United States v. Jameel Williams

USCA11 Case: 20-12742 Document: 80-1 Date Filed: 07/02/2025 Page: 1 of 10

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12742

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMEEL SHADEED WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00095-SCB-CPT-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12742

Before BRANCH, KIDD, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Jameel Williams appeals his conviction and

180-month imprisonment sentence for being a felon in possession

of a firearm. First, Williams argues that the district court erred un-

der Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S. Ct. 1840 (2024), in

applying the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement

to his sentence based on a judicial factfinding at sentencing that the

offenses underlying his predicate convictions occurred on different

occasions, the error was structural, and, even if the error is subject

to harmless-error review, the error was not harmless. Second, Wil-

liams argues that the district court erred in applying the ACCA en-

hancement to his sentence because his predicate offenses did not

qualify as a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA. Third, Wil-

liams argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional facially

and as applied to him under the Commerce Clause and under the

Second Amendment. Having reviewed the record and read the

parties’ briefs, we affirm Williams’s conviction and sentence.

I.

Regarding the ACCA, we review de novo whether prior of-

fenses satisfy the different occasions requirement. United States v.

Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2021). However, challenges

raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for plain error. Id.

The ACCA requires that any defendant who violates

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) serve a mandatory minimum sentence of

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20-12742 Opinion of the Court 3

15 years if the defendant has 3 prior convictions for violent felonies

or serious drug offenses “committed on occasions different from

one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a “serious

drug offense,” in relevant part, as “an offense under State law, in-

volving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to

manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in sec-

tion 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)).” Id.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

Williams contends that the district court erred in sentencing

him pursuant to the ACCA because the judge, not a jury, relied on

court documents1 to conclude that he had 3 prior convictions for

serious drug offenses committed on different occasions. See Er-

linger v. United States, 602 U.S. at 833-34, 144 S. Ct. at 1851 (holding

that judicial factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence that a

defendant has three ACCA predicate convictions committed on dif-

ferent occasions violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due

process of law and the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a jury trial).

The Court held that the ACCA predicate fact-finding must be made

by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or freely admitted by the de-

fendant in a guilty plea. See id. The Court explained that “no par-

ticular lapse of time or distance between offenses automatically

separates a single occasion from distinct ones.” Id. at 841, 144 S.

Ct. at 1855. The Court also noted that “in many cases the occasions

inquiry will be ‘straightforward,’” such as when “a defendant’s past

offenses [are] different enough and separated by enough time and

1 See Shepherd v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005).

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-12742

space that there is little question he committed them on separate

occasions,” though the Court stressed that this finding must still be

made by a jury rather than a judge. Id. at 842, 144 S. Ct. at 1856.

The Supreme Court did not opine whether the error was

structural or subject to harmless-error review. Recently, in United

States v. Rivers, 139 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2025), our court held that

Erlinger error is subject to harmless error review. Id. at 1305. Under

this review, the government bears the burden of showing beyond

a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found that the

defendant’s prior drug offenses all were “committed on occasions

different from one another.” Id. at 1306 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §924(e));

Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1259. Under this “fact-laden task,” the court con-

siders the amount of time between offenses, the proximity of the

locations where the offenses occurred, and whether the offenses

are part of the same scheme or achieve the same objective. Wooden

v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 367-70, 142 S. Ct. 1063, 1069-71 (2022).

But “[i]n many cases, a single factor—especially of time or place—

can decisively differentiate occasions.” Id. at 369-70, 142 S. Ct. at

1071. “Offenses committed close in time, in an uninterrupted

course of conduct, will often count as part of one occasion; not so

offenses separated by substantial gaps in time or significant inter-

vening events.” Id. at 369, 142 S. Ct. at 1071.

The record here demonstrates that the Erlinger error in this

case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Examining the

time, location and purpose or character of Williams’s crimes, it

seems unlikely that a reasonable jury would doubt that his prior

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offenses qualified as ACCA predicate offenses. Court documents

showed that Williams sold cocaine on May 1, 2003, September 2,

2003, and April 11, 2014. Given these gaps in time between his drug

offenses, no reasonable person would believe they were commit-

ted on the same occasion. See United States v. Penn, 63 F.4th 1305,

1318 (11th Cir. 2023) (“No reasonable person would say that Penn’s

two sales of cocaine, thirty days apart, occurred on the same occa-

sion.”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 398 (2023). Williams

presented no evidence to contradict these dates, nor did he make a

specific argument as to why the dates are inaccurate.

In addition, the offenses were committed at different loca-

tions. One was near a church, and another was near a school.

Thus, we conclude that Williams cannot meet the harmless-error

standard as to his Erlinger challenge because he has not “raised evi-

dence sufficient to support a contrary finding” and cannot show a

reasonable probability that a jury would find that his predicate drug

convictions in 2003 and 2014 occurred on the same occasion. Thus,

we affirm as to this issue.

II.

We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a

serious drug offense for ACCA purposes if the issue is preserved;

however, we review unpreserved challenges for plain error. United

States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221, 1229 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 2611 (2024). Under a plain error standard, the

defendant must establish that an error occurred, the error was

plain, and the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id.

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-12742

(quotation marks omitted). “An error is plain if it is obvious or

clear under current law.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Once the

defendant has made such a showing, we may exercise our “discre-

tion to notice the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted).

“To preserve an issue for appeal, one must raise an objection

that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the opposing party of

the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will later be

sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quotation marks omitted). “The objection must be raised in such

clear and simple language that the trial court may not misunder-

stand it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). General objections are

insufficient to preserve “specific sentencing issues for review.”

United States v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1238 (11th Cir. 2015).

However, we have also stated that “while an issue can be waived,

alternative arguments on an issue cannot.” United States v. Horn,

129 F.4th 1275, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025). “[O]nce a party has preserved

an issue, it may make any argument in support of that claim; parties

are not limited to the precise arguments they made below.” United

States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation

marks omitted).

In the district court, Williams’s argument centered around a

mens rea requirement although he claimed that Florida’s definition

of cocaine was broader than the federal definition. He maintains

that same broad argument on appeal but claims rather that the

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20-12742 Opinion of the Court 7

definitions are different because Florida’s drug schedules include

stereoisomers of cocaine, but the federal drug schedules include

only geometric and optical isomers of cocaine.

In 2003 and 2014, Florida prohibited the selling of a “con-

trolled substance,” which controlled “[c]ocaine or ecgonine, in-

cluding any of their stereoisomers, and any salt, compound, deriv-

ative, or preparation of cocaine or ecgonine.” Fla. Stat.

§§ 893.13(1)(e), 893.03(2)(a)(4) (2003); Id. §§ 893.13(c),

893.03(2)(a)(4) (2014). In 2003 and 2014, the federal government

defined cocaine as “cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric iso-

mers, and salts of isomers.” 21 U.S.C. § 812 (schedule II(a)(4))

(2003); 21 U.S.C. § 812 (schedule II(a)(4)) (2014).

Federal law governs the meaning of terms in the ACCA, and

state law governs the elements of state-law crimes. United States v.

Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct.

2457 (2023), and aff’d sub nom., Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101,

144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024). In determining whether a state conviction

is a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA, courts look at “the

version of state law that the defendant was actually convicted of

violating.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “the fed-

eral controlled-substances schedules in effect at the time of the pre-

vious state conviction,” rather than those in effect at the time of

the federal firearm offense, are used to determine whether a prior

state conviction constitutes a serious drug offense. Id. at 856.

Thus, a “prior state drug conviction constitutes an ACCA predicate

if the drugs on the federal and state schedules matched when the

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-12742

state drug offense was committed.” Brown, 602 U.S. at 119, 144 S.

Ct. at 1208.

We apply the categorical approach to determine whether a

defendant’s state conviction is a serious drug offense under the

ACCA. United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846, 850 (11th Cir. 2022),

cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2457 (2023), and aff’d sub nom.,

Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024). Under

the categorical approach, we consider the statutory definition of

the state offense rather than the facts of the crime itself. Id. A state

conviction qualifies only if the state statute under which the con-

viction occurred defines the offense in the same way as, or more

narrowly than, the ACCA’s definition of a serious drug offense. Id.

“The government bears the burden of establishing that an ACCA

sentencing enhancement is warranted.” United States v. Harris, 941

F.3d 1048, 1051 (11th Cir. 2019).

We apply the realistic probability test to determine whether

a state drug schedule covered more conduct than the correspond-

ing federal schedule. Chamu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 23 F.4th 1325, 1330

(11th Cir. 2022) (noting that a litigant must still show that any tex-

tual differences carry actual legal consequences). We found that

“when a state statute with different terminology is nonetheless no

broader than the federal standard[,] no realistic probability of

broader prosecution exists.” Id. We held that the inconsistencies

between the Florida and the federal definition of cocaine did not

themselves show a realistic probability that Florida’s drug

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schedules cover more isomers of cocaine than the federal schedules

do. Id. at 1331-32.

Whether Williams can show the textual differences here

carry actual legal consequences is immaterial because under a plain

error review, he cannot show that any error is plain. We have al-

ready rejected on plain-error review the same stereoisomer-over-

breadth argument that Williams raises here because the purported

error was not clear under current law. See Laines, 69 F.4th at 1234.

Williams cites no precedent establishing that the difference be-

tween stereoisomers of cocaine, as used in Florida’s drug sched-

ules, and geometric and optical isomers of cocaine, as used in the

federal schedules, renders Florida’s definition of cocaine over-

broad. Moreover, Williams cannot show that the purported error

affected his substantial rights. Thus, Williams cannot establish that

the district court plainly err by sentencing him under the ACCA,

and we affirm as to this issue.

III.

We review for plain error a constitutional challenge raised

for the first time on appeal. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815,

828 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___ (U.S. May 19, 2025).

“[T]here can be no plain error where there is no precedent from

the Supreme Court or [our] Court directly resolving” the issue.

United States v. Bolatete, 977 F.3d 1022, 1036 (11th Cir. 2020) (quota-

tion marks omitted).

Williams argues that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) is unconstitutional

because it violates the Commerce Clause, and he also contends that

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-12742

it violates the Second Amendment. Williams’s Commerce Clause

argument is foreclosed by our precedent. We have “clearly held

that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce

Clause.” United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir.

2017), abrogated on other grounds by Erlinger. We have also rejected

as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the gov-

ernment proves a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce where

it demonstrates that the firearms were manufactured outside of the

state where the offense took place and, thus, necessarily traveled in

interstate commerce. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715-16

(11th Cir. 2010).

Williams also fails to show that §922(g)(1) plainly violates

the Second Amendment, facially or as applied to him. Recently,

our court upheld the holding in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768

(11th Cir. 2010), that §922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second

Amendment. See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir.

2024), cert. granted and judgment vacated, ___ U. S. ___, 143 S. Ct.

1041 (Jan. 13, 2025) (No. 24-5744), reinstated by United States v. Du-

bois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025). In Dubois, we held that “Rozier

continues to bind us.” 139 F.4th at 894. Because Rozier remains

our circuit precedent, Williams cannot meet his burden of showing

plain error. Thus, we affirm. See Bolatete, 977 F.3d at 1036.

Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-

firm Williams’s conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon.

AFFIRMED.