The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JERRY DAVIS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-1870
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, ET AL. SECTION: “H”
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendant Jason R. Williams’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 20). For the following reasons, the Motion is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the unconstitutional prosecution, conviction, and
incarceration of Plaintiff Jerry Davis for the first-degree murder of John
Broussard. Post-conviction efforts to challenge Plaintiff’s conviction revealed
that leading up to and during the trial, exculpatory evidence was suppressed,
and false testimony was proffered without correction. Plaintiff was
incarcerated for over forty years.
A. The Crime
Late in the evening on May 6, 1983, Mr. Broussard and his wife parked
their camper in a trailer lot in New Orleans East. While Mr. Broussard hooked
up the camper to electricity, and his wife remained inside the camper, two
Black men approached. Mr. Broussard said something to the men before he
was shot by one of them. One of the men entered the camper and took Mrs.
Broussard’s purse before both men fled the scene on foot.
B. The Broussards’ Initial Statements and the Start of the
Investigation
New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) Officers Docia LaGrange and
Kenneth Maes arrived on the scene shortly after the shooting and saw Mr.
Broussard lying on the ground with a gunshot wound to the chest. Before
paramedics arrived, Officer LaGrange spoke to Mr. Broussard and took his
account of the incident, which she recorded in an initial incident report. Officer
LaGrange also recorded Mrs. Broussard’s account of the incident.
According to Mr. Broussard, after the men approached him outside the
camper, they began “demanding money” from him, and then one of the
perpetrators “started to enter the camper.” Mr. Broussard tried to stop the man
from entering the camper “when the perpetrator shot him.” In his account, as
“the other perpetrator stayed outside,” the first perpetrator who “was in
possession of the weapon” then “entered the camper [and] demanded his wife’s
purse.” Mrs. Broussard reported that, while inside the camper, she heard Mr.
Broussard outside of the camper “talking to someone” before she “heard a shot.”
Mrs. Broussard then told the officers that “immediately after the shot,” one of
the perpetrators entered the camper “demanding her money and purse.” Mrs.
Broussard said that she gave her purse to the perpetrator in the camper. When
paramedics arrived, they administered first aid to Mr. Broussard and
transported him to Methodist Hospital where he was pronounced dead around
12:30 A.M.
Detective Melvin Winins of NOPD’s Criminal Investigation Bureau was
assigned to investigate Mr. Broussard’s murder. After Mr. Broussard died,
Detective Winins went to Methodist Hospital, where Officers LaGrange and
Maes briefed him. After leaving the hospital the day after the shooting,
Detective Winins attempted to visit the crime scene, but he “observed that the
lighting in this area was very poor.” He concluded that he “could not locate a
scene,” nor “any evidence or witnesses.”
C. Eyewitnesses and Descriptions of the Suspects
Three days after the shooting, on May 9, 1983, Detective Winins spoke
with Joseph Celino, who said he was parked across the street from where the
Broussards were parked, sitting in his truck, when the shooting occurred. Mr.
Celino explained that after hearing “what sounded like two gunshots,” he
“looked up” and “observed two Black males running from the trailer lot.” Mr.
Celino described the two men as twenty to twenty-five years old, one being “5
feet 8 inches tall, about 160 lbs.,” and the other being “5 feet 9 inches tall, about
150 lbs.” On June 6, 1983, Detective Winins and Detective Robert Lambert
returned to the scene to canvass the area, when they spoke with another
witness, Charles Cornish. Mr. Cornish, like Mr. Celino, described the suspects
as one inch apart in height, twenty to twenty-three years of age, and 145 to
150 pounds.
On June 10, 1983, more than one month after the shooting, Mrs.
Broussard visited the Homicide Office to view three sets of line-ups. Mrs.
Broussard did not identify anyone as the perpetrator who entered her camper
at that time. While it is unclear whether Detective Winins spoke with Mrs.
Broussard at the hospital upon his initial visit or later1, Detective Winins took
1 According to daily reports completed by Detective Winins on June 6th and 10th of
1983, Detective Winins did not interview Mrs. Broussard about the crime until June
10, 1983, over one month after the crime. Detective Winins’s daily reports indicate
that when he attempted to interview Mrs. Broussard at the hospital, she was “not
mentally able for an interview at this time.” Detective Winins also reported that he
attempted to interview Mrs. Broussard on May 10, 1983, but she told him she was
occupied with funeral arrangements and ended the interview. Additionally, on both
May 16, 1983, and May 18, 1983, Detective Winins again attempted to set an
interview with Mrs. Broussard but received no response. According to a Supplemental
Incident Report prepared by Detective Winins on June 21, 1983, however, Detective
a statement from Mrs. Broussard when she came in to view the photo line-ups.
Mrs. Broussard told Detective Winins that she first heard her husband’s voice
outside, telling someone, “You can’t go in there,” after which she saw a “young
Bl[a]ck man coming toward the back door of the camper.” Mrs. Broussard
described the perpetrator as five feet and ten inches to six feet tall, “medium
complexioned,” and about 160 to 170 pounds. Though she tried to hold the door
closed, the man entered the camper, pushed her back, and grabbed her purse
and wallet. The man then “turned around and was leaving out the door when
[she] heard a shot.” When Detective Winins asked whether the subject was
armed, Mrs. Broussard said that she “never saw a weapon.”
Mrs. Broussard’s initial statements to the officers, and those made by
her husband before his death, are inconsistent with those reflected in Detective
Winins’s June report; in the former, one of the men did not enter the camper
until after her husband one shot and in the latter, one of the men was in the
camper with her when the other man shot her husband.
D. Investigation Evolves with the Help of a Confidential
Informant
Later in June 1983, Detective Winins and another detective met with a
confidential informant, Allen Johnson, who told them that he knew the two
men involved in the murder because his friend, John Phillip Ware, had told
him about the crime.2 When detectives located Mr. Ware, Detective Winins told
Mr. Ware he was a suspect in a murder and armed robbery, but that he knew
that “Jerry [Davis] was the gunman, that Jerry [Davis] did the shooting.”3 Mr.
Winins spoke with Mrs. Broussard at the hospital, where she gave him an account of
the crime and a list of property stolen from her.
2 Johnson did not mention Jerry Davis’s name when he spoke to police.
3 Mr. Ware and Mr. Davis had previously been arrested together, which may explain
where Detective Winins came up with Mr. Davis’s name.
Ware then admitted to taking the purse but said that Plaintiff Jerry Davis was
the gunman and that he would help the police “in any way that he could.” The
same day that officers spoke to Mr. Ware, he prepared a typewritten statement
that included these admissions and detailed how he and Mr. Davis met up at
a local elementary school to split the money from Mrs. Broussard’s purse before
leaving it behind in the cafeteria. After Mr. Ware gave his statement, Detective
Winins arrested him for murder and armed robbery. Detective Winins then
met with Mr. Davis, who was being held for unrelated charges. Mr. Davis
refused to make any statement. The interview was terminated, and he was “re-
booked in the Central Lock-up with the murder of John Broussard and also the
armed robbery.”
Mr. Johnson returned to give a statement the day after Detective Winins
spoke with and arrested Mr. Ware. At that time, Mr. Johnson changed his
story, telling Detective Winins that he heard about the crime from Mr. Davis,
not Mr. Ware, whose own statement matched Mr. Johnson’s. Mr. Johnson also
told Detective Winins that Mr. Davis told him that the murder weapon was a
pistol that he had stolen from a woman’s pocketbook. When police recovered
the murder weapon, the previous owner’s story matched Johnson’s.4
On June 23, 1983, Detective Winins went to the elementary school Mr.
Ware mention in his report and recovered a purse that matched Mrs.
4 According to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Davis “told [him] that the pistol they used was taken
out of a ladies [sic] pocketbook which was in a pickup truck while she was getting gas,” that
the pickup truck was blue, and that the incident occurred “about one month before the
murder” at “the Amoco station at Chef and Dale.” When asked if Mr. Davis told him what he
did with the murder weapon, Mr. Johnson stated that “he sold it to somebody, he didn’t
mention any name,” and that “he said he didn’t want to get caught with it.” When police later
recovered the murder weapon, the serial number matched a gun that had been reported
stolen in April 1983. A woman had reported her Beretta .25 caliber pistol stolen from her
“make-up bag inside [her] purse” from the gas station on Chef Menteur Highway and Reynes
Street. Reynes Street runs parallel to Dale Street and intersects with Chef Menteur Highway
one block west of Dale Street.
Broussard’s description of the one taken the night of the murder. Detective
Winins then reported that a crime lab technician who took photographs of the
purse and surrounding area removed the purse and forwarded it to the
Criminal Property and Evidence Room. Critically, while Detective Winins
reported that he obtained a Crime Lab Report and attached it to the case file,
no such report was recovered or turned over to the defense.
The following day, Detective Winins visited Mrs. Broussard in
Mississippi to conduct a second photo line-up. Upon viewing a “six picture
photographic line-up, which consisted of a picture of . . . [John] Phillip Ware,”
Mrs. Broussard positively identified Mr. Ware and advised Detective Winins
that “there was no doubt in her mind that Mr. Ware was the man who had
entered the camper the night her husband was killed and took her purse.” (This
meant that if Mrs. Broussard’s later report that the man who entered the
camper was in the camper with her when her husband was shot—and this man
was Mr. Ware—the other man was the one who shot and killed Mr. Broussard.)
On July 5, 1983, Detective Winins was notified that Herman Bernard
said that he was in possession of a gun that may have been used in the murder
of Mr. Broussard. Detective Winins purportedly took a statement from Mr.
Bernard wherein Mr. Bernard stated that his friend bought the gun from Mr.
Davis three weeks prior—a little over one month after Mr. Broussard’s murder.
Mr. Davis was subsequently indicted for the first-degree murder of Mr.
Broussard on July 7, 1983.
E. Trial and Conviction
ADA James Williams was assigned to the case. After Mr. Davis was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty in July 1983, his counsel filed an
Application for Bill of Particulars requesting evidence “materially favorable”
to him; statements of non-testifying witnesses, any deal made by NOPD or
District Attorney’s office for testimony of the co-conspirator, and arrest and
conviction records. In its answer to the defense’s requests, the State
answered that there was no evidence materially favorable to the defense;
that the defense was not entitled to statements of non-testifying witnesses;
and that any deal with the co-conspirator and any arrest and conviction
records were “not applicable.”
In January 1984, ADA Williams wrote a memorandum to the First
Assistant District Attorney asking for a reduction in Mr. Ware’s charge to
manslaughter in exchange for his testimony, conceding that without Mr.
Ware, the State would have to rely on the testimony of Mr. Johnson who was
unreliable due to his “long criminal record.” The First ADA consented, and
Mr. Ware pleaded guilty to the charge of manslaughter on January 30, 1984,
the same day that Davis went to trial.
During the trial, contradictions ensued. In his opening statement, ADA
Williams said that Detective Winins did not have any information about the
crime until Mr. Johnson pointed him to Mr. Ware and Mr. Davis, but this was
not accurate. Detective Winins spoke to two eyewitnesses prior to meeting with
Mr. Johnson—neither of whom testified. This omission is significant because
both men described the perpetrators as being roughly one inch apart in height.
Mr. Ware is six feet tall. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, is just five feet six inches
tall. Further, when Mr. Johnson first came to the police, he said only that he
knew Mr. Ware was responsible for the incident. Mr. Johnson did not mention
Jerry Davis until after Mr. Ware had implicated Mr. Davis.
Then, during direct examination, Detective Winins testified that he met
with Mrs. Broussard at the hospital the day after the shooting, but this
contradicts his daily reports that stated that she was not well enough to speak
that close to the murder. Detective Winins also misrepresented the timing of
when he first spoke to Mr. Johnson. Detective Winins testified that
“approximately two weeks” after the incident, he returned to the scene to
canvass the immediate area. Because of this canvassing and “speaking with
Mrs. Broussard,” Detective Winins stated that he had a possible suspect named
by Mr. Johnson, but all written reports indicate that Detective Winins first
spoke with Mr. Johnson on June 21, 1983—over a month and a half after the
murder. Finally, Detective Winins also testified that he could not recover any
physical evidence after Mr. Ware gave his statement, but this is refuted by the
police reports detailing the recovery of Mrs. Broussard’s purse from the
elementary school. The purse was not introduced into evidence, nor was it
turned over to the defense. The jury was never told that NOPD had recovered
the purse.
Mrs. Broussard’s account at trial of her interaction with the perpetrator
in the camper also differed from her earlier statements, making it unclear
whether the person who shot her husband was the same one who entered the
camper and demanded that she hand over her purse. When Mr. Williams asked
Mrs. Broussard if she ever saw Mr. Ware with a gun, and if he was “the man
who shot [her] husband,” Mrs. Broussard responded “no” to both. Mr.
Broussard, however, stated in his dying declaration to police that the
“perpetrator entering the camper was in possession of the weapon.”
Mr. Johnson testified that he heard about the armed-robbery homicide
from Mr. Davis, though he initially did not mention Mr. Davis’s name until
after Mr. Ware spoke to detectives and implicated Mr. Davis. Mr. Johnson also
misrepresented his previous convictions when asked about them on the stand,
only acknowledging a 1977 conviction for simple burglary and not three others
about which Williams knew but did not disclose to the jury.5 ADA Williams
was aware of Mr. Johnson’s prior convictions, as evidenced in a memorandum
mentioning them, but did not correct Mr. Johnson’s testimony. ADA Williams
then asked Mr. Johnson whether, “as a result of [his] testifying in this case, an
obscenity charge, which [was] currently pending against [him], [would] be
dropped.” Mr. Johnson responded, “yes.” While the charge was later dropped,
neither the State nor Mr. Johnson disclosed to the defense or the jury that Mr.
Johnson later received only a twelve-year suspended sentence and five years
of probation for his burglary charge. This was a considerable deal that was
struck after an ADA and the First ADA agreed that Mr. Johnson’s information
was vital to the break in the Broussard homicide case, and that Mr. Johnson
“should be shown some leniency” and not be “multiple-billed” as a habitual
offender.
Also, during his testimony, Mr. Ware did not disclose convictions other
than the manslaughter charges to which he had just pleaded guilty.6 Neither
ADA Williams nor any other prosecutor or OPDA employee corrected the false
testimony. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Ware about
his decision to speak to the police and implicate Mr. Davis. Mr. Ware said
Detective Winins came to speak to him at his mother’s house and told him that
“he knew that [he] had participated in this crime, but he know [sic] that Jerry
[Davis] was the gunman, that Jerry [Davis] did the shooting.” Thus, Mr. Ware
confirmed that it was not until after Detective Winins spoke to Mr. Ware on
June 21, 1983 and told him that he “[knew] Jerry [Davis] was the gunman”
that any witness implicated Mr. Davis.
5 The first was a 1977 misdemeanor conviction for theft, and the second was a 1979
felony conviction for unauthorized use of a moveable. The third was a felony conviction for
burglary in 1983, for which Mr. Johnson was still awaiting sentencing.
6 At the time of Mr. Davis’s trial, Mr. Ware had two prior convictions, one for escape
in October of 1980 and one for battery in December of 1980.
In their closing statements, ADA Holly Taylor and ADA Williams
misrepresented the timing of Mr. Johnson’s help as related to the arrests of
Mr. Ware and Mr. Davis7, reiterated Mr. Johnson and Mr. Ware’s
trustworthiness; and denied NOPD’s possession of Mrs. Broussard’s purse or
knowledge of its whereabouts.8
The jury ultimately found Mr. Davis guilty of first-degree murder.
F. Post-Conviction Proceedings and New Evidence
Following his conviction, Plaintiff tried many different legal avenues for
post-conviction relief.9 On May 3, 1994, Mr. Davis received a copy of the NOPD
file for the Broussard homicide, which included the Incident Report containing
both Mr. and Mrs. Broussard’s statements confirming that the perpetrator who
entered the camper was the shooter; the daily reports written by Detective
Winins containing witness descriptions of the perpetrators and Mr. Johnson’s
initial statement implicating Mr. Ware, not Mr. Davis; the typewritten
statements of all testifying and non-testifying witnesses; and the
memorandum written by Mr. Williams stating that he had knowledge of Mr.
Johnson’s “long criminal record,” which was not disclosed at trial. None of these
documents had previously been provided to Mr. Davis or his attorney.
In 2021, the Innocence Project of New Orleans (“IPNO”) conducted a
reinvestigation of Plaintiff’s case. The reinvestigation yielded exculpatory
evidence that had not been provided to the defense or presented to the jury, as
well as Mr. Johnson’s arrest and conviction history at the time of the
investigation and prosecution. In 2022, Mr. Bernard, the man who possessed
7 ADA Taylor claimed that Mr. Johnson provided both Mr. Ware’s and Mr. Davis’s
names “prior to the arrest of either of those people,” but that was not the case. Mr. Johnson
only provided Mr. Ware’s name—not Mr. Davis’s name—prior to their arrests.
8 In response to defense counsel’s argument about the lack of physical evidence presented to the
jury, Mr. Williams stated, “[w]e don’t have the purse . . . the purse was dumped somewhere. It’s
probably incinerated by now.”
9 Doc. 1, ¶¶119–33.
the gun used to shoot Mr. Broussard, averred that he never gave a typewritten
statement to the police. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed an Application for Post-
Conviction Relief with the Orleans Parish Criminal Court seeking vacatur of
his conviction and dismissal of the case against him. On July 26, 2023, a judge
vacated Plaintiff’s conviction and sentence due to the “breadth and severity of
the Brady and Napue violations” that the court found.10 On March 15, 2024,
the State filed a nolle prosequi motion, terminating the case in Plaintiff’s favor.
On July 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court against the City of New
Orleans (the “City”), Anne Kirkpatrick in her official capacity as
Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department, Winins in his
individual capacity, unidentified parties in their individual capacities, and
Defendant Williams in his official capacity as Orleans Parish District Attorney.
Defendant Jason Williams is the current OPDA, and as such, responsible for
the operation, maintenance, and control of the OPDA and for the selection,
training, supervision, and discipline of prosecutors and other OPDA
employees. The Complaint asserts that Defendant Williams is successor as
final policymaker for the OPDA to Harry Connick Sr., who served as OPDA’s
final policymaker from in or around 1974 to in or around 2003.11
Plaintiff brings a Monell claims against Defendant Williams in his
official capacity as District Attorney for Orleans Parish. In his Complaint,
Plaintiff alleges that “throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the OPDA
maintained policies and customs that promoted, facilitated, and condoned
misconduct by prosecutors and other OPDA employees and agents, including
concerning the suppression of exculpatory and favorable evidence to criminal
defendants and their counsel and the knowing use of false evidence to secure
10 Id., ¶132.
11 Doc. 1, ¶22.
convictions.”12 Plaintiff further alleges the OPDA’s policymakers maintained a
policy, custom, or pattern and practice of condoning official misconduct,
including by failing to train, supervise, and discipline prosecutors about the
constitutional obligations to the defendants.
On October 20, 2024, Defendant Williams filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Plaintiff opposes.13
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead
enough facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”14 A claim
is “plausible on its face” when the pleaded facts allow the court to “[d]raw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”15
A court must accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must “draw
all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”16 The Court need not,
however, accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.17
To be legally sufficient, a complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the plaintiff’s claims are true.18 “A pleading that offers ‘labels
and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action’”
will not suffice.19 Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual
12 Doc. 1, ¶149.
13 Doc. 25. Since filing these pleadings, Plaintiff has filed two Notices to the Court that
include recent Orders and Reasons from other judges in this district ruling on to Defendant
Williams’ motions to dismiss in their respective cases where similar actions are pending.
Docs. 29 & 32. Defendant Williams filed a response only to the Notice regarding Flanks v.
City of New Orleans, No. 23-cv-6897 (E.D. La. Feb. 28, 2025). Doc. 30.
14 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)).
15 Id.
16 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009).
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of each element of the plaintiff’s claim.20
LAW AND ANALYSIS
In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Jason Williams liable
in his capacity as District Attorney for the City of New Orleans under Monell
v. Department of Social Services21 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that “[p]rior to, during, and after [his] wrongful conviction,
OPDA supervisors and policymakers had actual and constructive notice of a
pattern and practice of prosecutors’ Napue and Brady violations” such that
“when confronted with instances of misconduct, including in particular Napue
and Brady violations, OPDA’s supervisors and policymakers, as a matter of
policy and custom, failed to impose reasonable discipline on the employee(s)
involved and failed to take other reasonable, remedial measures to deter and
prevent such misconduct.”22 Plaintiff also includes public statements made by
Connick acknowledging Brady violations but failing to address them and
describes a culture at the OPDA’s office of winning at all costs. Plaintiff further
alleges that this “complete failure to train, supervise, and discipline employees
regarding their Brady obligations predictably led to repeated Brady violations”
such as the ones that occurred in his own case.23
Plaintiff also provides empirical data to support his conclusion that
“concealing exculpatory evidence in New Orleans was routine” during the
relevant time, stating that “Orleans Parish has the highest per capital
exoneration rate of any county or parish in the country.”24 Plaintiff’s Complaint
20 Lormand, 565 F.3d at 255–57.
21 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22 Doc. 1, ¶150.
23 Id., ¶175.
24 Id., ¶179, 180.
includes numerous other instances of Brady violations during the relevant
time, as well as commentary by Supreme Court Justices John Paul Stevens
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg who observed “that the OPDA’s violations were
‘blatant and repeated’” and “that the OPDA during the 1980s was ‘a tinderbox
. . . in which Brady violations were nigh inevitable.’”25 Plaintiff also attached
to the Complaint an expert report prepared by Professor Laurie L. Stevenson
which discusses the extent to which the policies, customs, and practices of the
OPDA regularly failed to comply with Brady.
I. Municipal Liability
Section 1983 authorizes suits for damages against any “person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.”26 “In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a
governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the entity itself caused
the constitutional violation at issue.”27 “Municipalities, which include counties
and certain other local governmental bodies, are ‘persons’ under Section
1983.”28 However, it is well settled that “neither a State nor its officials acting
in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”29 To state an official
capacity claim against a municipality, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) an official
25 Id., ¶179 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 108 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)). This Supreme Court case considered Brady violations during the tenure of the
same Harry Connick, Sr. (“Connick”) to whom Defendant Williams has succeeded as OPDA.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
27 Moses v. City of New Orleans, No. 24-1768, 2025 WL 816296, at *5 (quoting Monell,
436 U.S. at 694).
28 Daves v. Dallas Cnty., 22 F.4th 522, 532 (5th Cir. 2022).
29 Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force
behind the violation of a constitutional right.”30
“Under Brady, a local government entity, including a district attorney’s
office . . . deprives a criminal defendant of his right to due process when it
suppresses or withholds evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and
material to his defense.”31 “A § 1983 Brady claim brought against the district
attorney in his or her official capacity is treated as a suit against the state
because the governmental entity is the real party in interest, and such claims
are analyzed under the Monell doctrine.”32
“In Napue v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court ‘held that a
prosecutor’s knowing use of, or deliberate failure to correct, perjured
testimony, violates a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.’”33 “To
successfully allege a Napue claim, a party must demonstrate that ‘(1) the
testimony was actually false; (2) the state knew it was false; and (3) the
testimony was material.’”34
Defendant avers that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged any of the
elements required to hold OPDA liable under Monell.35 Plaintiff responds that
he has alleged facts sufficient to support Monell liability against Defendant
Williams under two distinct theories: (1) that OPDA maintained an
unconstitutional custom driven by a “pervasive culture of indifference to
30 Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).
31 Truvia v. Connick, 577 F. App’x 317, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2014).
32 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *13 (citing Truvia, 577 F. App’x at 322).
33 Walter v. New Orleans, et al., No. 23-cv-4352, R. Doc. No.64, at 13 (quoting Spence
v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 996 (5th Cir. 1996).
34 Id. (quoting Devoe v. Davis, 717 F. App’x 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2018)).
35 To the extent that Defendant argues about the validity of Plaintiff’s underlying
constitutional claims, the Court adopts the analysis and conclusions from Walter v. New
Orleans, et al. wherein Judge Morgan found that the plaintiff bringing similar claims against
Williams and OPDA adequately pleaded constitutional violations underlying his Monell
claims. See Walter, Case No. 23-cv-4352, R. Doc. 64 at 11–15.
Brady” and Napue; and (2) that Mr. Connick, having knowledge of multiple
instances in which OPDA prosecutors suppressed material exculpatory
evidence and presented false testimony, fostered practices constituting
deliberate indifference toward Brady and Napue violations.36 The Court will
consider each issue in turn.
A. Brady & Suppressed Evidence
i. Policymaker
“First, the district attorney is the policymaker for the OPDA, and
[Plaintiff] identifies Connick as the OPDA at the time he was prosecuted and
convicted.”37
ii. Custom, Notice, and Deliberate Indifference
An “[o]fficial policy is ordinarily contained in duly promulgated policy
statements, ordinances or regulations.”38 Such an official policy is promoted
“by the municipality’s lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the
lawmakers have delegated policymaking authority.”39 When determining
Monell liability, “[a]n official policy may also be a persistent, widespread
practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by
officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to
constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy and practically
ha[s] the force of law.”40 Showing that such a custom, or “pattern of abuses that
transcends the error made in a single case,” was in place “requires similarity
36 In his Opposition, Plaintiff notes that in the instant Motion, Defendant Williams
did “not dispute that Plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, nor that Connick is the
official policymaker responsible for OPDA’s unconstitutional policies and customs.” Doc. 25
at 18 n.7.
37 Id. at *7.
38 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001).
39 York v. Welch, No. 20-40580, 2024 WL 775179, at *3 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2024)
(quotation and alteration omitted).
40 York, 2024 WL 775179, at *3 (quotation and alteration omitted).
and specificity; prior indications cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise
acts, but rather must point to the specific violation in question.”41 “The pattern
of similar and specific acts also ‘must be comprised of sufficiently numerous
prior incidents rather than merely isolated instances.’”42 Further, “[a]
policymaker with policy-making authority must have actual or constructive
knowledge of the custom.”43
“Plausibly to plead that a practice is so persistent and widespread as to
practically have the force of law, a plaintiff must do more than describe the
incident that gave rise to his injury.”44 “A plaintiff’s description of the
challenged practice cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”45
“[T]hose specific facts must be similar to the case at hand: ‘Prior indications
cannot simply be for any and all bad or unwise acts, but rather must point to
the specific violation in question.’”46
“A claim of a violation of section 1983 pursuant to . . . a persistent,
widespread practice of city officials or employers—may in an appropriate case
also encompass allegations that a policymaker failed to act affirmatively,
including a failure adequately to train a subordinate.”47 To find Monell
liability, such a custom “must be either unconstitutional or adopted with
deliberate indifference to the known or obvious fact that such constitutional
violations would result.”48 “Deliberate indifference is established by showing ‘a
41 Benfer v. City of Baytown, 120 F.4th 1272, 1286 (5th Cir. 2024)
42 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *6 (quoting Benfer at 1286).
43 Flanks v. City of New Orleans, No. CV 23-6897, 2025 WL 660037, at *8 (E.D. La.
Feb. 28, 2025) (citing Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1984)).
44 Johnson v. Harris Cnty., 83 F.4th 941, 946 (5th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
omitted).
45 Id. (internal quotation removed).
46 Id. (quoting Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., 71 F.4th 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned
up).
47 Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 369 (5th Cir. 2003).
48 Blanchard-Daigle v. Geers, 802 F. App’x 113, 116 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation
omitted).
pattern of similar violations arising from a policy so clearly inadequate as to
be obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.’”49
“In Connick v. Thompson, the Supreme Court recognized that ‘[i]n
limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to
the level of an official government policy for purposes of §1983.’”50 “A
municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train.”51 As such, “[t]o satisfy the statute, a
municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount
to ‘deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained
employees] come into contact.’”52 “Only then ‘can such a shortcoming be
properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under §
1983.’”53 “Because ‘[d]eliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault,
requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious
consequence of his action[,]’ the governmental entity may be deemed
deliberately indifferently[sic] only when the ‘policymakers are on actual or
constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program causes
city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights [and the policymakers]
choose to retain that program.’”54 “The city’s ‘policy of inaction’ in light of notice
that its program will cause constitutional violations is the functional
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.”55 “A
49 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *6 (quoting Covington v. City of Madisonville, 812 F.
App’x 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020)). “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to
establish deliberate indifference.” Covington, 812 F. App’x at 225.
50 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *6 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (2011)).
51 Connick, 563 U.S. at 61.
52 Id. (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
53 Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 388)).
54 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *6 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61).
55 Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–62).
pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is
ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of
failure to train.”56 Also, “[p]olicymakers’ continued adherence to an approach
that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by
employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their
action – the deliberate indifference – necessary to trigger municipal liability.”57
Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not adequately allege that OPDA
maintained an unconstitutional written policy regarding Brady at all or that
Connick, the District Attorney at the relevant time, was deliberately
indifferent to a practice of such violations within OPDA. Plaintiff does not
argue with Defendant’s statement that Plaintiff did not allege a formal,
written policy of violating Brady existed, asserting instead that OPDA had a
“’persistent, widespread practice’ of withholding exculpatory evidence and
knowingly presenting false evidence in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment that was ‘so common and well settled as to constitute a custom
that fairly represents municipal policy.’”58
To show that this custom of similar constitutional violations to those he
alleged in his Complaint—namely, “withholding exculpatory evidence,
fabricating evidence, knowingly presenting false testimony to obtain a
conviction, failing to appropriately train, monitor, and supervise”59 — existed
and that Connick had actual or constructive knowledge of it, Plaintiff cites
cases that he characterizes as ones involving “[o]ther individuals who were
documented victims of the Brady and Napue violations rampant in New
56 Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).
57 Id. (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62).
58 Doc. 25 at 18 (citing Marshall v. Webre, No. 23-1319, 2023 WL 5952645, at *11 (E.D.
La. July 25, 2022)).
59 Doc. 1, ¶235.
Orleans in the 1970[s], 1980s, and 1990s.”60 Defendant argues that most of
these cases are irrelevant because only prior court findings or admissions of
Brady violations in very similar cases can provide the notice necessary to show
deliberate indifference by OPDA’s policymaker. Plaintiff responds that these
allegations—combined with others regarding exoneration rates, the
incorporated report from Professor Laurie L. Levenson, and Supreme Court
justices’ observations about routine concealment of exculpatory evidence in
New Orleans—“illustrate persistent, widespread customs that evince a
‘pervasive culture of indifference to Brady’ and Napue.”61
“Guidance from appellate courts on how many cases are enough to prove
a custom and notice to the policymaker is sparse.”62 In his Complaint, Plaintiff
cites more than 30 convictions obtained by OPDA prosecutors in which a Brady
violation was subsequently found. The earliest conviction in those cases was in
1967, with at least 18 of those convictions occurring in the 16 years preceding
Plaintiff’s conviction in 1983.63 Here, adopting Judge Brown’s analysis in
Flanks v. the City of New Orleans, the Court finds that “[a]t this motion-to-
dismiss stage, this listing constitutes a plausible allegation that the OPDA had
a custom of nondisclosure of favorable evidence, as would violate Brady, with
Connick on constructive or actual notice of such violations—including the need
to train, supervise, and discipline prosecutors—as to reflect his deliberate
indifference.”64
60 Id., ¶183.
61 Doc. 25 at 20 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 73 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
62 Flanks, 2025 WL 660037, at *10.
63 Plaintiff provides the exoneration date for 8 of those 18 cases.
64 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *7 (citing Flanks, 2025 WL 660037, at *8–10). Defendant
relies on Verastique v. City of Dallas to assert that Flanks’ conclusion should not be adopted
here because without certain “contextual factors” such as “department size” or “number of
arrests,” “it is impossible to identify the existence of a pattern—much less one that imparts
constructive notice.” Notice Reply, Doc. 30 at 2 (quoting Verastique, 106 F.4th at 343). The
Court agrees with Moses and Flanks in their conclusions that “the Brady violations identified
iii. Moving Force
“The ‘moving force’ element of Monell liability requires a plaintiff to
‘show municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the
deprivation of federal rights.’”65 “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, ‘a
complaint’s description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the
underlying constitutional violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain
specific facts.’”66 Critically, “[t]he causal link ‘moving force’ requirement and
the degree of culpability ‘deliberate indifference’ requirement must not be
diluted, for ‘where a court fails to adhere to rigorous requirements of
culpability and causation, municipal liability collapses into
respondeat superior liability.’”67 Still, “‘[w]here a plaintiff claims that a
particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee
to do so,’ the causation determination ‘is straightforward.’”68
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff does not adequately allege that OPDA’s
policies were the “moving force” causing the alleged suppression of evidence in
his case because he failed to “adequately allege that the prosecutor or
prosecutors responsible for the disclosures in his criminal case were acting
pursuant to such a policy when they allegedly failed to disclose information
and records in NOPD’s possession.”69 Plaintiff argues that he has shown
deliberate indifference by OPDA’s policy maker in his Complaint by referring
to: a significant number of other instances of Brady violations during the
by [Plaintiff] as occurring during Connick’s tenure” were numerous and detailed enough to
show a custom. See Moses at *7 (citing Flanks at *10–11).
65 Id. at *7 (quoting York, 2024 WL 775179, at *3).
66 Id. (quoting York, 2024 WL 775179, at *3).
67 Covington, 812 F. App’x at 225–26 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Alvarez v. City of
Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2018)).
68 Jauch v. Choctaw Cnty., 874 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
69 Doc. 20-1 at 16.
relevant time; public statements made by Connick wherein he acknowledged
Brady violations but did not address them; a description of OPDA’s culture of
winning at all costs; OPDA practices of allowing attorneys to not investigate
whether they obtained information that was favorable to the defendant; not
disciplining attorneys that failed to comply with Brady; and a failure to train
attorneys regarding their ethical and constitutional obligations. Plaintiff
responds that because he has alleged that OPDA’s unconstitutional policies
caused his constitutional injury, he has met the causation requirement of the
“moving force” element.70 The Court agrees with Plaintiff—and both Flanks
and Moses—that the number of Brady violations during Connick’s tenure that
he alleged in his Complaint, “when combined with Connick’s alleged disdain
for Brady, would satisfy the requisite causal link between the policy and the
deprivation of federal rights.”71 Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated enough facts
at this motion-to-dismiss stage, to allege that the OPDA’s policy or practice
was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.
Considering the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts to state a Monell claim against Williams, in his official capacity
as the current OPDA, for Brady violations.
B. Napue & False Testimony
Defendant Williams argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is “entirely devoid
of any factual allegations suggesting that OPDA ever had, or its prosecutors
ever followed, an official policy of knowingly presenting false evidence at
trial.”72 He asserts that Plaintiff fails to show that OPDA knowingly presented
false evidence in any case and that OPDA policymakers were “[r]epeatedly . . .
confronted with instances of misconduct, including in particular Napue . . .
70 Doc. 25 at 29.
71 Moses, 2025 WL 816296, at *7 (citing Flanks, 2025 WL 660037, at *12).
72 Doc. 25 at 17.
violations.”73 As such, Defendant Williams argues that Plaintiff can show no
pattern, policy, or custom of Napue violations in OPDA. Plaintiff opposes,
arguing that he has sufficiently alleged enough other Napue violations to show
a pattern.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Winins’ testimony regarding the
timeline of his investigation of Mr. Broussard’s murder was inconsistent with
his previous reports and that Defendant Williams did not correct Ware’s or
Johnson’s false testimony regarding their criminal history. Plaintiff connects
these allegations to his assertion that OPDA had an unlawful policy, custom,
and/or practice of knowingly using false testimony to obtain a conviction. In
his response to Defendant Williams’ Motion, Plaintiff cites to ten cases that he
claims involve the failure to correct false testimony contradicted by inter-office
memoranda prepared by a prosecutor before trial, the failure to correct
testimony contradicted by undisclosed police records, and other failures to
correct obviously false testimony in violation of Napue.74
“[D]istrict courts throughout the Fifth Circuit have held that while a
plaintiff must do more than generically restate the elements of municipal
liability, ‘only minimal factual allegations should be required at the motion to
dismiss stage,’ given that many of the details would only be available through
discovery.”75 The Court finds that, at this motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged facts to demonstrate the nature of the false testimony in
those cases and their similarity to the instant case. As such, for reasons similar
to those stated as to the Brady violations, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
pleaded factual allegations demonstrating that OPDA committed Napue
73 Doc. 1, ¶150.
74 Doc. 25 at 21.
75 Alanis-Mejia v. Cameron Cnty., No. 1:23-cv-40, 2023 WL 4109784, at *13 (S.D. Tex.
May 17, 2023) (collecting cases).
violations under Monell by failing to correct perjured testimony, resulting in a
violation of his constitutional rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, on this 3rd day of July, 2025.
Gg. TRICHE LF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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