involving notice given, in part, through reports on jail conditions and lawsuits
How later courts described this case
- involving notice given, in part, through reports on jail conditions and lawsuits
- stating that the sheriff's failure to pursue reasonable measures, such as “classifying and segregating the inmates based on their likelihood for violence,” demonstrated deliberate indifference
- finding that a sheriff's “failure to take meaningful action” to address overcrowding, inadequate guard 23 supervision, and inmate violence amounted to deliberate indifference
- finding that, because of the dangerous conditions at the facility, defendant was deliberately indifferent even though “no serious injury was alleged to have [previously] occurred”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION
FRED TURNER, Administrator )
for the Estate of Lawrence )
Turner, deceased, )
)
)
Plaintiff, )
) CIVIL ACTION NO.
v. ) 2:22cv624-MHT
) (WO)
JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Alabama )
Prison Commissioner, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
This lawsuit stems from the death of Lawrence Turner
while he was a prisoner at the Bullock Correctional
Facility, an Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC)
facility. Plaintiff Fred Turner, the administrator of
decedent Turner’s estate, brings this lawsuit against two
Bullock correctional wardens in their individual
capacities: Patrice Jones and David Lamar.1
1. Plaintiff also names Jefferson S. Dunn as a
defendant. Dunn was the ADOC commissioner at the time
Plaintiff asserts two counts in his amended
complaint. In Count 1, he claims that Wardens Jones and
Lamar failed to protect decedent from a substantial risk
of serious harm, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. And, in Count 2, he seeks to hold them liable
under Alabama’s wrongful-death statute, again for their
failure to protect decedent. Jurisdiction is proper
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343 (civil rights), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(supplemental).
Before the court is the wardens’ motion to dismiss.
They argue that the two claims against them are barred
by qualified immunity. They also contend that the
amended complaint should be dismissed as an impermissible
shotgun pleading. For the reasons below, their motion
will be denied as to Count 1 and granted as to Count 2.
of decedent’s death. Dunn is addressed in a separate
order.
2
I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD
Wardens Jones and Lamar bring motions to dismiss
under subpart (b)(6) of Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. In considering a motion to
dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff’s factual
allegations as true, see Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467
U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in
plaintiff’s favor, see Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402
(11th Cir. 1993).
II. BACKGROUND
The facts alleged in the amended complaint, taken in
the light most favorable to plaintiff administrator, are
as follows.
In 2016, the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) opened an investigation into suspected Eighth
Amendment violations at ADOC’s male correctional
3
facilities, including Bullock Correctional Facility.
After a three-year investigation, DOJ issued a report on
the conditions in the male prisons in April 2019, and a
supplemental report in July 2020 further detailing those
conditions.2 The 2019 and 2020 reports were specifically
provided to ADOC officials.
2. The 2019 report is available at U.S. DOJ,
Investigation of Alabama’s State Prisons for Men
(April 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/6TRX-B5SJ, and the
2020 report at U.S. DOJ, Investigation of Alabama’s State
Prisons for Men (July 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/VP7B-
29L5. Because plaintiff incorporated the reports by
reference, the court will consider them in deciding this
motion. “In general, if it considers materials outside
of the complaint, a district court must convert the
motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion.” SFM
Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334,
1337 (11th Cir. 2010). But under the exception for
documents incorporated by reference, a court may consider
an extrinsic document without converting a motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, “if [the
document] is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim, and
(2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Id.
Here, both reports are central to plaintiff’s claims.
Paragraphs 11 through 77 of the amended complaint
summarize the reports, often directly quoting them in the
process. Compare Pl.’s Am. Compl. (Doc. 24) ¶ 58, and
id. ¶ 61(d), with 2019 Report, at 26, and id. at 18.
Plaintiff explains that the reports show that the wardens
had notice of the allegedly dangerous conditions at
4
The amended complaint summarizes the 2019 and 2020
DOJ reports and alleges that ADOC’s male correctional
facilities suffered from staffing shortages,
overcrowding, and rampant inmate-on-inmate physical and
sexual violence. The reports also allege that the
available data likely underestimate the prevalence of
violence at ADOC facilities, as (1) ADOC lacks a
centralized system to track prisoner homicides;
(2) prison officials often misclassify prisoner
Bullock, which is necessary to establish supervisory
liability for plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim.
Moreover, while defendants challenge the accuracy of
the reports, they do not challenge the reports’
authenticity. In fact, they cite the July 2020 report
in their brief. See Jones and Lamar Br. (Doc. 30) 4.
The amended complaint also cites to the DOJ’s lawsuit
against Alabama, which was based on the findings outlined
in the reports. And the record in that case contains the
reports. See Special Master Report and Recommendation
#2, United States of America v. Alabama,
No. 20-cv-01971-RDP, (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2023),
(Doc. 131-1) Ex. A-B.
Finally, there the court’s ability to take judicial
notice of the existence of the reports.
5
homicides as deaths precipitated by natural causes; and
(3) prison officials discourage reporting of incidents
of violence by retaliating against victims who speak out.
The reports also represented that there were other
patterns of dangerous conditions across Alabama prisons
including: failure to classify inmates by risk level and
house them accordingly; failure to prevent uncontrolled
movement of prisoners; lack of adequate supervision;
insufficient security cameras and convex mirrors; failure
to screen new inmates for contraband, including weapons,
drugs, and cell phones; failure to control the
manufacture and flow of weapons; failure to respond
appropriately to reports of threats; failure to prevent
extortion among prisoners; failure to fix broken and
defective locks; and failure to provide adequate
programming.
Among the prisons investigated by the DOJ was Bullock
Correctional Facility, where decedent Turner was
incarcerated, and defendants Jones and Lamar were
6
wardens. Bullock is a medium-security facility built to
accommodate 919 inmates. Around the time of DOJ’s
investigation, Bullock was operating at over 140 %
capacity and had a 60.1% staff vacancy rate. At least
five incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence were reported
at Bullock in the years leading up to decedent’s death,
including three homicides in February 2018, June 2020,
and November 2020, a sexual and physical assault in
January 2018, and a stabbing in April 2018. In at least
two of these incidents, the victims previously expressed
concern for their safety to prison officials.
Furthermore, due to ineffective classification and
pervasive misclassification of inmates, the prison
routinely failed to separate violent prisoners from
non-violent prisoners. Instead, officers at Bullock
routinely placed inmates with histories of violence
alongside other inmates, without those histories.
In January 2021, decedent began receiving death
threats from several other inmates who were “known” to
7
be violent. Am. Compl. (Doc. 24) ¶ 108. Both decedent
and other inmates notified several guards of concerns
over decedent’s safety due to the threats and named the
specific inmates threatening decedent to the guards.
Plaintiff Turner, decedent’s brother, also notified
officers at Bullock that decedent was being tortured by
inmates, as well as prison guards. Despite repeated
warnings, guards at Bullock took no protective action.
Three months after decedent was first threatened, in
April 2021, one or more of the inmates who previously
threatened decedent, physically assaulted him, and he
died from injuries sustained during the attack.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Count 1: Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim
As explained above, in Count 1, plaintiff asserts an
Eighth Amendment claim against Wardens Jones and Lamar
in their individual capacities. In response, the wardens
8
argue that the count should be dismissed because they are
entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity insulates government officials
from personal liability “for civil damages insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)). Once officials establish that they
were acting within their discretionary authority, which
is uncontested here, the court engages in two distinct
inquiries to determine whether qualified immunity
applies: (1) whether the plaintiff’s allegations “make
out a violation of a constitutional right,” and (2)
whether “the right at issue was clearly established at
the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Id. at
232 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
There are three ways a plaintiff may demonstrate the
law was clearly established. See Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918
9
F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019). First, he may “show
that a materially similar case has already been decided.”
Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019).
Second, he may point to broad statements of legal
principles that apply with “obvious clarity to the
circumstances.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240
(11th Cir. 2021). Third, he may prove that the conduct
was “so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly
violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Over the years,
materially similar cases and broad statements of legal
principles have created a foundation of relevant clearly
established Eighth Amendment law.
1. Plaintiff Asserted Clearly Established Eighth
Amendment Law.
The Constitution does not permit prison officials to
turn a blind eye to inmate-on-inmate violence. Rather,
it mandates that officials “protect prisoners from
violence inflicted upon them by other prisoners.”
10
Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir.
2014). However, not “every injury suffered by one
prisoner at the hands of another ... translates into
constitutional liability for prison officials
responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
To establish that a prison official violated the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, a plaintiff must prove that the official was
deliberately indifferent “to a substantial risk of
serious harm to an inmate who suffers injury.” Lane v.
Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016). To do so,
“a plaintiff must show (1) a substantial risk of serious
harm; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that
risk; and (3) causation.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d
1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).
Deliberate indifference “has both a subjective and an
objective component.” Id. Subjectively, the official
must know that his own conduct “put the plaintiff at
11
substantial risk of serious harm.” Wade v. McDade, 106
F.4th 1251, 1258 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc).
“Objectively, the official must have responded to the
known risk in an unreasonable manner, in that he or she
‘knew of ways to reduce the harm’ but knowingly or
recklessly declined to act.” Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233
(quoting Rodriguez v. Sec’y Dept. of Corr., 508 F.3d 611,
620 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Because plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim relies on
supervisory liability, proving it becomes more
complicated. Section 1983, which is the basis for the
claim, does not make supervisors automatically liable for
their subordinates’ actions. See Cottone v. Jenne, 326
F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003). “Instead, supervisory
liability under § 1983 occurs either when the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional
conduct or when there is a causal connection between the
actions of a supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.” Id.
12
A plaintiff may establish supervisory liability for
a § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim in at
least three ways.
First, a plaintiff may show that “the supervisor
directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that
the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop
them from doing so.” Id. (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Here, plaintiff has not made such allegations.
Second, a plaintiff may prove a “history of
widespread abuse put[] the reasonable supervisor on
notice of the need to correct” the asserted
constitutional violation, but the supervisor failed to
do so. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Usually, to plead an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff
must establish that an official was deliberately
indifferent to a specific threat the victim faced.
However, in some cases officials may be liable for their
deliberate indifference to a ‘generalized risk of
violence’ or ‘history of widespread abuse.’ See, e.g.,
13
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1235; Brown v. Dunn, 760 F. Supp.
3d 1326 (M.D. Ala. 2024) (Thompson, J.).
Generally, to establish liability for a
history-of-widespread-abuse claim (also known as a
generalized-risk-of-violence claim), a plaintiff must
point “to specific features of a facility or its
population” that render it particularly violent. Id. In
other words, that those particular features “present an
objectively substantial risk of serious harm.” Marsh v.
Butler Cnty., 268 F.3d 1014, 1029 (11th Cir. 2001) (en
banc). Next, the plaintiff must show that an official
was deliberately indifferent. See id. Then, the
plaintiff must explain how that official’s deliberate
indifference to those features caused the injury at
issue. See id. Here, as explained in more detail later,
plaintiff has adequately pled a
generalized-risk-of-violence claim.
Third, a plaintiff may show “a supervisor’s custom
or policy results in deliberate indifference to
14
constitutional rights.” Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231,
1237 (11th Cir. 2006). In the amended complaint,
plaintiff asserts that Wardens Jones’s and Lamar’s
customs or policies were deliberately indifferent to
decedent’s constitutional rights. But as plaintiff has
already adequately pled a generalized-risk-of-violence
claim, the court need not decide whether his assertions
would also establish a custom or policy claim.
2. Plaintiff Adequately Pled that Decedent’s Clearly
Established Right Was Violated.
With the amended complaint read in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, he has adequately pled a
generalized-risk-of-violence claim.
First, plaintiff alleges that decedent Turner faced
a substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiff begins by
asserting ADOC’s male prisons had a history of widespread
abuse. As stated previously, he alleges that all of the
facilities suffered from: overcrowding; staffing
shortages; inadequate supervision; a failure to classify
15
inmates by risk level and house them accordingly; the
proliferation of contraband (including weapons, drugs,
and cell phones); insufficient security equipment; and
broken or defective locks. He asserts that, because of
these conditions, there was rampant inmate-on-inmate
physical and sexual violence across ADOC’s male prisons.
For example, in the fiscal-year before decedent’s death,
there were at least 16 prisoners killed by other
prisoners, and over 1,100 prisoner-on-prisoner assaults.
Plaintiff further alleges that Bullock was part of
this widespread abuse, and points to various features
that rendered the facility particularly violent. He
describes how Bullock was physically deteriorating, as
it had broken and defective locks, which allowed
prisoners to often roam freely, and insufficient or
broken security cameras and convex mirrors, which
prevented guards from monitoring prisoners. He also
contends that, even if Bullock were not deteriorating,
guards would have been unable to stop inmate misconduct,
16
for over half (60.1 %) of the staff positions at Bullock
were vacant, while it was also overcrowded with inmates
at an occupancy rate of 140 %; and that lopsided ratio
left too few guards to watch over too many prisoners.
Plaintiff submits that reckless and poorly
implemented practices and policies at Bullock heightened
the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence. Due to pervasive
misclassification many inmates with histories of violence
were not housed separately. And, even if they had been
properly classified, it would not have made much
difference, as Bullock housed everyone in general
population together and everyone in restrictive housing
together, rather than separating “nonviolent inmates from
violent inmates.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1029.
Plaintiff explains how these conditions combined to
create an exceptionally dangerous environment at Bullock.
Guards failed to screen new inmates for contraband, and
as a result the facility was flooded with, weapons,
drugs, and cell phones. Those weapons and drugs not
17
imported would be manufactured at Bullock by prisoners
inadequately supervised by short-staffed guards equipped
with insufficient security cameras and convex mirrors.
Guards then failed to control the flow of those weapons,
drugs, and cell phones, which readily made their way
through doors secured with broken and defective locks,
and into the hands of other prisoners.
This risk of substantial harm was not just
theoretical; it materialized into actual harm at Bullock.
Inmates used cell phones to extort other inmates and
their families. Sexual and physical violence was
commonplace, often involving the use of prevalent
weapons. The amended complaint also provides two
examples of homicides that occurred in the ten months
leading to decedent’s death. Plaintiff also contends
that the actual number of homicides during that time may
be much higher, as Bullock routinely misclassifies
prisoner deaths. This misclassification problem is in
turn made worse by ADOC’s lack of a centralized
18
classification system for reporting prisoner deaths. For
example, it is alleged that one of the two previously
referenced homicides was unreported.
According to the amended complaint, the many alleged
incidents of inmate-on-inmate violence that did not
result in death, also faced reporting problems. As
explained above, in the fiscal-year before decedent
Turner’s death, there were over 1,100 inmate-on-inmate
assaults in ADOC male prisons. What proportion of those
assaults occurred at Bullock, the month-to-month
breakdown of those assaults, and whether there are many
other unreported assaults is unclear, in part, because
of ADOC’s own actions. ADOC curbed public reporting of
serious inmate-on-inmate violence in the months after DOJ
issued its first report. Moreover, ADOC did not have a
grievance system to report when guards improperly
responded to incidents or threats of inmate-on-inmate
violence, which also made proper reporting difficult.
And that lack of a grievance system was in turn made
19
worse, because officials at Bullock allegedly discouraged
reporting of incidents and threats of violence through
retaliation.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
consistently determined that features like those that
plaintiff alleges occurred at Bullock pose a substantial
risk of serious harm. In Marsh v. Butler County, the
appellate court found that a jail that did not separate
violent and nonviolent inmates, and which suffered from
overcrowding, routine understaffing, broken locks,
inadequate mental health screening, and uncontrolled flow
of weapons posed an “objectively substantial risk of
serious harm.” 268 F.3d at 1029. The appellate court
concluded the same in Hale v. Tallapoosa County, for a
jail that was overcrowded, failed to classify and
separate violent inmates, and inadequately supervised
inmates. 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). And more
20
recently, in Dickinson v. Cochran,3 the Eleventh Circuit
found that a prison that “routinely housed dangerous
inmates in crowded conditions with non-violent inmates,
allowed the introduction of contraband by improperly
searching inmates, and inadequately supervised inmates”
posed a substantial risk of serious harm. 833 F. App’x
268, 272 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Second, plaintiff has adequately pled that Wardens
Jones and Lamar were deliberately indifferent to this
substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at Bullock.
They were subjectively aware that their conduct posed a
substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at the
facility. According to the amended complaint, they were
notified of the history of widespread abuse at the
3. While an unpublished case like Dickinson cannot
itself be relied upon to define clearly established law
for purposes of qualified immunity, see J W by & through
Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248,
1260 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018), it is nonetheless persuasive
as to how a court in the Eleventh Circuit would apply law
already clearly established.
21
facility by the DOJ reports, both of which were sent to
the officials. See Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 270-73
(involving notice through a letter sent by DOJ); Marsh,
268 F.3d at 1029 (involving notice given, in part,
through reports on jail conditions and lawsuits). The
DOJ reports provided illustrative (but not exhaustive)
examples of inmate-on-inmate violence and inmate access
to contraband at Bullock. The reports also detailed
patterns of facility deterioration, staffing issues,
overcrowding, violence, and dangerous policies, across
all the prisons investigated. As Bullock was one of the
prisons investigated and discussed by the DOJ, the report
provided notice of the conditions at the facility. See
Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 270-73.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that Wardens Jones’s and
Lamar’s responses were objectively unreasonable, as they
knowingly or recklessly failed to remedy the conditions
at Bullock. The amended complaint asserts that they, as
wardens at the facility, were responsible for the
22
conditions there. Yet, according to the amended
complaint, in the two years following DOJ’s first report
until decedent was killed, they knew about the widespread
abuse at the facility and failed to correct it. More
specifically, plaintiff contends that they took no action
in response, and implicitly offers several specific,
concrete actions Wardens Jones and Lamar could have taken
to remedy the conditions at Bullock. For example,
changing the classification and housing policies;
remedying the staffing shortages and overcrowding; fixing
the broken, defective, or inadequate locks, mirrors, and
cameras; and establishing a grievance system to report
when guards improperly respond to incidents or threats
of inmate-on-inmate. Plaintiff’s assertions, taken as
true and in the light most favorable to him, would reflect
that Wardens Jones and Lamar were deliberately
indifferent. See, e.g., Hale, 50 F.3d at 1584-85
(finding that a sheriff's “failure to take meaningful
action” to address overcrowding, inadequate guard
23
supervision, and inmate violence amounted to deliberate
indifference); id. at 1583-84 (stating that the sheriff's
failure to pursue reasonable measures, such as
“classifying and segregating the inmates based on their
likelihood for violence,” demonstrated deliberate
indifference).
Finally, plaintiff has shown how Wardens Jones’s and
Lamar’s deliberate indifference to the specific features
at Bullock caused the decedent’s death. Plaintiff
asserts that decedent Turner was yet another victim of
the widespread abuse at the facility. In January 2021,
several other inmates with a reputation for being violent
began threatening Turner’s life. Fearful for his life,
decedent told the guards at the facility about the death
threats, and in doing so he named the specific inmates
who were threatening him. The under-staffed and
under-equipped guards did nothing in response. According
to the amended complaint, for the next three months,
decedent (and later other concerned inmates as well)
24
continued to seek help from the guards at Bullock. Those
threats began to materialize, and so, plaintiff Turner,
decedent Turner’s brother, reported to several
administrative officers at the facility that decedent was
being tortured by the inmates and other guards. The
amended complaint states that despite these repeated
pleas, help never came, and, as a result, in April 2021,
decedent was attacked by the inmates who previously
threatened him. He died a month later from injuries
caused by the attack.
Plaintiff alleges that, because of the conditions at
Bullock, the inmates who repeatedly threatened decedent
Turner’s life were put in a position where they could
attack him. Insufficient staffing, ineffective
classification, overcrowding, defective locks, and
inadequate security cameras and convex mirrors made it
particularly easy for those inmates to harm decedent, as
guards were ill equipped to respond to any threats. And
Warden Jones’s and Lamar’s failure to implement a
25
centralized grievance system for improper responses to
threats of violence made it harder to report the guards’
failure to respond to the threats against decedent, as
well as the inmates and guards alleged torturing of
decedent.
Still, Wardens Jones and Lamar make several arguments
for why plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a
violation of clearly established law. First, they point
to several Eleventh Circuit cases involving
inmate-on-inmate violence, where the plaintiff did not
meet the generalized-risk-of-violence standard. They
chiefly rely on Marbury v. Warden, which involved a
plaintiff who repeatedly asked to be transferred because
he feared for his safety. See 936 F.3d at 1231. In his
letters to the warden seeking a transfer, plaintiff
mentioned witnessing 15 stabbings in his cell block. See
id. at 1231-32. After two months of being repeatedly
denied a transfer, plaintiff was stabbed by another
inmate. Id. Plaintiff sued the warden, asserting the
26
warden had been put on notice of a history of widespread
abuse (the 15 stabbings) and that the warden’s deliberate
indifference to those stabbings caused plaintiff to be
stabbed. See id. at 1234-35. The Eleventh Circuit stated
that the 15 stabbings, standing alone, were not
sufficient to demonstrate the prison was one “where
violence and terror reign.” Id. at 1234. Wardens Jones
and Lamar correspondingly argue that, because plaintiff
gives only a few examples of violence at Bullock, he has
not demonstrated that the facility was one where violence
and terror reign.
Wardens Jones and Lamar misunderstand Marbury.
Marbury does not establish that to prove a
generalized-risk-of-violence claim, violence must be so
commonplace that violence and terror reign. Rather,
Marbury’s violence-and-terror standard only “applies
where a plaintiff alleges only a generalized risk and
points to no ‘specific features of a facility or its
population rendering it particularly violent.’”
27
Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 275 (discussing Marbury, 936
F.3d at 1235). “Marbury merely suggests that evidence
of a reign of violence and terror would be one way to
establish deliberate indifference; it is does not say it
is the only way.” Brown v. Dunn, 760 F. Supp. 3d 1340
(M.D. Ala. 2024) (Thompson, J.). When a plaintiff points
to “specific features of [a facility] that render it
particularly violent,” Dickinson, 833 F. App’x at 275,
and thus “has alleged more than a generalized risk of
violence,” id., the plaintiff need not prove a reign of
terror and violence. See id.; see also Marsh, 268 F.3d
at 1034 (finding that, because of the dangerous
conditions at the facility, defendant was deliberately
indifferent even though “no serious injury was alleged
to have [previously] occurred”). In such cases, the
specific features help explain how a defendant’s
deliberate indifference caused the injury.
Finally, Wardens Jones and Lamar argue that plaintiff
has not demonstrated the necessary causal connection for
28
supervisory liability because he has not adequately pled
that they were told of the specific threats on decedent’s
life. However, “[plaintiff] was not required to show
that [defendants] knew ‘precisely who would attack whom,’
but only that [they] had subjective knowledge of a
generalized, substantial risk of serious harm from inmate
violence.” Hale, 50 F.3d at 1583 (quoting Farmer, 511
U.S. at 844). And here, plaintiff made that showing.
B. Count 2: Plaintiff’s Wrongful-Death Claim
The court now turns to Count 2, in which plaintiff
claims that Wardens Jones and Lamar violated Alabama’s
wrongful-death statute.
Under the traditional-common-law rule, an injured
party’s personal tort claims abate upon his death. See
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978). In other
words, there is no survivorship under the traditional
common-law rule. See id. Unsatisfied with that harsh
rule, Alabama passed a wrongful-death statute, which
29
permits survivorship when a decedent’s death is caused
by “the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any
person, persons, or corporation,” Ala. Code
§ 6-5-410(a). See Simmons v. Pulmosan Safety Equip.
Corp., 471 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (S.D. Ala. 1979)
(Thomas., J.). Here, plaintiff contends that Wardens
Jones’s and Lamar’s Eighth Amendment violation was a
wrongful act or omission that caused decedent’s death.
While plaintiff asserts Count 2 as a separate count from
Count 1, Count 2 is redundant, for it just reasserts the
claim in Count 1.
To understand why Count 2 is redundant, it helps to
provide some explanation about why plaintiff may assert
Count 1, his § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. The Eleventh
Circuit has explained that, “[b]y its terms, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 does not provide for the survival of civil rights
actions.” Est. of Gilliam ex rel. Waldroup v. City of
Prattville, 639 F.3d 1041, 1045 (11th Cir. 2011). “Due
to this ‘deficiency’ in the statute, the survivorship of
30
civil rights actions is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a).”
Id. Section 1988(a) “generally directs that, where
federal law is ‘deficient,’ the state law of the forum
applies,” so long as that law is not inconsistent with
federal law. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a)).
Generally, “the applicable Alabama survivorship law
is Ala. Code § 6-5-462,” which requires that a decedent’s
unfiled tort claims abate upon his death. Id. at 1046
(cleaned up). If this survivorship statute were to
apply, then decedent Turner’s Eighth Amendment claim
would not survive his death. See id.
However, “when a constitutional violation actually
causes the injured party’s death, a § 1983 claim can be
asserted through the Alabama wrongful-death statute,
Ala. Code § 6-5-410.” Id. at 1047 (cleaned up). To
permit otherwise would allow a state actor to “escape
§ 1983 liability by killing off the victim,” thereby
undermining the “deterrent purposes of the statute.” Id.
at 1048 n.10.
31
Here, as already discussed, Wardens Jones’s and
Lamar’s constitutional violation allegedly proximately
caused decedent’s death; therefore, plaintiff may use
Alabama’s wrongful-death statute to resolve the
deficiency and resurrect decedent’s § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim. See id. at 1047-48, 1047 n.9. In
essence, he can claim that the wardens’ “Eighth Amendment
violation (Count 1) also violates the wrongful-death
statute (Count 2), which contains a survivorship
provision incorporated through § 1988(a), allowing
plaintiff to assert decedent’s § 1983 claim (Count 1).
As plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is based on a violation of
the wrongful-death statute, Count 2 is just repeating the
claim in Count 1.”4 Brown, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 1342.
4. Wardens Jones and Lamar also argue Count 2 is
barred by state-agent immunity, but as this section
explains, Count 2 just repeats Count 1. And as an Alabama
state court has correctly recognized, such immunity does
not apply to federal claims like the one asserted in
Count 1. See King v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 919 So.
2d 1186, 1191 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); see also Brown, 760
F. Supp. 3d at 1342 (state-agent immunity does not apply
to § 1983 federal claims).
32
Accordingly, Count 2 will be dismissed, albeit without
prejudice, as redundant.
C. Wardens Jones and Lamar’s
Shotgun-Pleading Assertion
The court now turns to Wardens Jones and Lamar’s
final argument: that the amended complaint should be
dismissed as it constitutes an impermissible “shotgun
pleading,” in violation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b). A complaint is a “shotgun
pleading” when it presents claims in a manner in which a
defendant cannot “discern what [the plaintiff] is
claiming and frame a responsive pleading.” T.D.S. Inc.
v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 760 F.2d 1520, 1533 n.14
(11th Cir. 1985). At bottom, the complaint must “give
the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them
and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323
(11th Cir. 2015).
33
The Eleventh Circuit has recognized at least four
types of shotgun pleadings: first, “a complaint
containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts” into each subsequent
count, which is the most common type of shotgun pleading,
id. at 1321; second, “a complaint ... replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action” id. at 1322;
third, a complaint that fails to separate “each cause of
action or claim for relief” into a different count, id.
at 1323; and, fourth, a complaint that asserts “multiple
claims against multiple defendants without specifying
which of the defendants are responsible for which acts
or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is
brought against,” id. Wardens Jones and Lamar argue that
the amended complaint falls into the first, second, and
fourth types.
Wardens Jones and Lamar contend the amended complaint
falls into the first category of shotgun pleading because
34
“each count reincorporate[s] and adopt[s] the previous
paragraphs.” Jones and Lamar Br. (Doc. 30) 6. This
argument misunderstands the first category, which is not
just about repeating the same allegations from preceding
counts; it is about the incorporation of “irrelevant
factual allegations and legal conclusions” into
subsequent counts. Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295
(11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). In essence, the first
category is attempting to address an issue where
defendants would have “difficulty knowing what they were
alleged to have done and why they were liable for doing
it” because by incorporating all the preceding
allegations plaintiff would also incorporate irrelevant
or immaterial allegations. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324.
Such a concern is inapplicable to the amended complaint,
because, as discussed above, the reason plaintiff repeats
the allegations is that he is repeating the same claim
in two separate counts. So, while Count 2 is due to be
35
dismissed as redundant, this complaint is not the type
covered by the first category of shotgun pleading as the
assertions made are relevant to both counts.
Wardens Jones and Lamar also argue the amended
complaint fits into the second category of shotgun
pleading, which covers complaints “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to any particular cause of action.” Weiland,
792 F.3d at 1322. They urge that many of the amended
complaint’s assertions are either vague and conclusory
or not specific to the Bullock facility or decedent’s
death. On the contrary, as explained above, the facts
asserted in the amended complaint are concrete, detailed,
and material to plaintiff’s claims. While the amended
complaint begins by outlining a history of alleged
defects across all of ADOC’s male prisons (which of
course includes Bullock), it then discusses the specific
conditions at Bullock, and the circumstances of
decedent’s death. Those systemic allegations provide
36
necessary background for the Bullock-specific
allegations and shed light on Wardens Jones’s and Lamar’s
knowledge of the substantial risks associated with the
conditions at Bullock.
Finally, Wardens Jones and Lamar assert that the
amended complaint belongs in the fourth category. This
category addresses complaints that assert “multiple
claims against multiple defendants without specifying”
which defendant is responsible for which actions or
specifying which defendant each claim is directed toward.
Id. at 1323. Wardens Jones and Lamar contend that the
amended complaint does not distinguish between the named
defendants. Instead, they contend that it only refers
to them and Jefferson Dunn, the third named defendant
(who is not discussed in this opinion), jointly as
“Defendants Dunn, Jones and Lamar,” without specifying
which defendant engaged in each action.5 Jones and Lamar
Br. (Doc. 30) 7. This argument misunderstands the fourth
5. See note 1 infra (discussing Dunn).
37
category, which concerns cases where no specific
defendants are named, not where all the defendants are
explicitly named, and the allegations apply to all of
them. In essence, defendants contend that the amended
complaint implicitly asserts all the named defendants
shared the same knowledge and took the same actions.
However, that contention is a dispute over whether the
allegations are true, not whether they are
comprehensible.
“Comprehension, not perfection, is the standard of
the pleading rules.” Brown, 760 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
And, in this case, plaintiff’s amended complaint is
sufficiently comprehensible so as not to be a shotgun
pleading.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Wardens Jones and Lamar’s
dismissal motion will be denied as to Count 1 and granted
as to Count 2. The court emphasizes that it has relied
38
on only plaintiff’s allegations, and it has found only
that the plaintiff may proceed with discovery. Whether
the evidence supports those allegations is not before the
court at this time. And, as discovery has not yet begun,
whether the evidence supports the conclusion Wardens
Jones and Lamar were deliberately indifferent is also not
before the court at this time.
***
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
(1) Defendants Patrice Jones and David Lamar’s
motion to dismiss (Doc. 29) is denied as to Count 1.
(2) Said motion is granted as to Count 2, and said
count is dismissed without prejudice.
DONE, this the 7th day of July, 2025.
/s/ Myron H. Thompson
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
39