Shaw v. Habitat for Humanity

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

TEKEVA SHAW, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02217-SHL-atc

)

HABITAT FOR HUMANITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff Tekeva Shaw filed a pro se Complaint alleging claims under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Habitat for Humanity – Memphis (“Habitat”) and Regions

Bank (“Regions”).1 (ECF No. 1.) On April 26, 2024, Shaw filed an “Amendment,” listening

multiple additional corporate and individual Defendants. (ECF No. 7.) Shaw also filed a motion

to proceed in forma pauperis, which was subsequently granted. (ECF Nos. 2, 6.)

On November 14, 2024, the Court found that Shaw had failed to adequately plead a

§ 1983 claim and ordered her to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 9.) On November 26,

2024, Shaw filed her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 10.) For the following reasons, it is

recommended that Shaw’s federal claims be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the

Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Shaw’s state-law claims.

1 This case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management and for all

pretrial matters for determination and/or report and recommendation as appropriate. (Admin.

Order 2013-05, Apr. 29, 2013.)

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

In her original Complaint, Shaw’s factual allegations against Habitat and Regions

consisted entirely of the following: “Habitat for Humanity has violated building codes as well as

bundle of rights. Also other violations. Regions Bank is violating rights by Redlining and

exploiting. Also other violations.” (ECF No. 1, at 2.) In her April 26th Amendment, Shaw

listed the following as additional Defendants: Irving Mazzanet (Regions Mortgage Department),

Marvin M. (Regions Loan Servicing Department), Anthony Williams (Regions), Julie Romine

(Habitat), Alan Massing (Habitat), Adrian Turner (Habitat), Treva Sease (Habitat) Daniel Craig

and Linda S./Ellendale Electric, Don Story/Bluff City Fence Company, Allstate Insurance –

Tyson Oakman Agency (“Allstate”), and Ruby Williams/State Farm Insurance Company (“State

Farm”). (ECF No. 7.)

In her Amended Complaint, Shaw lists seven causes of action: (1) “breach of contract,”

(2) “violation of property rights,” (3) “private inurement,” (4) “violation of privacy,”

(5) “harassment/exploitation,” (6) “violation of building codes and safety codes,” and (7)

“redlining.”2 (ECF. No. 10, at 1.) Shaw’s allegations stem from the purchase and construction

of her home. (Id.) She broadly alleges that Habitat and the other Defendants violated her

contract and privacy rights relating to the construction of her home, including by rigging her

home with “illegal monitoring” devices that are “able to connect with your brain waves, causing

2 Shaw does not include a § 1983 in her Amended Complaint as she did in her original

Complaint. Even if she had, such a claim would be subject to dismissal because she has not pled

a violation of a federal right that “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Hudson v. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:21-cv-392, 2021 WL 5782471, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 7,

2021) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,

814 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also McRee v. Renasant Bank Legal Dep’t, No. 16-cv-2879-JDT-dkv,

2017 WL 31470, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2017) (“A § 1983 plaintiff may not sue purely private

parties.” (quoting Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 567 (6th Cir. 1999))). Here, all of

Shaw’s allegations involve private actions by private parties, such that § 1983 is inapplicable.

them to be able to read your thoughts and mind.” (Id. at 1–2.) Shaw also contends that Regions

and Habitat had an undisclosed partnership relating to the extension of unidentified “promotional

offers” that may be related to a homeowners insurance quote from State Farm and an automobile

policy offer from Allstate that Shaw vaguely references in the Amended Complaint. (ECF No.

10, at 3–4.) Otherwise, her allegations consist of complaints relating to the quality of home

construction and maintenance services provided by various Defendants. (Id.) Shaw seeks

compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000,000 from Defendants. (Id. at 4.)

PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I. 28. U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) Screening

Under Local Rule 4.1(b)(2), the Clerk of the Court will only issue summonses in cases

with non-prisoner pro se plaintiffs who are proceeding in forma pauperis at the Court’s direction

after the Court conducts a screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that provision, the Court shall

dismiss the case at any time if it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails

to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” This Report and Recommendation constitutes the Court’s

screening.

II. Standard of Review for Failure to State a Claim

To determine whether Shaw’s Amended Complaint states a claim for which relief may be

granted, the Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as

articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007). “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court “construes the complaint in a light

most favorable to [the] plaintiff” and “accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine

whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. HDC, LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675

F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012).

Pleadings provide facial plausibility when they present “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. However, “pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not

entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket

assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to

see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature

of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).

“[A] pleading filed pro se is to be liberally construed and held to less stringent standards

than a pleading filed by counsel.” Kondaur Cap. Corp. v. Smith, 802 F. App’x 938, 945 (6th Cir.

2020) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)); see also Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416

F. App’x 560, 562 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding the less stringent standard applies to pro se

complaints, “however inartfully pleaded”). Nevertheless, pro se litigants “are not exempt from

the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Wright v. Penguin Random House,

783 F. App’x 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Fox v. Mich. State Police Dep’t, 173 F. App’x 372,

376 (6th Cir. 2006)); see also Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011)

(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf

of pro se litigants. Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, but it would also transform

the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes into advocates for a particular party. While courts are

properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come before it, that responsibility does not

encompass advising litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”); Brown v.

Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] court cannot ‘create a claim which a

plaintiff has not spelled out in his pleading.’”) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co.,

518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)). “A pro se complaint must still ‘contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Shelby v.

Greystar Mgmt. Servs., L.P., No. 2:17-cv-02650-SHM-cgc, 2018 WL 386647, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.

Jan. 11, 2018) (quoting Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x. 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011)).

III. Shaw’s Fair Housing Act Claims

Though her allegations and claims are difficult to parse, Shaw has stated primarily state-

law causes of action for breach of contract, breach of property rights, breach of privacy rights,

and breach of housing codes relating to the construction and maintenance of her home. When

construing the Amended Complaint in a light most favorable to Shaw and giving her the benefit

of every possible doubt with respect to her allegations, the only claims under federal law that

Shaw attempts to bring are claims for discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42

U.S.C. § 3605, which provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity whose business includes

engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against any

person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of

such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,

or national origin.

To state a claim under § 3605, a plaintiff “must plead” that

(1) they were a member of a protected class; (2) they attempted to engage in a

“real estate-related transaction” with the defendant, and met all relevant

qualifications for doing so; (3) the defendant refused to transact business with the

plaintiffs despite their qualifications; and (4) the defendant continued to engage in

that type of transaction with other parties with similar qualifications.

Ray v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 627 F. App’x 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Here,

Shaw has not pled that she met all relevant qualifications for the housing-related services that she

was allegedly denied, and she has not pled that Defendants continued to engage in those services

with others who have similar qualifications. But most importantly, Shaw has not pled

membership in any protected class with respect to the alleged discrimination.

In the Amended Complaint, Shaw supports her claim that Regions, Habitat,

Allstate, State Farm, Germantown Pest Control, and Bluff City Fence Company engaged

in discrimination by alleging:

Regions has a partnership with Habitat for Humanity that was not disclosed to me.

They have reached out to me to offer me promotional offers, but once they get my

information, they say that I am not qualified due to the specific area that I am in.

They have repeatedly harassed me although they know that I must go through

Habitat for Humanity first. Bluff City Fence Co., Allstate Insurance, State Farm

Insurance and Germantown Pest Control are all partnered with Habitat for

Humanity and it was not disclosed to me. Bluff City Fence Co. installed a fence

backwards and did not include all of my property, State Farm Insurance provided

a home insurance quote without me giving them my home information, Allstate

Insurance has engaged in harassment and offered me auto insurance just to

[renege] and say I do not qualify because I am not old enough, and Germantown

Pest Control has sprayed the lawn with chemicals that kills trees and brings

weeds.

(ECF No. 10, at 3–4.) Shaw fails to allege membership in a protected class under § 3605 that

relate to any of her allegations. Shaw’s only allegation of discrimination based on what could

characterized as a protected characteristic (age) is against Allstate, who Shaw alleges denied her

auto-insurance due to her young age. But being too young is not a protected class under § 3605,

and the services that were allegedly denied (auto-insurance) are not a “real estate-related

transactions.” Because Shaw fails to plead discrimination claims under § 3605, it is

recommended that they be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IV. Shaw’s State-Law Claims

In this case, the Court only has original subject matter jurisdiction over Shaw’s § 3605

claims, which should be dismissed, and she fails to adequately allege any jurisdictional basis

over her state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of property rights, breach of privacy

rights, and breach of housing codes. Those claims, “at most, [are] claims arising under state

law” McRee, 2017 WL 31470, at *1 (dismissing the case during the § 1915(e) screening process

because the plaintiff failed to adequately plead federal question jurisdiction or diversity

jurisdiction), and thus can independently support this Court’s jurisdiction only if they meet the

requirements of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. “For diversity jurisdiction to

exist, there must be complete diversity between the parties, plus an amount in controversy

exceeding $75,000.” Austin v. Econo Auto Painting of W. Tenn., Inc., No. 23-cv-02209-TLP-

tmp, 2023 WL 9105660 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 19, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023

WL 8952134 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 28, 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). Complete diversity of

citizenship exists when “no plaintiff and no defendant are citizens of the same state.” Id. (citing

Jerome-Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, LLC, 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Here, though Shaw has stated an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, complete

diversity does not exist between the parties. Shaw alleges that she and nearly all of the

Defendants are Tennessee residents—only some of the Regions-related Defendants are alleged to

reside outside of Tennessee. All of the Habitat-related Defendants and each of the remaining

Defendants are alleged to be Tennessee residents, thus foreclosing § 1332(a) jurisdiction due to a

lack of complete diversity.

Because this Court recommends dismissal of Shaw’s federal claims and does not have

diversity jurisdiction over her state-law claims, it is further recommended that the Court decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claims. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a

district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims if it has dismissed all

claims over which it has original subject matter jurisdiction. Moses v. Gardner, No. 2:14-cv-

2706-SHL-dkv, 2017 WL 1364977, at *16 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 12, 2017); see also Brooks v.

Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009) (“If the federal claims are dismissed before trial, the

state claims generally should be dismissed as well.”) (quoting Wojnicz v. Davis, 80 F. App’x

382, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2003)). Regardless of whether Shaw’s claims against Defendants have

merit, this Court is not the proper jurisdiction to pursue them.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Shaw’s § 3605 claims be

dismissed with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted. It is further recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over her state-law claims against Defendants and that they be dismissed without

prejudice.

Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of June, 2025.

s/Annie T. Christoff

ANNIE T. CHRISTOFF

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation

disposition, a party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings and

recommendations. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14)

days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within

fourteen (14) days may constitute forfeiture/waiver of objections, exceptions, and further

appeal.