Couch v. Crites

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

LAMAR COUCH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:24-CV-340-KAC-CHS

)

MISTY CRITES, STACY OAKES, SGT. )

GRIBSON, U.M. FRANIS, MORGAN )

COUNTY CORRECTIONAL COMPLEX, )

SGT. HEWITT, U.M. BELL, and DAVID )

VINCENT, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, a Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) prisoner housed in the Morgan

County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), filed a pro se complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging various unrelated claims against different Defendants [Doc. 4], a supplement to

his complaint [Doc. 4-1], and a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1]. Each of

those filings is currently before the Court. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc 1] and DISMISSES this action because the

complaint filings [Docs. 4, 4-1], even liberally construed, fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under Section 1983.

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may

apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A

review of Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. 1] shows that he lacks sufficient resources to pay the filing fee

in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion

[Doc. 1] and ASSESSES Plaintiff the civil filing fee of $350.00.

The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account SHALL submit to the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, U.S. District Court, 900 Georgia Avenue, Suite 309, Chattanooga, Tennessee, 37402 twenty

percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust

account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars

($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the Court’s

financial deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure

compliance with the PLRA’s requirements for payment of the filing fee.

II. COMPLAINT SCREENING

A. Standard

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the Complaint

and sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or

are against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Because Hill’s lawsuit seeks redress from

governmental officers, and because Hill proceeded in forma pauperis, the district court screened

Hill’s complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)).”).

The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state

a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language

tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill, 630 F.3d at

470-71. Thus, to survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later establish

undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible claim.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of

a claim that are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. However, the Supreme Court has instructed that courts should liberally

construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent standard than

“formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

B. Complaint Allegations

On January 31, 2024, Plaintiff “was allowed into T-Com” without approval from

Defendants Misty Crites and David Vincent, and these Defendants then “conspired to get

[Plaintiff] kick[ed] out of T-COM” [Doc. 4 at 3-4]. Specifically, according to Plaintiff, he and

another inmate received the same disciplinary sanction, but Plaintiff was kicked out of “T-Com”

on February 7, 2024, “[b]ecause he was a different race or color th[a]n the staff” in a manner that

disregarded TDOC and/or “T-COM” policies and rules [Id.].

Then, on June 6, 2024, after Plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation, Defendant Sgt.

Gribson postponed Plaintiff’s disciplinary board hearing for fourteen (14) days without his

approval, in alleged violation of TDOC policy [Id.]. Defendant Sgt. Gribson then held Plaintiff’s

disciplinary hearing even though another prisoner had admitted and pled guilty to the incident

underlying that hearing because “they” planned to discriminate against him because of his “race,

color,” political and religious views, and an unspecified “personal relationship” [Id. at 4].

From June 6, 2024, through July 22, 2024, Defendants Sgt. Hewitt and Bell refused to

allow Plaintiff “basic need[s]” including library, religion, hygiene, recreation, and “leisure

services” [Id.]. They also “barely allowed” Plaintiff clothes, laundry, mail, telephone, and

commissary [Id.]. According to Plaintiff, these Defendants “us[ed] the[ir] position to

discrimin[a]te against [his] race, color, or religious view[,] and personal relationship” [Id.].

On September 9, 2024, Defendant Franis moved a “homosexual with a Std” into Plaintiff’s

cell even though it was against Plaintiff’s “will, religion, and political view to live with one”

[Doc. 4-1 at 1]. Plaintiff “went through the proper channels to file [] a CR-2532 form twice[] and

still was ignored” by the prison, presumably because his living arrangements were not

changed [Id.]. Based on these allegations, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Franis

“discriminated against [Plaintiff’s] religion and political view” [Id.].

Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Stacy Oakes on May 1, May 6, May 18, and June 6, 2024, to

“inform him of the injustices on discriminate at his institution” [Doc. 4-1 at 1]. But Defendant

Oakes did not do any investigation or inquiry (or respond to Plaintiff’s correspondence with any

such indication), even though “he is the acting title IV coordinator” [Id.].

Plaintiff sued Misty Crites, Sgt. Gribson, Sgt. Hewitt, U.M. Franis, U.M. Bell, Stacey

Oakes, David Vincent, and the Morgan County Correctional Complex [Doc. 4 at 1, 3]. As relief,

Plaintiff seeks “compensation for [his] time los[t]” and “[t]o bring awareness to this situation[] so

they won’t keep doing this” [Id. at 5].

C. Analysis

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person

acting under color of state law deprived him of a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. Equal Protection Claim

Plaintiff attributes nearly all the incidents in his complaint to discrimination. However,

Plaintiff does not set forth a plausible claim for violation of his right to equal protection. The

Equal Protection Clause commands that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a viable equal protection

claim, “a plaintiff must adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as

compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a

fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’” Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform,

Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org.,

Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, Mich., 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006)). A plaintiff must be

“similarly situated” to his comparators in “all relevant respects.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,

10 (1992); see also Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (“‘Similarly

situated’ is a term of art—a comparator . . . must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’”).

Plaintiff generally states that he was subjected to discrimination based on race and political

and/or religious views, as well as an unspecified personal relationship. But he does not set forth

facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that any Defendant treated a similarly situated

inmate of a different race, political view, religion, or unspecified personal relationship differently

than that Defendant treated Plaintiff as it related to any incident in the Complaint. The closest

Plaintiff comes to stating sufficient facts are his assertions that another inmate received the same

disciplinary sanction as him, but Plaintiff was kicked out of the “T-Com” program because he was

a different race than the “staff” [Doc. 4 at 4]. But Plaintiff does not state his own race or the race

of the inmate who allegedly received the same disciplinary sanction as Plaintiff but was not

removed from “T-Com.” Nor does the Complaint include facts from which the Court could

plausibly infer that this inmate was otherwise similarly situated to Plaintiff in all relevant respects.

See Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 648 F.3d at 379 (finding that a complaint failed to state an

equal protection claim where it did not “make a plausible allegation that similarly situated . . .

individuals, of a different political viewpoint, have not been subject to the same alleged treatment

by Defendants”); see also Nali v. Ekman, 355 F. App’x 909, 913 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that a

claim for race discrimination in prison discipline must be supported by allegations “that the people

not disciplined were similarly situated and of a different race” to state an equal protection claim).

As such, the Complaint fails to allege a plausible equal protection claim. And the Court

DISMISSES any equal protection claim.

2. Defendant MCCX

Plaintiff named MCCX as a Defendant in his Complaint [See Doc. 4 at 1]. But MCCX is

not an entity that is subject to suit under Section 1983. See Anderson v. Morgan Cnty. Corr.

Complex, No. 15-6344, 2016 WL 9402910, *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 21, 2016) (finding that a state prison

and its “medical staff” were not subject to suit under § 1983). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES

Defendant MCCX.

3. Defendants Crites and Vincent

Plaintiff’s only remaining allegations against Defendants Crites and Vincent are that they

conspired to kick him out of “T-Com” in a manner that violated TDOC and “T-Com” rules and

policies [Doc. 4 at 3-4]. But Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and therefore fails to state a

plausible Section 1983 conspiracy claim. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 (6th

Cir. 1987) (providing that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and

“vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such

a claim”). Additionally, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a prison rehabilitation

program. See Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 429 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Prisoners have no

constitutional right to rehabilitation, education, or jobs.”). And the violation of a TDOC or “T-

Com” rule or policy alone is not enough to state a constitutional claim. Accordingly, the Court

cannot plausibly infer that Defendants Crites or Vincent violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,

and the Court DISMISSES them from this action.

4. Defendant Gribson

The Complaint alleges after Plaintiff was placed in punitive segregation, Defendant

Gribson postponed Plaintiff’s disciplinary board hearing for fourteen (14) days without Plaintiff’s

approval in violation of TDOC policy and then held that hearing even though another prisoner had

admitted and pled guilty to the incident [Doc. 4 at 4]. But the Complaint does not set forth facts

from which the Court can plausibly infer that these acts violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

First, to the extent that Plaintiff claims that his placement in punitive segregation without

a hearing violated his due process rights, this allegation is without merit. Specifically, in Sandin

v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Supreme Court concluded that a prisoner’s due process

rights could be violated by a sanction only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration

of his sentence” or imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; see also Jones v. Baker, 155

F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998). The Court concluded that mere placement in segregation did not

implicate a liberty interest because that placement did not impose an atypical and significant

hardship. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-23 (2005).

Plaintiff has not set forth any facts from which the Court can plausibly infer that his time

in punitive segregation without a hearing inevitably affected the duration of his sentence or was

unusually or significantly more restrictive than his usual prison accommodations. See Warfield v.

Washburn, No. 3:19-CV-00650, 2020 WL 70881, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 7, 2020) (finding that

the plaintiff’s “alleged 40-day confinement in punitive segregation” did not qualify as an “‘atypical

and significant hardship’” under Sandin where the plaintiff did not describe any of the restrictions

to which he was subjected in that segregation) (citations omitted). And while Plaintiff alleges that

the postponement of his disciplinary hearing without his approval violated TDOC policies,

violation of TDOC policy alone is not actionable under Section 1983. See Johnson v. Lewis, No.

3:23-CV-00660, 2023 WL 5663082, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2023). Moreover, TDOC policies

and regulations do not create a liberty interest for purposes of due process. Taylor v. Dukes, 25 F.

App’x 423, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, the allegations that Defendant Gribson proceeded with a disciplinary hearing

against Plaintiff even though another prisoner had already admitted and pled guilty to the incident

underlying that hearing does not allow the Court to plausibly infer a violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Perhaps most importantly, Plaintiff does not present any facts from which

the Court could plausibly infer that the other prisoner’s guilt precluded Plaintiff from being guilty

of the same offense. But even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged that the other inmate’s guilt meant

that Plaintiff could not also be guilty of the offense, this does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-71 (1974) (providing that inmates do not

have the right to be free from charges or convictions for prison disciplinary offenses); Person v.

Campbell, No. 98-5638, 1999 WL 454819, at *1 (6th Cir. June 21, 1999) (“[T]he filing of false

disciplinary charges against an inmate does not constitute a constitutional violation redressable

under § 1983.”).

Accordingly, the complaint fails to state a plausible claim for violation of Section 1983 as

to Defendant Gribson, and the Court DISMISSES him from this action.

5. Defendants Hewitt and Bell

The Complaint also asserts that for weeks, Defendants Hewitt and Bell refused to allow

him “basic need[s]” and “leisure services” and “barely allowed” him clothes, laundry, mail,

telephone, and commissary [Id.]. However, Plaintiff does not support these conclusory allegations

with any facts from which the Court could find that these denials rose to the level of a constitutional

violation. Without more, these allegations are merely “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” which fail to state a plausible claim

for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. According, the Court DISMISSES these Defendants.

6. Defendant Franis

The Complaint alleges that Defendant Franis moved a “homosexual with a Std” into

Plaintiff’s cell against Plaintiff’s “will, religion, and political view to live with one” and that the

prison refused to change the living arrangement [See Doc. 4-1 at 1]. “The Free Exercise Clause

of the First Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that

‘Congress shall make no law. . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” Fulton v. City of

Philadelphia, Penn., 593 U.S. 522, 532 (2021). Imprisonment “does not eliminate an individual’s

constitutional protections.” Ali v. Adamson, 132 F.4th 924, 935 (6th Cir. 2025). “But the ‘complex

and intractable problems of prison administration’ require due consideration in applying

constitutional guarantees.” Id. (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001)).

Here, the allegations of the Complaint do not allow the Court to plausibly infer that

Defendant Franis violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Complaint does not allege that

Defendant Franis was aware of, knew of, or should have known of Plaintiff’s religious objection

to living with the inmate at issue [See Doc. 4-1]. The Complaint only alleges that Defendant Franis

moved the inmate into the cell [See id.]. “Section 1983 liability turns ‘only on’ each officer’s ‘own

[alleged] unconstitutional behavior.’” Ali, 132 F.4th at 936 (quoting Heyerman v. County of

Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012)). Without something more, Defendant Franis is not

liable for any violation of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights that may have occurred. See id. at

935-36. According, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Franis.

7. Defendant Oakes

Finally, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff wrote to Defendant Oakes several times in May

and June of 2024 to “inform him of the injustices on discriminate at this institution,” but Defendant

Oakes did not conduct an adequate investigation or inquiry [Doc. 4-1 at 1]. These allegations fail

to state a claim. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to either an investigation by a

supervisor or a response to his grievance from a supervisor. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,

300 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that a failure to respond to or remedy a prisoner’s grievance was

insufficient to impose liability on supervisory personnel under Section 1983); Mitchell v. McNeil,

487 F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2007) (“There is no statutory or common law right, much less

a constitutional right, to an investigation.” (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

(1973))). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Defendant Oakes.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[Doc. 1];

2. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts MUST submit the filing fee to

the Clerk in the manner set forth above;

4. The Clerk MUST provide a copy of this Memorandum & Order to the custodian of

inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and the Court’s

financial deputy;

5. Even liberally construing the Complaint, it fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted under Section 1983;

6. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSED this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A; and

7. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good

faith and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24. Therefore, should

Plaintiff file a notice of appeal, he is DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

/s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge