Lattimore v. Kosciusko County Sheriff

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ALEX LATTIMORE,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO.: 3:22-CV-900-TLS-JEM

KOSCIUSKO COUNTY SHERIFF,

QUALITY CORRECTIONAL CARE, LLC,

CANDIE HUPP, JERRAD JONES,

KEATON SCHOPF, and GORDON NASH,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises out of a jaw injury that the Plaintiff sustained at the Kosciusko County

Jail (the Jail)—where the Plaintiff was temporarily housed for a hearing—on July 15, 2021,

when another inmate punched him in the face. After the incident, the Plaintiff was taken to see

the Jail nurse, Defendant Candie Hupp (an employee of Defendant Quality Correctional Care,

LLC), about a minute after he requested medical attention. Defendant Hupp evaluated the

Plaintiff, and she determined that he needed an x-ray. However, the Jail did not have an x-ray

machine. While the Plaintiff saw the nurse, Defendant Jerrad Jones dealt with the inmate that

punched the Plaintiff.

After the Plaintiff saw the nurse, Defendant Keaton Schopf decided that for the x-rays the

Plaintiff should be returned to the Indiana Department of Corrections, Westville Correctional

Facility (Westville), which was the Plaintiff’s residence and involved a drive that takes about one

hour and fifteen minutes. Defendant Gordon Nash transported the Plaintiff to Westville. The

Plaintiff experienced pain from the movements of the vehicle on the ride to Westville. Although

the Plaintiff asked Defendant Nash to take him to the hospital, his request was denied. Defendant

Nash informed the Westville guards of the Plaintiff’s jaw injury and need for medical attention

on arrival.

At Westville, a nurse evaluated the Plaintiff and ordered x-rays about 2.5 hours after

Defendant Hupp had evaluated the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff then waited for the x-rays for an

unspecified amount of time. He was later (at an unspecified date and time) taken to a hospital

where he testified that his jaw was wired, which lasted four to six weeks.

The Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [ECF No. 19] alleging, as is relevant here, that

he should have been taken directly from the Jail to a nearby hospital, not to Westville, and that

the delay in going to Westville caused him more pain. The federal law claims are: (1) against

Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf, and Nash for deliberate indifference based on a delay in

medical care under the Eighth Amendment; (2) against Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf, and

Nash for a failure to intervene under the Eighth Amendment; and (3) against Defendant

Kosciusko County Sheriff for a delay in medical care caused by unconstitutional and/or

constitutionally deficient policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs in effect at the jail. The

Indiana state law claims are: (1) against Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff for a failure to

provide the Plaintiff with adequate medical care; (2) against Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf,

and Nash for the careless and negligent denial of the Plaintiff’s right to receive reasonable

medical services; and (3) against Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff and Quality Correctional

Care, LLC for careless and negligent denial of reasonable medical care under a theory of

respondeat superior.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Kosciusko County Sherriff, Jones, Schopf,

and Nash’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 44], filed on August 30, 2024, which is

fully briefed and ripe for ruling. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part the

motion and denies in part the motion. The Court sua sponte grants summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Hupp on the delay in medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Court

also sua sponte grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf, and Nash

on the failure to intervene claim under the Eighth Amendment. The Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Indiana state law claims.

BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL FACTS

On July 14, 2021, the Plaintiff—Alex Lattimore—resided in the Indiana Department of

Corrections, Westville Correctional Facility (Westville) serving a sentence under Cause No.

02D05-1810-F5-000305. Am. Compl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 19; Def. Ex. A, p. 9, ECF No. 45-2. On July

14, 2021, the Plaintiff had charges in another case pending against him in Kosciusko County

under Cause No. 43C01-2010-F4-000725. Am. Compl. ¶ 7; Def. Ex. A, pp. 9–10. The initial

hearing for that other case was scheduled for July 15, 2021. Def. Ex. A, p. 10. On June 30, 2021,

the Kosciusko County, Indiana, Circuit Court entered a Transport Order, ordering Westville to

release the Plaintiff to the custody of the Kosciusko County Sheriff to be transported to

Kosciusko County for an initial hearing on July 15. Def. Ex. E, ECF No. 45-10. The court further

ordered the Kosciusko County Sheriff to return the Plaintiff to Westville’s custody at the

conclusion of the hearing. Id. On July 14, 2021, the Plaintiff was transferred from the Westville

to the Kosciusko County Jail (the Jail). Am. Compl. ¶ 7; Def. Ex. A, p. 10.

At the Jail, the Plaintiff was housed in J Block while he was temporarily there on July 14

and 15, 2021. Def. Ex. A, p. 11–12; Def. Ex. B, ¶ 3, ECF No. 45-7. In the morning on July 15,

2021, the Plaintiff attended the initial hearing on his pending Kosciusko County criminal case.

Def. Ex. A, p. 11–12. He attended the hearing remotely from the Jail. Def. Id., p. 11.

At 12:09 p.m. on July 15, 2021, once he returned to J Block, the Plaintiff was punched in

the face by another inmate. Am. Compl. ¶ 8; Ex. A at 12; Ex. A-2, timestamp 12:09:49.1 As a

result, the Plaintiff suffered a jaw injury. Def. Ex. A, p. 17; Pl. Ex. 1 ¶ 4, ECF No. 65-1. A

female officer took the Plaintiff out of the cell block at 12:24 p.m., about one minute after the

Plaintiff asked for medical attention. Def. Ex. A, p. 25; Def. Ex. A-2, timestamp 12:24:36. The

female officer took the Plaintiff directly to medical where a nurse, Defendant Candie Hupp,

evaluated him, took his blood pressure and pulse, and asked permission from the doctor (Dr.

Mikhail Galperin) to order mobile x-rays. Def. Ex. A, pp. 26–27; Def. Ex. A-9, ECF No. 45-6;

Def. Ex. A-4, timestamp 12:26:16–12:29:43. The Jail does not have an x-ray machine. Def. Ex.

D ¶ 5, ECF No. 45-9. The doctor okayed the mobile x-ray order. Def. Ex. A-9. The Plaintiff

asserts that at this time “it was obvious that [he] needed to be taken to the hospital.” Pl. Ex. 1 ¶ 5.

At 12:25 p.m., Defendant Jerrad Jones (a sergeant) went to the sergeants/corporals office

and pulled a video of the event. Def. Ex. B ¶¶ 2, 5. He was informed that Defendant Hupp was

seeing the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 4. After viewing the video, Defendant Jones dealt with the inmate that

struck the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 6.

At 12:29 p.m., the Plaintiff stood up and walked out of Nurse Hupp’s office escorted by a

correctional officer (unidentified). Def. Ex. A, p. 33; Def. Ex. A-4, timestamp 12:29:54 p.m.

Then the correctional officer (unidentified) put the Plaintiff in a holding cell. Def. Ex. A, p. 36.

The Plaintiff testified that he told that correctional officer that he needed medical attention. Id. at

37.

1 Defense Exhibits A-2, A-4, A-5, and A-7 are manually filed exhibits that are videos on discs. See ECF

Nos. 47, 48. These videos are played using self-contained video players. See Def. SOMF fn. 1, ECF No.

45. In order to show the correct timestamps, select the Options menu, then Show Timestamps, then

Server. See id. If this is not done, the timestamps shown on the video will be one hour behind the correct

time. See id.

The Plaintiff was released to Westville before Defendant Hupp ordered the mobile x-

rays. Def. Ex. A-9. At 1:01 p.m., the Plaintiff exited the holding cell, and he was told that he had

to sign a paper and that he was going back to Westville. Def. Ex. A, pp. 43–44; Def. Ex. A-5,

timestamp 1:01:58 p.m. The Plaintiff signed the paperwork. Def. Ex. A, p. 44. He asked a

correctional officer (unidentified), “Can you please take me to a hospital?” Id. And the Plaintiff

testified that the officer responded, “No.” Id.

Defendant Keaton Schopf, a corrections officer at the Jail, completed the paperwork for

the Plaintiff to be released back to Westville’s custody. Def. Ex. C ¶¶ 2, 4, ECF No. 45-8. “[He]

knew that [the Plaintiff] had seen the jail nurse, so [he] believed that [the Plaintiff] was

medically ok to be transferred back to Westville.” Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Schopf also knew “it would

be several hours for the x-ray service to respond to the Jail. At times, the x-ray service would not

respond to the Jail until the next day.” Id. ¶ 6.

Defendant Gordon Nash was the transport officer at the Jail assigned to take the Plaintiff

back to Westville on July 15, 2021. Def. Ex. D ¶ 3. At 1:08 p.m., Defendant Nash pulled out of

the sally port of the Jail, and he transported the Plaintiff to Westville. Def. Ex. A-7, timestamp

1:08:52 p.m.; Def. Ex. D ¶¶ 3, 11. He knows from experience that the trip takes about an hour

and fifteen minutes, and it could take as long as three hours for the x-ray service to respond to

the Jail to x-ray an inmate. Def. Ex. D ¶¶ 6, 7. Therefore, he believed that the Plaintiff would get

medical attention sooner at Westville than at the Jail. Id. ¶ 9.

On the way to Westville, the Plaintiff asked Defendant Nash “to stop at the hospital and

take [him] to the hospital.” Def. Ex. A, p. 50. The Plaintiff testified that on the ride “it hurt really

badly . . . the movements of the car” and he begged Defendant Nash to take him to the hospital.

Id. The Plaintiff testified that Defendant Nash said that “he couldn’t stop at the ER, and that he

was sorry about that.” Id. at 51.

When Defendant Nash and the Plaintiff arrived at Westville, Defendant Nash “told the

guards that [the Plaintiff] needed to see medical right away.” Def. Ex. D ¶ 11. He also told them

“that [the Plaintiff] might have a broken jaw.” Def. Ex. A, p. 52. Defendant Nash released the

Plaintiff into the custody of the Westville guards. Def. Ex. D ¶ 11. “[T]hey brought [the Plaintiff]

in, took [him] to the medical part.” Def. Ex. A, p. 52.

At 2:53 p.m., a nurse at Westville evaluated the Plaintiff and ordered jaw x-rays. Def. Ex.

A, p. 55; Def. Ex. A-8, p. 1–2, ECF No. 45-5. However, he “could not be x-rayed at Westville

immediately because of such short notice and had to wait for a suitable ‘dental apparatus’ or

‘dental thing,’ which caused additional delays.” P1. Ex. 1 ¶ 10. The Plaintiff was then sent to the

hospital for continuity of care (with no date, time, or treatment noted). Def. Ex. A-8, p. 2, ECF

No. 45-5; Pl. Ex. 1 ¶ 11. The Plaintiff testified that at the hospital his jaw was wired—which

lasted four to six weeks, he received mouthwash and wax for the wires, and he was put on a

liquid diet. Def. Ex. A, p. 60. The Plaintiff also testified that no doctor has ever told him that he

suffered any medical complications because the Jail did not send him to the ER immediately. Id.,

p. 61. However, he also asserts, “non-treatment caused me additional horrendous pain and

suffering, which would not have happened had my request for immediate hospitalization been

granted in Kosciusko County.” Pl. Ex. 1 ¶ 11.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). The movant may discharge this burden by “either: (1) showing that there is an

absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim; or

(2) presenting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s

claim.” Hummel v. St. Joseph Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 817 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted). In response, the non-movant “must make a sufficient showing on every

element of his case on which he bears the burden of proof; if he fails to do so, there is no issue

for trial.” Yeatts v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc., 940 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). In ruling on a motion for summary

judgment, a court must construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citation omitted). A court’s role “is not to sift through the

evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe. The court has

one task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any

material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920

(7th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Jones, Schopf, and Nash seek summary judgment

on the Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 deliberate indifference claims against them based on a delay

of medical care under the Eight Amendment. They also seek summary judgment on the

Plaintiff’s Indiana state law claims against Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff.

A. Federal Claims—42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very person who, under color of [state

law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff

must show that the defendant deprived him of a federal constitutional right and that the

defendant acted under color of state law. Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006).

1. Delay of Medical Care

In the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff brings a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim

based on a delay of medical care under the Eight Amendment against Defendants Jones, Schopf,

and Nash for taking him from the Jail to Westville instead of taking him directly to the closest

hospital after he injured his jaw, causing him more pain.2 To establish liability under the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must show: (1) he suffered an objectively serious medical condition; (2)

the defendant in question knew of the condition and was deliberately indifferent to treating the

plaintiff; and (3) this deliberate indifference injured the plaintiff. Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty.,

44 F.4th 605, 614 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010);

Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)).

“Summary judgment on causation is . . . warranted where ‘a plaintiff can proffer no

evidence that a delay in medical treatment exacerbated an injury.’” Id. at 615 (quoting Gayton,

593 F.3d at 624). This is because the plaintiff must produce “verifying medical evidence” that

the delay in treatment had a detrimental effect. Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235, 1240–41 (7th

Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Thus, an “action will not lie unless the plaintiff introduces

2 Although the Plaintiff brings a claim for a delay in medical care under the Fourteenth and/or Eighth

Amendments, in the summary judgment briefing, the parties presume that the Eighth Amendment

provides the proper standard for evaluating the claim. In this case, the Plaintiff was temporarily at the Jail

as a pretrial detainee for an initial hearing at the time of the injury. He was also a resident at Westville as

a post-conviction prisoner (in another case). “In Miranda v. County of Lake, [the Seventh Circuit] held the

standard for pretrial detainees challenging their medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment is lower

than that for post-conviction prisoners proceeding under the Eighth Amendment.” Stockton v. Milwaukee

Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 614 n.3 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350–54 (7th

Cir. 2018)). In this case, the Plaintiff did not advocate for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment

standard in his summary judgment response brief, “thereby waiving the question.” Id. Thus, the Court

assumes that the Eight Amendment standard applies.

verifying medical evidence that shows his condition worsened because of the delay.” Knight v.

Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458, 466 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d

710, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2007) (“In cases where prison officials delayed rather than denied medical

assistance to an inmate, courts have required the plaintiff to offer ‘verifying medical evidence’

that the delay (rather than the inmate’s underlying condition) caused some degree of harm.”).

“Verifying medical evidence” includes

expert testimony that the plaintiff suffered because of a delay in treatment . . . . On

the other hand, evidence of a plaintiff’s diagnosis and treatment, standing alone, is

insufficient if it does not assist the jury in determining whether a delay exacerbated

the plaintiff’s condition or otherwise harmed him.

Williams, 491 F.3d at 715 (cleaned up). For example, medical records indicating that the

administration of medication “almost immediately relieved [the plaintiff’s] pain” would allow “a

jury could find that the defendants’ delay caused [the plaintiff] six extra hours of pain . . . for no

good reason.” Id. at 716.

Here, the Plaintiff has not provided verifying medical evidence that the delay in going to

Westville for medical treatment exacerbated his jaw injury. The Plaintiff’s briefing on this issue

provides:

Plaintiff contends that the delay exacerbated his injury by causing more pain. In

this case, Plaintiff could have and should have been treated for his seriously

broken jaw simply by being transferred to a local hospital where he could have

received appropriate medical care. Here, there was no valid reason (other than to

save money by providing no medical care) by transferring him back to Westville

and causing him to suffer needless pain for hours. All of the correctional officers

that interacted with the Plaintiff saw his injury, heard his pleas for help, and knew

that Plaintiff was in serious pain—which they all prolonged by refusing to get him

immediate emergency medical care locally, and instead opting to transfer him

back to Westville, causing Plaintiff to suffer additional hours of pain which was

needless and demonstrative of deliberate indifference.

Pl. Br. 4, ECF No. 64 (cleaned up).

As highlighted by the Defendants, the Plaintiff merely asserts reasons why Defendants

Jones, Schopf, and Nash demonstrated deliberate indifference. The Plaintiff also asserts that the

jaw injury required “immediate emergency medical care.” Id. at 7. However, he does not point to

a medical record showing a medical diagnosis related to his jaw injury. Nor does he point to any

expert testimony that the Plaintiff suffered because of the delay in treatment of his jaw injury or

a medical record that indicates that the Plaintiff experienced pain from the jaw injury and that a

particular treatment or medication relieved the Plaintiff’s pain. See Williams, 491 F.3d at 715.

Instead, the Plaintiff testified that no doctor has ever told him that he suffered any medical

complications because the Jail did not send him to the ER immediately.

The Plaintiff additionally shows that he disagreed with being taken from the Jail to

Westville and then to the hospital because he wanted to be taken directly from the Jail to a

hospital near the Jail. However, although the Plaintiff testified that at the hospital his jaw was

wired—which he had for four to six weeks, he received mouthwash and wax for the wires, and

he was put on a liquid diet, he does not indicate that any of this provided pain relief. Nor does he

provide his hospital medical record. Thus, at most the Plaintiff shows that he disagreed with not

being taken directly from the Jail to the closest hospital. Evidence of “a mere disagreement with

the course of the inmate’s medical treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment claim of

deliberate indifference.” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996) (cleaned up).

Consequently, the Plaintiff has not shown that a jury could find that the Defendants’

delay caused the Plaintiff pain for no good reason because he has not produced verifying medical

evidence indicating such. Accordingly, no reasonable jury could find that the conduct of

Defendants Jones, Schopf, and Nash amounted to a constitutional violation. See Langston, 100

F.3d at 1240–41.3

2. Qualified Immunity

Defendants Jones, Schopf, and Nash argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Rivas-

Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78–79

(2017)). Thus, the two questions are “whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a

constitutional right at all, and whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time and

under the circumstances presented.” Bianchi v. McQueen, 818 F.3d 309, 319 (7th Cir. 2016)

(citation omitted). Because the Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact as

to a constitutional violation, the Court need not further address the issue of qualified

immunity. See Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 616 (2007); Tucker v. Williams, 682

F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Because we do not find a constitutional violation, we need not

and do not address Williams’ qualified immunity defense.”).

B. Abandoned Federal Claim

The Defendants also move for summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against

Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff for a delay in medical care caused by unconstitutional

and/or constitutionally deficient policies, practices, procedures, and/or customs in effect at the

jail. In his response, the Plaintiff does not address these arguments or defend this claim in any

3 Thus, the Court need not address the Defendant’s additional arguments.

way; thus, he has abandoned his federal claim against Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff. See

Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 2003) (concluding that a claim was

abandoned when a party failed to defend it “in his district court brief in opposition to summary

judgment”). Therefore, Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff is entitled to judgment on the

Plaintiff’s § 1983 delay in medical care claim in the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

C. Federal Claim Against Defendant Hupp for Delay in Medical Care

The one remaining federal claim is the delay of medical care claim under the Eighth

Amendment against Defendant Candie Hupp based on not taking the Plaintiff directly to the

closest hospital when he injured his jaw. “[W]here one defendant files a motion for summary

judgment which the court grants, the district court may sua sponte enter summary judgment in

favor of additional non-moving defendants if the motion raised by the first defendant is equally

effective in barring the claim against the other defendants and the plaintiff had an adequate

opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion.” Malak v. Associated Physicians, Inc., 784 F.2d

277, 280 (7th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Here, the delay in medical care claim brought against

Defendant Hupp is interrelated with the delay in medical care claims against Defendants Jones,

Schopf, and Nash because proving a delay in medical care against each party requires verifying

medical evidence that any delay in taking the Plaintiff to Westville and not taking him directly to

the hospital exacerbated his jaw injury.

Accordingly, because the Court has granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants

Jones, Schopf, and Nash on the delay in medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment (based

on the absence of verifying medical evidence) and the Plaintiff submitted other evidence arguing

in opposition to the motion for summary judgment by Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff,

Jones, Schopf, and Nash, the Court sua sponte grants summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s delay

in medical care claim under the Eighth Amendment in favor of Defendant Hupp.

D. Federal Claim for Failure to Intervene Against Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf,

and Nash

The Court notes that, although neither party mentions it in their summary judgment

briefing, in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges a claim against Defendants Hupp,

Jones, Schopf, and Nash for a failure to intervene as an alternative basis for an Eighth

Amendment violation. Am Compl. ¶¶ 5, 21. To succeed on a failure to intervene claim, a

plaintiff must show that the officer “(1) knew that a constitutional violation was committed; and

(2) had a realistic opportunity to prevent it.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 342 (7th

Cir. 2017) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994)); Stewardson v. Biggs, 43

F.4th 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2022) (same). “In order for there to be a failure to intervene, it logically

follows that there must exist an underlying constitutional violation . . . .” Harper v. Albert, 400

F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). This is “because an underlying constitutional violation is a

primary concern when attempting to establish a failure to intervene claim.” Id.

Here, even if the Plaintiff had pursued his failure to intervene claim in opposition to

summary judgment, there was no underlying violation of his constitutional rights under the

Eighth Amendment committed by Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf, or Nash, as discussed above,

and the Plaintiff does not allege additional facts in support of the failure to intervene claim that

could amount to a constitutional violation. See Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 506 (7th Cir.

2004) (“The problem for Fillmore, however, is the fact that there was no underlying violation of

his constitutional rights committed by Henderson, Jack, or Higgins.”).

“Simply put, there was no constitutionally impermissible failure to intervene because

there was no violation that compelled intervention.” Id. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of

material fact that Defendants Hupp, Jones, Schopf, or Nash did not commit an Eighth

Amendment violation for an alleged failure to intervene. “A district judge is authorized to grant

summary judgment to a party that has not requested it; [she] is not required to conduct a trial

when there is no genuine issue of material fact, just because the parties . . . [did not] notice the

absence of any triable issues.” Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the Court sua sponte grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants Hupp,

Jones, Schopf, and Nash on the Amended Complaint’s alternative § 1983 failure to intervene

claim.

E. Indiana State Law Claims

Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Jones, Schopf, and Nash argue for summary

judgment in their favor as to the Amended Complaint’s Indiana state law claims against

Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff.

In this case, the Amended Complaint does not address the citizenship of the parties or the

jurisdictional basis for any of the claims. In their summary judgment brief, the Defendants assert

that the Court has supplemental jurisdiction (under 28 U.S.C. § 1367) over the Indiana state law

claims. In his response, the Plaintiff does not dispute this statement of the Court’s jurisdiction

over the Indiana state law claims.

“When all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the principle of comity

encourages federal courts to relinquish supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to § 1367(c)(3).”

Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 2008). While the

decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, “there is a general presumption

that the court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction.” Rivera v. Allstate Ins. Co., 913 F.3d

603, 618 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476,

479–80 (7th Cir. 2012)). “The presumption is rebuttable, but it should not be lightly abandoned,

as it is based on a legitimate and substantial concern with minimizing federal intrusion into areas

of purely state law.” RWJ Mgmt. Co., Inc., 672 F.3d at 479 (cleaned up). As the Court has not

engaged in any meaningful review of the merits of the Indiana state law claims and has not

otherwise committed substantial judicial resources to them, declining to exercise jurisdiction is

proper. See Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district court

disposed of the federal claims on summary judgment, and so ‘substantial judicial resources’ have

not yet been committed to the case.”).

Thus, the Court denies as moot Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Jones, Schopf, and

Nash’s motion for summary judgment on the Indiana state law claim against Defendant

Kosciusko County Sheriff because the Court is relinquishing supplemental jurisdiction over the

Amended Complaint’s Indiana state law claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part

as moot the Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Jones, Schopf, and Nash’s Motion for

Summary Judgement [ECF No. 44], granting the motion as to the Plaintiff’s claims for delay in

medical care under the Eighth Amendment against Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Jerrad

Jones, Keaton Schopf, and Gordon Nash. The Court DENIES as moot Defendants Kosciusko

County Sheriff, Jones, Schopf, and Nash’s motion for summary judgment on the Indiana state

law claims against Defendant Kosciusko County Sheriff because the Court is relinquishing

supplemental jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint’s Indiana state law claims.

The Court sua sponte GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Defendants Candie Hupp,

Jones, Schopf, and Nash as to the Plaintiff’s alternative claim for a failure to intervene under the

Eighth Amendment. The Court also sua sponte GRANTS summary judgment in favor of

Defendant Hupp as to the Plaintiff’s claim for delay in medical care under the Eighth

Amendment. This resolves all federal claims brought under § 1983 in the Amended Complaint in

favor of Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Candie Hupp, Jerrad Jones, Keaton Schopf, and

Gordon Nash, and the Plaintiff Alex Lattimore takes nothing by way of the Amended Complaint

on these federal claims.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment against the Plaintiff Alex

Lattimore and in favor of Defendants Kosciusko County Sheriff, Candie Hupp, Jerrad Jones,

Keaton Schopf, and Gordon Nash on the federal claims of the Amended Complaint.

The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdictional over the Plaintiff’s

remaining Indiana state law claims and DISMISSES without prejudice those claims.

SO ORDERED on June 27, 2025.

s/ Theresa L. Springmann

JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT