Opinion

Motton v. Ruark

Court
District Court, C.D. Illinois
Filed
Jul 3, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 37.3%

when a prisoner indicates that he received help from another person, the court must “specifically examine a plaintiff’s personal ability to litigate the case, versus the ability of the jailhouse lawyer who assisted.”

How later courts described this case

  • when a prisoner indicates that he received help from another person, the court must “specifically examine a plaintiff’s personal ability to litigate the case, versus the ability of the jailhouse lawyer who assisted.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

BRANDON MOTTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:21-CV-4093

)

CORY RUARK, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER & OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Robinson

Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

matter comes before this Court for ruling on Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time

(Doc. 122), Plaintiff’s Partially Agreed Motion to Reopen Discovery for a Limited

Purpose (Doc. 123), and Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Reply (Doc. 126).

PLAINTIFF’S AGREED MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME (DOC. 122)

Plaintiff’s motion requests an extension of time to reply to Defendant’s

Motion in Limine (Doc. 96). The motion is retroactively granted. Plaintiff has since

filed the appropriate response within the timeframe requested. See (Doc. 124). A

new deadline is not necessary.

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A REPLY (DOC. 126)

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a reply to Defendant’s response to the motion to

reopen discovery. Defendant has not opposed this motion. The motion is granted.

The Court will consider the reply attached to Plaintiff’s motion.

PLAINTIFF’S PARTIALLY AGREED MOTION TO REOPEN DISCOVERY (DOC. 123)

Plaintiff seeks to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of issuing a single

set of requests for production, to take no more than three depositions, and to amend

disclosures under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1) and (a)(2). Defendant has agreed to

produce certain documents relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff may

depose individuals Defendant identified as witnesses in his initial disclosures.

Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s request to amend his expert disclosures to

identify expert witnesses. He cites to previous rulings that Plaintiff was “capable of

representing himself” within the context of ruling on Plaintiff’s motions to request

counsel, Judge Hawley’s statements regarding appointment of counsel at a previous

hearing, and Plaintiff’s failure to identify experts while pro se to argue that good

cause does not exist to reopen discovery and that doing so would unreasonably delay

this case.

A motion to reopen discovery requires the moving party to show good cause

for doing so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The central consideration in assessing

whether good cause exists is the diligence of the party seeking [this relief].” Allen v.

Brown Advisory, LLC, 41 F.4th 843, 852-53 (7th Cir. 2022).

The Court’s Scheduling Order entered September 14, 2021, required Plaintiff

to disclose any experts within 60 days. (Doc. 24 at 4, ¶ 10). Plaintiff did not disclose

any experts by that deadline. At the time it lapsed, Defendant Ruark had not yet

been added as a defendant.

The previous findings that Plaintiff was capable of representing himself were

made within the context of ruling on Plaintiff’s motions to request counsel.

Plaintiff’s statement at the August 8, 2024, hearing before Judge Hawley that

another inmate had assisted him with “everything” in the case negated these

findings and required the Court to conduct a new analysis. (Doc. 100 at 02:10-02-

15); see McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1033 (7th Cir. 2018) (when a prisoner

indicates that he received help from another person, the court must “specifically

examine a plaintiff’s personal ability to litigate the case, versus the ability of the

jailhouse lawyer who assisted.”) (internal quotations and citations removed). Judge

Hawley stated that he would defer ruling on the issue pending Plaintiff’s

anticipated written motion seeking appointment of counsel. Id. 04:46-5:01.

Judge Hawley indicated further that, in the interim, he would “reach out to

some lawyers…to see if they would represent [Plaintiff] solely for purposes

of…trying the case.” Id. at 08:30-08:51. He explained that requesting a limited

appointment, as opposed to one requiring a greater time commitment, sometimes

increases the likelihood that a lawyer will volunteer to represent an indigent

plaintiff. Id. 08:52-09:44. Judge Hawley did not rule on Plaintiff’s motion to request

counsel before the case was transferred to another judge. Judge Long granted

Plaintiff’s motions. Minute Entry dated Mar. 6, 2025. He did not limit the scope of

Plaintiff’s counsel’s representation at the March 6, 2025, hearing where Plaintiff

accepted representation.

Plaintiff’s detention and pro se status likely affected his ability to search for

and hire an expert, and any delay resulting from the search for pro bono counsel

was not Plaintiff’s fault. Based on Plaintiff’s statement that he received assistance

from jailhouse lawyers, the Court cannot attribute any lack of diligence in disclosing

experts to him. The proposed scope of the expert discovery does not appear likely to

cause significant delay, and the parties’ ability to conduct fact and expert discovery

concurrently mitigates any potential risk.

The Court finds that good cause exists to reopen discovery, and Plaintiff’s

motion is granted. The Court will reopen fact and expert discovery to the extent

requested in the motion. The parties are directed to meet and confer regarding a

discovery schedule and to submit a proposed schedule to the Court within the

deadline set forth below. The parties are also directed to provide at least three

proposed final pretrial conference and trial dates.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE (DOC. 128)

Defendant’s motion to permit the withdrawal of Yordana J. Wysocki as

counsel of record is granted.

THEREFORE:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion [122] is GRANTED.

2) Plaintiff’s Motion [126] is GRANTED. Clerk is directed to docket the

proposed reply attached to Plaintiff’s motion.

3) Plaintiff’s Motion [123] is GRANTED.

4) Defendants’ Motion to Substitute Counsel [128] is GRANTED. Clerk

is directed to remove Yordana J. Wysocki as attorney of record for

Defendants Lape, Young, and Ruark.

5) The parties are directed to meet and confer and to provide to the

Court within 14 days of this Order a proposed discovery schedule

and at least three proposed final pretrial conference and trial dates.

SO ORDERED.

Entered this 3rd day of July, 2025.

s/Ronald L. Hanna

Ronald L. Hanna

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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