The opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA
In re DREXEL BRADSHAW on Discipline.
S282314
July 3, 2025
Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Kruger, Groban,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
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In re BRADSHAW
S282314
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
In 2018, the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court
found attorney and respondent Drexel Andrew Bradshaw
(Bradshaw) culpable of three counts of misconduct: engaging in
a scheme to defraud (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106), breach of
fiduciary duty (id., § 6068, subd. (a)), and three willful and
intentional misrepresentations (id., § 6106). (All undesignated
statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.)
The disciplinary action brought by the State Bar’s Office of Chief
Trial Counsel (OCTC) stemmed from Bradshaw’s conduct as
successor trustee of the Gosey Revocable Living Trust (Gosey
Trust or Trust). The hearing judge recommended disbarment.
Separately, in civil court probate proceedings, Bradshaw was
removed as trustee of the Gosey Trust. The Review Department
of the State Bar Court concluded that although Bradshaw was
grossly negligent in making three misrepresentations,
Bradshaw’s culpability as to the charged misconduct was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Review
Department recommended a six-month suspension and two
years of probation. One member of the Review Department
disagreed and would have recommended disbarment.
Based on an independent review of the record, we find
Bradshaw culpable of multiple counts of misconduct involving
moral turpitude and conclude that disbarment is necessary to
protect the public and the integrity of the legal profession.
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I.
We begin by recounting the history of the Gosey Trust and
then discuss the manner in which Bradshaw channeled Trust
funds to a company he created. The Hearing Department, as
well as the superior court and Court of Appeal in a
contemporaneous probate proceeding, found that Bradshaw
breached his fiduciary duties as trustee, acted in bad faith, and
engaged in a multi-year scheme to defraud the Trust, among
other misconduct. The Review Department, with one judge
dissenting, rejected the factual and legal conclusions of the
Hearing Department. We granted the OCTC’s petition for
review.
A.
Bradshaw first represented Ora Gosey in a landlord-
tenant dispute in 2006. Gosey, then 78 years old, requested that
Bradshaw’s law firm, Bradshaw & Associates, P.C., prepare an
estate plan, including the drafting of her will and the Gosey
Trust. The Trust was established (1) “[t]o provide for the care
and maintenance” of Gosey in her lifetime, (2) “[t]o facilitate
management of the trust property in the event of [her]
incapacity,” and (3) “[t]o facilitate transfer of the trust property”
upon her death. The Trust estate consisted primarily of Gosey’s
home in San Francisco, which included a rental unit.
Gosey had no children or spouse at the time of drafting;
her former partner Thomas Bush, her longtime friend Willie
Cole, and Bradshaw’s law firm were designated, respectively, as
first, second, and third successor trustee upon her disability or
death. The terms of the Trust instrument permitted the trustee
to “[e]mploy the Trustee, a relative of the Trustee, or a business
in which the Trustee has an interest, to perform needed services
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for the Trust or any business in which the Trust has an interest
and pay compensation not exceeding fair market value” so long
as the trustee did not “act in bad faith or in disregard of the
purposes of the Trust.” Except as expressly provided otherwise
in the Trust instrument, the trustee had “the duties imposed by
law” and was required to wield the power of trustee as “a
prudent person” would. Gosey expressed a strong preference to
remain in her home if she were to become incapacitated. Her
will authorized the trustee to “expend as much of the Trust
estate as necessary to avoid placing [her] in an assisted living
community, home for the elderly, or the like,” and to “apply or
expend all or a part of the income and principal of said Trust, or
both, for [her] comfort, health and maintenance in [her]
accustomed manner of living.”
After drafting these documents, Bradshaw did not have
contact with Gosey until she fell in her home in August 2013.
Gosey’s tenants contacted Adult Protective Services (APS)
because Gosey refused to eat or drink, but Gosey declined APS’s
assistance. Shortly thereafter, Gosey was hospitalized, and her
doctors determined she was unable to care for herself or her
estate due to dementia. She subsequently returned to her home
with the assistance of in-home care. After Bush and Cole
declined to serve as successor trustee, Bradshaw’s attorney
Sheila Robello petitioned the probate court to appoint Bradshaw
as Gosey’s temporary and permanent conservator. In describing
Gosey’s “obvious lack of means to care for herself,” Bradshaw’s
petition — signed under penalty of perjury — stated that Gosey
had been removed from her home by APS. Bradshaw was
appointed as Gosey’s temporary conservator and temporary
trustee of Gosey’s estate on September 11, 2013, and as
permanent conservator in November 2013. He petitioned the
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probate court to waive court accounting pursuant to Probate
Code section 2628 and to terminate its supervision over the
Gosey Trust in order to avoid “additional expense” to Trust
assets. The probate court declined both requests.
B.
We now describe the origins and operations of the
company to which Bradshaw channeled substantial payments
from the Gosey Trust.
In November 2013, around the time Bradshaw became
Gosey’s conservator, Bradshaw hired Juan Gonzalez to fix
flooding damage from a burst pipe in Gosey’s home and rental
unit. Gonzalez had previously performed small construction
and repair jobs for Bradshaw and was doing business as NJ
Construction. Gonzalez did not have a contractor’s license.
Bradshaw then hired NJ Construction for small repairs at
Gosey’s home between November 2013 and June 2014. During
that time, Bradshaw and Gonzalez entered into an agreement
whereby Bradshaw would assist Gonzalez in obtaining his
contractor’s license. Bradshaw paid $1,000 for Gonzalez to
attend a licensing course. In April 2014, Bradshaw’s law firm
prepared and filed with the California Secretary of State the
incorporation documents for a company named Bay
Construction, Inc. (Bay Construction). Bradshaw was the sole
signatory on Bay Construction’s Articles of Incorporation, and
he listed himself as the initial agent for service of process and
his law firm address as the corporate address.
After the Contractors State License Board (CSLB) denied
Gonzalez’s first and second license applications, Bradshaw
engaged a construction consulting firm for advice on obtaining a
license for Bay Construction. The firm recommended that Bay
Construction hire a Responsible Managing Officer (RMO) in
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order to qualify for a contractor’s license. (See §§ 7068 [an RMO
under the statute must be permanently employed and actively
engaging in the operations of the applicant’s contracting
business for at least 32 hours or 80 percent of the total hours per
week that the business is in operation], 7068.1 [an RMO must
engage in direct supervision and control of the work performed
by the applicant contracting business].) Bradshaw then hired
Raymond Invernon, a licensed contractor, to serve as an RMO
supervising the work of Bay Construction.
Invernon was in his 70s and lived in Idaho most of the
time. Neither Gonzalez nor Bradshaw’s son Colin Grey
Bradshaw (Grey), who worked for Bay Construction with
Gonzalez on repairs for Gosey’s home, ever met or spoke with
Invernon. Grey testified that he had never heard of Invernon.
Claire Lewis, Gosey’s tenant, did not recall seeing Invernon on
the property. During the OCTC’s investigation into Bradshaw,
Invernon said he assumed no work had been done under Bay
Construction’s license because Bradshaw never called him about
any project. Carlos Marquez, a CSLB supervisor, testified that
if the CSLB had been aware that Invernon was renting his
license to Bay Construction and not actually supervising its
work, the CSLB would not have approved Bay Construction’s
application. Nancy Rasch, an attorney appointed by the probate
court to investigate Bradshaw’s affiliation with Bay
Construction, found no evidence that Invernon supervised any
of Bay Construction’s work. Invernon was paid $1,000 by
Bradshaw’s law firm in November 2014 and another $5,000
from Bay Construction’s checking account in December 2014.
On December 22, 2014, Bay Construction obtained a contractor’s
license with Gonzalez listed as the President, Secretary,
Treasurer, and Owner.
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In October 2014, Bradshaw enlisted his personal banker
to set up a business checking account for Bay Construction.
Bradshaw used his own Social Security number and deposited
$10,000 from his law firm’s checking account to Bay
Construction’s new checking account. Bradshaw was and
remained the sole authorized signatory on Bay Construction’s
checking account until the company ceased operation. He
designated himself President of Bay Construction and used his
law firm office as the business address; neither Gonzalez’s name
nor anyone else’s appears on the banking documents. At
Bradshaw’s request, Bradshaw’s wife opened two American
Express cards under her name on behalf of Bay Construction.
The first card, opened in July 2014, was issued to Bradshaw, his
wife, and Grey. The second, opened in January 2015, was issued
to Bradshaw, his wife, and Brea Violette, the receptionist at
Bradshaw’s law firm. The statements for both cards were sent
to Bradshaw’s law firm office for his review and payment
authorization.
On February 3, 2015, Bradshaw filed the Gosey Trust’s
“First and Final Report and Account of Trustee,” covering the
period from December 2, 2013 through November 30, 2014. In
this report, Bradshaw said there was “no relationship or
affiliation between [him] and any agent hired by [him]” during
the accounting period. Bradshaw again requested that the
probate court terminate its supervision over the Gosey Trust;
the probate court declined to do so. Bradshaw appealed the
probate court’s denial order, and the Court of Appeal reversed,
terminating the probate court’s supervision over the Trust on
July 29, 2016.
Bradshaw had another client, Noretha Jones, who, like
Gosey, was an elderly woman seeking Bradshaw’s assistance in
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a landlord-tenant dispute. Bradshaw referred Jones to Bay
Construction for repair work on her rental unit and, in a May
2015 letter, disclosed to Jones his affiliation with the company
as follows: “When I referred you to Bay Construction, Inc., I
informed you that I was affiliated with Bay Construction, Inc.,
in that I am their attorney, I filed their articles of incorporation
and am the initial agent for service of process, my staff provides
back office support for them including phone support, and that
we share a receptionist. My son also works for them. Should a
dispute arise between you and them, I would not be able to
represent either side as it would constitute a conflict of interest.”
Jones’s daughter-in-law Linda Lee testified that no one had
mentioned Invernon to her and she had never met Invernon;
that Grey and Bradshaw conducted the negotiation for the
repair work on behalf of Bay Construction; and that she barely
communicated with Gonzalez, who spoke little despite his
presence at the negotiation.
After Gonzalez stopped working for Bay Construction in
December 2015, Violette became the Chief Executive Officer,
Chief Financial Officer, and Secretary on January 7, 2016, and
Bradshaw seemingly took over those positions in March 2016.
The updated documents filed with the Secretary of State were
signed using Gonzalez’s signature stamp. Bay Construction’s
license was suspended on January 14, 2016, and the company
ceased operations that month. Through April 2016, Bradshaw
and Grey charged $2,675.29 to one of Bay Construction’s
American Express cards for various personal purchases such as
snowboarding expenses and the Presidio Social Club.
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C.
We next discuss Bradshaw’s petitions for two reverse
mortgages on Gosey’s home and the repair work Bay
Construction did on the home.
On February 14, 2014, ten days after Bradshaw and
Gonzalez entered into the attorney-client agreement, Bradshaw
petitioned the probate court for a reverse mortgage on Gosey’s
home. Bradshaw said a reverse mortgage was necessary
because Gosey’s expenses exceeded her income by $7,147 per
month and the current cash balance of $76,825.81 in the estate
would be exhausted by the end of November 2014. The probate
court granted Bradshaw’s petition, and a reverse mortgage of
$346,000 was disbursed to Bradshaw, an amount he claimed
would sustain Gosey’s care for about four years.
Two and a half years later, in July 2016, Bradshaw filed a
petition for a second reverse mortgage on Gosey’s home,
similarly stating that Gosey’s monthly expenses exceeded her
income by $7,644 per month and that the remaining balance
from the first reverse mortgage would be exhausted in two or
three months. He requested a lump sum disbursement of
$889,741.05. Around this time, Gosey’s condition worsened;
Bradshaw’s attorney, Robello, told the probate court that
Gosey’s doctors believed she would live only six more months.
This petition prompted an investigation by the probate court, as
discussed further below.
According to a declaration Bradshaw submitted to the
probate court, Bay Construction performed the following repairs
on Gosey’s home: (1) In January 2015, Bradshaw authorized the
Gosey Trust to pay Bay Construction $9,933.41 to repair the
“emergency” flooding damages caused by a burst pipe
underneath the property. (2) Bay Construction replaced the
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staircase that Gosey used to access the backyard and garden for
$48,909.20, which Bradshaw found to be “dangerous” with
“significant rotting.” (3) Bradshaw authorized payment of
$70,793.36 to Bay Construction from May to August 2015 to
repair the rear foundation of Gosey’s home; according to
Bradshaw, a pest control company had inspected the foundation
and found it had shifted due to termite infestation. There is no
credible evidence that Bradshaw obtained an assessment by a
licensed contractor or competitive bids for any of this work.
For the staircase replacement, Bradshaw obtained a
permit in June 2014. But no work was done until Bay
Construction’s proposal was submitted and accepted by
Bradshaw on January 31, 2015, roughly a month after the CSLB
issued the company a contractor’s license. Bradshaw offered no
reason for the seven-month delay even though, according to him,
“it was clear that the steps were not safe” and repair was
necessary because the staircase “was the only back entrance to
the home” and served as Gosey’s fire escape.
For the foundation repair, Bay Construction’s proposal
quoted $40,735.05, with a quarter of that amount to be paid
upon acceptance of proposal, half upon delivery of materials,
and the rest upon completion of the repair. Bradshaw
immediately accepted the proposal and authorized the Trust to
pay the full amount of $40,735.05 to Bay Construction on the
same day. In addition to that payment, Bay Construction was
paid another $6,350 the next day, $15,187.89 a week later,
$5,853.27 on August 10, 2015, and $2,667.15 on August 26,
2015 — for a total of $70,793.36. Bradshaw explained to the
probate court that “change orders were made to the project
causing delays and increased costs” after an inspector found the
initially approved plans did not comply with current codes.
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Throughout this period, the Trust owed $45,000 in arrears to
the Institute on Aging, the agency that provided daily care to
Gosey.
D.
The probate court learned of Bradshaw’s possible
affiliations with Bay Construction upon his petition for a second
reverse mortgage and promptly appointed Nancy Rasch to
represent Gosey. Rasch told the court that Bradshaw had not
disclosed information “relevant to a determination about the
reasonableness of the funds spent on repairs,” principally “how
Juan Gonzalez went from being an unlicensed handyman to a
licensed contractor.” She also said “[t]here appear[ed] to be a
lack of clarity and disclosure” concerning the facts that
Bradshaw did not obtain competitive bids for the work done on
Gosey’s home, that Bradshaw was Gonzalez’s attorney, and that
Bay Construction employed Bradshaw’s son, Grey. The probate
court issued a written inquiry on September 19, 2016, ordering
Bradshaw to “explain how the funds were spent that resulted in
such a quick depletion of available funds, including specific
information about any and all repairs paid for with those funds.”
Bradshaw filed two supplementary declarations in
response. The first did not address his role in setting up Bay
Construction or his attorney-client relationship with Gonzalez.
He stated that he “called several contractors in an attempt to
obtain bids . . . but most of the contractors did not return [his]
call much less offer a bid” and Bay Construction emerged as the
only choice for various emergency repairs. According to
Bradshaw, “the lack of response or interest from the contractors
[was] due to the availability of many larger construction projects
in San Francisco at the time.”
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In a second declaration, he stated: “As noted in my
previous declaration, for many of those jobs I did call different
contractors for quotes, but I rarely had calls back, and when I
did the contractors were not interested in the job or my
conservative price point.” In addition, Bradshaw characterized
his affiliation with Gonzalez and Bay Construction as limited.
He said that he allowed Gonzalez to utilize his law firm office
and the assistance of his receptionist, and that he prepared and
filed Bay Construction’s incorporation documents at no cost to
Gonzalez or Bay Construction because “Gonzalez struck [him]
as a hard-working and skilled contractor who needed help
getting a leg up.” According to Bradshaw, Gonzalez
“independently made” the decision to hire Grey, and Bradshaw
otherwise “had no relationship” with Bay Construction or
Gonzalez. Bradshaw said he “d[id] not have, and never ha[d]
had a financial interest in Bay Construction; nor ha[d] [he]
received any financial benefit from Bay Construction or its
construction projects.” In addition, his second declaration said
Bay Construction had a valid license with Invernon serving as
the RMO.
On September 27, 2016, the probate court held a hearing
on Bradshaw’s petition for a second reverse mortgage. The
judge expressed concerns about the appropriateness of the Trust
money spent, the relationship between Bradshaw and Bay
Construction, and the manner in which Bay Construction was
hired. The judge asked if Bradshaw was using his position as a
fiduciary to further a career by giving unbid work to an
individual or corporation with which he had ties, noting that
“Bradshaw was doing lots of things to advance Bay
Construction’s interests.” The probate court eventually
authorized a second reverse mortgage on the Gosey home in
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October 2016 on the condition that only $250,000 may be
disbursed for the purpose of paying for Gosey’s care and living
expenses, with no other expenditures permitted without prior
court approval. Bradshaw confirmed there were no more repairs
necessary on the Gosey home, and Robello likewise confirmed
that the approved disbursement was to be used solely for
Gosey’s care.
E.
Shortly after Gosey passed away in June 2017, counsel for
Dolores Coleman (Coleman), one of the beneficiaries of the
Gosey Trust, petitioned the probate court to suspend and
remove Bradshaw as trustee. The probate court granted
Coleman’s petition and appointed an interim trustee on January
25, 2018. The superior court agreed and formally removed him
as trustee, concluding that Bradshaw materially breached the
Gosey Trust by violating his fiduciary duties. (In re Gosey
Revocable Trust Dated January 3, 2007, (Super. Ct. City and
County of S.F., 2019, No. PTR-17-301118) (In re Gosey), affd.
Coleman v. Bradshaw (Sept. 30, 2022, A157968) [nonpub. opn.]
(Coleman).) Specifically, the superior court found that
Bradshaw engaged in self-dealing “when he repeatedly engaged
Bay Construction, Inc., a company in which he was a principal
and a substantial creditor, to perform no-bid work on settlor Ora
Gosey’s home”; that he did so “knowing that Bay Construction
was without credible contracting credentials”; and that he
demonstrated bad faith by “actively concealing from the court
and misrepresenting his interests, Bay Construction’s lack of
credentials and the no-bid status of the work.” The court said
that while each circumstance in isolation would not necessarily
lead to a finding of breach, the totality of circumstances showed
Bradshaw “committed significant breaches” and provided “no
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confidence that Bradshaw would act any differently” if
reinstated as trustee.
During those proceedings, the parties stipulated that the
work Bay Construction performed on Gosey’s home was of
professional quality and priced at fair market value, and on that
basis, Bradshaw argued he could not have breached his duties
to the Gosey Trust. The court rejected this argument,
explaining that “[t]he harm in Bradshaw’s actions is the
jeopardy in which he put Gosey . . . and the whole Trust” by
allowing an unqualified contractor to perform “substantial life
safety work on . . . Gosey’s only home.” The Trust required
Bradshaw to perform the duties of a trustee as a prudent person
acting in good faith would; such a person, the court said, would
not have undertaken the same risks and “certainly not without
discussing the issues with interested parties.”
As relevant here, the probate court credited Gonzalez’s
testimony over Bradshaw’s. Likewise, the superior court found
that Bradshaw repeatedly “lied about many of the facts
discussed” and “misstated a number of material facts and
omitted many others.”
F.
In October 2017, the OCTC charged Bradshaw with five
counts of misconduct, alleging that Bradshaw (1) created and
perpetuated a scheme to defraud the Trust, (2) breached his
fiduciary duties as trustee, (3) misappropriated funds in the
Trust to benefit Bay Construction, (4) made misrepresentations
in various court documents, and (5) engaged in a contractor
business without a license.
After a 22-day trial, the State Bar Hearing Department
concluded that Bradshaw was culpable of engaging in a scheme
to defraud the Gosey Trust (count one), breaching his fiduciary
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duties (count two), and making several misrepresentations
under penalty of perjury (count four). The hearing judge found
Bradshaw not credible on several points, including the existence
of an attorney-client relationship between Bradshaw and
Gonzalez, Bradshaw’s testimony regarding his limited control of
Bay Construction, his purported receipt of no bids or estimates
from other contractors, and his purported lack of motivation to
conceal his true affiliation with Bay Construction. The Hearing
Department recommended disbarment.
On July 30, 2019, soon after the superior court’s decision
in In re Gosey, the Review Department issued an opinion
dismissing all counts with prejudice. The OCTC petitioned for
review, and we remanded the matter to the Review Department
for reconsideration in light of the Coleman decision. Meanwhile,
Bradshaw appealed the judgment in Coleman and challenged
the sufficiency of the evidence. In September 2022, the Court of
Appeal affirmed the superior court’s judgment finding a breach
of trust, concluding all factual determinations were supported
by substantial evidence.
On remand in this matter, the Review Department held
that Bradshaw was culpable of three grossly negligent
misrepresentations (count four) and recommended six months
of actual suspension. In so concluding, the Review Department
reiterated its prior rejection of various factual findings
supporting a scheme to defraud (count one), rejected the factual
findings of Bradshaw’s bad faith and disregard of his fiduciary
duties (count two), and affirmed the Hearing Department’s
dismissal of culpability for misappropriation (count three).
Judge Ribas dissented; she would have found Bradshaw
culpable on the first four counts alleged by the OCTC and would
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have adopted the Hearing Department’s recommendation of
disbarment. We granted the OCTC’s petition for review.
II.
In attorney discipline proceedings, the burden is on the
OCTC to prove culpability by clear and convincing evidence.
(Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.103.) The clear and convincing
evidence standard “demands a degree of certainty greater than
that involved with the preponderance standard, but less than
what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. This intermediate standard ‘requires a finding of high
probability.’ ” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
998.)
In this matter, the Hearing Department found culpability
on three counts while dismissing two others and recommended
disbarment. Before the Review Department, Bradshaw argued
that the evidence was insufficient to establish culpability by
clear and convincing evidence. The Review Department agreed
and dismissed all counts in a 2019 opinion. The OCTC appealed,
and we remanded the matter to the Review Department to
consider the superior court’s then-recent decision in In re Gosey
finding Bradshaw in breach of his fiduciary duties and removing
him as trustee. After the Court of Appeal in Coleman upheld
the superior court’s decision in In re Gosey, the Review
Department revisited this matter and found Bradshaw culpable
for three instances of grossly negligent misrepresentation,
recommended a six-month suspension and other remedial
measures, and otherwise affirmed its 2019 dismissal of other
charges.
In our consideration of this matter, “[t]he findings of the
[H]earing [Department] . . . are entitled to great weight.”
(Greenbaum v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 543, 549.) In
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particular, “the hearing [court] is best suited to resolving
credibility questions, because it alone is able to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor and evaluate their veracity firsthand.”
(McKnight v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025, 1032; see Connor
v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047, 1055 (Connor) [“On matters
of credibility, we are reluctant to reverse the decision of the
hearing panel, which had the opportunity to evaluate conflicting
statements after observing the demeanor of the witnesses and
the character of their testimony.”].) At the same time, “while we
give great weight to both the review department’s disciplinary
recommendation and the hearing panel’s factual findings, it is
this court’s duty to independently examine the record, examine
the evidence and pass on its sufficiency. [Citations.]
Independent review of the record is particularly appropriate
when, as here, the review department and the hearing panel
have disagreed, and the review department itself is divided.”
(Connor, at p. 1055.)
Further, this disciplinary proceeding has occurred
alongside a parallel probate proceeding in civil court (the In re
Gosey/Coleman litigation). Although civil court findings are
typically made under a preponderance of the evidence standard
and are not binding in this disciplinary matter, we accord such
findings a strong presumption of validity if they are supported
by substantial evidence and especially if the issues in civil court
bear a strong similarity, if not identity, to the charged
disciplinary conduct. (Berstein v. Committee of Bar Examiners
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 90, 101–102; see In the Matter of Kinney
(Review Dept. 2014) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 112, 117.)
Nevertheless, we must ultimately “assess [any findings]
independently under the more stringent [clear and convincing]
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standard of proof applicable to disciplinary proceedings.”
(Maltaman v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924, 947.)
A.
We first consider whether the evidence establishes under
count one that Bradshaw engaged in a scheme to defraud in
violation of section 6106, which states that “[t]he commission of
any act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption,
whether the act is committed in the course of his relations as an
attorney or otherwise,” may be cause for suspension or
disbarment. As relevant here, Bradshaw may be found culpable
of defrauding the Trust based on conduct reflecting common
dishonesty — that is, dishonest conduct that does not
necessarily give rise to criminal liability or cause monetary loss.
(See Trusty v. State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 550, 554 [gross
negligence accompanied by an element of deceit sufficient to
prove moral turpitude warranting disbarment]; Crane v. State
Bar (1981) 30 Cal.3d 117, 124 [attempt to deceive escrow agents
by deleting excerpts from a beneficiary statement without
authorization]; Farnham v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, 446
[habitual disregard of client’s interests such as misrepresenting
case statuses].) The fact that lack of honesty can give rise to
culpability for a scheme to defraud under section 6106 is
consistent with the statute’s purpose of regulating professional
misconduct, for acts of dishonesty “manifest an ‘abiding
disregard of “ ‘the fundamental rule of ethics . . . without which
the [legal] profession is worse than valueless.’ ” ’ ” (Levin v.
State (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1140, 1147; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64
Cal.2d 787, 792–793.)
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Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find
Bradshaw culpable of engaging in a scheme to defraud the
Gosey Trust by clear and convincing evidence. Bradshaw
fraudulently held himself out to be a prudent trustee who acted
in good faith and in the Trust’s best interest. By obtaining
reverse mortgages, Bradshaw converted the equity of Gosey’s
home into cash within the Trust, which he had full access to and
enjoyed wide discretion in spending. Bradshaw incorporated
Bay Construction purportedly for the benefit of Gonzalez but
retained complete control of the company’s cashflow, finances,
payroll, and operations behind the scenes. Bradshaw identified
various “essential” repairs on Gosey’s home, and by not
obtaining competitive bids, he made sure Bay Construction
would be awarded contracts for the repairs and paid in amounts
far exceeding its initial proposals. By withholding disclosure of
his financial ties with Bay Construction and its licensing
arrangement from the probate court, Bradshaw interfered with
the court’s duty and ability to ensure Trust funds were
prudently managed.
Bradshaw’s attempts at self-enrichment through hiring
and paying a company he effectively controlled, coupled with the
failure to disclose the arrangement, created a heightened risk
that Trust funds would not be spent in good faith or in the best
interest of Gosey. Bradshaw exhibited “conduct on the part of a
member of the bar which cannot be condoned,” whether or not
his action caused material damage to Gosey or the Trust. (Lady
v. State Bar (1946) 28 Cal.2d 497, 504; see Pickering v. State Bar
(1944) 24 Cal.2d 141, 145 [Business and Professions Code
denounces “the endeavor to secure an advantage by means of
falsity” without regard to whether anyone was actually deceived
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
or harmed]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 172, 178 [no
harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts].)
Our independent findings mirror the facts the hearing
judge found to support culpability under count one. The OCTC
argues the Review Department improperly disregarded five
factual findings when it dismissed this count for want of clear
and convincing evidence. Although the Review Department is
required to independently review the record and may depart
from the factual findings of the hearing judge, “[t]he findings of
fact of the hearing judge are entitled to great weight.” (Rules
Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.155(A).) We find no basis in the record
to reject the hearing judge’s findings and therefore adopt those
findings: (1) Bradshaw misrepresented his true affiliation with
Bay Construction; (2) he repeatedly hired and paid Bay
Construction, an unlicensed contractor, for services that
required a licensed contractor; (3) he concealed from the probate
court the intended purposes of the reverse mortgages; (4) he
attempted to avoid court supervision in order to perpetuate the
alleged fraud; and (5) he maintained effective control of Bay
Construction and ran the company from the shadows. We
discuss each finding below.
First, the Review Department did not agree with the
hearing judge that Bradshaw misrepresented his true affiliation
with Bay Construction as part of the alleged scheme to defraud
the Trust. According to the Review Department, the OCTC did
not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bradshaw was
the owner or had control of the company. The Review
Department found Gonzalez’s testimony on this issue
“inconsistent” and concluded that “all of the documents in the
record indicate[d] Gonzalez’s ownership of Bay Construction.” It
further reasoned that even if the evidence established Bradshaw
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
had ownership or control, this was permitted by the Trust
instrument. Relatedly, the fifth factual finding set aside by the
Review Department was that Bradshaw ran Bay Construction
from the shadows. It concluded that Bradshaw did not control
or own Bay Construction despite incorporating the company and
providing initial funding.
As an initial matter, the OCTC need not conclusively
prove Bradshaw’s ownership or actual control to establish he
“ma[de] multiple misrepresentations under penalty of perjury in
court documents regarding his true financial affiliation with
Bay Construction,” as the Hearing Department found.
Bradshaw’s culpability for misrepresentation arose from the
discrepancy between his declarations of no financial
relationship with the company and what ample evidence in the
record shows: Bradshaw “incorporated, funded, and controlled
the finances” and directed the company’s operations. By
Bradshaw’s own admission, his role in initially incorporating
and representing Bay Construction and allowing the company
to utilize various resources that belonged to his law firm was
sufficient to “constitute a conflict of interest” disqualifying
Bradshaw from representing his other client, Noretha Jones, in
any legal dispute with Bay Construction.
Bradshaw’s control of the company is further evidenced by
Gonzalez’s lack of awareness and participation in various
activities that one would reasonably attribute to a business
owner. Gonzalez, whom the Review Department accepted as the
true owner of Bay Construction, was an hourly employee whose
wages were determined and paid by Bradshaw. Gonzalez
neither “controlled the payroll” for the company nor made any
decisions on which jobs to accept and how much to charge; those
decisions were made by Bradshaw. Gonzalez never approved
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
any proposals to be submitted to Gosey, nor did he authorize
issuance of invoices for work done. Gonzalez was unaware that
Bradshaw had opened a business checking account for Bay
Construction and that payments were being made on the
American Express cards for the company. Because Bradshaw
was the sole authorized signatory on Bay Construction’s only
checking account, and because the credit card statements were
sent to Bradshaw for review and payment, Gonzalez had no
knowledge or control of Bay Construction’s cashflow or finances.
Contrary to the Review Department’s reasoning,
Gonzalez’s testimony on Bradshaw’s control over Bay
Construction did not stand alone. The receptionist at
Bradshaw’s law firm, Brea Violette, testified that Bradshaw was
the one “giving [] directions” to Gonzalez. Jones’s daughter-in-
law, Linda Lee, testified that in negotiations with Bay
Construction, Grey and Bradshaw dominated the conversation
while Gonzalez spoke so little that she presumed he did not
“sp[eak] English very well.” When Lee pushed back on Bay
Construction’s initial bid, Bradshaw interjected with a
counteroffer without discussing it with Gonzalez first.
To the extent that the issue of ownership and control
hinges on the credibility of Gonzalez versus Bradshaw, we see
no basis for rejecting the hearing judge’s credibility
determination. The Review Department pointed out that
Gonzalez offered inconsistent answers “at least twice,” that
Gonzalez’s signature was on the corporate documents as the sole
shareholder, and that the hearing judge did not specify the
“numerous credible exhibits” she relied upon. But the Review
Department did not make clear what inconsistencies in
Gonzalez’s testimony it was referring to. And it is not the case
that “all the documents in the record indicate Gonzalez’s
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
ownership of Bay Construction”; the banking records, which
showed Bradshaw’s full control over the company’s cashflow,
provide strong reason to doubt Gonzalez was the true owner.
Further, the Hearing Department described Lee’s observations
of the power dynamic between Bradshaw and Gonzalez, the
executive roles of Violette and Bradshaw at Bay Construction
after Gonzalez’s departure, and the control and use of company
credit cards by Bradshaw, his wife, and Grey. This evidence
corroborated the Hearing Department’s direct observations of
Bradshaw’s and Gonzalez’s credibility during testimony, as well
as the superior court’s similar credibility determination in In re
Gosey.
Accordingly, we find that the Review Department erred in
rejecting the findings that Bradshaw misrepresented his
affiliation with Bay Construction and that he effectively
controlled the company.
The second finding set aside by the Review Department
was that Bradshaw hired and paid an unlicensed contractor for
services that required a licensed contractor. According to the
Review Department, although the validity of Bay Construction’s
license was suspect, the company was nevertheless licensed and
held valid permits for all repairs on Gosey’s home. But Bay
Construction was issued a license on the condition that a
licensed contractor, Invernon, would serve as an RMO and
directly supervise Bay Construction’s work. There is no
indication in the record that Invernon actually performed that
function. Neither Grey nor Gonzalez, the only two payroll
employees of the company, had ever met or spoken to Invernon.
Grey testified that no one had ever mentioned Invernon to him.
Lee and Gosey’s tenant, Claire Lewis, said essentially the same
thing. Bradshaw knew the statutory requirements of an RMO,
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
and since he was the only person in contact with Invernon, he
knew that Invernon did not supervise any work. We see no basis
for rejecting the finding that Bradshaw hired and paid an
unlicensed contractor as part of his scheme to defraud the Trust.
The other findings dismissed by the Review Department
are that Bradshaw concealed from the probate court the
intended purposes of the reverse mortgages and that he
attempted to avoid court supervision in order to perpetuate the
alleged fraud. As discussed under count four below (post, at
pp. 24–26), the record leaves us unable to discern any good-faith
reason for Bradshaw’s lack of transparency to the probate court.
No valid reason appears for rejecting these findings.
In sum, clear and convincing evidence establishes that
Bradshaw attempted to enrich himself by repeatedly hiring and
paying an unlicensed contracting company he controlled,
without adequate disclosure of his financial ties to the company
or its licensing status, all while holding himself out to Gosey and
the probate court as a fiduciary acting in the Trust’s best
interest. We conclude that Bradshaw is culpable for engaging
in a scheme to defraud the Trust in violation of section 6106.
B.
We next consider whether the evidence supports the
hearing judge’s finding that Bradshaw breached his fiduciary
duty to Gosey and her beneficiaries in count two. We find that
clear and convincing evidence shows Bradshaw breached his
fiduciary duties in violation of section 6068, subdivision (a).
Trustees owe trust beneficiaries a duty of loyalty, and
trustees are required to avoid self-dealing. (Prob. Code,
§§ 16002; 16004.) The Trust instrument here permitted a
trustee to “[e]mploy the Trustee, a relative of the Trustee, or a
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
business in which the Trustee has an interest, to perform
needed services for the Trust . . . and pay compensation not
exceeding fair market value” so long as the trustee “does not act
in bad faith or in disregard of the purposes of the Trust.” At the
same time, the Trust instrument says the trustee “has the
duties imposed by law” and must exercise the power of trustee
as “a prudent person would.”
The Hearing Department found culpability on count two
based on Bradshaw’s repeated engagement of a company he
owned to perform work on Gosey’s home while knowing the
company had no valid license, concealing his affiliation with the
company, and failing to obtain competitive bids. These findings
are echoed by the superior court decision in In re Gosey, which
found that Bradshaw “jeopardized the safety of the [Gosey]
home and the health and welfare of its occupants” in disregard
of the Trust’s principal purpose to care for Gosey, and that his
failure to disclose his ties with Bay Construction to the court
demonstrated bad faith. The Court of Appeal affirmed the
superior court’s finding that Bradshaw breached his fiduciary
duties.
The Review Department, by contrast, concluded that
Bradshaw did not act in disregard of the Trust’s purposes
because the repair work had valid permits and approvals from
the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection (DBI) and
thus “Gosey and the occupants were never actually in jeopardy.”
It further reasoned that Bradshaw did not act in bad faith
because he had no duty to disclose his relationship with Bay
Construction to the probate court under the Trust instrument
or the Probate Code.
In finding no culpability for breach of fiduciary duty, the
Review Department emphasized that Gosey was not harmed
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
because there is no evidence that the repair work was not done
competently at fair market value. But culpability on this count
does not turn on actual harm to the client, monetary or
otherwise. We have consistently rejected a harm requirement
in evaluating culpability for attorney misconduct; instead, we
have evaluated the degree of harm as an aggravating factor in
the discipline phase. (See Connor, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1057
[actual injury to client is not an element of breaching the duty
against self-dealing]; Allen v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 12, 17
[no harm requirement in finding fraudulent and deceitful acts];
Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912, 926 [same for willful
misrepresentations]; Rules Proc. of State Bar, std. 1.5(j) [listing
“significant harm to the client” as an aggravating factor].)
The superior court found that “Bradshaw breached the
Trust when he repeatedly engaged Bay Construction, Inc., a
company in which he was a principal and a substantial creditor,
to perform no-bid work on settlor Ora Gosey’s home, which was
the Trust’s main asset, knowing that Bay Construction was
without credible contracting credentials, all while actively
concealing from the court and misrepresenting his interests,
Bay Construction’s lack of credentials and the no-bid status of
the work.” This finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeal,
and we conclude it is supported by clear and convincing
evidence.
As Judge Ribas explained in dissenting from the Review
Department’s analysis, Bradshaw “plac[ed] the interests of Bay
Construction over the primary purpose of the Gosey Trust,
which was the care and maintenance of Gosey,” as evidenced by
his disbursement of “punctual payments to Bay Construction”
even as the Trust owed $45,000 in arrears to Gosey’s caregiver,
the Institute on Aging. Moreover, we agree with Judge Ribas
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
that the fact “that DBI later validated the work as competent
did not obviate the risk Bradshaw imposed on the Gosey Trust
by employing an unlicensed contractor — who had not
demonstrated the requisite training and knowledge of a licensed
contractor — to work on the Gosey House at the outset.
[Citations.] In other words, whether Bradshaw breached his
fiduciary duty does not turn on what DBI decides to do after the
fact. The employment of an unlicensed contractor is
inconsistent with the prudent person standard and does not
show due regard for the trust.”
The fact that the contractor Bradshaw employed was a
company he controlled and had a financial interest in only
strengthens the case for finding breach. It is true that the Trust
permitted self-dealing, but that permission did not obviate the
duty to act in good faith and as a prudent person would. Upon
determining that the back staircase of Gosey’s home was
“dangerous” and obtaining a permit for repair in June 2014,
Bradshaw did nothing for seven months — even though the
staircase was Gosey’s only fire escape — until Bay Construction
submitted a proposal and was given the job without other bids.
Even accepting that Bay Construction’s repairs on Gosey’s home
were done competently at fair market value, we do not agree
that a trustee, acting as a prudent person in this context, would
award over $150,000 of work to a company he controlled without
obtaining competitive bids. In addition, the Trust instrument
did not exempt Bradshaw from the duty to disclose his financial
ties with Bay Construction under rules 1.7 and 1.8.1 of the Rules
of Professional Conduct. (See Schneider v. State Bar (1987) 43
Cal.3d 784, 796.)
In sum, the ends do not justify the means when it comes
to a trustee’s faithful discharge of fiduciary duties. Clear and
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
convincing evidence shows Bradshaw breached the Trust by
prioritizing his interests over Gosey’s and by exposing Gosey to
the risks of engaging a contractor that lacked genuine
credentials and qualified supervision.
C.
Although the OCTC requests that this court find
Bradshaw culpable for misappropriating $157,246.76 from the
Trust in violation of section 6106 (count three), we decline to
rule on this count. The record does not clearly establish the fair
market value of the repair work performed on the Gosey home,
nor does it provide a way to ascertain such value in the absence
of competitive bids and evidence showing the home’s condition
before and after the repairs. Moreover, as we explain further
below, Bradshaw’s disbarment is warranted even without
culpability on this count.
D.
As to the allegations of misrepresentation under count
four, the Hearing Department found that Bradshaw
intentionally and willfully made three misrepresentations to the
probate court in violation of section 6106: (1) Bradshaw stated
Gosey was removed from her home by APS while petitioning the
probate court to appoint him as temporary and permanent
conservator in August 2013; (2) Bradshaw stated in the
February 2015 accounting report to the probate court that he
shared “no relationship or affiliation” with any agent hired by
him between December 2, 2013, and November 30, 2014; and (3)
Bradshaw stated in his second supplemental declaration to the
probate court that he had no financial interest in Bay
Construction. The Review Department rejected the finding as
to the first statement, and the OCTC does not appeal that ruling
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
here. The Review Department found Bradshaw culpable with
regard to the other two statements, along with another sworn
declaration in the In re Gosey litigation, dated September 20,
2017, that repeated Bradshaw’s assertion of no financial
interest in Bay Construction.
In so concluding, the Review Department relied on
findings by the superior court in In re Gosey: “The crux is that
the superior court found that Bradshaw should have disclosed
more facts regarding his relationship to Bay Construction. It
was imprudent for Bradshaw to present information to the court
in the way that he did. Based on the superior court’s finding,
we now find that Bradshaw violated section 6106 when he
stated in the second supplemental declaration that he did not
have a financial interest in Bay Construction.” But the Review
Department said it could not find by clear and convincing
evidence that Bradshaw intended to mislead the court and
instead concluded that “Bradshaw’s actions amount to gross
negligence under section 6106.”
We have no difficulty concluding that clear and convincing
evidence shows Bradshaw intentionally misrepresented his
relationship with Bay Construction and Gonzalez in all three
instances. Given the abundant evidence of Bradshaw’s
controlling role in the company, or even on the view that he was
merely an unsecured creditor of Bay Construction, his
statements that he had no financial interest in the company
were plainly false. And a strong inference of intentionality
arises from the fact that he stood to benefit from mispresenting
that the company and the Trust were engaged in arms-length
transactions, as well as from the fact that he repeated the
misrepresentations. (See Lee v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 927,
942 [“repeated false statements and attempts to deceive the
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
court” are evidence of “corrupt and dishonest purposes”].) This
conclusion is additionally bolstered by the superior court’s
findings that Bradshaw lied when he testified that he had no
financial interest in Bay Construction and that Gonzalez ran the
company, prepared the company’s bids, and made the decision
to hire Bradshaw’s son.
Further, we find it significant that Bradshaw failed to
disclose the true nature of his relationship with Bay
Construction when the probate court was investigating his
possible misconduct as trustee and attempting to account for
Trust assets that had been rapidly depleted. In particular, the
probate court sought to ascertain Bradshaw’s connections to Bay
Construction through written declarations after Rasch had
informed the court that such affiliations existed and Bradshaw
displayed a lack of candor and transparency throughout her
investigation. When viewed in that light, any contention that
Bradshaw was only grossly negligent — because he made his
representations with the advice of his lawyer or because he
genuinely believed he did not have to report any interest in Bay
Construction short of formal ownership — is unpersuasive.
Bradshaw also displayed a lack of candor when he
declared that he had “no relationship or affiliation” with any
agent he hired between December 2, 2013, and November 30,
2014. Although he did not hire Bay Construction during that
period, he did repeatedly hire NJ Construction, the handyman
company owned by Gonzalez. Bradshaw and Gonzalez began
the process of creating and incorporating Bay Construction in
February 2014. In light of the close business relationship
between Bradshaw and Gonzalez during this period,
Bradshaw’s declaration that he had “no relationship or
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
affiliation” with NJ Construction (and by extension Gonzalez)
was clearly false.
We find that Bradshaw willfully misrepresented his
relationship with Bay Construction and Gonzalez under count
four.
III.
Having found Bradshaw culpable for engaging in a scheme
to defraud, breaching his fiduciary duty, and making intentional
misrepresentations in violation of sections 6106 and 6068, we
now turn to the appropriate discipline for his misconduct.
State Bar disciplinary proceedings are meant to protect
the public, the courts, and the legal profession. (Chasteen v.
State Bar (1985) 40 Cal.3d 586, 591 (Chasteen).) “[T]he
discipline in each case must be determined on the particular
facts of the case.” (Ibid.) Exercising our independent judgment,
we consider the totality of the circumstances with “ ‘no fixed
formula.’ ” (Connor, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1055.) We consider
the State Bar Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional
Misconduct (Jan. 2025) (Standards), applicable case law, and
aggravating and mitigating factors proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Although “we generally accord great
weight to the Review Department’s recommendation,” “ ‘we
have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than
recommended by the department.’ ” (In re Silverton (2005)
36 Cal.4th 81, 89–90; see In re Nevill (1985) 39 Cal.3d 729, 735
[rejecting recommendation of suspension and ordering
disbarment].)
Here, the Review Department’s disciplinary
recommendation was based on its finding of three instances of
grossly negligent misrepresentation. We have found Bradshaw
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
culpable for more severe and extensive misconduct, and thus we
consider the appropriate discipline accordingly.
A.
We begin by considering aggravating factors. The OCTC
bears the burden of proving each aggravating factor by clear and
convincing evidence. (Standards, supra, std. 1.5.) In addition to
factors inherent to the misconduct already established (id.,
stds. 1.5(d) [“intentional misconduct, bad faith or dishonesty”],
1.5(e) [“misrepresentation”], 1.5(f) [“concealment”]), we consider
several additional factors.
The first is prior discipline. (Standards, supra,
std. 1.5(a).) In 2009, Bradshaw stipulated to misconduct in
violation of section 6068, subdivision (m) for failing to inform his
client Kita Miller of the amount of a settlement he received on
her behalf. Specifically, he received a check of $47,500 made out
to her but mailed her a check for $11,181.22 without informing
her of the actual amount received. Bradshaw was subject to a
private reproval. The Review Department reduced the weight
assigned by the Hearing Department to this factor from
moderate to minimal. But the prior disciplinary action occurred
within six years of the events resulting in the current matter
(see In the Matter of Koehler (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State
Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628 [prior reproval occurring seven years
prior was “not too remote”]), and we find it troubling that
Bradshaw displayed a similar lack of honesty and loyalty in
handling client funds (see In the Matter of Shalant (Review
Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 829, 841 [greater weight
placed on common element among attorney’s prior and current
misconduct]). Under the circumstances, we assign moderate
weight to this factor.
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Second, we consider the number of instances of
misconduct. (Standards, supra, std. 1.5(b).) We have found
Bradshaw culpable for three counts of misconduct, with each
count encompassing multiple acts over a sustained course of
action. Accordingly, we assign moderate weight to this factor.
(See In the Matter of Martin (Review Dept. 2020) 5 Cal. State
Bar Ct. Rptr. 753, 761 [moderate weight for two counts of
misconduct involving multiple acts].)
Third, we assign substantial weight to the misconduct
involving a highly vulnerable victim. (Standards, supra,
std. 1.5(n).) Bradshaw’s actions defrauding and draining a trust
meant to benefit an elderly woman with advanced dementia
were highly reprehensible. Gosey had no spouse or children;
when she sustained a fall in 2013, it took days for her to receive
medical attention because no one knew until her tenant checked
in with her. Gosey’s age, mental condition, and lack of
community made her especially vulnerable. As Gosey’s attorney
and trustee of the Gosey Trust, Bradshaw was responsible for
acting in her best interest, yet he repeatedly prioritized his own
pecuniary interests over her welfare. Bradshaw paid Bay
Construction liberally from the Trust even as bills from Gosey’s
caregiver were in arrears. Bradshaw knew Gosey had mere
months remaining in hospice when he petitioned the probate
court for a second reverse mortgage on her home, requesting a
lump sum of $889,741.05. Bradshaw took advantage of Gosey’s
high level of vulnerability, and this factor must be accorded
substantial weight, consistent with the public protection
purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings.
Finally, we consider Bradshaw’s “indifference toward
rectification or atonement for the consequences of the
misconduct.” (Standards, supra, std. 1.5(k).) The Hearing
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
Department accorded significant weight to this factor, citing
Bradshaw’s record of avoiding accountability, lack of insight or
remorse, and general indifference toward rectification. The
Court of Appeal in Coleman, in affirming the removal of
Bradshaw as trustee, similarly stated that “the trial made plain
that Bradshaw sees nothing wrong in his actions.” (Coleman,
supra, A157968.) And as Judge Ribas observed in dissenting
from the Review Department’s recommendation, the record
shows that Bradshaw has a history of “asserting nefarious
motives on the part of those who questioned his dubious
actions.” During a September 2016 hearing in the probate court,
Bradshaw accused the court of attempting to “demonize” him
when the judge expressed valid concerns over Bradshaw’s ties
with Bay Construction and his lack of candor around his
involvement. In addition, Rasch testified that Bradshaw wrote
her a letter accusing her of defamation after she made a
complaint to the State Bar based on her investigation.
Throughout this disciplinary action, Bradshaw repeatedly
deflected responsibility toward his lawyer Robello and has yet
to acknowledge his wrongdoing. Because Bradshaw “has no
appreciation that [his] method of practicing law is totally at odds
with the professional standards of this state” (Lebbos v. State
Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37, 45), we accord substantial weight to
this factor.
B.
As for mitigation, “[a] lawyer must establish mitigating
circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.” (Standards,
supra, std. 1.6.) We conclude that the record does not show
Bradshaw’s discipline should be mitigated for “extraordinary
good character attested to by a wide range of references in the
legal and general communities, who are aware of the full extent
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
of the misconduct.” (Id., std. 1.6(f).) Seven witnesses, comprised
of friends, colleagues, and former clients, testified on
Bradshaw’s behalf at the Hearing Department. They described
his generosity and loyalty as a friend, and some said they
believed he was honest. Only three witnesses knew of
Bradshaw’s prior private reproval. When asked, five witnesses
said their opinion of Bradshaw’s character would be adversely
affected if he were found culpable of some or all of the charges.
Three said that culpability for making misrepresentations —
the one count for which every adjudicatory body has found
multiple instances of misconduct by Bradshaw — would lower
their opinion of his character. Ernest Goldstein, a retired
superior court judge who knew Bradshaw professionally,
testified that his “reaction would be very negative” if the
“allegations of self-dealing” or culpability under section 6068,
subdivision (a) were found true. In light of his own witnesses’
testimony, Bradshaw has not shown extraordinary good
character attested to by references “who are aware of the full
extent of the misconduct.” (Standards, std. 1.6(f).)
Bradshaw’s lack of integrity, determined by two separate
factfinders, was further highlighted by the testimony of OCTC’s
rebuttal character witness, Richard Zitrin, an expert on legal
ethics who also testified as a complaining witness at Bradshaw’s
first disciplinary action. In this matter, Zitrin testified that for
six years in a row, Bradshaw failed to disclose his criminal
record, including a felony conviction for grand larceny by check
in 1991, when applying to a lawyer referral service run by a local
bar association. When Zitrin investigated Bradshaw’s
representation of Kita Miller through the referral service — the
investigation that resulted in a private reproval against
Bradshaw — Bradshaw misled Zitrin into believing that his fee
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
agreement with Miller allowed him to deposit the settlement
check made out to her into his own trustee account.
The Hearing Department assigned moderate weight to
Bradshaw’s character evidence and to the cooperation he
showed by stipulating to certain facts and the authenticity of
some exhibits (Standards, supra, std. 1.6(e)), and the Review
Department agreed with those determinations. Although we do
not question the hearing judge’s assessment of Bradshaw’s
cooperation, in our judgment Bradshaw’s character evidence,
considered alongside the OCTC’s rebuttal evidence, merits little
weight in mitigation.
C.
The record before us established multiple counts of
misconduct in Bradshaw’s handling of the assets and home of a
highly vulnerable elderly victim to whom he owed a fiduciary
duty. He misused his authority and Gosey’s confidence in an
attempt to enrich himself and made willful misrepresentations
to various courts in order to obscure his relationship with Bay
Construction and frustrate the probate court’s ability to
supervise his conduct as trustee of the Gosey Trust. The risks
to the public, the courts, and the profession are compounded by
the fact that Bradshaw had been disciplined for dishonesty in
handling client funds not long before the present scheme and by
Bradshaw’s continuing indifference and lack of insight or
remorse toward his misconduct.
Because the totality of the circumstances shows that
Bradshaw has repeatedly failed to uphold the most basic duties
of an attorney, we are compelled to find him unfit to serve as a
member of the bar or an officer of the court. Regrettably,
Bradshaw has shown himself unable to honor the duties of
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.
honesty and loyalty inherent in the role of attorney and
fiduciary, and we find no indication in the record of his capacity
or willingness to reform. Because “ ‘ “[o]ur principal concern is
always the protection of the public, the preservation of
confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the
highest possible professional standard for attorneys” ’ ”
(Chasteen, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 592), we order Bradshaw
disbarred. (See Lebbos v. State Bar, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 43–
44 [disbarment in first disciplinary action for attorney who
lacked remorse despite committing multiple acts of dishonesty];
Weber v. State Bar (1988) 47 Cal.3d 492 [attorney disbarred for
misconduct involving moral turpitude and dishonesty in
handling client and trust funds].)
CONCLUSION
We order that respondent Drexel Andrew Bradshaw, State
Bar Number 209584, be disbarred from the practice of law in
California and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.
36
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion In re Bradshaw
__________________________________________________________
Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding XX
Review Granted (published)
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________
Opinion No. S282314
Date Filed: July 3, 2025
__________________________________________________________
Court:
County:
Judge:
__________________________________________________________
Counsel:
Drexel Bradshaw, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Ellin Davtyan, Brady R. Dewar, Rachel S. Grunberg and Danielle A.
Lee for Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):
Drexel Bradshaw
3053 Fillmore Street, #205
San Francisco, CA 94123
(415) 275-1983
Danielle A. Lee
State Bar of California
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 538-2218