H. Reilly v. Upper Moreland PD and L. Cruz

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Hugh Reilly :

:

v. :

:

Upper Moreland Police Department :

and Layla Cruz, : No. 140 C.D. 2024

Appellants : Submitted: June 3, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: July 7, 2025

Upper Moreland Police Department (UMPD) and Layla Cruz (Officer

Cruz) (together, Appellants) appeal from a November 20, 2023, order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (trial court). The trial court denied

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment against Hugh Reilly (Reilly). Upon

review, we vacate and remand to the trial court for reconsideration of its order in

accordance with this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On July 29, 2020, Reilly filed a pro se complaint in the trial court under

42 U.S.C. § 19831 (Section 1983) asserting that as a result of a July 29, 2018,

1

“Section 1983 does not create substantive rights but, rather is the vehicle for vindicating

rights conferred in the United States Constitution or in federal statutes.” Jae v. Good, 946 A.2d

802, 809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (citation omitted).

incident, Officer Cruz, a police officer with UMPD, falsely arrested him and violated

his civil rights. Original Record (O.R.) at 13.2 Reilly also asserted that the UMPD

violated his civil rights by failing to properly train and supervise Officer Cruz prior

to the incident. Id. at 15. Appellants filed preliminary objections, which the trial

court denied. Id. at 67. Appellants then filed an answer with new matter denying

Reilly’s allegations, asserting “all common law, statutory and qualified immunity to

which [Appellants] may be entitled,” and averring that Reilly failed to state a claim

for Appellants’ liability. Id. at 74-79. On July 24, 2023, Appellants filed a motion

for summary judgment asserting that Officer Cruz was entitled to qualified

immunity, that Reilly failed to establish that Officer Cruz lacked probable cause to

arrest him, and that Reilly’s claims against UMPD were derivative of his claims

against Officer Cruz and could not stand once those claims failed. Id. at 121-34.

The record includes Officer Cruz’s affidavit of probable cause

regarding the incident. O.R. at 375. She responded to a reported domestic incident

in progress at the marital home of Reilly and his then-wife Annmarie Reilly

(Annmarie). Id. Montgomery County’s dispatcher advised the UMPD that

Annmarie had a Protection from Abuse order (PFA) against Reilly, who left the

scene before Officer Cruz arrived. Id. The PFA was to run from January 2, 2018,

through January 2, 2020. Id. at 149. It stated that Reilly was not to abuse, harass,

stalk, or threaten Annmarie, or to contact her by telephone or any other means,

including through third persons. Id. Reilly was “evicted and excluded” from the

marital home and had “no right or privilege to enter or be present on the premises[.]”

Id.

2

Original Record (O.R.) references are to electronic pagination.

2

Officer Cruz stated in the affidavit that Annmarie told her that Reilly

and their son came to the house “to retrieve property,” but there was no agreement

between the spouses to meet that day for a property exchange; that Reilly was not

allowed on the property due to the PFA but had “parked partially into the driveway

to prevent [Annmarie] from leaving”; that Reilly “sent their son as a third party” into

the house to get the family dogs and then again to get a laptop3; and that when

Annmarie “attempted to get the laptop” from [Reilly’s] vehicle, he “forcibly held

the door closed,” then left “with possession of the laptop.” O.R. at 375.

Reilly turned himself in later that day on an arrest warrant procured by

Officer Cruz. O.R. at 381. On September 14, 2018, Judge Daniele of the trial court,

who had signed the PFA, held proceedings on criminal charges lodged against Reilly

for violation of the PFA. Id. at 383-86. After the parties stipulated that Reilly did

not park on or enter the property during the incident, Officer Cruz did not testify.

Id. at 403-04. The judge concluded that the prosecutor had not shown Reilly’s guilt

of a PFA violation beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 412.

In this litigation, Annmarie and Reilly gave depositions presenting their

versions of the incident. O.R. at 416-532 & 877-1049. Reilly testified that he and

their son went to the marital residence to drop off a guitar Reilly borrowed from one

of their daughters and to pick up the family dogs. Id. at 961. His son went inside to

return the guitar and came out with the computer, which the son put into the back

seat; the son went back into the house and came out with a large speaker for the

computer, at which point Reilly got out of the car and opened the trunk for the

speaker. Id. at 985. When Annmarie and her boyfriend drove up, he got in his car.

3

The record confirms that the computer was a desktop computer, not a laptop. O.R. at

388.

3

Id. at 986. Annmarie pounded on his car’s hood and tried to open a car door to get

the computer. Id. at 986-87. Reilly felt threatened by Annmarie’s boyfriend, so he

drove away with his son to his parents’ home, where he was living at the time. Id.

at 988-89 & 998.

Sometime later, Officer Cruz called him on his cell phone, told him that

he was not allowed to go to the marital property, that an arrest warrant had been

issued, and that he could come down to the station or he would be arrested at his

parents’ home. O.R. at 1000-01 & 1006. His lawyer advised him to turn himself in,

which he did. Id. at 1001. He believed that he did nothing wrong because he was

allowed to go to the property for pickups and drop-offs as long as he did not go on

the property. Id. at 1001-03.

Annmarie testified that she got out of the car and told Reilly that he was

not allowed to take the computer, then tried to hold onto the car door but failed to

stop him from driving away. O.R. at 453-54. Her boyfriend called the police and

Officer Cruz, whom she had not met before, showed up. Id. at 455. She did not

remember exactly what she told Officer Cruz other than she believed Reilly was not

allowed to be there that day; her boyfriend told the dispatcher that there was a PFA.

Id. at 455-57 & 485. She believed Reilly sent their son into the house to get the

computer so he could see her personal information and communications with her

lawyer on it even though their divorce lawyers had stipulated that Reilly could not

take the computer. Id. at 457-58, 486, 507 & 520. She acknowledged that Reilly

was not on the property during the incident. Id. at 516-17. She stated that any

inconsistencies were probably due to her state of mind at the time based on prior

incidents with Reilly, his family, and their son. Id. at 473-74. She acknowledged

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that Reilly was not on the property during the incident but believed he had in fact

violated the PFA even though he was found not guilty. Id. at 516-17 & 532.

On November 20, 2023, the trial court issued an order denying

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment; the order included no explanation or

rationale. O.R. at 1131. Appellants appealed to the Superior Court, which ultimately

transferred the matter to this Court. On February 28, 2024, the trial court issued its

opinion. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 506a-18a. The trial opinion stated that the

trial court now “believe[d] the order was erroneously entered and Appellants are

entitled to judgment in their favor” and recommended that this Court reverse the

November 2023 order. Id. at 507a & 518a.

II. Issues

Appellants assert that the trial court’s order is an appealable collateral

order. Appellants’ Br. at 17-21. On the merits, they aver that summary judgment

was appropriate because evidence showed that Officer Cruz had probable cause to

arrest Reilly on the date of the incident and, therefore, no constitutional violation

occurred and she established qualified immunity from Reilly’s suit. Id. at 23-28.

They also maintain that because no underlying constitutional violation occurred,

summary judgment was appropriate on Reilly’s derivative municipal liability claim

against UMPD. Id. at 29-30.

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III. Discussion

A. Appealability of Trial Court’s November 3, 2023, Order

An appeal “may be taken as of right from a collateral order of a trial

court[.]”4 Pa.R.A.P. 313(a). A collateral order is “separable from and collateral to

the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied

review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final

judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Tracking

that language, the test is as follows: “an order is considered final and appealable if

(1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right

involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such

that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be

irreparably lost.” Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 370 (Pa. 2021).

With regard to separability, an order is separable from the main cause

of action if “it can be resolved without an analysis of the merits of the underlying

dispute” and is “entirely distinct from the underlying issue in the case.” Brooks, 259

A.3d at 371. We conduct “a practical analysis recognizing that some potential

interrelationship between merits issues and the question sought to be raised in the

interlocutory appeal is tolerable.” Id. at 371-72. In civil matters, which includes

Section 1983 claims, immunity defenses are separable because they “conclusively

determine whether the defendant is entitled to immunity from suit[,]” which “is both

important and completely separate from the merits of the action[.]” Commonwealth

v. Pownall, 278 A.3d 885, 905 n.18 (Pa. 2022) (distinguishing civil cases with

immunity defenses from criminal case where police officer’s defense of justified use

of deadly force in a shooting was deemed insufficiently separable from his

4

This distinguishes collateral appeals from other interlocutory orders that require the

appellant to seek permission to appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 312.

6

underlying guilt or innocence of murder to support appealability of interlocutory

order regarding use at trial of standard jury instruction on peace officer justification

defense).

With regard to the importance of the right and irreparable harm,

immunity defenses generally implicate rights too important to evade review before

final judgment and which would be irreparably lost if review is postponed until after

final judgment because immunity defenses protect public entities and actors, like

police officers, from the expense and time required to defend against lawsuits, not

just the prospect of liability. Brooks, 259 A.3d at 372-74.

Here, the trial court did not directly address appealability in its February

2024 opinion. However, the court’s position that its November 2023 order denying

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment was incorrect and should be reversed

implies that the trial court believed its order was immediately appealable. See R.R.

at 518a.

Appellants assert that as in Brooks, the issue of Officer Cruz’s

eligibility for qualified immunity is separable because it can be determined without

consideration of the merits of Reilly’s underlying suit, implicates a right deeply

rooted in public policy going beyond the litigation at hand, and claims protections

that would be lost if review is postponed until after final judgment. Appellants’ Br.

at 18-22. Reilly does not address this issue.

We agree with Appellants. Although Brooks pertained to an underlying

negligence action as opposed to Reilly’s assertion of constitutional torts, and the

government entity in that case asserted sovereign rather than qualified immunity, the

legal analysis and conclusion are the same. Officer Cruz’s claim of qualified

immunity is distinct and separable from whether Reilly has shown that he was

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wrongly arrested on July 29, 2018. The importance of the right of public officials

to qualified immunity, assuming it is validly claimed, is similar to the basis discussed

in Brooks for sovereign immunity in that it is longstanding, wide-reaching, and

protects public actors’ ability to perform their duties “without fear of litigation and

unlimited damages.” 259 A.3d at 372-73. Lastly, a valid claim of qualified

immunity operates similarly to the sovereign immunity at issue in Brooks in that it

protects public actors not just against exposure to liability, but from the expense and

effort needed to defend against lawsuits in the first place. Id. at 373-74. As such,

the trial court’s November 2023 order is an appealable collateral order.

B. Trial Court’s Change of Position Between its Order Denying Appellants’

Motion for Summary Judgment and its Rule 1925(a) Opinion

Section 706 of the Judicial Code states: “An appellate court may affirm,

modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any order brought before it for review, and may

remand the matter and direct the entry of such appropriate order, or require such

further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 706.

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment asserted that Officer Cruz

was entitled to qualified immunity, that Reilly failed to establish that Officer Cruz

did not have probable cause to arrest him, and that Reilly’s claims against UMPD

were derivative of his claims against Officer Cruz and could not stand once those

claims failed. O.R. at 121-34. The trial court’s November 2023 order denied

Appellants’ motion for summary judgment with no explanation. R.R. at 506a.

Appellants’ December 2023 statement of the errors complained of on appeal (Rule

1925(b) statement) stated that although the trial court’s order provided no reasoning,

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Appellants sought appellate review to the extent the trial court rejected Officer

Cruz’s eligibility for qualified immunity. O.R. at 1139-40. The record reflects that

no further proceedings or discovery took place after the trial court’s November 2023

order.

When the trial court issued its February 2024 opinion, it stated that it

now “believe[d] the order was erroneously entered and Appellants are entitled to

judgment in their favor.” R.R. at 507a. The court explained that based on the

evidence, Officer Cruz had probable cause to arrest Reilly on the date of the incident

and was therefore eligible for qualified immunity, which meant that Reilly’s Section

1983 claim against Officer Cruz failed. Id. at 512a-15a. The court further explained

that Reilly’s claim against UMPD depended on his claim against Officer Cruz and

could not survive the failure of that claim. Id. at 515a-17a. The court added that

Reilly also failed to present any evidence that UMPD failed to properly train its

police officers or did so with deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of

individuals. Id. at 517a. Based on its evaluation, the trial court recommended that

its November 2023 order be reversed. Id. at 518a.

In Grobelny v. Cityview Condominium Association, Inc. (Pa. Cmwlth.

No. 1471 C.D. 2023, filed January 6, 2025), 2025 WL 33122 (unpublished),5 the

trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, then stated in its

Rule 1925(a) opinion that it erred because genuine issues of material fact remained.

Id., slip op. at 2. This Court agreed, vacated the trial court’s order, and remanded

for further proceedings. Id., slip op. at 4-5.

5

This unreported decision is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Section 414(a) of

this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

9

In MNC Corp. v. Mount Lebanon Medical Center, Inc., 440 A.2d 528

(Pa. Super. 1982),6 the trial court issued an order denying the appellant’s petition to

open judgment. Id. at 529. When the trial court wrote its Rule 1925(a) opinion, it

concluded that it had erred but no longer had jurisdiction to correct its mistake. Id.

The Superior Court acknowledged the trial court’s admission of error, vacated the

order, and remanded the matter to the trial court “to reconsider its order based upon

its Rule 1925 opinion.” Id.

In Grobelny, this Court explained the rationale behind such remands as

follows:

Remand requests are commonly honored by Pennsylvania

appellate courts. See Commonwealth v. Vasquez, . . . 744

A.2d 1280 (Pa. 2000) (concluding that the Superior Court

did not err in remanding upon a request of the trial court

based on the determination that the original sentence was

illegal due to the trial court’s omission of a mandatory

fine); Jackson Twp. Supervisors v. Est. of Gresh (Pa.

Cmwlth., No. 1970 C.D. 2014, filed July 9, 2015)

(vacating and remanding for full evidentiary hearing on

trial court’s request and conclusion that evidentiary

hearing was required); Kelso Woods Ass’n v. Swanson,

753 A.2d 894 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (vacating and

remanding for calculation of damages upon request by the

trial court, which indicated it had erred in making part of

its determination).

Grobelny, slip op. at 2 (quotation marks and additional citation omitted). Here,

although the trial court requested that we reverse its order, that disposition would

effectively grant Appellants’ motion for summary judgment and put Reilly out of

court. However, he would be unable to appeal that determination to this Court by

right and would have only our Supreme Court’s discretionary allocatur process for

6

“In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer

persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.

of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

10

potential redress. Consistent with Grobelny and MNC Corp., and in order to avoid

that potential injustice, the fair and proper course of action here is to construe the

trial court’s request as one for vacatur and remand for the trial court to reconsider its

order based upon its Rule 1925(a) opinion.

IV. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, we vacate the trial court’s order denying

summary judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for reconsideration in

accordance with this opinion.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

11

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Hugh Reilly :

:

v. :

:

Upper Moreland Police Department :

and Layla Cruz, : No. 140 C.D. 2024

Appellants :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 7th day of July, 2025, the November 20, 2023, order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County is VACATED. This matter is

REMANDED for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

__________________________________

CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge