Baker v. CA School Employees Assoc.

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 WENDY BAKER, No. 2:23-cv-02857-DAD-SCR

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

14 CALIFORNIA SCHOOL EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION, RIVER DELTA (Doc. No. 34)

15 VALLEY CHAPTER 821, et al.,

16 Defendants.

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18 This matter is before the court on the motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

19 § 1988(b) filed on behalf of defendants Tammy Reynolds and Michelle Rodriguez (collectively,

20 “the District defendants”) on April 24, 2025. (Doc. No. 34.) On May 5, 2025, the pending

21 motion was taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 35.) For the reasons explained

22 below, the court will deny defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.

23 BACKGROUND

24 Plaintiff Wendy Baker, a schoolteacher, filed her first amended complaint (“FAC”) in this

25 action on January 29, 2024. (Doc. No. 5.) According to plaintiff’s allegations in her FAC,

26 defendant Tammy Reynolds is the payroll operations manager for the Stockton Unified School

27 District, and defendant Michelle Rodriguez is the district superintendent. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8.) In her

28 FAC, plaintiff asserted a claim against the District defendants for violation of her procedural due

1 process rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments on the grounds that the District

2 defendants had failed to adopt an internal procedure requiring plaintiff’s teachers’ union to

3 produce a written authorization in the event of a dispute regarding the issue of authorization of

4 union dues.1 (Id. at ¶¶ 118–34.) On February 19, 2025, the court issued an order granting the

5 District defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FAC. (Doc. No. 30.) The court noted in its

6 order that “[c]ourts in the Ninth Circuit confronting similar circumstances to those alleged by

7 plaintiff here—that is, where a local government has relied on information supplied by a union to

8 deduct union dues as required under state law—have concluded seemingly universally that a local

9 government cannot be held liable under § 1983.” (Doc. No. 30 at 13–14.) The court nevertheless

10 dismissed plaintiff’s claims asserted against the District defendants with leave to amend “out of

11 an abundance of caution.” (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff filed a notice of her intent not to file an amended

12 complaint on March 17, 2025. (Doc. No. 31.)

13 On April 24, 2025, the District defendants filed the pending motion for attorneys’ fees.

14 (Doc. No. 34.) Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 8, 2025. (Doc. No. 36.) On May 19, 2025,

15 the District defendants filed their reply thereto. (Doc. No. 37.)

16 LEGAL STANDARD

17 In an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its discretion, may allow

18 the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

19 costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Although this provision does not distinguish between

20 prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, courts have interpreted the statute as treating the

21 two differently. Thomas v. City of Tacoma, 410 F.3d 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2005). A prevailing

22 defendant in a § 1983 action may be awarded attorneys’ fees under § 1988 only when the

23 plaintiff’s action is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Tutor-Saliba Corp. v. City

24 of Hailey, 452 F.3d 1055, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

25 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)); see also Alaska Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v. Feldman, 504 F.3d

26 840, 852 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The terms ‘frivolous’, ‘unreasonable’ and ‘without foundation’ as used

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1 A more complete summary of the allegations of plaintiff’s FAC is contained in the court’s

28 February 19, 2025 order. (See Doc. No. 30 at 2–4.)

1 in this context do not have appreciably different meanings.”). “In determining whether this

2 standard has been met, a district court must . . . avoid ‘post hoc reasoning by concluding that,

3 because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without

4 foundation.’” Tutor-Saliba, 452 F.3d at 1060. “A defendant can recover if the plaintiff violates

5 this standard at any point during the litigation, not just at its inception.” Galen v. Cnty. of Los

6 Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 666 (9th Cir. 2007). “A case may be deemed frivolous only when the

7 ‘result is obvious or the . . . arguments of error are wholly without merit.’” Karam v. City of

8 Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003) (ellipses in original). Accordingly, a defendant

9 may “recover fees and costs from a plaintiff in a civil rights case only ‘in exceptional

10 circumstances[.]’” Harris v. Maricopa Cnty. Superior Ct., 631 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2011).

11 ANALYSIS

12 A. The Parties’ Contentions

13 In their pending motion, the District defendants argue that plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

14 Amendment claims asserted against them were “meritless and groundless under extremely clear

15 existing law.” (Doc. No. 34-1 at 2.) The District defendants point out that the Ninth Circuit has

16 held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. 878 (2018) “imposes no

17 affirmative duty on government entities to ensure that membership agreements and dues

18 deductions are genuine.” (Id. at 3) (quoting Wright v. SEIU, 48 F.4th 1112, 1125 (9th Cir. 2022)).

19 The District defendants further cite to the section of the court’s February 19, 2025 order in which

20 the court noted the many district court decisions and unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions granting

21 motions to dismiss in generally similar circumstances. (Id. at 5.)

22 In opposition, plaintiff advances several unpersuasive arguments, but also argues that her

23 allegations presented an allegedly “novel” situation where “a government employer not only had

24 knowledge of a dispute between an employee and union regarding deductions, but had and

25 refused to exercise the statutory ability to demand proof from the union of the employee’s

26 authorization[.]” (Doc. No. 36 at 6.) Plaintiff argues in similar fashion that no binding authority

27 addressed circumstances like those presented in this case: The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Belgau

28 v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020) did not address a procedural due process claim, and the

1 Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wright did not address a statute with a provision akin to the one at

2 issue here, California Education Code § 45168(7).2 (Id. at 14.)

3 In reply, the District defendants again cite the section of the court’s February 19, 2025

4 order listing the many district court decisions and unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions addressing

5 allegations that “a local government has relied on information supplied by a union to deduct

6 union dues as required under state law[.]” (Doc. No. 37 at 2) (citing Doc. No. 30 at 13–14).

7 B. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Were Frivolous

8 California Education Code § 45168(7) provides in relevant part:

9 A classified or recognized employee organization that certifies that

it has and will maintain individual employee authorizations shall not

10 be required to submit to the governing board of a public school

employer a copy of the employee’s written authorization in order for

11 the payroll deductions described in this section to be effective, unless

a dispute arises about the existence or terms of the written

12 authorization.

13 Cal. Educ. Code § 45168(7) (emphasis added). In its February 19, 2025 order, the court

14 considered plaintiff’s argument that § 45168(7) removed this case from the ambit of the Ninth

15 Circuit’s decisions in Belgau, Wright, and Ochoa. (See Doc. No. 30 at 15–16.) The court

16 rejected plaintiff’s argument in this regard. (Id.) While no court had previously considered

17 § 45168, at least two district courts had considered a California statute containing nearly identical

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2 Plaintiff also argues that the district court’s decision in Mendez v. California Teachers

24 Association, 419 F. Supp. 3d 1182 (N.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d 854 F. App’x 920 (9th Cir. 2021), is

the only decision with “precedential weight” other than Belgau and Wright, and that Mendez is

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also distinguishable. (Doc. No. 36 at 13–14.) It is unclear whether plaintiff intended to refer to

the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Ochoa v. Public Consulting Group, 48 F.4th 1102 (9th Cir. 2022),

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which is the third binding precedent that courts in the Ninth Circuit typically apply—along with

27 Belgau and Wright—when considering allegations regarding a government employer’s failure to

deduct union dues pursuant to state law. In any event, the state statute at issue in Ochoa also did

28 not contain any provision similar to § 45168(7). See Wash. Rev. Code § 41.56.113.

1 language3 after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinions in Wright and Ochoa and nevertheless found

2 that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under § 1983 against the local government entities.

3 See Parde v. SEIU, No. 22-cv-03320-GW-PLA, Doc. No. 88 at 7–9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2022);

4 Craine v. AFSCME, No. 22-cv-03310-DSF-SK, 2023 WL 2379217, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 1,

5 2023). The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed those decisions in unpublished opinions. See

6 Parde v. SEIU, No. 23-55021, 2024 WL 2106182 (9th Cir. May 10, 2024); Craine v. AFSCME,

7 Nos. 23-55206, 23-55369, 2024 WL 1405390 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2024). The Ninth Circuit had

8 previously issued an unpublished opinion finding similarly. See Deering v. IBEW, No. 22-55458,

9 2023 WL 6970169, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2023).

10 However, while the court was ultimately not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument in this

11 regard, the court cannot find that such an argument was “wholly without merit.” Karam, 352

12 F.3d at 1195. Multiple district court decisions and unpublished Ninth Circuit opinions had

13 rejected liability for municipal defendants in connection with a nearly identical statute. But no

14 binding authority had addressed a statute with a provision similar to § 45168(7). See Taylor AG

15 Indus. v. Pure-Gro, 54 F.3d 555, 565 (9th Cir. 1995) (“It is true that in this case, the law has been

16 clearly established not only by the Supreme Court but seven other courts of appeal. However,

17 this circuit has never spoken on the issue, and Appellants’ argument cannot be characterized as

18 ‘wholly without merit.’ An award of attorney’s fees is not appropriate.”); Galen, 477 F.3d at 667

19 (“In the absence of controlling Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court authority . . . Galen’s

20 perseverance in his suit was not unreasonable.”). The court must “avoid ‘post hoc reasoning by

21 concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been

22 unreasonable or without foundation.’” Tutor-Saliba, 452 F.3d at 1060.

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25 3 California Government Code § 1157.12(a) provides in relevant part:

26 An employee organization that certifies that it has and will maintain

individual employee authorizations shall not be required to provide

27 a copy of an individual authorization to the public employer unless a

dispute arises about the existence or terms of the authorization.

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1 Accordingly, the District defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

2 | § 1988(b) will be denied.*

3 CONCLUSION

4 For the reasons explained above, the motion for attorneys’ fees filed on behalf of

5 | defendants Tammy Reynolds and Michelle Rodriguez (Doc. No. 34) is DENIED.

6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: _ July 1, 2025 Da A. 2, aye

8 DALE A. DROZD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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> + The pending motion will be denied for the reasons explained in this order. However, the court

5 additionally notes that despite the many district court decisions and unpublished Ninth Circuit

26 | Opinions applying Belgau, Wright, and Ochoa, each addressing slightly different factual

circumstances, the District defendants have not directed the court’s attention to any decision

27 || granting a motion for attorneys’ fees in those cases. Nor has the court located any. Cf Harris,

631 F.3d at 968 (noting that a defendant in a civil rights case may recover attorneys’ fees “only

28 | ‘in exceptional circumstances’”).