Opinion

McKim v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

Court
District Court, W.D. Arkansas
Filed
Jul 3, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

BRIAN MCKIM PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 24-6164

FRANK BISIGNANO,1 Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Brian McKim, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial

review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner)

denying his claims for period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB) under the

provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the Court must

determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the

Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. Procedural Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed his current application for DIB on June 10, 2021, alleging an

inability to work since November 20, 2020, due to a back injury, depression, social anxiety, a

learning disorder and insomnia. (Tr. 56, 199). For DIB purposes, Plaintiff maintained insured

status through December 31, 2024. (Tr. 214). An administrative telephonic hearing was held on

January 18, 2024, at which Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 32-54).

1 Frank Bisignano, has been appointed to serve as Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration, and is substituted as Defendant pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

By written decision dated February 26, 2024, the ALJ found that during the relevant time

period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 16).

Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: major depressive

disorder, anxiety disorder, learning disorder, and a spinal disorder, with hardware fusion.

However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s

impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any impairment listed in the Listing of

Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4. (Tr. 17). The ALJ found Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:

[P]erform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except: claimant can stand

and walk for 4 hours; occasional climbing, no ladders, ropes or scaffolding;

occasional balancing, stooping; no kneeling, no crawling; claimant is limited to

simple, nonproduction rate pace jobs, occasional interaction with the public,

occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, occasional changes to work

procedures and requirements, no reading for meaning, simple addition and

subtraction, counting.

(Tr. 18-19). With the help of a vocational expert, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform work

as a laundry worker, a mail sorter and a routing clerk. (Tr. 24).

Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who

denied that request on November 29, 2024. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.

(ECF No. 2). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (ECF No.

6). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (ECF Nos. 11,

13).

The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are

presented in the parties’ briefs and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.

II. Applicable Law:

The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to

ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it

adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154

(2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support

it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence

in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply

because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,

or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477

(8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must

affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one

year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act

defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that

his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final stage is

reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light

of his residual functional capacity. Id.

III. Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s RFC determination. RFC is the most

a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using

all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating

physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v.

Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th

Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held

that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d

700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must

be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the

workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required

to set forth specifically a claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his

RFC.” Id.

For claims like Plaintiff's, filed after March 27, 2017, an ALJ evaluates medical opinions

pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). These new rules provide that the Social Security

Administration “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling

weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), including those from

medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). Rather, an ALJ is to evaluate the persuasiveness of

any opinion or prior administrative medical finding by considering the: (1) supportability of the

opinion with relevant objective medical evidence and supporting explanations; (2) consistency

with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim; (3) relationship

with the plaintiff, including length, purpose, and extent of treatment relationship, whether it is an

examining source, and frequency of examination; (4) specialization; and (5) other relevant factors.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).

In the present case, the ALJ determined Plaintiff maintained the RFC to perform light work

with limitations to include being limited to simple, nonproduction rate pace jobs, occasional

interaction with the public, occasional contact with coworkers and supervisors, occasional changes

to work procedures and requirements, no reading for meaning, and simple addition, subtraction,

and counting. In making this determination, the ALJ found the opinion of Dr. Geraldene E. Moore,

Ph.D., a psychological consultative examiner, persuasive. (Tr. 21-22). However, the ALJ did not

include some of the limitations found in Dr. Moore’s opinion and failed to explain why these

additional limitations were not included in the RFC. Specifically, Dr. Moore opined Plaintiff had

a poor ability to attend to and sustain concentration on basic tasks; a poor ability to complete tasks;

and a poor capacity to complete work-like tasks in an acceptable time frame. (Tr. 1610-1611).

While the ALJ is not required to incorporate every limitation from a medical opinion into the RFC,

“once a medical opinion is found to be persuasive, an ALJ must explain any inconsistencies

between the limitations found in that opinion and the ultimate RFC.” Harris v. Dudek, No. 4:23-

CV-1705, 2025 WL 776516, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 10, 2025) (citations omitted). The record before

the Court is inadequate to permit meaningful review of the decision to omit Dr. Moore’s opinion

that Plaintiff had a poor ability to attend to and sustain concentration on basic tasks; a poor ability

to complete tasks; and a poor capacity to complete work-like tasks in an acceptable time frame.

On remand the ALJ should consider all of the functional limitations in Dr. Moore’s opinion and

should either incorporate those limitations into the RFC or explain why an excluded limitation was

not adopted. See Bedore v. Kijakazi, No. 4:22-CV-567-SPM, 2023 WL 6064854, at *6 (E.D. Mo.

Sept. 18, 2023).

With this evidence, the ALJ should then re-evaluate Plaintiff's RFC and specifically list in

a hypothetical to a vocational expert any limitations that are indicated in the RFC assessment and

supported by the evidence.

IV. Conclusion:

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, and therefore, the denial of benefits to the Plaintiff should be reversed and this matter

should be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

DATED this 3rd day of July 2025.

isi Aas _Comateck

CHRISTY COMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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