Davis v. Ratledge

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 5:25-CV-113-D -

MICHAEL SCOTT DAVIS, et al, )

Plaintiffs,

v. ORDER

BRIAN RATLEDGE, et al.,

Defendants.

On June 24, 2025, Michael Scott Davis (“Davis”) and Stetson Mansfield Webster

(“Webster”) (collectively “plaintiffs”) moved to file a second amended complaint [D.E. 12]. On

July 1, 2025, Davis and Webster moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) [D.E. 13] and

filed amemorandum in support [D.E. 14]. Davis and Webster allege an “extra-judicial conspiracy”

among several North Carolina state judges and other individuals to deprive Davis of his purported

parental rights under a 2019 Wake County District Court custody order. [D.E. 13] 2; see [D.E. 13-

1] 1-19. As explained below, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and denies plaintiffs’

motion to file a second amended complaint.

On February 28, 2015, Davis and Webster filed a sprawling 89-page complaint. See [D.E.

1]. On March 21, 2025, Davis and Webster filed a near-identical 85-page amended complaint.

See [D.E. 7}. On May 12, 2025, the court gave David and Webster until June 12, 2025, to serve

the amended complaint. See [D.E. 9] 1. On June 23, 2025, the court denied David and Webster’s

motion to file yet another amended complaint. See [D.E. 11] 1; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Davis and Webster admit that they failed to comply with the court’s order to serve

defendants with the amended complaint by June 12, 2025. Compare [D.E.9] 1, with, [D.E. 12] 1

(“As of the date of this filing, no defendant has been formally served with process.”). Moreover,

Davis and Webster failed to serve their complaint within 90 days of filing and have not shown

good cause for any more extensions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Gelin v. Shuman, 35 F.4th

212, 218 (4th Cir. 2022); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2006)

(analyzing Rule 4(m) under the old 120-day peroid). Thus, the court dismisses the amended

complaint without prejudice. Without an operative complaint, plaintiffs’ pending motions for a

TRO and to file a second amended complaint are moot. See Mitchell v. N.C. Div. of Emp. Sec.,

76 F. Supp. 3d 620, 628 (E.D.N.C. 2014), aff'd, 599 F. App’x 517 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)

(unpublished). Accordingly, the court denies as moot plaintiffs’ motions for a TRO and to file a

_ second amended complaint.

Alternatively, the court considers plaintiffs’ motions on the merits. A motion for a TRO

follows the same standard applicable to a motion for a preliminary injunction. See U.S. Dep’t of

Lab. v. Wolf Run Mining Co., 452 F.3d 275, 281 n.1 (4th Cir. 2006). Davis and Webster must

establish that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits, (2) they are likely to suffer irreparable

harm absent preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in their favor, and (4) an injunction

is in the public interest. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008);

Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (en banc). A TRO “is an

extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24; see Di Biase v. SPX

Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017); Mitchell, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 628. Moreover, mandatory

injunctive relief is “warranted only in the most extraordinary circumstances.” Pierce v. N. Carolina

State Bd. of Elections, 97 F.4th 194, 209 (4th Cir. 2024) (quotation omitted).

Davis and Webster are unlikely to succeed on the merits. Davis and Webster seek a

mandatory preliminary injunction concerning child custody, but merely state that defendants have

committed “clear violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and [engaged in an] actionable

conspiracy.” [D.E. 13] 5. Such “conclusory statements” do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

US. 662, 663 (2009); see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Thus, Davis and

Webster are unlikely to succeed on the merits, and the court denies their motion for a TRO.

As for the motion to file a second amended complaint, the court denies the motion as futile.

“An amendment is futile if the amended complaint would fail to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Johnson v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 550, 562 (E.D.N.C. 2018); see, e.g., Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6); United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 375

(4th Cir. 2008). To state a a claim, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, . . . that is plausible on its face.” Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation omitted); see Twombly,

550 U.S. at 554-63; Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566

USS. 30 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). A court need not accept

as true a proposed amended complaint’s legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable

- conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678-79. Rather, a plaintiff’s factual allegations must “nudge[] [his] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

When evaluating a proposed amended complaint, a court considers the pleadings and any

materials “attached or incorporated into the [proposed amended] complaint.” E.I. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c);

Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427

F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court may also consider a document submitted by a moving party

if it is “integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.”

Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records without

converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid.

201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty.

Mem’I Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

The proposed amended complaint, though much shorter, is just as outlandish as its two

predecessors. See [D.E. 12-1] 1-35. Davis and Webster obsessively focus on judicial immunity

and abstention doctrines, but fail to explain how the alleged facts support their claims. See id. □

Most claims in the proposed amended complaint are conclusory. See [D.E. 12-1] 1-35. Moreover,

Davis and Webster fail to plausibly allege facts, or coherent legal theories, that state a claim. See,

e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554-63; United States ex rel. Angel v. Scott,

697 F. Supp. 3d 483, 495 (E.D. Va. 2023). Thus, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion to file a second

amended complaint as futile.

In sum, the court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the amended complaint [D.E. 7]

and DENIES as moot plaintiffs’ motion to file a second amended complaint [D.E. 12] and motion

for a TRO [D.E. 13]. The clerk shall close the case.

SO ORDERED. This 3 day of July, 2025.

<4 Daven

J. S C. DEVER II

United States District Judge