Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

790 July 3, 2025 No. 26

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

FRIENDS OF YAMHILL COUNTY,

Respondent on Review,

v.

YAMHILL COUNTY,

Respondent,

and

GRANGE HILL LLC,

Petitioner on Review.

(LUBA 2022-081) (CA A180472) (SC S070290)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted March 1, 2024, at Willamette

University College of Law, Salem, Oregon.

Andrew Mulkey, 1000 Friends of Oregon, Portland,

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.

Kevin H. Kono, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Portland,

argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review.

Also on the briefs were Elaine Albrich and Meagan A. Himes.

Steve Elzinga, Sherman, Sherman, Johnnie & Hoyt LLP,

Salem, filed the brief for amicus curiae The Ground LLC.

Also on the brief was Mark Hoyt.

Alexandria E. Dolezal, Crag Law Center, Portland, filed

the brief for amici curiae Jason Lett, Mike McCarthy, and

Shelley Wetherell. Also on the brief was Meriel L. Darzen.

FLYNN, C.J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part

and reversed in part. The final order of the Land Use Board

of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Land

Use Board of Appeals for further proceedings.

________________

* On judicial review from a final order of the Land Use Board of Appeals. 325

Or App 282, 529 P3d 1007 (2023).

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 791

792 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

FLYNN, C.J.

Although Oregon’s land use laws strictly limit how

Exclusive Farm Use (EFU) land may be used, a county

generally has authority to approve “home occupations” in

that zone, subject to numerous specified conditions. ORS

215.283(2)(i); ORS 215.203(1). In this case, Yamhill County

approved a “home occupation” permit for Grange Hill to

operate a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast adjacent to its

vineyard, on land zoned for EFU, in a structure that Grange

Hill had not yet built. Friends of Yamhill County (Friends)

challenges the approval, contending that the proposed bed

and breakfast does not meet one of the specified conditions

for a home occupation on EFU land—that it must be oper-

ated “substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling” or “[o]ther build-

ings normally associated with uses permitted in the zone in

which the property is located.” ORS 215.448(1). At issue is

the meaning of the “dwelling” within which a home occupa-

tion may operate under ORS 215.448(1).

The Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) affirmed

the county’s approval of the home occupation. LUBA rea-

soned that the county permissibly concluded that Grange

Hill’s bed and breakfast would be operated in a “dwelling”

because Grange Hill had approval from the county to con-

struct a category of “dwelling” normally allowed in the

zone—a “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use”—

and because the county had found that the proposed struc-

ture “meets the design standards for [a] single-family resi-

dence” and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper.

In doing so, LUBA rejected Friends’ argument that, in order

to qualify as a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448(1),

the structure in which Grange Hill proposed to operate its

home occupation needed to satisfy all of the requirements

for the “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use”

that Grange Hill had authority to construct, including that

a “primary dwelling” must be a structure designed and used

as a home for a farm operator. Friends of Yamhill County

v. Yamhill County, ___ Or LUBA ___, ___ (LUBA No 2022-

081, Dec 27, 2022) (slip op at 11-12). According to LUBA,

that general requirement for a “primary dwelling” was not

relevant to whether the structure would be a “dwelling” as

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 793

required by ORS 215.448. The Court of Appeals reversed

LUBA’s decision, however, concluding that the proposed

structure—as a matter of law—is not a “primary dwelling”

because it is a “motel.”

This court granted Grange Hill’s petition for

review, and we now affirm the Court of Appeals in part and

reverse in part. Although we are not persuaded by the Court

of Appeals’ reasons for concluding that the structure fails

to qualify as a “dwelling” as a matter of law, we agree, for

other reasons, that LUBA erred in affirming the county’s

approval of Grange Hill’s home occupation permit. As we

will explain, we conclude that the legislature intended the

“dwelling” requirement for a home occupation under ORS

215.448 to mean a structure that satisfies the requirements

for a particular category of “dwelling” that the land use laws

normally allow on property in the zone. When, as here, the

purported category of dwelling is a “primary dwelling” on

EFU land, those requirements include that the structure

will be the home for a farm operator. Because LUBA errone-

ously dismissed that requirement as irrelevant to whether

the proposed structure satisfies the “dwelling” require-

ment in ORS 215.448, we reverse LUBA’s decision, and

we remand the case to LUBA for further consideration of

Friends’ challenge to the county’s approval of the proposed

home occupation.

I. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAND USE LAW

Before turning to the details of this case, we pro-

vide a brief overview of the pertinent statutory land use

protections. In 1973, Oregon enacted a comprehensive and

unified statewide land use planning system. SB 100 (1973);

Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego,

360 Or 115, 118, 379 P3d 462 (2016). As part of that com-

prehensive statutory scheme, the legislature established the

Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC),

to which it delegated the setting of statewide land use goals.

ORS 197.030; ORS 197.040. One of those statewide goals,

Goal 3, is “[t]o preserve and maintain agricultural lands.”

OAR 660-015-0000(3); Goal 3: Agricultural Lands, Oregon’s

Statewide Planning Goals and Guidelines, https://www.

oregon.gov/lcd/OP/Documents/goal3.pdf (accessed June 25,

794 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

2025). The legislature has directed every county in the

state to adopt and maintain a comprehensive land use plan

that complies with the statewide goals. ORS 197.175(2).

Consistent with those plans, counties may adopt ordinances

that “zone designated areas of land within the county as

exclusive farm use zones.” ORS 215.203(1).

Generally, land that a county has designated as

an EFU zone under its master land-use plan “shall be used

exclusively for farm use,” except as otherwise provided by

specific statutes. ORS 215.203(1). The legislature has iden-

tified uses of EFU land that are permitted “as of right” and

others that are permitted as “conditional uses.” Brentmar v.

Jackson County, 321 Or 481, 496, 900 P2d 1030 (1995);1 ORS

215.283(1), (2). A county may not restrict the uses that are

allowed “as of right,” but it may restrict, or opt not to allow,

“conditional uses.” Brentmar, 321 Or at 496.

Only a few types of structures are permitted on

EFU land as of right under ORS 215.283, including “pri-

mary or accessory dwellings and other buildings customar-

ily provided in conjunction with farm use.” ORS 215.283(1)

(e). Additional, conditional, uses may be permitted by the

local governing body as long as the proposed use satisfies

the statutory criteria for the particular conditional use.

ORS 215.283(2). As pertinent here, conditional uses that

counties may permit on EFU land include so-called “[h]ome

occupations,” which are subject to numerous specified condi-

tions and subject to approval by the local governing body or

its designee. ORS 215.283(2)(i).

Although the land use statutes contain no express

definition of “home occupation,” some of the more descriptive

1

In Brentmar, we addressed ORS 215.213(1), which lists a number of uses

that “may be established,” and concluded that “the legislature intended that

the uses delineated in ORS 215.213(1) be uses ‘as of right[.]’ ” 321 Or at 496.

Throughout this opinion, we primarily cite to provisions of ORS 215.283, which

contains an essentially duplicate list of permitted uses “in any area zoned

for exclusive farm use.” The primary difference between the lists is that ORS

215.213, which predates ORS 215.283, applies only to counties that had adopted

“marginal lands provisions” under a process that the legislature eliminated in

1993. See Or Laws 1993, ch 792, § 29 (providing that counties that previously had

adopted “marginal lands provisions under ORS 197.247 (1991 Edition) * * * may

continue to apply those provisions,” but that “[a]fter January 1, 1993, no county

may adopt marginal lands provisions”).

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 795

statutory conditions create a general picture of what the

legislature had in mind. At least in an EFU zone, a “home

occupation” is “operated by a resident or employee of a res-

ident of the property on which the business is located,” is

operated at least “substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling” or “[o]

ther buildings normally associated with uses permitted in

the zone,” and has no more than five on-site employees. ORS

215.448(1).

II. BACKGROUND

As described above, the dispute focuses on whether

the proposed bed and breakfast will satisfy the require-

ment of ORS 215.448 that it operate substantially within a

“dwelling.” The pertinent background facts are undisputed

for purposes of the issue before us.

Grange Hill owns property consisting of nearly 19

acres of high-value EFU land in Yamhill County, including

approximately 13 acres of vineyard. The property’s prior

owner had obtained county approval to build a “principal

dwelling customarily provided in conjunction with farm

use”—the county’s term for a type of use that the land

use statutes refer to as a “primary dwelling.” See Yamhill

County Zoning Ordinance (YCZO) 402.03 (providing that

a “[p]rincipal dwelling customarily provided in conjunction

with farm use on high-value farmland,” shall be permitted

in the county’s exclusive farm use district, subject to spec-

ified criteria); see also ORS 215.283(1) (providing that uses

permitted on land zoned for exclusive farm use include “pri-

mary or accessory dwellings and other buildings customar-

ily provided in conjunction with farm use”).

The prior owner also had sought, and obtained, a

conditional use permit to operate a nine-guestroom bed and

breakfast in the approved “principal farm dwelling.” That

previously approved application described the intended

structure as “a two-story, single-family dwelling containing

a dining area, living room, kitchen, one resident bedroom

suite, and nine guest bedrooms.” Friends of Yamhill County,

___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 8). After obtaining the

dwelling permit and the conditional use permit, but before

796 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

constructing the intended dwelling, the prior owners sold

the property to Grange Hill.

The transfer of the property to Grange Hill trans-

ferred the permit to build a “principal farm dwelling cus-

tomarily provided in conjunction with farm use” on the

property, but it did not transfer the conditional use permit,

which expressly required any subsequent owner to seek new

approval for any home occupation. Accordingly, after pur-

chasing the property, Grange Hill submitted its own appli-

cation for a home occupation. As set out by the county, the

application sought approval to operate a bed and breakfast

with nine guestrooms “from a single-family dwelling, once it

has been built.”

The county described the design of the “proposed

single-family dwelling” as a structure having “ten bedrooms

with ensuite bathrooms,” each of which “can be accessed

from a shared heated hallway that shares common atmo-

sphere with the rest of the house.” In addition, the design

plans showed “[c]ommon areas and living space” with an

adjacent kitchen “next to an area marked as a common

space on the first floor.” Based on that description, the

county found that “[t]he structure meets the design stan-

dards for a single-family residence,” which it described as

“a building normally found in the” EFU zone. The county

thus determined that the proposed bed and breakfast met

the “dwelling” requirement for a home occupation. It also

determined that the proposal met the other statutory and

county-specific requirements for the requested conditional

use permit.

Friends appealed the county’s decision to LUBA,

challenging the county’s determination that Grange Hill’s

proposed bed and breakfast would meet the requirement of

ORS 215.448 that the home occupation operate “substan-

tially in” a “dwelling.” Friends raised several assignments of

error, including that the proposed “dwelling,” although pur-

portedly allowed in the EFU zone as a “primary dwelling

in conjunction with farm use,” would not qualify as a “pri-

mary dwelling” because it would not be “designed and used

as a home or primary residence for a farm operator.” Friends

also contended that the design of the proposed structure,

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 797

particularly the number of rooms devoted to lodging rooms,

made the structure a “hotel or motel” as a matter of law, nei-

ther of which is a dwelling or other building allowed in the

EFU zone.

LUBA agreed with some aspects of Friends’ argu-

ments, but it ultimately affirmed the county’s decision.

Friends of Yamhill County, ___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op

at 32). LUBA agreed that, in order to issue the original

approval for a primary dwelling “customarily provided in

conjunction with farm use,” the county needed to determine

that the dwelling would be “occupied by a person or persons”

involved in the farm operation, citing OAR 660-033-0135(4)

(c).2 Id. at ___ (slip op at 10-11). But LUBA concluded that the

occupancy determination was an initial—not an ongoing—

requirement, and that it was not pertinent to whether the

structure qualified as a “dwelling” within which the home

occupation must operate under ORS 215.448. Id. LUBA

emphasized that the county had found that the structure

“meets the design standards” for a single-family residence

and would be used as a residence for the innkeeper, which

LUBA described as “consistent with the term ‘dwelling,’ ” and

LUBA affirmed those findings. Friends of Yamhill County,

___ Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 14-15). Thus, LUBA reasoned

that the county had not erred in concluding that Grange

Hill’s application to operate a bed-and-breakfast home occu-

pation satisfied the “dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448.

Id. at ___ (slip op at 16).

The Court of Appeals reversed. The court described

the key inquiry as “whether the proposed structure is pri-

marily dedicated as a dwelling for the use of a farm family,

or whether it is a motel, primarily dedicated to the lodging

of guests or tourist[s].” Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill

County, 325 Or App 282, 289, 529 P3d 1007 (2023). The court

then answered that inquiry by concluding that “the design

features of the proposed structure as a whole are those of a

motel, for transient lodging” and, thus, that “the proposed

2

LUBA cited OAR 660-033-0135(4)(c), which refers to occupancy by “a per-

son or persons who produced the commodities[.]” Friends of Yamhill County, ___

Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 11). But it also accepted Friends’ premise that a pri-

mary residence must be occupied by a “farm operator.” Id. at ___ (slip op at 12).

798 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

structure is not itself a ‘dwelling’ ” under ORS 215.283. Id. at

294-95. According to the court

“[t]he statutory scheme makes clear that the entire struc-

ture—not merely a portion of it—must be a farm dwelling

that provides a home occupied by a group of people sharing

a household—not by individuals and groups who share no

social or legal relationship—on a long-term or permanent

basis—not in a transitory way.”

Id. at 295 (emphasis in Friends of Yamhill County, internal

quotation marks omitted). The court added that “the struc-

ture within which the bed and breakfast inn exists must

be, first, a dwelling.” Id. at 295. Grange Hill sought review,

which this court allowed.

In arguments on review, Grange Hill contends that

the Court of Appeals’ conclusion—that, as a matter of law,

the structure at issue here is not a “dwelling”—miscon-

strues the “dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448. Grange

Hill primarily argues that the plain meaning of “dwelling”

is “a home occupied by a person as their household or by

a group of people sharing a household.” (Emphasis added.)

Thus, according to Grange Hill, the only pertinent ques-

tion regarding the “home occupation” permit is whether the

structure will serve as a home for someone. It emphasizes—

as did LUBA—that the structure will be a home for the

“innkeeper” of the bed and breakfast and that the structure

will have some characteristics commonly associated with

dwellings, such as bathrooms, a kitchen, and bedrooms con-

nected to a common living space. “That alone is sufficient,”

Grange Hill contends, to satisfy the “dwelling” requirement

of ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A).

Friends, on the other hand, contends that LUBA

erred in construing the “dwelling” requirement, although

Friends does not embrace the Court of Appeals’ focus on

whether the “entire structure” will be used as a home.

Rather, Friends faults LUBA for having adopted a construc-

tion of the “dwelling” requirement that “allows an applicant

to build any type of building so long as the building is capable

of being used in whole or in part as a home.” Friends reiter-

ates the arguments that LUBA rejected, including that ORS

215.448 requires a “dwelling” that is “customarily provided

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 799

in conjunction with farm use” and that a structure purport-

ing to satisfy the requirement as a “primary dwelling cus-

tomarily provided in conjunction with farm use” must be a

dwelling that is designed and used as a residence for a per-

son who operates the farm. Friends also contends that the

county’s approval of a nine-guestroom bed and breakfast is

inconsistent with the legislature’s declared priority for pre-

serving farmland for agricultural use. See ORS 215.243

(declaring that “[t]he preservation of a maximum amount of

the limited supply of agricultural land is necessary to the

conservation of the state’s economic resources” and that, for

a variety of reasons, “[e]xpansion of urban development into

rural areas is a matter of public concern”).

III. DISCUSSION

As indicated above, the only home occupation

requirement in dispute in this court is the requirement

in ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A) that the proposed bed and break-

fast “shall be operated substantially in * * * [t]he dwelling.”

Whether the Court of Appeals, or LUBA, correctly construed

that requirement presents a question of statutory construc-

tion that we resolve by employing the analytical framework

described in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or

606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), and modified in State v. Gaines,

346 Or 160, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). Under that framework, we

examine the text of the statute in context, as well as any

helpful legislative history, all with the “paramount goal” of

determining the intent of the legislature that enacted the

disputed provision. Gaines, 346 Or at 171-72.

As we will explain, the statutory text, context, and

legislative history persuade us that the legislature intended

the “dwelling” required under ORS 215.448 to mean a struc-

ture that satisfies the requirements for a particular cate-

gory of “dwelling” that the land use laws allow as of right in

the zone. Here, the only identified category of allowed dwell-

ing is a “primary dwelling in conjunction with farm use,”

and, as we will explain, the legislature intended such dwell-

ings to mean a farm operator’s home. Because LUBA con-

cluded that Grange Hill could satisfy the “dwelling” require-

ment of ORS 215.448 without proof that the proposed home

occupation will operate in a structure that satisfies the

800 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

requirements for the “primary dwelling” that the structure

purports to be, we conclude that LUBA based its decision on

an incorrect interpretation of the statute.

A. The Meaning of the “Dwelling” in ORS 215.448

The term “dwelling” is not defined in the land use

statutes, and the arguments of the parties, as well as the

decisions of LUBA and the Court of Appeals, present a spec-

trum of competing interpretations. We begin with the con-

struction arrived at by the Court of Appeals, under which

the proposed structure is—as a matter of law—not a “dwell-

ing,” because that is the conclusion that Grange Hill chal-

lenges on review.

As described above, the Court of Appeals concluded

that “the proposed structure is not a ‘dwelling’ ” under the

land use laws “for which a ‘home occupation’ can be autho-

rized” and, thus, that LUBA’s affirmance of the conditional

use permit “is unlawful in substance.” Friends of Yamhill

County, 325 Or at 292.

Grange Hill contends that, in concluding as a matter

of law that the proposed structure is not a “dwelling” under

the land use laws, the Court of Appeals erroneously added

limitations to the meaning of “dwelling” in ORS 215.448

that go beyond the meaning that the legislature intended.

Grange Hill primarily argues that the legislature intended

the “dwelling” requirement in ORS 215.448 to mean only

that the structure is “a home occupied by a person as their

household or by a group of people sharing a household.” It

insists that questions about whether the proposed structure

qualifies as a “dwelling” are addressed through other aspects

of the land use permitting processes that govern whether

the structure can be built, and it contends that questions

about whether the structure can be built are not at issue in

this challenge to the conditional use permit. Emphasizing

the county’s findings that there is no dispute that the pro-

posed structure will be a home for the “innkeeper” of the bed

and breakfast, and that the structure will have characteris-

tics commonly associated with dwellings, i.e., bathrooms, a

kitchen, and bedrooms connected to a common living space,

Grange Hill contends that LUBA correctly affirmed the

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 801

county’s determination that the proposed home occupation

will operate substantially in a “dwelling.”

Although we ultimately agree with Grange Hill

that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the pro-

posed structure as a matter of law is not a “dwelling,” we

are not persuaded by Grange Hill’s argument that the legis-

lature intended the “dwelling” required by ORS 215.448 to

mean any structure that is occupied by at least one person

as their household. Instead, we conclude that the legislature

intended the “dwelling” requirement in ORS 215.448 to be

met only by a structure that satisfies the requirements for a

category of dwelling that may be established as of right on

the property.

1. Text and context

To aid our analysis of what the legislature intended

the “dwelling” requirement to mean, we set out the text of

that requirement in the broader statutory context:

“(1) he governing body of a county or its designate

may allow, subject to the approval of the governing body or

its designate, the establishment of a home occupation and

the parking of vehicles in any zone. However, in an exclu-

sive farm use zone, forest zone or a mixed farm and forest

zone that allows residential uses, the following standards

apply to the home occupation:

“(a) It shall be operated by a resident or employee of a

resident of the property on which the business is located;

“(b) It shall employ on the site no more than five full-

time or part-time persons;

“(c) It shall be operated substantially in:

“(A) The dwelling; or

“(B) Other buildings normally associated with uses

permitted in the zone in which the property is located; and

“(d) It shall not unreasonably interfere with other uses

permitted in the zone in which the property is located.

“(2) The governing body of the county or its designate

may establish additional reasonable conditions of approval

for the establishment of a home occupation under subsec-

tion (1) of this section.

802 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

“(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the governing

body or its designate to permit construction of any struc-

ture that would not otherwise be allowed in the zone in

which the home occupation is to be established.

“(4) The existence of home occupations shall not be

used as justification for a zone change.”

ORS 215.448 (emphases added).

According to Grange Hill, “dwelling” is a term of

common usage, meaning a structure that a person uses

as a home, and we should presume that the legislature

intended the term to have its ordinary meaning. See Brown

v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 372 Or 225, 231, 548 P3d 817

(2024) (explaining the “common usage” general presump-

tion and exceptions); Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary

706 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining “dwelling” as referring

to “a building or construction used for residence”); id. at

1931 (defining “residence” as referring to “a temporary or

permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one

intends to return as distinguished from a place of temporary

sojourn or transient visit” and “a building used as a home”).

Pointing to the structure of ORS 215.448(1)(c),

Grange Hill contends that the legislature intentionally did

not further limit the “dwellings” in which a home occupation

may operate. ORS 215.448(1)(c)(B)—the “[o]ther buildings”

provision—includes the qualifying phrase “normally associ-

ated with uses permitted in the zone in which the property

is located”:

“[The home occupation] shall be operated substantially

in:

“(A) The dwelling; or

“(B) Other buildings normally associated with uses

permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”

ORS 215.448(1)(c). And Grange Hill urges us to under-

stand that the legislature failed to similarly qualify the

term “dwelling” in subparagraph A because the legislature

wanted “dwelling” to remain unqualified.

Although we have sometimes concluded that the leg-

islature’s failure to qualify a statutory term means “that the

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 803

legislature intended that provision to be read in an expan-

sive sense,” we have also emphasized that there can be mul-

tiple reasons for the legislature to omit a limiting phrase

from one part a statute. See Lake Oswego Preservation

Society, 360 Or at 129-30 (explaining that, “[w]hereas the

absence of narrowing language in [a statute] could mean

that the legislature intended that provision to be read in an

expansive sense, an equally plausible inference is that the

omission means nothing at all, except that the legislature

did not perceive the need to clarify its intent”). Here, text

and context persuade us that the legislature intended the

“dwelling” to which ORS 215.448(1)(c)(A) refers to mean a

“dwelling” that is “normally associated with uses permitted

in the zone in which the property is located.” The legisla-

ture’s failure to separately include the requirement in ORS

215.448(1)(c)(A) “means nothing at all, except that the legis-

lature did not perceive the need to clarify its intent” in that

way. Lake Oswego Preservation Society, 360 Or at 129-30.

Three aspects of the statutory text and context

point to that conclusion. First, the “substantially in * * * [t]

he dwelling” requirement of ORS 215.448 applies to home

occupations located in “an exclusive farm use zone, forest

zone or a mixed farm and forest zone that allows residential

use.” And in each of those zones, the land use laws limit the

permissible types of “dwelling.” See ORS 215.283 (farm use);

ORS 215.720 - ORS 215.757 (forest use). Second, regardless

of whether a home occupation is located within a dwelling

or other building, the legislature has specified that the

approval of a home occupation does not authorize “construc-

tion of any structure that would not otherwise be allowed in

the zone.” ORS 215.448(3). Third, the legislature has speci-

fied that home occupations “shall not be used as justification

for a zone change.” ORS 215.448(4). Together, those provi-

sions suggest that the legislature intended to require that

a home occupation would be conditionally permitted only if

it will operate substantially within a structure—dwelling

or other building—that the land use laws normally allow in

the zone in which the property is located.

That meaning, in turn, points to a legislative intent

that the “dwelling” requirement incorporates the land use

804 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

laws and regulations that govern whether a proposed struc-

ture qualifies as a “dwelling” allowed on property in the par-

ticular zone. And when the structure is in any area zoned

for exclusive farm use, the categories of dwelling normally

allowed, or allowed “as of right,” are limited to dwellings

that facilitate the farming operation: “primary or accessory

dwellings * * * customarily provided in conjunction with

farm use,” ORS 215.283(1)(e), and a “dwelling” that “is occu-

pied by a relative of the farm operator or the farm operator’s

spouse” if “the farm operator does or will require the assis-

tance of the relative in the management of the farm use,”

ORS 215.283(1)(d). In other words, it is not enough that the

structure will be occupied by “a person as their household.”

We thus disagree with Grange Hill’s primary argument for

reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

We nevertheless agree with Grange Hill that the

Court of Appeals erred in concluding, as a matter of law,

that the proposed structure is not a “dwelling.” In explaining

its conclusion that “the proposed structure is not a ‘dwell-

ing’ ” under the land use laws, the court did not articulate

a specific construction of “dwelling,” but it stated that “[t]

he statutory scheme makes clear that the entire structure—

not merely a portion of it—must be a farm dwelling that

provides a ‘home [is] occupied by a group of people sharing

a household—not by individuals and groups who share no

social or legal relationship—on a long-term or permanent

basis—not in a transitory way.’ ” Friends of Yamhill County,

325 Or App at 295 (quoting 1000 Friends of Oregon v.

Clackamas County, 320 Or App 444, 453, 514 P3d 553 (2022))

(emphasis in original);3 see also Webster’s at 1082 (defining

“home” as “the house and grounds with their appurtenances

habitually occupied by a family : one’s principal place of resi-

dence : domicile”). The court also characterized the ultimate

inquiry as whether the structure is “primarily dedicated” as

a “dwelling” or a “motel,” id. at 289, and it concluded that

“the design features of the proposed structure as a whole are

those of a motel, for transient lodging,” id. at 294. Because

3

The court in 1000 Friends of Oregon defined a “home” for the purposes of

explaining why the allowance under ORS 215.283 of “dwellings” did not implic-

itly include allowance of “the short-term rental use of dwellings.” 320 Or App at

459.

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 805

the court decided the “dwelling” question as a matter of law,

we understand the court to have concluded that those lim-

itations are part of the statutory requirements for a “dwell-

ing” under ORS 215.448.

Text and context do not suggest, however, that the

legislature intended the term “dwelling” to incorporate a

requirement that the “entire structure” will be used as a home

for long-term residents or to exclude every structure that can

be said to have design features of a motel in addition to the

design features of a single-family residence. As indicated, the

land use statutes contain no definition of “dwelling,” and the

plain meaning of the term adds little except to suggest that

a structure qualifying as a “dwelling” must be used by some-

one as their residence or home. See Webster’s at 706 (defining

“dwelling” as referring to “a building or construction used for

residence”); id. at 1931 (defining “residence” as “a building

used as a home” and dwelling place “to which one intends to

return as distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn

or transient visit”). Although we have concluded from the

broader statutory context that the legislature intended the

“dwelling” requirement to incorporate other provisions of the

land use laws that define the categories of dwelling normally

allow in the zone in which the property is located, those pro-

visions do not limit the number of bedrooms or bathrooms

that the dwelling may include. Nor do they preclude a res-

ident who meets the requirements for a “home occupation”

conditional use permit from using many of those bedrooms to

operate a bed and breakfast, or other home business.4

Indeed, adding such limitations to the meaning of

the “dwelling” in which the home occupation may operate

would create tension with the type of small businesses that

the legislature intended to allow as “home occupations.”

The conditions that the legislature has imposed for a home

occupation allow a resident—or employee of the resident—to

operate a home business large enough to employ up to five

4

Friends has argued that a bed and breakfast facility with more than five

guest rooms must be considered a “hotel or motel” because that is how the state

building code’s structural specialty code (OSSC) classifies such occupancies.

OSSC 310.2; OSSC 310.4. The Court of Appeals reasoned that those code stan-

dards are relevant to the nature of a structure but not dispositive of whether the

structure is a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448, and we agree.

806 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

persons full-time and to operate the business “substantially

in” a structure that qualifies as a “dwelling.” ORS 215.448(1)

(a), (b). In combination, those conditions suggest that the

legislature contemplated that a building can qualify as a

“dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448 even when a resi-

dent is operating a home occupation large enough to occupy

a substantial portion—if not a majority—of the space in the

“dwelling,” compared to the space reserved for the resident.

Moreover, a limitation that precluded a struc-

ture from qualifying as a “dwelling” under ORS 215.448 if

part of the structure is used for transient lodgers would be

incompatible with newer land use provisions that expressly

contemplate that a bed and breakfast is one type of home

occupation that may be approved for EFU land. See ORS

215.452(13) (specifying the scale of meal service at “a bed

and breakfast facility” that “is sited as a home occupation on

the same tract as a winery”); ORS 215.453(12) (same); ORS

215.449(10) (same for farm breweries); ORS 215.451(10) (same

for cider businesses). Those newer provisions have effect only

if it is possible for a “bed and breakfast facility” to satisfy

the “dwelling” requirement for a home occupation, and that

informs our understanding that the “dwelling” requirement

can be satisfied even if the dwelling will be occupied at least

in part by transient lodgers. See, e.g., State v. Ofodrinwa, 353

Or 507, 529, 300 P3d 154 (2013) (describing limited circum-

stances under which later legislative enactments can inform

the meaning of related, earlier-adopted provisions).

In short, given the multiple indications that the leg-

islature contemplated home occupations—including bed-and-

breakfast facilities—that would prevent the resident from

continuing to use the “entire structure” as a home for long-

term residents, text and context do not persuade us that the

legislature intended to condition home occupations on proof

that the “entire structure” remain a home for long-term res-

idents. That is, we do not understand the legislature to have

intended to preclude some portion of a residence from being

used for commercial purposes, as opposed to residential pur-

poses, if the requirements for a home occupation are met.

Nor are we persuaded that the legislature intended

to preclude a structure from being a “dwelling” if it has some

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 807

characteristics of another type of building. We understand

the Court of Appeals’ concern that this structure purporting

to be a “primary dwelling” also has design characteristics

of a “motel,” which is not a category of building allowed in

an EFU zone. But the county found that the same proposed

structure meets the design characteristics of a single-family

residence, and LUBA affirmed that finding. There undoubt-

edly will be structures that seemingly straddle the design

standards for two categories of building—whether it is a

structure that meets the design standards of a single-family

residence but also has nine bedrooms with en suite bathrooms

or a structure that meets the design standards of a single-

family residence but includes an enormous “home theater”

space. When that is the case, the county and LUBA must

determine whether the structure is a “dwelling,” and the fact

that the structure might have characteristics consistent with

a single-family dwelling is not dispositive. But the fact that

the structure has some characteristics of a motel is not dis-

positive either. Thus, to the extent that the Court of Appeals

concluded that a structure that has some characteristics of a

motel cannot be a dwelling, as a matter of law, we disagree.5

2. Legislative history

Those conclusions are consistent with legislative

history, which reflects a general intent to protect agricul-

tural land in an EFU zone while also allowing counties to

authorize home occupations—including bed and breakfast

facilities—subject to limitations imposed by state statutes

and any applicable county ordinances—including that they

5

Because we resolve this case on the basis of LUBA’s erroneous conclusion

that the structure at issue can qualify as a “dwelling” under ORS 215.448 with-

out satisfying the requirements for the “primary dwelling” the structure pur-

ports to be—here, without satisfying the requirement that the structure be occu-

pied by a farm operator—we need not, and do not, address when, as a matter of

law, a structure that has the characteristics of both a single-family residence and

another type of structure is a “dwelling.”

We note, however, that a “dwelling” sharing the design characteristics of a

category of building that is not allowed as of right in the zone might struggle to

satisfy other requirements of ORS 215.448 that give effect to the legislature’s

goal of preserving Oregon’s agricultural economy, including that the home occu-

pation “shall not unreasonably interfere with other uses permitted” in the EFU

zone and that the home occupation process does not authorize “construction of

any structure that would not otherwise be allowed in the zone.” ORS 215.448(1)

(B)(d), (3).

808 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

operate substantially within structures that are allowed in

the zone. “Home occupations” were first permitted in EFU

zones as a conditional “nonfarm” use in 1977, Or Laws 1977,

ch 788, § 2, and specific conditions on the approval of “home

occupations” followed, with the enactment of what became

ORS 215.448 in 1983, Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.6

The 1983 law included an earlier version of the cur-

rent “dwelling” requirement. Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.

The 1983 enactment was the result of the passage of House

Bill (HB) 2625, a bill intended to address concerns about

“cottage industries” in rural areas. Tape Recording, House

Committee on Environment and Energy, HB 2625, Apr 27,

1983, Tape 174, Side A (statement of Rep Verner Anderson).

Proponents of the bill explained that small businesses were

operating in rural areas and that it would be beneficial to

both recognize and regulate them. Tape Recording, Senate

Committee on Energy and Environment, HB 2625, June 27,

1983, Tape 187, Side A. They explained that the businesses

were often just starting out and lacked the capital to rent a

storefront or locate in an industrial park. Tape Recording,

House Committee on Environment and Energy, HB 2625,

Apr 27, 1983, Tape 174, Side A (statement of Rep Peg Jolin).

They articulated their expectation that, when the busi-

nesses grew, they would relocate to industrial areas. Tape

Recording, Senate Committee on Energy and Environment,

HB 2625, June 27, 1983, Tape 186, Side A (testimony of

Manager of the Roseburg Area Chamber of Commerce

Charles Adams).

Legislators expressed concerns about the con-

struction of structures specifically for the businesses. Tape

Recording, House Committee on Environment and Energy,

HB 2625, May 20, 1983, Tape 212, Side B (statement of

Committee Staff Beth Samson). In response, the committee

removed a provision from the originally introduced bill that

would have allowed home occupations to be operated in “[b]

6

The 1977 legislature amended ORS 215.213 to authorize the approval of

“[h]ome occupations carried on by the resident as an accessory use within their

dwelling” as a conditional “nonfarm” use in any area zoned for exclusive farm

use. Or Laws 1977, ch 788, § 2. And the 1983 legislature adopted a list of condi-

tions for approval of “home occupations,” which were codified as ORS 215.448(1)

(1983). Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2.

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 809

uildings constructed for the purpose of operating the home

occupation if the buildings are similar in appearance and

size to buildings normally associated with uses permitted in

the zone in which the property is located.” HB 2625, A-eng

(1983). It was explained that the provision was removed to

address concerns “that buildings would be specifically con-

structed in order to start these industries in EFU zones.”

Tape Recording, House Committee on Environment and

Energy, HB 2625, May 20, 1983, Tape 212, Side B (statement

of Committee Staff Beth Samson); see also Tape Recording,

Senate Committee on Energy and Environment, HB 2625,

June 27, 1983, Tape 186, Side A (testimony of Manager of

Roseburg Area Chamber of Commerce Charles Adams)

(explaining intent was to use existing structures).

In addition, the legislature added the provision

that became ORS 215.448(3), which specifies that nothing

about the process for allowing home occupations authorizes

the “construction of any structure that would not otherwise

be allowed in the zone in which the home occupation is to

be established.” Or Laws 1983, ch 743, § 2. Senator John

Kitzhaber, a proponent of the bill, stated that the provision

was intended to address “the concern that was raised about

the building [of] new structures specifically for this pur-

pose.” Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Energy and

Environment, HB 2625, June 30, 1983, Tape 198, Side A

(statement of Sen John Kitzhaber). He also explained that

he was aware of concerns about potential conflicts between

farm and nonfarm uses and that was why he had been “so

interested in clarifying the language,” stating that “the

activity has to be carried out in buildings normally associ-

ated with the uses permitted in that zone.” Id.

Later legislative history reflects concern with what

advocates viewed as overly restrictive decisions regard-

ing home occupations. The text currently set out at ORS

215.448(1) is the product of legislative amendments in 1995,

through House Bill (HB) 2561. Or Laws 1995, ch 465, § 1.

HB 2561 amended ORS 215.448 in four main ways. First,

it provided that a home occupation could be operated by

the resident’s employee, expanding the concept of a home

occupation beyond a business operated by a resident of the

810 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

property. Or Laws 1995, ch 465, § 1. Second, it specified that

the five-employee limit was for on-site employees, expand-

ing the size of business that could be a home occupation. Id.

Third, it modified what had been a requirement that home

occupations operate “in” a dwelling or other building nor-

mally associated with uses permitted in the zone, allowing

home occupations that operate “substantially in” those loca-

tions. Id. Fourth, it modified what had been a requirement

that a home occupation “not interfere” with other uses per-

mitted in the zone, requiring instead that a home occupa-

tion “not unreasonably interfere” with those uses. Id.

The legislative history indicates that legislators in

1995 were reacting to permit denials by county boards of

directors, LUBA, and the Court of Appeals that proponents

viewed as applying an overly restrictive construction of the

home occupation requirements, including a decision by the

Columbia County Board of Commissioners to reject a home

occupation request for a bed and breakfast because the guests

would be allowed to walk on the owner’s property. Exhibit

E, House Natural Resources Committee, Subcommittee on

Environment and Energy, HB 2561, Mar 10, 1995 (writ-

ten testimony of Attorney Robert VanNatta). Although the

initial bill proposed a limited amendment to permit activ-

ities such as parking vehicles at home occupations, at an

early hearing, an attorney practicing land use law, Robert

VanNatta, also specifically reported that restrictive text in

ORS 215.448 had defeated car repair, daycare center, car

repossession, and bed-and-breakfast home occupations.

Id. And the subcommittee chair encouraged advocates to

work with the Association of Oregon Counties (AOC) to

“make whatever appropriate amendments you feel need to

be made to this whole concept of home occupations and not

just deal with the vehicles.” Tape Recording, House Natural

Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Environment and

Energy, HB 2561, Mar 10, 1995, Tape 30, Side B. Those

amendments added the new provisions, described above,

that somewhat expanded the operations that counties could

approve as “home occupations.”

The legislative history confirms our conclusion,

based on the text and context, that the legislature intended

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 811

to allow home occupations—including bed and breakfasts—

to operate in a “dwelling” allowed as of right in the zone, even

if the home occupation itself prevents the “entire structure”

from being used as a home. It also confirms our conclusion

that the legislature intended the “dwelling” requirement to

incorporate the land use laws and regulations that govern

whether a proposed structure meets the requirements for a

category of “dwelling” that is normally allowed on property

in the particular zone. Because Grange Hill, the county, and

LUBA all have identified the relevant dwelling category in

this case as a “primary dwelling,” we turn to the land use

requirements for that category of dwelling.

B. The Meaning of a “Primary Dwelling” in an Exclusive

Farm Use Zone

Although the land use laws do not include an

express definition for a “primary” dwelling “customarily pro-

vided in conjunction with farm use,” several limitations are

clear from context. Collectively, those limitations point to the

“primary dwelling” on EFU land as meaning, among other

requirements, a structure that is the home of a “farm opera-

tor.”7 First, the term “farm use” is defined to mean “the cur-

rent employment of land for the primary purpose of obtain-

ing a profit in money by * * * agricultural or horticultural

use or animal husbandry or any combination thereof.” ORS

215.203(2)(a).8 The primary “dwelling” provided in conjunc-

tion with such use suggests the structure occupied as a home

by the person primarily engaged in that use of the land.

7

Neither this court nor the Court of Appeals has had an occasion to construe

the meaning of the term “farm operator,” as used in ORS 215.283, and the issue

is not argued by the parties in this case. But LUBA has concluded that the mean-

ing of the term “farm operator” is informed by OAR 660-033-0130(9), which—for

purposes of an allowed dwelling for a relative of the farm operator—defines a

“farm operator” as the “ ‘person who operates a farm, doing the work and making

the day-to-day decisions about such things as planting, harvesting, feeding and

marketing.’ ” Richards v. Jefferson County, 79 Or LUBA 171, 180 (2019); see also

Kenagy v. Benton County, 22 Or LUBA 356, 358 (1991) (looking to the common

meaning of “operator” as found in Webster’s, which includes “[o]ne that produces

a physical effect or engages himself in the mechanical aspect of any process or

activity”).

8

ORS 215.203(2)(a) lists specific examples of “farm use” activities of “raising,

harvesting and selling crops or the feeding, breeding, management and sale of, or

the produce of, livestock, poultry, fur-bearing animals or honeybees or for dairy-

ing and the sale of dairy products[.]”

812 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

Second, context indicates that, in contrast to “acces-

sory dwellings,” “primary dwellings” are occupied by the

“farm operator.” With respect to “accessory dwellings” that

are “customarily provided in conjunction with farm uses,”

the legislature has indicated that such a dwelling may be

established when “needed to provide opportunities for farm-

worker housing for individuals primarily engaged in farm

use whose assistance in the management of the farm is or

will be required by the farm operator on the farm unit.” ORS

215.278. And the limitations on a dwelling “occupied by a rel-

ative” similarly emphasize the connection to the farm opera-

tor. Such dwellings are permitted only if they will be “occu-

pied by a relative of the farm operator or the farm operator’s

spouse,” only “if the farm operator does or will require the

assistance of the relative in the management of the farm use,”

and only if located “on the same lot or parcel as the dwelling

of the farm operator.” ORS 215.283(1)(d). We thus agree with

Friends’ premise that a structure allowed on EFU land as a

“primary dwelling” means a farm operator’s home.

C. Both the Court of Appeals and LUBA Incorrectly

Construed the “Dwelling” Requirement.

As we have explained, we are not persuaded that the

Court of Appeals correctly construed the “dwelling” require-

ment in ORS 215.448 to mean that the “entire structure”

must be used for long-term residents or that the structure

must not have any of the design characteristics of a building

that is not allowed in the zone. To that extent, we disagree

with the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals

that LUBA incorrectly construed the meaning of “dwelling,”

because we have concluded that the legislature intended the

“dwelling” requirement under ORS 215.448 to mean a struc-

ture that satisfies the requirements for a category of dwell-

ing that the land use laws allow as of right on property in the

zone. Those laws limit the categories of dwelling allowed on

EFU land to “primary or accessory dwellings * * * customar-

ily provided in conjunction with farm use,” ORS 215.283(1)

(e), and a “dwelling” that “is occupied by a relative of the

farm operator or the farm operator’s spouse” if “the farm

operator does or will require the assistance of the relative in

Cite as 373 Or 790 (2025) 813

the management of the farm use.” ORS 215.283(1)(d). And

the only category of dwelling that has been identified in this

case is a “primary dwelling.”

Although LUBA recognized that, as we have

explained, a “primary dwelling” means a farm operator’s

home, it dismissed as irrelevant that key requirement that

defines a “primary dwelling.” Friends of Yamhill County, ___

Or LUBA at ___ (slip op at 11). LUBA reasoned that the

requirement does not continue once the county has approved

construction of a “primary dwelling” and, thus, that the

requirement does not govern whether the proposed struc-

ture qualifies as a “dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.448.

Id. at ___ (slip op at 11-12).

Even if LUBA’s premise is correct, however, its con-

clusion does not follow. A home occupation is a conditional

use under the land use laws that requires its own applica-

tion and approval process. See ORS 215.448 (describing the

approval conditions). One of the conditions for approval is

that the home occupation “shall be operated substantially

in” a “dwelling” or other building “normally associated with

uses permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”

ORS 215.448(1)(c). For the reasons explained above, we are

persuaded that the legislature intended to require, as a con-

dition for approval of a “home occupation,” that the occu-

pation will operate substantially in a structure that meets

the land use requirements for at least one category of struc-

ture allowed in the zone. Thus, it is the new conditional use

permit, not the original dwelling approval, that makes it

essential for the structure to meet the requirements for a

“dwelling” or other building “normally associated with uses

permitted in the zone in which the property is located.”9

9

The Court of Appeals observed that “it does not appear that the proposed

structure could qualify as a ‘primary dwelling,’ because the record does not indi-

cate whether the ‘resident’ would be the person who manages the vineyard,” but

it did not decide the case on that basis, because neither party pointed to the “farm

operator” requirement in briefing to the Court of Appeals. Friends of Yamhill

County, 325 Or at 292. But that meaning of “primary dwelling” is argued by

Friends in the briefing in this court, it was discussed at oral argument, and it

was an argument below that LUBA expressly addressed. Moreover, this court

has “an independent duty to correctly interpret any statute that comes before us,

regardless of the arguments and interpretations offered by the parties.” Strasser

v. State of Oregon, 368 Or 238, 260, 489 P3d 1025 (2021).

814 Friends of Yamhill County v. Yamhill County

IV. CONCLUSION

On judicial review of a LUBA decision, the appel-

late court may reverse or remand a LUBA order if the order

is “unlawful in substance or procedure.” ORS 197.850(9)

(a); see Craven v. Jackson County, 308 Or 281, 283, 779 P2d

1011 (1989) (describing the statutory standard for judicial

review by the Court of Appeals as applicable to review in

this court as well). Although we agree with the Court of

Appeals that LUBA’s order was unlawful in substance, we

disagree with that court’s reasons for concluding that the

proposed structure, as a matter of law, is not a dwelling.

Instead, we conclude that LUBA erred for a different reason.

Based on our analysis of text, context, and legislative his-

tory, we have concluded that the “dwelling” for purposes of

the home occupation statute must satisfy the requirements

for a category of “dwelling” that the land use laws allow in

the zone. Because LUBA concluded otherwise, its decision

to affirm the home occupation permit in this case was based

on an incorrect construction of ORS 215.448 and, thus, was

unlawful in substance. Accordingly, we reverse and remand

the case to LUBA to consider Friends’ challenge to the coun-

ty’s approval of the conditional use permit under the stan-

dards articulated in this opinion.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in

part and reversed in part. The order of the Land Use Board

of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Land

Use Board of Appeals for further proceedings.