19-1 at 11.
41 R. Doc. 19-1 at 12.
42 R. Doc. 23 at 10.
43 R. Doc. 19-8 at 10.
position as a plant nurse at Fruit of the Loom, she did not manage other nurses, so
therefore, her time there could not run toward the three-year requirement.44 At the
time she applied for the position, Bush did not have three years of management
experience; therefore, by law, she not qualified for the position. Under the McDonnell
Douglas framework, if the plaintiff can’t meet the prima facie showing, the Court may
end its analysis there.
Because Plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case, the Court suspends its
inquiry and summary judgment on this claim is warranted.
b. Retaliation Claim
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must
show that (1) she engaged in protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action.45 Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory
reason for its actions.46 If the employer does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to
show that the proffered reason is pretextual.47
In its Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim fails
because she cannot establish either an adverse employment action or the required
causal connection between any protected activity and alleged retaliation.48 Defendant
first contends that Plaintiff suffered no adverse employment action after her 2021
44 R. Doc. 19-8 at 7.
45 Cooper v. Dallas Police Ass'n, 278 F. App'x 318, 320 (5th Cir. 2008).
46 Hockman v. Westward Commc'n LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 330 (5th Cir. 2004).
47 See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
48 R. Doc. 19-1 at 14.
complaint about racially discriminatory remarks by her former co-worker, Troxler.49
Defendant highlights how Plaintiff was neither terminated nor demoted, and she
resigned voluntarily.50 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s three categories of alleged
retaliatory acts—(1) a negative performance evaluation; (2) unfair criticism of her
work; and (3) denial of a request to work from home—do not amount to adverse
employment actions under Title VII.51 Defendant argues the negative evaluation did
not result in any change to Plaintiff’s job or benefits, that ordinary workplace
criticism does not constitute materially adverse action, and that the denial of remote
work was a de minimis inconvenience insufficient to support a retaliation claim.52
Even assuming any of these acts could qualify as adverse employment actions,
Defendant asserts Plaintiff cannot show “but-for” causation linking the alleged
retaliation to her protected activity.53 Defendant highlights that there is nearly a
year-long gap between Plaintiff’s November 2021 protected complaint and the
earliest alleged retaliatory conduct in late 2022, which undermines any inference of
causation.54 Defendant also contends Plaintiff offered no evidence beyond her own
speculative belief that the actions were retaliatory.55 Without competent evidence of
either adverse action or causation, Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, and her claim should be dismissed with prejudice.56
49 R. Doc. 19-1 at 15.
50 R. Doc. 19-1 at 15.
51 R. Doc. 19-1 at 15-17.
52 R. Doc. 19-1 at 15-17.
53 R. Doc. 19-1 at 17.
54 R. Doc. 19-1 at 18.
55 R. Doc. 19-1 at 18.
56 R. Doc. 19-1 at 18.
In response to Defendant’s argument that she suffered no adverse employment
action and cannot show causation, Plaintiff contends that she experienced multiple
materially adverse actions that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging
in protected activity.57 While making no citations to the law or the record, Plaintiff
asserts that the denial of remote work privileges during her approved intermittent
FMLA leave, receipt of a negative performance evaluations, and exclusion from
meetings and decision-making processes collectively amount to adverse employment
actions under Title VII.58
Regarding causation, Plaintiff asserts that her protected activity was ongoing,
not limited to a single complaint in November 2021.59 She argues that because
Defendant never investigated or resolved her complaint about the racially offensive
comments by her co-worker, she was forced to continually raise the issue until her
resignation in April 2023.60 Without citation to the record, Plaintiff maintains that
retaliation escalated as she persisted in seeking accountability, resulting in a pattern
of exclusion, criticism, and disparate treatment.61 She further contends that under
Fifth Circuit precedent, the continuous nature of her complaints preserves temporal
proximity and supports a causal link between her protected activity and Defendant’s
adverse actions.62 Plaintiff concludes that this ongoing pattern of retaliatory
treatment precludes summary judgment on her retaliation claim.63
57 R. Doc. 23 at 21.
58 R. Doc. 23 at 21.
59 R. Doc. 23 at 21
60 R. Doc. 23 at 21.
61 R. Doc. 23 at 22-23.
62 R. Doc. 23 at 23.
63 R. Doc. 23 at 23.
Finally, in reply, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s opposition fails to
establish either an adverse employment action sufficient for a retaliation claim under
Title VII or a causal connection between any alleged adverse acts and her protected
activity.64 Defendant reiterates that Plaintiff’s cited actions—including exclusion
from meetings, denial of remote work privileges, increased scrutiny, and a negative
performance evaluation—do not rise to the level of materially adverse employment
actions under controlling Fifth Circuit precedent.65 Defendant further argues that,
even if these acts were adverse, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate “but for” causation, as
required by Title VII, relying instead on her speculative belief that Defendant was
retaliating against her.66 Defendant asserts that Plaintiff offers no competent
summary judgment evidence connecting the alleged adverse actions to her prior
complaint of discrimination, and therefore, her retaliation claim cannot survive
summary judgment.67
Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish
she suffered an adverse employment action and a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. First, Plaintiff did not suffer
an adverse employment action. She alleges several workplace actions—including a
negative performance evaluation, alleged exclusion from discussions, increased
scrutiny, and denial of remote work privileges—yet none of these constitute adverse
employment actions under binding Fifth Circuit precedent or the precedent of this
64 R. Doc. 24 at 6.
65 R. Doc. 24 at 6-7.
66 R. Doc. 24 at 7.
67 R. Doc. 24 at 7.
Court. Starting with the negative evaluation, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[A]
negative performance evaluation does not constitute ‘an adverse employment action
actionable under Title VII.’”68 Next, the alleged exclusion from workplace discussions
appears to be based on the fact that she was “kept in the dark about a critical state
inspection – a task that directly fell under [her] responsibilities.”69 Even resolving
this allegation in her favor, exclusion from workplace discussions does not meet the
requirement that the allegedly retaliatory action be materially adverse. “To
determine whether an action is materially adverse, we look to indicia such as whether
the action affected “job title, grade, hours, salary, or benefits” or caused “a diminution
in prestige or change in standing among ... co-workers.”70 Plaintiff has not established
by law or evidence that such exclusion is a materially adverse employment action.
Finally, increased scrutiny and denial of remote work privileges are not adverse
employment actions. The Fifth Circuit has determined chastisement by superiors
does not rise to the level of material adversity that distinguishes an adverse
employment action from “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners” which the Supreme Court has recognized are not actionable retaliatory
conduct.71 Next, this Court in Green v. Ochsner LSU Health Shreveport held that a
plaintiff could not show that she suffered an adverse employment action greater than
68 Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Douglas v. DynMcDermott
Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 373 n.11 (5th Cir. 1998)).
69 R. Doc. 34-2 at 5, ¶ 24.
70 Paul v. Elayn Hunt Corr. Ctr., 666 F. App'x 342, 346 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Stewart v. Miss. Transp.
Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009)).
71 Credeur v. Louisiana Through Off. of Att'y Gen., 860 F.3d 785, 798 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Stewart v.
Mississippi Transp. Comm'n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Burlington Northern and
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
a de minimis harm after she received delayed work-from-home permission.72 The
Court sees no reason to deviate from its prior holding in this case. Plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action. Finally, because
Plaintiff has not established working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable
person would feel compelled to resign, she cannot show constructive discharge.73
Second, even assuming arguendo that these acts could constitute adverse
employment actions, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate the required causal
connection. Plaintiff relies solely on her belief that Defendant was retaliating against
her for her protected activity in November 2021, but she provides no competent
summary judgment evidence linking the challenged acts to her complaint of
discrimination. Mere subjective belief or speculation of retaliatory animus is
insufficient to establish causation.74
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
either the existence of an adverse employment action or the requisite causal
connection. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim
is therefore warranted.
72 Green v. Ochsner LSU Health Shreveport, No. CV 22-1422, 2024 WL 1057217, at *7-8 (W.D. La.
Mar. 11, 2024)
73 Stover v. Hattiesburg Public School Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 991 (5th Cir. 2008).
74 Welsh v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 941 F.3d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 2019).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Louisiana
Homecare of Miss-Lou, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 19) is
GRANTED and Plaintiff Christa Bush’s claims will be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. A judgment consistent with this ruling will be issued accordingly.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 7th day of July, 2025.
JERRY E RDS, JR.
UNI¥YED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE