Jenkins v. Centurion Health Care Services

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

ERIC T. JENKINS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:24-cv-02498-SHM-tmp

)

CENTURION HEALTHCARE SERVICES, )

ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING THE CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT (ECF NOS. 1, 7, 10, 11 &

12); GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND THE CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE; DENYING REQUESTS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF (ECF NOS. 6 & 9);

DENYING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 8) AND DIRECTING

CLERK TO MODIFY THE DOCKET

_____________________________________________________________________________

On July 15, 2024, Plaintiff, Eric T. Jenkins, Tennessee Department of Corrections

(“TDOC”) prisoner number 627290, filed a pro se complaint (the “Complaint”) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1) and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3).

When Jenkins filed the Complaint, he was confined at the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (the

“WTSP”), in Henning, Tennessee. On July 30, 2024, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and assessed the three hundred and fifty dollar ($350.00) civil filing fee pursuant to the

Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No. 5 (the “IFP

Order”).) On September 9, 2024, Jenkins filed a motion for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 6.) On

September 25, 2024, Jenkins filed an amended complaint. (ECF No. 7.) On December 9, 2024,

Jenkins filed a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 8) and a motion for emergency injunctive

relief (ECF No. 9.) On March 12, 2025, Jenkins filed an attachment to amended complaint. (ECF

No. 10.) On March 25, 2025, Jenkins filed a second attachment to amended complaint (ECF No.

11.) On May 16, 2025, Jenkins filed a third attachment to complaint (ECF No. 12).

The Court CONSOLIDATES the Complaint (ECF No. 1), the amended complaint (ECF

No. 7), the attachment (ECF No. 10), the second attachment (ECF No. 11), and the third attachment

(ECF No. 12) as the “Consolidated Complaint” for the purpose of screening Jenkins’ claims

pursuant to the PLRA.

The Consolidated Complaint addresses Jenkins’ claims about his medical treatment during

his incarceration at WTSP. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 10, 11 & 12 at PageID 5-22, 62-63, 71-75, 82-84, 88-

210.) The majority of the Consolidated Complaint’s claims are based on events between January

2024 and March 2025. (See id.) The Consolidated Complaint is liberally construed to allege

claims of: (1) deprivation or denial of medical care; (2) failure to follow TDOC policy; and (3)

supplemental state law claims. (ECF Nos. 1, 7 & 10 at PageID 5-22, 62-63, 71-75.) Jenkins sues:

(1) Centurion Health Care Services (“Centurion”); (2) Alisa Hurdle, Centurion Nurse and

Healthcare Administrator; (3) Dr. Rich, Centurion Doctor at WTSP; (4) Dr. Nguyen, Centurion

Doctor at WTSP; (5) f/n/u Longmire, Centurion Nurse Practitioner; (6) April l/n/u, Centurion

Nurse (collectively, the “Centurion Defendants”); (7) TDOC; (8) L. R. Thomas, TDOC Assistant

Commissioner; and (9) WTSP Warden Fitz (collectively, the “TDOC Defendants”). (ECF Nos. 1

& 7 at PageID 1, 4, 62.) Jenkins sues all individual Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF

Nos. 10 & 11 at PageID 73, 84.) Jenkins seeks: (1) an injunction ordering TDOC to determine

and treat the cause of Jenkins’ abdominal pain and heart condition; (2) punitive damages in the

amount of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00) for his pain and suffering; (3)

damages for his physical pain in the amount one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000.00);

(4) damages for his mental anguish in the amount of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars

($150,000.00); and (5) for Centurion to pay “all costs of [t]his [l]awsuit[,]” and to send Jenkins to

an “outside [h]ospital for appropriate diagnosis and treatment.” (ECF Nos. 1, 7 10, & 11 at PageID

6, 63, 73, 84.)

The Consolidated Complaint (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 10, 11 & 12) is before the Court. For the

reasons explained below, the Court: (1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Consolidated Complaint WITH

PREJUDICE in part AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part for failure to state a claim to relief

against Defendants; (2) GRANTS leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice; (3)

DENIES motions for injunctive relief; (4) DENIES motion for default judgment; (5) DECLINES

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims; and (6) DIRECTS the Clerk to modify

the docket.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes Jenkins’ allegations are true for the purpose of screening the

Consolidated Complaint. In January 2024, Jenkins alleges he began complaining about abdominal

pain. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 5.) Jenkins alleges that the nursing staff employed by Centurion,

including nurse and healthcare administrator Alisha Hurdle, “refuse to send me to an outside

hospital per T.D.O.C. Policey (sic)” for diagnosis and treatment. (Id.) Jenkins alleges he has

“been complaining of pain for months[.]” (Id.) Jenkins alleges Defendants have given him Tums,

Fiber-Lax, omeprazole, naproxen and ibuprofen for his pain. (Id.) The source of Jenkins’ pain is

undetermined. (Id.) Jenkins alleges he suffers from heart “spasms” and “pangs”, but “these people

continue to give me the run around.” (Id.) Jenkins alleges he “forced the staff” to take him to an

outside hospital on March 30, 2024. (Id.) Jenkins alleges the source of his pain was not diagnosed.

(Id.) Jenkins alleges TDOC policy requires an inmate to be sent to an outside facility to relieve

his pain and suffering when the healthcare provider cannot treat the inmate “accordingly[.]” (Id.)

Jenkins alleges “these people refuse to aid me in determining the cause of this illness.”

(Id.) Jenkins alleges he has been denied access to qualified medical personnel to treat his heart

and abdomen issues. (Id.) Jenkins alleges the “medical staff” at WTSP are deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical need. (Id.) Jenkins alleges TDOC assistant commissioner L.R.

Thomas denied Jenkins’ grievance. (ECF No. 7 at PageID 62.) Jenkins alleges Drs. Rich and

Nguyen have denied him “further evaluation” and have not allowed Jenkins to be taken to outside

hospitals for an MRI or endoscopy. (Id.) Jenkins alleges WTSP Warden Fitz has told Jenkins it

is “not his problem, it’s a Centurion problem.” (Id.) Jenkins alleges Hurdle has denied Jenkins

medical treatment. (Id.) Jenkins alleges that nurse practitioner Longmire gave Jenkins a “minimal

evaluation[.]” (Id.) Jenkins alleges that Nurse April was argumentative. (Id.)

Jenkins alleges he has “been forced to live with excruciating abdominal pain since February

2024.” (Id.) Jenkins alleges his Tennessee and U.S. Constitutional rights have been violated by

Centurion’s failure to provide him adequate medical care. (ECF No. 10 at PageID 71.) Jenkins

alleges Centurion’s “knowing” and “deliberate” failure to provide adequate healthcare shows

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the

Tennessee constitution. (Id.) Jenkins alleges he has been to sick call for “this issue” more than

fifty times. (Id.) Jenkins alleges he was given a colonoscopy that revealed hemorrhoids in his

colon in August of 2024. (Id.) Jenkins alleges that the hemorrhoids were not the source of his

pain and that his pain continued. (Id.) Jenkins alleges Centurion’s Dr. Hodge saw him after the

colonoscopy and told Jenkins “there was basically nothing more he would do for me[]” and that

Jenkins would need to see a specialist. (Id. at PageID 71-72.) Jenkins alleges he was not “put in”

to see anyone else and that his pain continued. (Id. at PageID 72.)

Jenkins alleges he has a large, painful mass “at the center of my body” and that he is

experiencing pain in his lower extremities. (Id.) Jenkins alleges that none of the medications he

has been given have relieved the “source” of his pain. (Id.) On February 3, 2025, Jenkins alleges

he was seen via telehealth by an unnamed doctor who told Jenkins his medical issues would require

surgery. (Id.) On February 7, 2025, Jenkins alleges Hurdle lied when she told Jenkins that he had

been “put in” to see a surgeon, that TDOC Nashville had approved, and that a date had been

scheduled for Jenkins to see the surgeon. (Id.)

Jenkins alleges nurse practitioner Jaime Shoemaker told Jenkins on March 5, 2025, that he

was waiting on approval to be seen by a surgeon. (Id.) Jenkins alleges Drs. Rich, Hodge, and

Nuygen have denied Jenkins medical procedures necessary to determine Jenkins’ diagnosis in

violation of T.C.A. §§ 4-3-603 through 606.1 (Id.) Jenkins alleges Warden Fitz has knowledge of

and is responsible for WTSP inmates and has denied Jenkins appropriate healthcare. (Id.) Jenkins

alleges Warden Fitz’ conduct amounts to deliberate indifference to Jenkins’ serious medical

condition and violates Jenkins’ constitutional rights. (Id.) Jenkins alleges the five inmate

grievances he has filed about “this issue” have been “denied on all levels leading up to Asst. TDOC

Commissioner L. R. Thomas.” (Id. at PageID 73.)

Jenkins alleges Defendants’ actions amount to deliberate indifference to his serious

medical needs. (Id.) Jenkins alleges that he needs surgery. (Id.) Jenkins alleges that the

Defendants’ failure to follow TDOC policy has caused Jenkins to live in “continual excruciating

pain” from February 2024 to the present. (Id.)

1 See T.C.A. § 4-3-603 (Lexis Advance through the 2024 Regular Session); T.C.A. § 4-3-

604 (Lexis Advance through the 2024 Regular Session); T.C.A. § 4-3-606 (Lexis Advance through

the 2024 Regular Session); T.C.A. § 4-3-605 (Lexis Advance through the 2024 Regular Session)

(last accessed July 2, 2025.)

II. SCREENING

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of it, if

the complaint — (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In assessing whether the complaint states a claim

on which relief may be granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007), and in Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th

Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual

allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement

to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681).

The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and

all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

679. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides guidance on this issue. Rule 8 requires a

complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” It also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion,

of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. Courts screening cases accord more

deference to pro se complaints than to those drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held

‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be

liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th

Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415

F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to

comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a

plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518

F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Jenkins sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the “Constitution and

laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting under color of state

law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Additional Plaintiff

In Jenkins’ amended complaint, he seeks to add WTSP inmate Bobby Johnson as a plaintiff

“in this lawsuit[.]” (ECF No. 7 at PageID 62.) That request is DENIED. Jenkins cannot represent

other inmates. Johnson must file on his own behalf or hire counsel to do so. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to remove Bobby Johnson from the docket.

B. Claims Against The Centurion Defendants

Jenkins sues Centurion, the private corporation that provides healthcare services for

WTSP. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) Jenkins sues Centurion employees, Hurdle, April,

Longmire, and Drs. Rich, Nguyen, and Hodge in their official capacities. (See ECF Nos. 1, 7, 10

& 11 at PageID 4, 62, 72-73, 82-84.) The Clerk is DIRECTED to add Dr. Hodge as a Defendant.

Jenkins fails to state a claim to relief against Centurion or any of its employees in their official

capacities.

Jenkins’ official capacity claims against Rich, Nguyen, Hodge, April, Longmire, and

Hurdle are construed as claims against their employer – Centurion. See Jones v. Union Cnty.,

Tennessee, 296 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th

Cir. 1994)). See, e.g., Glenn v. Walker, No. 21-1013, 2021 WL 4269474, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.

20, 2021); Talley v. McKinney, No. 20-1118, 2021 WL 1254681, at *3 n.2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 5,

2021).

“A private corporation that performs the traditional state function of operating a prison acts

under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 F. App'x 748 (6th Cir.

2003) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit

applies the standards for assessing municipal liability to claims against private corporations that

operate prisons or provide medical care to prisoners. Id. at 748-49; Street, 102 F.3d at 817-

18. Centurion “cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Braswell v. Corr.

Corp. of Am., 419 Fed. Appx. 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011). To prevail on a § 1983 claim against

Centurion, Jenkins “must show that a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the

‘moving force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of Jenkins’ rights. See id.

Jenkins does not allege that any actions described in the Consolidated Complaint were

taken pursuant to a policy or custom of Centurion that was “the moving force” behind any violation

of Jenkins’ constitutional rights. Jenkins does not allege that the Defendants implemented an

unconstitutional policy of Centurion to deprive Jenkins of his constitutional rights. This

distinction is determinative for the purpose of analyzing the insufficiency of the Consolidated

Complaint’s factual allegations about Centurion. See Montgomery v. Conrad, No. 3:21-cv-0820,

2022 WL 509111, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2022) (“The Complaint does not allege that any

policy or custom of the … County caused the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; indeed,

he complains that his alleged harm was caused by the failure to follow [the alleged policies].

Generally, ‘[i]f employees aren’t following the policy, then the policy itself isn’t causing the

injury.’ Harvey v. Dart, No. 19-CV-2996, 2021 WL 4264312, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2021).

Accordingly, the Section 1983 claims against the … [municipal entity defendant] and its

employees in their official capacity cannot be allowed to proceed”); accord Richardson v. Webb,

No. 15-2537-JDT-cgc, 2016 WL 4532378, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 2016) (“[T]he third

amended complaint still fails to state a claim against [the municipal entity defendant]. While

[Plaintiff] ostensibly alleges that his injury was due to a policy or custom of these Defendants,

what he actually alleges is that his injuries are due to the Defendants’ failure to follow their

established policies. He does not allege that the policies themselves are unconstitutional”)

(emphasis in original). Jenkins does not allege that Centurion’s policies are unconstitutional, much

less that one of Centurion’s policies or customs was the moving force behind the alleged violations

of Jenkins’ constitutional rights. For the reasons explained above, Jenkins’ § 1983 claims against

Centurion and against Rich, Nguyen, Hodge, April, Longmire, and Hurdle in their official

capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

C. Claims Against TDOC Defendants

Jenkins’ claims against TDOC, are construed as claims against the State of Tennessee. The

Clerk is DIRECTED to add the State of Tennessee as a Defendant. As explained supra, Jenkins’

official capacity claims against Thomas and Fitz are construed as claims against their employer –

TDOC. A state is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents

of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.

58, 71 (1989). Section 1983 does not authorize suites against state entities. See Will 491 U.S. at

58, 65. “Will removes persons acting in their official capacities on behalf of the State from the

scope of § 1983 altogether, thereby eliminating the need for a court to undertake any sort of

immunity analysis with respect to such a claim[.]” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766–67, 2003

WL 21295019 (6th Cir. 2003).

Jenkins does not state a claim to relief against TDOC, the State of Tennessee, or Thomas

and Fitz in their official capacities. For the reasons explained above, Jenkins’ § 1983 claims

against TDOC, the State of Tennessee, and against Thomas and Fitz in their official capacities are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

D. Injunctive Relief Against the State of Tennessee

To proceed on his claim for injunctive relief against the State of Tennessee, Jenkins must

allege that the State was responsible for violating his constitutional rights based on a custom or

policy. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.159, 166 (1985); Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 691 (1978). The Sixth Circuit has held that, to establish the required causal link between a

constitutional violation and a policy, a plaintiff must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the

[entity] itself and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that

policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't., 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993). The custom or policy

must be “the moving force” behind the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Powers v. Hamilton

Cty. Pub. Def. Comm'n, 501 F.3d 592, 606–07 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).

Jenkins has not alleged he was injured because of an unconstitutional custom or policy of the State

of Tennessee. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 10 & 11 at PageID 5-22, 62-63, 71-75, 82-84.) Jenkins’ motions

for injunctive relief against the State of Tennessee are DENIED for failure to state a claim to relief.

(See ECF 6 & 9.)

E. Injunctive Relief Against Centurion

The Court must consider four factors in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction

against Centurion: “(1) whether the claimant has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on

the merits, (2) whether the claimant will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, (3)

whether granting the stay will cause substantial harm to others, and (4) whether the public interest

is best served by granting the stay.” Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d. 896, 905 (6th Circ. 2007).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant

carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v.

Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v.

Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000)). Jenkins has not shown the strong likelihood of

success on the merits that would support issuance of a preliminary injunction. Jenkins has not

alleged that a Centurion custom or policy violated his rights. (ECF Nos. 1, 7, 10 & 11 at PageID

5-22, 62-63, 71-75, 82-84.) Jenkins has not shown that his continued confinement at WTSP will

result in irreparable injury or that the remaining factors of the preliminary injunction standard have

been met. Jenkins has not demonstrated that circumstances clearly demand the injunctive relief

he seeks.

For the reasons explained above, the motions for injunctive relief against Centurion (ECF

Nos. 6 & 9) are DENIED for failure to state a claim to relief.

F. State Law Claims

Jenkins alleges that Centurion and Drs. Rich, Hodge and Nuygen violated Jenkins’

Tennessee constitutional rights and T.C.A. §§ 4-3-603 through 606. (ECF Nos. 10 & 11 at PageID

71-72, 82-83.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), “[i]f there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the

default assumption is that the court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related

claims.” Veneklase v. Bridgewater Condos, L.C., 670 F.3d 705, 716 (6th Cir.

2012) (quoting Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 137 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 1998)) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Section 1367 grants district courts broad discretion in exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over related state law claims. See Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d

949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). Courts should “weigh several factors, including the ‘values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Id. at 951–52 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because the Consolidated Complaint’s federal claims are being dismissed and because

proceeding on Jenkins’ state law claims would not be in the interest of comity or judicial economy,

the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any claims arising under state

law. The Consolidated Complaint’s state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every

other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff

to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see

also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal

for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the

deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a

deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to

the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts”). The Court grants leave to amend the complaint under the

conditions set forth below.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Clerk is DIRECTED to add the State of Tennessee and Dr. Hodge as

Defendants and to remove any reference to Bobby Johnson as a Plaintiff;

B. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Jenkins’ § 1983 claims against

TDOC, the State of Tennessee, and Thomas and Fitz in their official capacities for

failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and 1915A(b)(1);

C. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Jenkins’ § 1983 claims against

Centurion and against Hurdle, Rich, Nguyen, Hodge, Longmire and April in their

official capacities for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1);

D. Leave to amend claims dismissed without prejudice in the Consolidated Complaint

is GRANTED. Amended claims must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the

date of this Order. An amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and

plain statement of Jenkins’ claims. An amended complaint supersedes the

Consolidated Complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the

prior pleadings. Jenkins or his counsel must sign the amended complaint, and the

text of the amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim

without reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by

number in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the complaint.

All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts alleged in the

Consolidated Complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count

and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. If Jenkins fails to file an

amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the

Consolidated Complaint with prejudice and enter judgment;

E. The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Jenkins’ state

law claims;

F. Jenkins’ motions for injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 6 & 9) are DENIED for failure to

state a claim for relief;

G. Jenkins’ motion for default judgment (ECF No. 8) is DENIED AS MOOT; and

H. Jenkins is ORDERED to notify the Court the Court immediately, in writing, of his

current address, if he is transferred or released. If Jenkins fails to provide the Court

with his current address or fails to follow any other requirements of this order, the

Court may impose appropriate sanctions, up to and including dismissal of this

action, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of July, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr. .

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE