Boyd v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

DERRIN BOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:25-cv-00729

v. )

)

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC )

ASSOCIATION, ) JUDGE RICHARDSON

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

In this brand-new case filed by a former (and potentially future) college basketball player,

pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction” (Doc. No. 10, “Motion”). The Motion is supported by an accompanying declaration of

Plaintiff (Doc. No. 10-1) and a memorandum (Doc. No. 11). Via the Motion, Plaintiff seeks

. . . immediate injunctive relief to preclude the National Collegiate Athletic

Association (“NCAA”) from enforcing its NCAA Bylaws 12.8.1 (the “Five-Year

Rule”) and 12.8.1.1 (the “Eligibility Clock”) (collectively referred herein as the

“NAIA Limitation Bylaws’) and NCAA Bylaw 12.8.1.7 (the “Five Year Rule

Waiver”) to preclude [Plaintiff] from playing in a fourth season of NCAA Division

I college basketball on the grounds that such enforcement violates Section 1 of the

Sherman Antitrust Act and the Tennessee Trade Practices Act.

[Plaintiff] specifically seeks a preliminary injunction order that: 1) enjoins

the NCAA from enforcing its Five-Year Rule as it applies to his time spent at an

NAIA institution; 2) orders the NCAA to immediately grant Division I institutions

and/or [Plaintiff] a waiver of any NCAA eligibility rule that would preclude him

from engaging in intercollegiate competition in the 2025- 26 season based on his

time spent at an NAIA institution; 3) orders the NCAA to declare [Plaintiff] eligible

to play during the 2025-26 season; and 4) enjoins the NCAA from enforcing its

Bylaw 12.11.4.2 (“Rule of Restitution”) against [Plaintiff] or any Division I NCAA

institution for complying with, and relying on, an injunction entered by this Court.

Without this urgent and narrowly tailored relief, [Plaintiff] will suffer immediate

and irreparable harm, losing not only the opportunity to compete at the highest level

of college basketball, but also the ability to secure meaningful NIL compensation,

complete his athletic development, and pursue a professional career. The window

for these opportunities is rapidly closing, and each day of delay compounds the

damage.

(Doc. No. 10 at 1-2). Although the above-quoted language, which constitutes the entirety of the

Motion, speaks in terms only of a request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff actually also

requests the more immediate remedy of a temporary restraining order (TRO); this is clear from

both the title of the Motion and the proposed order (Doc. No. 12) that was submitted

contemporaneously with the Motion.

The Motion is hereby denied in part and deferred in part. Specifically, with respect to

its request for a preliminary injunction, it is deferred pending further briefing, as discussed below.

And with respect to its request for a TRO, it is denied because, as discussed below, “Plaintiff[ ]

did not persuade the Court that [he] met the [below-described] high burden to establish the risk

that [he] will suffer immediate and irreparable harm absent [the requested] TRO.” Deore v. Sec’y

of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 2:25-CV-11038, 2025 WL 1303954, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Apr.

17, 2025 (emphasis added).

DISCUSSION REGARDING REQUEST FOR TRO

Those seeking a TRO (or preliminary injunction) must meet four requirements.1 They must

show a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the requested

1 Published Sixth Circuit case law stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are factors

rather than requirements, except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the

possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors).

See, e.g., D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent

with other (including more recent) cases from the Sixth Circuit case law and the Supreme Court (including

the Supreme Court’s below-cited Winter case) that describe items as being requirements (i.e., things that

must be established). See, e.g., id. at 328, 329 (Nabaldian, J., concurring) (noting that “[Winter]’s language

seems clear—a plaintiff must establish the factors” and questioning “whether the balancing analysis itself

aligns with Winter.”). Cf. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Notably, other courts

have likewise treated the four items as requirements (prerequisites), rather than as factors. E.g., Southern

Poverty Law Ctr. v. United States Dep’t Homeland Sec., Civil Action No. 18-760 (CKK), 2020 WL

injunctive relief; the balance of equities favors them; and that the public interest favors an

injunction. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sisters for Life, Inc. v.

Louisville-Jefferson County, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022). “A preliminary injunction is an

extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of

proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty.

Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).

The Court notes several things about what Plaintiff is actually requesting in requesting a

TRO here. First, he is requesting that the TRO be issued ex parte and without written notice.2

Second, under Federal law, such a TRO (an ex parte TRO) is a form of temporary injunctive relief

3265533, *10 (D.D.C. June 17, 2020); Transatlantic, LLC v. Humana, Inc., 8:13–CV– 1925–T–17TBM,

2013 WL 3958361, *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2013). The Court does likewise, for the following reasons.

First, explaining and applying the standard in terms of requirements is substantially more straightforward

than the alternative—which is to explain that the four items are factors to be balanced, except that, well,

that’s only partially true because actually irreparable harm is a requirement (but also, if it exists, then a

factor to be balanced along with the other factors) and likelihood of success (at least to some minimal

extent) is also required. D.T., 942 F.3d at 326–27 (“Thus, although the extent of an injury may be balanced

against other factors, the existence of an irreparable injury is mandatory.”); S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio,

LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that it is reversible error for a

district court to issue a preliminary injunction “where there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits

(quoting Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc., 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010))). Second, it easier to articulate a

conclusion as to whether requirements are satisfied (which is done in simple yes/no, or satisfied/unsatisfied,

terms) than to articulate the outcome of some so-called “balancing” of (mismatched) factors. This is

especially true given that case-specific balancing apparently is based in part on some inscrutable sliding

scale of required likelihood of success on the merits that depends on the strength of the other three factors.

See, e.g., In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir.1985) (“[T]he degree of likelihood of

success required may depend on the strength of the other factors.”).

But under either approach, the sole circumstance that is relevant here—the existence of irreparable harm

in the absence of the particular relief requested—is treated as a requirement.

2 Indeed, Rule 65 refers only to a TRO issued “without written or oral notice to the adverse party,” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(b)(1), which the Court herein will call an “ex parte” TRO (since “ex parte” means “on one side

only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on the application of one party only.” Black’s Law Dict.

(6th ed. 1990) p. 76.). Rule 65 prescribes rules for the issuance and duration of an ex parte TRO. It does

not mention, let alone set any rules for, TROs that are not ex parte; to the extent that temporary injunctive

relief that is not issued ex parte is properly called a TRO, such a TRO is simply not within the scope of

Rule 65.

that lasts no more than 14 days; once an ex parte TRO is issued, it is either (a) dissolved upon

motion of the enjoined party; (b) extended beyond the 14-day period based on good cause shown

or consent of the enjoined party, or (c) set for a preliminary-injunction hearing as soon as possible

(and, it stands to reason, necessarily prior to the expiration of the 14-day period) and dissolved if

the movant does not proceed with the preliminary-injunction hearing.3 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 65(b).

Third, the upshot of this is that generally—i.e., absent good cause shown or consent by the enjoined

party4—an ex parte TRO cannot last more than 14 days, whereafter the movant must succeed in

obtaining a preliminary injunction or else be left with no ongoing injunctive relief. See, e.g.,

Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 86 (1974) (agreeing that “a temporary restraining order

continued beyond the time permissible under Rule 65 must be treated as a preliminary injunction,

and must conform to the standards applicable to preliminary injunctions”); Flying Cross Check,

L.L.C. v. Cent. Hockey League, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1259 (D. Kan. 2001) (“Rule 65(b) does

contemplate that if the need for injunctive relief extends beyond the brief periods of protection

offered by the TRO provisions, then a preliminary injunction must be pursued.”), modified (Mar.

8, 2001). Fourth, there is nothing in the Motion to suggest that either: (a) good cause would exist

for extending the 14-day period for an ex parte TRO rather than requiring Plaintiff to prevail at a

preliminary injunction hearing held prior to the expiration of that period; or (b) Defendant here

3 Although the Court need not delve herein into how or why this is the case, parties and courts have been

known to speak as if a motion can be one for a TRO (and not a preliminary injunction) even if it is made

with notice to the opposing party. E.g., In re Reynolds, No. 23-22086, 2023 WL 11853230, at *3 (Bankr.

W.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2023) (A temporary restraining order is a temporary order entered in an action, often

without notice . . ..”).

4 Absent the applicability of one of these two exceptions to the general rule restricting the duration of an ex

parte TRO to 14 days, then once the 14 days expires, it is appropriate to treat the order no longer as an ex

parte TRO but rather as a preliminary injunction (and perhaps as an improper preliminary injunction,

especially if no preliminary-injunction hearing had been held and resolved in the movant’s favor).

would be amenable to consenting to extend beyond 14 days the duration of an ex parte TRO issued

in this case.

Based on these observations, it is clear that the ex parte TRO that Plaintiff is requesting

here is injunctive relief that would last, at most, 14 days. And as noted above, to obtain requested

temporary injunctive relief, the movant must show that it would suffer irreparable injury in the

absence of the particular temporary relief requested; it is not enough to show that it would suffer

irreparable injury in the absence of the other kind temporary injunctive relief. That is, to obtain an

ex parte TRO (as opposed to temporary injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction),

the movant must show that it would suffer irreparable injury were it denied an ex parte TRO. This

means that the movant must show that it would suffer irreparable injury if it were denied injunctive

relief that would expire in 14 days (as contrasted with being denied injunctive relief that

presumptively would last the duration of the litigation, as would a preliminary injunction); if the

movant cannot show that, he cannot show the irreparable injury required for the issuance of an ex

parte TRO.

Plaintiff fails to make that showing. For now, the Court does not dispute that Plaintiff

would be irreparably harmed if he were not granted a preliminary injunction, i.e., injunctive relief

that presumptively lasts for the duration of this litigation. But Plaintiff does nothing to show that

he would be irreparably injured absent temporary injunctive relief that would commence

immediately, but last no more than fourteen days. Among other things, he does not show how

injunctive relief, just because it commences immediately, ultimately would do him any good if it

is just going to expire in 14 days anyway and will endure in substance thereafter only if he is able

to show an entitlement to a preliminary injunction after a contested preliminary-injunction hearing.

In short, the Court understands why Plaintiff might like to obtain temporary injunctive

relief immediately and without having to face any opposition, but the Court does not see why he

needs it to avoid irreparable injury when it would last at most 14 days. Likewise, “there is nothing

to indicate [that Plaintiff] needs [injunctive relief] before [Defendant] can be heard” in connection

with Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:25-

CV-02323-SHL-CGC, 2025 WL 903840, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 25, 2025), reconsideration

denied, No. 2:25-CV-02323-SHL-CGC, 2025 WL 1144676 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 17, 2025). And the

lack of such need dooms Plaintiff’s request for such relief:

. . . Plaintiff has not shown how the denial of an ex parte temporary restraining

order pending a preliminary injunction ruling will result in irreparable harm. An ex

parte TRO is only appropriate where the applicant would face irreparable harm so

immediate that it would be improper to wait until after a preliminary injunction

hearing to enjoin the non-movant’s conduct. See Bronco Wine Co. v. U.S. Dept. of

Treasury, 997 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (“The purpose of a TRO is to

preserve the status quo pending a full hearing on a preliminary injunction.”); cf.

Hacker v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 450 F.Supp.2d 705, 710 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“A

temporary restraining order is an extraordinary remedy that generally is reserved

for emergent situations in which a party may suffer irreparable harm during the time

required to give notice to the opposite party or where notice itself may precipitate

the harm.”). As succinctly stated by the Supreme Court, an ex parte TRO serves a

limited purpose:

The stringent restrictions imposed ... by Rule 65[ (b) ], on the

availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact

that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court

action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard

has been granted both sides of a dispute. Ex parte temporary

restraining orders are no doubt necessary in certain circumstances,

but under federal law they should be restricted to serving their

underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing

irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and

no longer.

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39, 94 S. Ct. 1113, 39

L.Ed.2d 435 (1974) (internal citation omitted).

Erard v. Johnson, 905 F. Supp. 2d 782, 791–92 (E.D. Mich. 2012).

Shifting for a moment away from the requirements of a TRO to the purpose for an ex parte

TRO, the Court notes that the Supreme Court’s statement above has been correctly restated

recently by another court in this circuit: “[t]he purpose of a temporary restraining order is to

preserve the status quo until the motion for a preliminary injunction can, after notice, be brought

for hearing and decision.” In re Reynolds, 2023 WL 11853230, at *3 (internal quotation marks

omitted). It is actually not a listed requirement for the issuance of an ex parte TRO that its issuance

would serve the recognized purpose of an ex parte TRO. However, the decision to grant a TRO is

within the discretion of the district court. See Ohio Republican Party v. Brunner, 543 F.3d 357,

361 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The district court’s decision to grant a temporary restraining order, when

appealable, is reviewed by this court for abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

And the Court believes that in exercising its discretion, it can consider whether the requested ex

parte TRO would fail to serve the purpose of a TRO (even if all requirements for its issuance were

satisfied). Here, the Court cannot find that the requested ex parte TRO would preserve (rather than

change) the status quo (which is that the challenged NCAA Bylaws are in effect); thus, the

requested ex parte TRO would not serve the proper purpose of an ex parte TRO.

CONCLUSION

“In short, Plaintiff[ ] ha[s] not established that [he] face[s] imminent, irreparable harm

without [an ex parte] TRO.” Curtis v. Deutsche Bank, No. 1:23-CV-12859, 2025 WL 1296206, at

*18 (E.D. Mich. May 5, 2025). Plaintiff was required to establish this. So the Court cannot grant

Plaintiff an ex parte TRO as requested. To that extent, the Motion (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED.

None of this is to say that Plaintiff could not show the irreparable injury (and the other

three things) required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. To determine whether Plaintiff

can make that showing, the Court needs to defer the ruling on the request for a preliminary

injunction pending further briefing. So to that extent, the Motion is DEFERRED.

Regarding such briefing, the Court directs that: (a) Defendant file a response to the Motion

(with respect to the Motion’s request for a preliminary injunction) within ten (10) days of the

date on which it is served with process; and (b) Plaintiff thereafter may file an optional reply in

support of his request for a preliminary injunction within seven (7) days of the filing of Defendant’s

response. The Court thereafter will take prompt action upon this request as appropriate, including

the scheduling of a hearing if warranted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Chi Richardson

Chi Ruch

UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE