“Statements which identify another co-conspirator as the source of drugs involved in the conspiracy are in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
How later courts described this case
- “Statements which identify another co-conspirator as the source of drugs involved in the conspiracy are in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
- noting the “low threshold of proof” required to allow testimony based on personal knowledge
- discussing how evidence can corroborate a confession by supporting the facts confessed to
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 25a0319n.06
No. 24-5328
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
Jul 02, 2025
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)
Plaintiff - Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CHASE RUSSELL DOWNEY, )
Defendant - Appellant. ) OPINION
)
)
Before: MOORE, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
BUSH, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which NALBANDIAN, J., concurred.
MOORE, J. (pg. 15), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Chase Downey appeals his conviction and sentence for
charges related to his involvement in a drug trafficking operation. He challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence, the district court’s application of sentence enhancements, and two evidentiary
issues. We AFFIRM.
I. Facts of the Case
Chase Downey thought of himself as the type of drug trafficker “people make movies
about.” Video Interview, R. 84 at 2:00. But a life with a riveting plot had its downside. Like
silver screen characters from Tony Montana to Tony Soprano, Downey feared that “someone was
trying to get me.” R. 135, PageID 1010. With this in mind, Downey reached out to the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in August and September 2022, boasting that he could set up
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
a sting operation for them involving more than 100 kilograms of cocaine. But Downey failed to
follow up, and he did not become an informant for the DEA.
The DEA, however, did follow up with Downey—it opened an investigation into him.
Agents surveilled Downey at the Lexington, Kentucky home of his girlfriend, Lamari Henson. On
December 12, 2022, they saw Downey arrive there with a man whom they later learned is named
Sebastian. Downey’s companion was there to pick up $150,000 of drug cash to drive to Texas.
The DEA agents executed a search warrant the next day and recovered significant evidence that
the house was part of a drug trafficking operation. Inside the home, agents found more than a
pound of cocaine, more than a pound of Super Mannitol (a cocaine cutting agent), a drug press,
and a “kilo packaging unit.” R. 135, PageID 824. They also found $71,957 in cash and a currency-
counting machine. And, in the master bedroom and bathroom, police recovered seven guns,
including a semi-automatic shotgun with two curved magazines and a 12-gauge, pump-action
shotgun with a pistol grip.
After the agents arrested Downey, he consented to an interview. He confessed in detail to
his participation in a wide-ranging conspiracy to traffic cocaine. He said that the amount of
cocaine in the house was small compared to the fifty or one-hundred kilograms he could acquire.
He also said he got his drugs from Juan Arellano, who lived in Matamoros, a Mexican city
bordering Brownsville, Texas. And he said he had worked with Arellano for a long time and had
recently smuggled $1 million in drug proceeds to Mexico by walking across the border with cash
in duffel bags. The agents corroborated Downey’s account through border crossing reports that
showed him crossing into the United States from Mexico fourteen times between September and
November 2022. Downey also gave the agents four phones and unlocked them at their request.
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No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
The agents found text messages with Arellano in which he and Downey discussed drug payments
exceeding $100,000 and how Downey could distribute between ten and twenty kilograms of
cocaine at a time to buyers in Detroit and across Michigan.
A jury convicted Downey on five counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute and to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, (2) possession with intent to distribute 500
grams or more of cocaine, (3) possession of a firearm by a felon, (4) possession of a firearm in
furtherance of drug trafficking, and (5) conspiracy to commit money laundering. At sentencing,
the district court largely adopted the recommendations from Downey’s presentence report. It
applied sentencing enhancements for his leadership of a criminal conspiracy and maintenance of
drug premises. It also found that Downey qualified as an armed career criminal and as a career
offender. It calculated his criminal offense level as 40 and criminal history category as VI (based
on a score of 16 criminal history points), leading to a Guidelines range of 30 years to life
imprisonment. In addition, Downey’s conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime mandated a consecutive five-year sentence, boosting his effective range to
35 years to life imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors, the district court sentenced Downey to 45 years’ imprisonment.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Downey argues that the government did not present enough evidence to convict him on
any count except possession with intent to distribute 500 grams of cocaine. We must deny his
sufficiency challenge if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,”
we conclude that “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime[s]
3
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sadler, 24 F.4th 515, 539 (6th Cir. 2022). We reach
that conclusion for the reasons explained below.
A. Conspiracy to Distribute Cocaine
The jury convicted Downey of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The government had
a burden to prove the existence of “(1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge of and
intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy.” Id. (quoting United States
v. Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2021)). As to quantity, the government needed to prove
that five or more kilograms of cocaine were attributable to Downey or to the foreseeable conduct
of his co-conspirators. United States v. Rosales, 990 F.3d 989, 997–98 (6th Cir. 2021).
Downey only challenges the quantity prong of the offense. He argues the government did
not meet its burden because the police recovered less than a kilogram of cocaine at Henson’s house.
We disagree. The government presented sufficient evidence to find that Downey trafficked more
cocaine than that found at Henson’s house on the day of his arrest. Downey told agents that he
had taken more than $1 million in cocaine proceeds across the Mexican border. Given that
Downey also said he typically sold cocaine in Lexington for $20,000 per kilo, a jury could believe
that he had trafficked greater than five kilograms of cocaine. The government also presented
physical corroborating evidence from Henson’s house that would allow a jury to infer the presence
of a large drug operation, including a big drug press larger than what the DEA usually finds, more
than a pound of a cocaine cutting agent, and equipment that could be used to package the cocaine
into kilo units. In sum, the government presented sufficient evidence to show that Downey
trafficked more than five kilograms of cocaine.
4
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
B. Firearm Charges
Downey next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented to convict him of
possessing a firearm (1) as a felon and (2) in furtherance of drug trafficking. Downey’s sole
argument against both counts is that the government failed to show he actually or constructively
possessed any of the seven firearms found at Henson’s house. Constructive possession “exists
when a person . . . knowingly has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion
and control over an object, either directly or through others.” United States v. Taylor, 800 F.3d
701, 709 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2007)).
The record contains sufficient evidence that Downey constructively possessed the firearms
in the residence. Although the home belonged to Henson, Downey had unfettered access to it:
Henson gave him a door access code, he stayed there for weeks at a time, and he had permission
to store items there. Henson testified that, other than her, Downey was the only person who stayed
at the house and who had access to the firearms inside. She also testified that Downey brought
into her home the shotgun that police found and that he had also brought into the house a handgun
and a gun case in which police found three firearms. Further, the government showed the jury a
picture from Downey’s phone of him holding a gun inside the home. At the very least, this
evidence is enough to sustain a finding that Downey constructively possessed the firearms found
in Henson’s home.
C. Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering
Downey finally contests the evidence used to convict him of conspiracy to commit money
laundering. The elements of conspiracy to commit money laundering are “(1) that two or more
persons conspired to commit the crime of money laundering, and (2) that the defendant knowingly
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No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
and voluntarily joined the conspiracy.” United States v. Matthews, 31 F.4th 436, 447 (6th Cir.
2022) (quoting United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760, 781 (6th Cir. 2017)). The corresponding
crime of money laundering occurs when “the defendant knowingly used the proceeds from a
specified unlawful activity in financial transactions that were intended to promote the continuation
of the unlawful activity, or were designed to conceal or disguise the proceeds of the unlawful
activity.” United States v. Castro-Aguirre, 983 F.3d 927, 941 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted); Matthews, 31 F.4th at 447. Downey contends that (1) the
government presented no physical evidence of money laundering, (2) Henson could not be a co-
conspirator because she did not know the money was for illegal activity, and (3) there was no
corroboration of Downey’s statement that he transported $1 million of cocaine funds over the
Mexican border. But the government did present such physical evidence. It also presented
evidence of a conspiracy between Downey, Sebastian, and Arellano, making it unnecessary to
show that Henson was a conspirator. Finally, the government corroborated Downey’s statement
about border smuggling with the proof of his border crossings.
The government’s evidence on this count is strong. A “paradigmatic example” of money
laundering is “a drug dealer using the proceeds of a drug transaction to purchase additional drugs
and consummate future sales.” United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (quoting United Statas v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 317 (6th Cir. 2010)). There was good
reason for the jury to believe drug smuggling is what Downey did. The agents found over $70,000
in the house when they arrested Downey. Downey also told agents he had given $150,000 to co-
conspirator Sebastian to take to Houston, and Henson testified that she took $40,000 to Houston
for Downey. Downey also confessed that he himself had smuggled upwards of $1 million across
6
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
the Mexican border, and, as noted, the government produced border crossing records showing that
Downey had indeed crossed the border fourteen times between September and November 2022.
See United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d 857, 862–63 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing how evidence can
corroborate a confession by supporting the facts confessed to). Finally, text messages between
Downey and co-conspirator Arellano showed them discussing trafficking proceeds, sharing
pictures of bulk cash, and trading information for Arellano’s account with Cash App, a phone app
used to exchange money. This evidence was more than enough for a rational juror to convict
Downey for money laundering.
III. Evidentiary Objections
Downey renews two objections related to evidentiary issues, neither of which is
meritorious.
A. Untimely Motion to Suppress
First, Downey contends that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing him to
file an untimely motion to suppress. We review such a claim for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Walden, 625 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2010).
The district court ordered Downey to file defensive motions by May 30. But he failed to
meet this deadline. Downey received a new lawyer on June 13, but he concedes that this occurred
after the trial court’s deadline had passed.
On October 20, with the trial less than two weeks away, Downey asked for leave to file an
untimely motion to suppress. Downey argued that he had good cause to not file earlier—he was
negotiating a plea deal and felt that moving to suppress would have derailed the talks. The district
court rejected this rationale and declined to allow Downey to file his untimely motion.
7
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
On appeal, Downey does not develop an argument that he had good cause to file his motion
late. Downey’s brief only cites the flexible standard for a district court to decide such issues case-
by-case and states that the parties only completed discovery on August 21. Downey does not
explain why ongoing discovery gave him good cause to file his untimely motion to suppress.
Because Downey does not meaningfully develop his argument as to good cause, he forfeits it.
United States v. Jamison, 85 F.4th 796, 800 (6th Cir. 2023).
Even if it were not forfeited, Downey’s claim would not succeed. As Downey notes in his
brief, “good cause” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C) is “a flexible standard
heavily dependent on the facts of the particular case as found and weighed by the district court in
its equitable discretion.” Walden, 625 F.3d at 965. “Generally, if the failure to timely file occurred
as a result of a lawyer’s conscious decision not to file a pretrial motion before the deadline, the
party seeking a waiver will not be able to establish good cause.” Id. Downey’s justification in the
district court falls into this category—Downey consciously decided to not file his motion in an
attempt to curry favor with the prosecution in plea negotiations. That is not a sufficient reason to
establish good cause for failure to file in a timely manner.
The dissent argues that the district court abused its discretion because its filing deadline
did not give Downey time to review discovery and because it denied Downey’s requests to extend
the deadline. But even if the district court had granted Downey’s most recent request for an
extension of the pretrial filing deadline, the new deadline would have been August 4. Downey
moved to file his untimely motion on October 20, eleven weeks past the deadline he requested,
and less than two weeks before trial. And more importantly, when Downey moved to file his
untimely motion to suppress, he only cited the ongoing plea negotiations to explain his tardiness.
8
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
He did not say that he had too little time to review discovery. We cannot say the district court
abused its discretion for failing to consider a ground that the defendant himself failed to raise.
United States v. Embry, 728 F. App’x 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2018).
B. Hearsay
Downey also argues that the district court violated the Federal Rules of Evidence by
allowing the government to introduce inculpatory text messages found on a cell phone he gave the
police. Downey claims these messages were not properly authenticated and were hearsay.
We review a challenge to a district court’s decision to admit authenticated evidence for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 628 (6th Cir. 2005). Downey argues
that Detective Evans, who testified to the authenticity of the messages, did not know who owned
or used the phone. The record contradicts this. Detective Evans testified that Downey possessed
four phones. Downey allowed Detective Evans to search the phones, and Downey unlocked the
phones for the officers. These facts are more than enough to establish Detective Evans’s personal
knowledge that the phones belonged to Downey. See United States v. Franklin, 415 F.3d 537, 549
(6th Cir. 2005) (noting the “low threshold of proof” required to allow testimony based on personal
knowledge).
As to hearsay, Downey argues:
These text message statements were clearly hearsay as no testimony was offered by
anyone with personal knowledge of who was communicating in the texts admitted.
Additionally, they were only offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the
statements in an attempt to persuade the jury that Mr. Downey was engaged in large
scale drug trafficking.
Appellant’s Br. at 15. The first part of this argument appears to rehash the authenticity challenge.
Construing Downey to argue that the texts are hearsay because neither Downey nor any of his
9
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
conversation partners testified, that argument fails. None of the texts Downey sent qualifies as
hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); United States v. Chavez, 951 F.3d 349, 361 (6th Cir. 2020).
It is difficult to assess whether the statements of Downey’s conversation partners would be
excludable hearsay because Downey does not point to any specific statement or conversation. But
the government notes that the texts include conversations with Arellano, the man who, according
to Downey, sourced his drugs. To the extent that the government used such conversations to prove
that Downey traffics drugs, such statements would fall into the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 450 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“Statements which identify another co-conspirator as the source of drugs involved in
the conspiracy are in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). We therefore find no error in the district
court’s admission of the inculpatory text messages.
IV. Sentencing Objections
The district court calculated Downey’s offense level as 40 and his criminal history category
as VI. It also categorized him as an armed career criminal and as a career offender. Downey
challenges the district court’s application to his offense level of a drug premises enhancement and
a leadership enhancement. He also argues that the district court erroneously designated him as an
armed career criminal and a career offender. None of Downey’s challenges to his sentence has
merit.
A. Drug Premises Enhancement
The Sentencing Guidelines mandate a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant
maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.”
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12). When reviewing a district court’s application of a sentence
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No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
enhancement, we review the district court’s determination of the facts for clear error and its
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo. United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386, 388 (6th Cir.
2023).
There was substantial evidence that Downey maintained Henson’s home as a drug
premises. As noted, the DEA agents found in the home tens of thousands of dollars in cash, a drug
press, a kilo packaging unit, cocaine, and a cocaine cutting agent. And DEA agents saw Downey
meet with Sebastian at the home on the day before the DEA raid. Further, Henson’s testimony
reflects that Downey exercised “de facto control” over the home even though it belonged to
Henson. Id. at 390. For instance, she testified that Downey had stayed at her home for weeks at
a time, had a passcode to unlock the front door, and had her permission come and go as he pleased.
She also said that Downey, with her permission, had stored drugs and guns at the home. Finally,
Henson testified that, at Downey’s direction, she had counted $150,000 in cash at the house and
transported large sums of cash to Houston, suggesting Downey was in charge. The district court
did not err by relying on this evidence to conclude that Downey maintained drug premises at
Henson’s home.
B. Leadership Enhancement
The government also presented sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
application of a two-level leadership enhancement. The Guidelines mandate a two-level
enhancement for a defendant who is an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
activity” involving fewer than five participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). As relevant here, Downey
would qualify for the enhancement if he “exercised control or authority over at least one
accomplice.” United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 473 (6th Cir. 2009).
11
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
Henson’s testimony provides a sufficient basis for the district court to apply the leadership
enhancement. She testified that Downey asked her to count cash and that she knew this cash came
from Downey’s trafficking activities. She also testified that Downey told her to drive to Houston
with $40,000 of his drug money. Both examples demonstrate that Downey exercised control over
Henson’s activities as part of his drug trafficking enterprise. And Downey does not argue on
appeal that the district court erred in crediting Henson’s testimony.
C. Armed Career Criminal Status
Downey next challenges the district court’s finding that he qualifies for a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment as an armed career criminal. A defendant qualifies as an armed
career criminal upon conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm while having three
previous convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug offense” committed on different
occasions. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). A serious drug offense can be “an offense under State law,
involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
controlled substance . . . for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is
prescribed by law.” Id. § 924(e)(2)(ii).
Downey challenges whether he has three qualifying convictions. He argues that three of
his convictions (for offenses committed: in Kentucky and Ohio in 2011 and in Ohio in 2012)
cannot undergird his armed career criminal designation. But, of these three convictions, the district
court only relied upon the 2012 Ohio conviction. Downey argues that this conviction should “not
be counted as a predicate offense[] as the underlying crimes do not meet the standard for violent
crimes as they are lacking the requisite requirement of force.” Appellant’s Br. at 21. Even if this
were true, it would not matter. Downey’s 2012 Ohio conviction was on three counts: aggravated
12
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
robbery, felonious assault, and drug trafficking. For the drug trafficking count, Downey was
sentenced to eleven years in prison. So the probation office and the district court were correct to
count the 2012 Ohio conviction as a serious drug offense. It is irrelevant whether it would be
wrong to count this conviction as a violent felony, as Downey argues. Because Downey’s
challenge to the counting of this conviction fails, and because he does not challenge the two other
offenses that the district court actually used, Downey fails to show that the district court erred by
designating him an armed career criminal.
D. Career Offender Status
“Errors that do not affect the ultimate Guidelines range or sentence imposed are harmless
and do not require resentencing.” United States v. Faulkner, 926 F.3d 266, 275 (6th Cir. 2019).
We therefore need not address Downey’s argument that the district court incorrectly designated
him as a career offender because it would not have affected his Guidelines range. See id.
To begin, his offense level of 40 was higher than the applicable offense level Downey
would have received as a career offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). So his designation as a career
offender had no impact on his offense level. Nor does Downey challenge the district court’s
calculation of his criminal history score as 16. Based on this score, Downey’s criminal history
category is VI, the highest category in the Guidelines. Because the district court had this
independent basis to calculate Downey’s criminal history category as VI, any alleged error in
finding him a career offender would not have affected his criminal history category. Taken
together, Downey’s designation as a career offender made no difference to his Guidelines range.
Consequently, any alleged error in that designation would be harmless.
13
No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
V. Conclusion
Because all of Downey’s challenges to his conviction and sentence fail, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
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No. 24-5328, United States v. Downey
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the majority
opinion because the record demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Downey’s motions to extend his deadline to file pretrial motions. Accordingly, I would vacate the
criminal judgment, reverse the district court’s orders denying Downey’s motions for extensions of
time, and remand for the district court to resolve Downey’s motion to suppress in the first instance.
There are several reasons to conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied Downey’s motion to file an untimely motion to suppress. Given the district judge’s 30-day
deadline to file defensive motions, Downey effectively had no opportunity to review discovery
before filing a pretrial motion to suppress. Replacement counsel appeared in June 2023 (after the
deadline) and discovery was ongoing through at least August 2023. On several occasions, Downey
sought an extension of time for pretrial filings, but the district court did not extend the deadline for
filing defensive motions. With so much at stake in a criminal trial, district courts must provide
adequate time for criminal defendants to make informed decisions. The district court’s deadline
in this case was wholly inadequate to achieve this important aim. In this context, the district court’s
decision was an abuse of discretion.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
15