Corbin v. Prummell, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

SANDRA CORBIN and JOHN

CORBIN,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 2:22-cv-394-JES-KCD

BILL PRUMMELL, JR., in his

official capacity as

Sheriff of the Charlotte

County, Florida Sheriff’s

Office, and AARON

WILLIAMS, individually and

in his official capacity

as a Deputy for the

Charlotte County Sheriff’s

Office,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Deputy Aaron Williams’

(Deputy Williams or Defendant) Amended Post Trial Brief on

Qualified Immunity (Doc. #179) and Sandra and John Corbin’s

(Plaintiffs or the Corbins) Amended Post Trial Brief on Qualified

Immunity. (Doc. #186.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

finds Deputy Williams is entitled to qualified immunity and

directs the Clerk to enter judgment accordingly.

I.

The Corbins filed this action against a county sheriff and

several deputies after a traffic stop on November 29, 2019. In

relevant part, Sandra Corbin (Mrs. Corbin) asserted federal

claims against Deputy Williams for false arrest and excessive

force under the Fourth Amendment, and state law claims of

battery, assault, and loss of consortium. (Doc. #1.) John Corbin

(Mr. Corbin) asserted a loss of consortium claim. (Id.) The Court

denied the qualified immunity defense raised by Deputy Williams

in his motion to dismiss. (Doc. #67.) Deputy Williams’ Answer

asserted, among other things, an affirmative defense of qualified

immunity. (Doc. #69, p. 18.) The Court denied the qualified

immunity defense raised in motions for summary judgment (Doc.

#131), and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

During their respective trial testimony, Deputy Williams

and Mrs. Corbin gave diverging accounts of important portions of

their encounter. Mrs. Corbin testified that:

At about 9:00 p.m. on November 29, 2019, Mrs. Corbin and

her husband, Mr. Corbin, left a local establishment called the

Sandbar and Grille. Mr. Corbin was driving the vehicle and Mrs.

Corbin was in the passenger seat. The vehicle was pulled over by

Deputy Davidson and came to a stop in a sloped McDonalds’ parking

lot. Deputy Davidson asked Mr. Corbin if he had anything to drink

and Mr. Corbin responded he had had two beers. Deputy Davidson

said, “I can smell alcohol now,” and asked Mr. Corbin if he would

submit to a field sobriety test (FST). Mr. Corbin agreed to the

FST and walked with Deputy Davidson to a nearby parking lot which

had a flatter surface.

Mrs. Corbin stayed in the passenger seat of the vehicle

until she heard a scream and saw people pointing at something.

Fearing her husband was in trouble, Mrs. Corbin got out of the

vehicle. Deputy Williams, who had recently arrived at the scene,

stood in front of her and told her to get back in the vehicle.

She did so.

Mrs. Corbin remained in the vehicle until she again heard

screaming and saw people pointing. Mrs. Corbin then exited the

vehicle for the second time. Deputy Williams again stood in front

of her, not saying anything but just looking at her. Mrs. Corbin

started to say, “my husband . . .,” when Deputy Williams kicked

or leg swept her to the asphalt by hitting the side of her knee

with his leg. Mrs. Corbin testified she crashed head-first into

the asphalt, urinated on herself, and was then handcuffed by

Deputy Williams.

Deputy Williams testified that:

He arrived at the scene as a backup officer after the Corbin

vehicle had been stopped and while both Corbins were still inside

the vehicle. Deputy Williams spoke with Deputy Davidson, who was

going to perform a FST on Mr. Corbin because Deputy Davidson

believed Mr. Corbin had been driving impaired. Mr. Corbin and

Deputy Davidson walked to a nearby parking lot which had a

flatter surface for the FST. Deputy Williams stayed behind

watching Mrs. Corbin, who was sitting in the vehicle yelling.

Mrs. Corbin got out of the vehicle, still yelling, and began

walking in the direction of the FST. Deputy Williams stepped in

front of her, placing himself between Mrs. Corbin and the FST

site, and told her to get back in the car and to stay in the

vehicle. Ms. Corbin returned to the vehicle, where she kept

yelling.

Shortly thereafter Mrs. Corbin got out of the car for a

second time, still yelling, again walking towards the FST

location. Deputy Williams again placed himself between Mrs.

Corbin and the FST site, telling Mrs. Corbin to stop and to get

back into the vehicle or she would be arrested. Mrs. Corbin said

he would have to arrest her. Deputy Williams grabbed Mrs.

Corbin’s wrist, but she kept moving and struggling, attempting

to push past him. At that point, Deputy Williams performed a leg

sweep on Mrs. Corbin by striking both her calves with the calf

of his left leg. Deputy Williams controlled her fall to the

ground, and applied handcuffs when she was on the ground in her

own urine.

Deputy Williams testified that he perceived Mrs. Corbin to

be older than he was, but about the same height and strong enough

to push past him. He also testified that Mrs. Corbin was

constantly screaming, slurring her speech, and emanating an odor

of alcoholic beverages on her person and breath, with the general

demeanor of a drunk person.

Mrs. Corbin was taken to a hospital, where she was diagnosed

with a fractured tibia. Mrs. Corbin ultimately underwent two

surgeries for the injury.

The parties’ experts presented conflicting opinions as to

the leg sweep. The Corbins’ expert opined that, under either

version of events, the leg maneuver Deputy Williams used on Mrs.

Corbin was not proportionate to her actions, was not a properly

executed leg sweep, and was more akin to a kick. Deputy Williams’

expert opined that, under Deputy Williams’ version of events,

the leg maneuver Deputy Williams used on Mrs. Corbin was a

properly executed leg sweep whose force was proportionate to her

actions.

The jury verdict rejected Mrs. Corbins’ state law claims of

false arrest, battery, and assault against Deputy Williams, but

found Deputy Williams liable to Mrs. Corbin for excessive force

and liable to Mr. Corbin for loss of consortium. The compensatory

damages were $1.7 million for excessive force and $300,000 for

loss of consortium. No punitive damages were awarded.

After the jury verdict was read, defense counsel requested

four special interrogatories be submitted to the jury to resolve

the unsettled qualified immunity issue. Through these special

interrogatories, Deputy Williams wanted to know if he had been

“objectively reasonable” and whether Mrs. Corbin had resisted.

(See Doc. #174-1, ¶¶ 5-8.) The Court declined to send those

proposed special interrogatories to the jury.1

The sole question now before the Court is whether Deputy

Williams is entitled to qualified immunity.

II.

The qualified immunity general principles are well-

established. Qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for torts committed while performing

discretionary duties unless the conduct violates a clearly

established statutory or constitutional right of which a

reasonable person would have known. Gervin v. Florence, No. 23-

11452, 2025 WL 1618289, at *16 (11th Cir. June 9, 2025). The

government official must first prove he or she was acting within

the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful

act occurred. DeMarcus v. Univ. of S. Alabama, 133 F.4th 1305,

1 The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that, in the qualified immunity

context, any “jury interrogatories should be restricted to the who-

what-when-where-why type of historical fact issues,” Johnson v.

Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002), and that “the question

of whether the officer's perceptions and attendant actions were

objectively reasonable under th[e] circumstances is a question of law

for the court.” Simmons v. Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1164 (11th Cir.

2018). The first two proposed interrogatories asked whether Deputy

Williams was “objectively reasonable”, and defense counsel conceded

that the “proposed questions, . . . involved mixed questions of law

and fact.” (Doc. #179, p. 20.) The last two proposed interrogatories—

asking the jury about two alleged instances of resistance by Mrs.

Corbin—were “irrelevant to the qualified immunity issue in light of

the verdict and jury findings,” Johnson, 280F.3d at 1323, because it

was evident the jury found Mrs. Corbin resisted or obstructed, as

explained later herein.

1317 (11th Cir. 2025). If successful, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show a violation of clearly established federal

statutory or constitutional rights. Id.

Three limitations are placed on the legal authorities a

plaintiff may use to satisfy her burden. Gervin, at *17. First,

a plaintiff may rely only on three types of substantive law: (1)

case law with indistinguishable facts; (2) a broad statement of

principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law; or (3)

conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly

violated, even in the total absence of case law. Id.; Lewis v.

City of W. Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009).

Second, a plaintiff may only point to applicable law from

the following jurisdictions: Binding decisions of the Supreme

Court of the United States, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the pertinent

state, here the Florida Supreme Court. Gervin, at *17; Wate v.

Kubler, 839 F.3d 1012, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016).

Third, a plaintiff may rely only on law developed at the

time of the alleged conduct. Gervin, at *17. “[F]or the law to

be clearly established to the point that qualified immunity does

not protect a government official, pre-existing law must dictate,

that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a

question about), the conclusion for every like-situated,

reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates

federal law in the circumstances.” King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d

1135, 1145 (11th Cir. 2020)(quoting Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d

1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2000)).

While entitlement to qualified immunity is a question of

law for the court, resolution can sometimes turn on issues of

fact resolved at a trial. Simmons, 879 F.3d at 1163-64. In such

situations, “the court uses the jury’s factual findings to render

its ultimate legal determination as to whether it would be

evident to a reasonable officer, in light of clearly established

law, that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Id. at 1164. “In other words, the question of what

circumstances existed at the time of the encounter is a question

of fact for the jury – but the question of whether the officer’s

perceptions and attendant actions were objectively reasonable

under those circumstances is a question of law for the court.”

Id.

“In determining whether a government official is entitled

to qualified immunity following a jury verdict, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed

at trial.” Bailey v. Swindell, 89 F.4th 1324, 1329 (11th Cir.

2024)(quoting Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275,

1290 (11th Cir. 2000). “In so doing, we give deference to the

jury's ‘discernible resolution of disputed factual issues.’” Id.

(quoting Oladeinde, 230 F.3d at 1290).

III.

The question becomes whether clearly established law

prohibited the force Deputy Williams used on Mrs. Corbin under

the factual circumstances found by the jury. Kirby v. Sheriff of

City of Jacksonville, Fla., No. 22-11109, 2023 WL 2624376, at *6

(11th Cir. Mar. 24, 2023). The Court begins by ascertaining the

factual circumstances, as found by the jury, and then analyzes

whether clearly established law prohibited Deputy Williams’ use

of force under those circumstances.

A. The Factual Circumstances

Looking at the evidence presented at trial, the jury

instructions, and the jury verdicts, it is clear that the jury,

as the ultimate factfinder, disbelieved at least a part of Mrs.

Corbin’s version of events and found she had resisted or

obstructed Deputy Williams. According to the jury verdicts, Mrs.

Corbin proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Deputy

Williams intentionally subjected her to excessive or

unreasonable force during her arrest (Doc. #176, p. 3), but did

not prove that Deputy Williams battered, assaulted, or falsely

arrested her. (Id. at pp. 1-4.)

As to the federal false arrest claim, the jury was

instructed that, “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, every person has the right not to be

arrested unless the officer has at least probable cause to arrest

that person.” (Doc. #171, p. 9.) The jury was also instructed

that “[a]n officer has probable cause and may arrest a person

without a warrant whenever the facts and circumstances within

the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest, based on

reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a reasonable

officer to believe that the person has committed, is committing,

or is about to commit a criminal offense.” (Id.) The jury was

further instructed that there were only two criminal offenses at

issue: resisting or obstructing an officer without violence, and

disorderly intoxication. (Id. at 10.)

“Reading that instruction . . . and verdict together, the

inference is inescapable that the jury” Johnson, 280 F.3d at

1319, disbelieved at least part of Mrs. Corbin’s version of

events and concluded that Mrs. Corbin had obstructed or resisted

Deputy Williams. By finding in favor of Deputy Williams as to

the federal false arrest claim, the jury necessarily found he

had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Corbin for either resisting or

obstructing an officer without violence, disorderly

intoxication, or both. But given the disorderly intoxication

jury instructions, and the evidence presented at trial, the jury

could only have found that Deputy Williams had probable cause to

arrest Mrs. Corbin for resisting or obstructing without violence.

The jury was instructed that public intoxication required

a public disturbance, which:

occurs when public order is disrupted. The conduct

must have some effect on the public. For example, a

person loudly and profanely yelling at an officer, to

the point that several persons were drawn to the scene,

creates a public disturbance. But belligerent behavior

toward an officer is not, standing alone, sufficient

to establish a public disturbance.

(Doc. #171, p. 14.) Deputy Williams testified that Mrs. Corbin

was yelling, disobeying his orders, pushing past him, and acting

with a drunken demeanor. But Deputy Williams never testified

that Mrs. Corbin disrupted the public order, drew a crowd,

obstructed people, or did anything approximate.

Quite the opposite. Deputy Williams testified that because

McDonalds was open, “people [were] coming and going” and simply

“looking as they passed by.” Deputy Williams also denied Mrs.

Corbin’s assertion that people there were screaming or pointing.

The facts clearly fail to establish a public disturbance within

the meaning of the jury instructions and case law. See DeSantis

v. Dream Defs., 389 So. 3d 413, 422 (Fla. 2024)(holding that a

“public disturbance” under Florida’s disorderly intoxication

statute requires disruption of public order like a drawing of a

crowd or preventing the passage of persons). Given the evidence

presented and the jury instructions, no jury could have found

that the facts and circumstances known to Deputy Williams were

sufficient to support a reasonable belief that Mrs. Corbin had

committed or was committing a public disturbance or was publicly

intoxicated.

The jury instructions and the trial evidence establish that

the jury found Deputy Williams had probable cause to arrest Mrs.

Corbin for resisting or obstructing without violence. This jury

determination means that Deputy Williams had the right to use

the amount of reasonably necessary force justified by the

totality of the circumstances to make an arrest for resisting or

obstructing without violence. When the jury returned a verdict

for Mrs. Corbin and against Deputy Williams as to excessive force

claim, it necessarily found that Deputy Williams’ leg maneuver

was not justified despite Mrs. Corbin’s resistance or

obstruction. Whether such a determination survives the qualified

immunity defense is the issue immediately presented.

B. Deputy Williams was Acting Within His Discretionary

Authority

As discussed earlier, Deputy Williams must prove that at

the time of the leg sweep he was acting within his discretionary

authority as a law enforcement officer. “For qualified immunity

to apply, a government official must initially establish that he

was acting within his discretionary authority when the alleged

wrongful acts occurred.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1179

(11th Cir. 2022). “The term ‘discretionary authority’

‘include[s] all actions of a governmental official that (1) were

undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties, and (2)

were within the scope of his authority.’” Patel v. City of

Madison, Alabama, 959 F.3d 1330, 1338 (11th Cir. 2020)(quoting

Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1994)).

Mrs. Corbin argues Deputy Williams was not acting within

his discretionary authority when he arrested her “because no

such discretionary duty to deploy excessive force exists.” (Doc.

#186, p. 18.) This is the same unpersuasive argument Mrs. Corbin

advanced in her summary judgment papers. See Corbin, 2024 WL

3470289, at *8. The Court continues to reject this argument

because “in assessing whether a police officer may assert

qualified immunity against a Fourth Amendment claim, we do not

ask whether he has the right to engage in unconstitutional

searches and seizures, but whether engaging in searches and

seizures in general is a part of his job-related powers and

responsibilities.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370

F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). “Put another way, to pass the

first step of the discretionary function test for qualified

immunity, the defendant must have been performing a function

that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have

fallen with his legitimate job description.” Id.

As Mrs. Corbin admits, Deputy Williams was “an on-duty law

enforcement officer acting under color of law” when he arrested

Mrs. Corbin. (Doc. #186, p. 20.) “Because making an arrest is

within the official responsibilities of a sheriff's deputy,

[Deputy Williams] was performing a discretionary function when

he arrested [Mrs. Corbin].” Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d

1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). The Court finds that Deputy Williams

has established that he was acting within his discretionary

authority as a law enforcement officer during his entire

encounter with Mrs. Corbin.

C. Clearly Established Constitutional Excessiveness

“[A] defendant officer could use force in making an arrest

that is later judged to be excessive enough that it violates the

Fourth Amendment, but if prior decisions did not clearly

establish that the use of that amount of force in those

circumstances was constitutionally excessive, the defendant

officer would be entitled to qualified immunity.” Simmons, 879

F.3d at 1166 (quoting Johnson, 280 F.3d at 1321). The burden

shifts to Mrs. Corbin to show that clearly established law gave

a reasonable officer in Deputy Williams’ shoes fair warning that

using a leg maneuver and handcuffing Mrs. Corbin was

unconstitutional under the circumstances.

As discussed earlier, Mrs. Corbin may meet her burden by

pointing to a binding decision from the United States Supreme

Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court issued before

November 29, 2019 — the date of the incident here. See Brooks,

78 F.4th at 1280 (citing Powell v. Snook, 25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th

Cir. 2022)). Mrs. Corbin arguably foregoes the opportunity to

meet her burden through applicable case law. (See Doc. #186, p.

23)(Mrs. Corbin asserting that “[c]itation to a certain case or

cases prior to Williams’ breaking of Mrs. Corbin’s leg in 2019

is not required to defeat Defendants’ claims for qualified

immunity” because “the clearly established right to be free from

excessive force is common knowledge at this point in 2025.”).

At most, Mrs. Corbin points to two binding cases: Patel and

Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2017). (See

Doc. #187, p. 33-34.) Neither could have given a reasonable

officer in Deputy Williams’ shoes fair warning that a single leg

sweep maneuver was unconstitutional to handcuff a person

resisting or obstructing, as Mrs. Corbin was doing.

In Patel, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the following facts:

Plaintiff was not doing anything suspicious, id., 959 F.3d at

1338, but was “merely walking leisurely down the sidewalk when

the officers encountered him.” Id. The officers knew plaintiff

did not know English, but plaintiff “did his best to cooperate

with the officers and obey their commands . . . .” Id. Plaintiff

“made no movements of resistance” “[n]or did he otherwise

interfere with [the officer] . . . .” Id. At most, “in what could

be construed as a move to maintain his balance, [plaintiff]

adjusted his foot what looks like at most an inch to the side”

and turned his head halfway towards the officers. Id. at 1335.

One officer then “us[ed] his left leg to sweep the [plaintiff]’s

left leg out from under him,” which resulted in the plaintiff

crashing to the floor and becoming permanently partially

paralyzed. Id.

In Stephens, plaintiff was standing by a car while an

officer was questioning him. Id., 852 F.3d at 1307. “There [was]

no evidence [plaintiff] attempted to resist” or that he was

noncompliant. Id. at 1323. Yet, for “no reason,” id. at 1326,

the officer slapped a Bluetooth device away from plaintiff and

struck plaintiff’s chest two separate times, knocking plaintiff

back into the car each time. Id. at 1308. When plaintiff told

the officer that “children were watching his abusive conduct,

[the officer] responded by stepping on [plaintiff]'s foot as he

slammed him the third time forcefully back into the car, which

resulted in [plaintiff] being thrown against the car-door frame,

causing severe injuries to his neck, back, and shoulder.” Id. at

1322. “As [plaintiff] attempted to grasp the car door with his

right hand to lift himself up, [the officer] grabbed and twisted

his hand, so the palm faced up, then forced the last three

fingers on [plaintiff]'s right hand backward toward his forearm,

causing [plaintiff]'s full body weight to be supported on those

three fingers of his right hand.” Id. at 1322-23. Plaintiff was

then handcuffed. Id. at 1308.

Neither case helps Mrs. Corbin meet her burden. First,

neither is case law with indistinguishable facts. Plaintiff in

Patel did not resist or interfere with the duties of any police

officer. Here, the jury found Mrs. Corbin did resist or obstruct

Deputy Williams. Thus, Patel could not have given Deputy Williams

or a reasonable officer in his shoes notice that a leg sweep or

kick was unconstitutional to arrest a resisting or obstructing

person. Mrs. Corbin’s reliance on Stephens fares no better

because that case involves materially different circumstances

and challenged conduct. Plaintiff in Stephens was compliant, not

resisting, and the officer there “had no reason to use the force

he did . . .” Id., 852 F.3d at 1326. Those circumstances differ

materially from those which the jury determined were faced by

Deputy Williams, who faced a resisting/obstructing Mrs. Corbin.

Additionally, the single leg sweep in this case is materially

different than the multiple assaults inflicted upon the plaintiff

in Stephens. Thus, Stephens could not have given Deputy Williams,

or a reasonable officer in his shoes, notice that a single leg

sweep or kick was unconstitutional to restrain a resisting or

obstructing person.

Second, Patel was issued in May 2020, long after Deputy

Williams arrested Mrs. Corbin in November 2019. Patel could not

have given Deputy Williams —or any officer— notice about the

appropriate level of force to be used in November 2019. Mercado

v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005)(“Any

case law that is ‘materially similar’ to the facts in the case

at hand must pre-date the officer's alleged improper conduct .

. . .”).

“In light of the rarity of obvious clarity cases, if a

plaintiff cannot show that the law at issue was clearly

established under the first (materially similar case on point)

method, that usually means qualified immunity is appropriate.”

King v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2020).

Nonetheless, Mrs. Corbin tries. Mrs. Corbin asserts “that a

broader, clearly established principle controls this case,”

(Doc. #186, p. 23.) Throughout her brief, Mrs. Corbin states

that she had a “clearly established constitutional Fourth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force, of which

Williams was clearly on notice.” (Id. at p. 20.)

But this argument also fails to satisfy Mrs. Corbin’s

burden. A “qualifying” principle “cannot be ‘too general’ and

must ‘put every reasonable officer’ on notice that it ‘clearly

prohibit[s] the officer's conduct in the particular

circumstances before him.’” DeMarcus, 2025 WL 1076822, at *8

(cleaned up)(quoting Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1268 (11th

Cir. 2022)). The “principle that officers may not use excessive

force to apprehend a suspect is too broad a concept to give

officers notice of unacceptable conduct.” Mercado, 407 F.3d at

1159. The Supreme Court long ago explained that:

there is no doubt that Graham v. Connor, supra, clearly

establishes the general proposition that use of force

is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive

. . . . Yet that is not enough. Rather, we emphasized

in Anderson “that the right the official is alleged to

have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in

a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense:

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what

he is doing violates that right.”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001) rev'd on other

grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)(quoting

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Mrs. Corbin’s

argument improperly invites this Court to “err[] in relying on

the general proposition that it is clearly established that the

use of excessive force is unconstitutional.” Corbitt v. Vickers,

929 F.3d 1304, 1316 (11th Cir. 2019). It is therefore rejected.

Nor does any applicable principle emerge from Patel or

Stephens, both of which rely on the principle “that a police

officer violates the Fourth Amendment, and is denied qualified

immunity, if he or she uses gratuitous and excessive force

against a suspect who is under control, not resisting, and

obeying commands.” Patel, 959 F.3d at 1343 (quoting Saunders v.

Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2014)); Stephens, 852 F.3d

at 1328. As explained earlier, the jury determined that Mrs.

Corbin was resisting or obstructing Deputy Williams. Therefore,

this principle could not have given a reasonable officer, in

Deputy Williams’ shoes, fair warning that a single leg sweep or

kick to handcuff Mrs. Corbin was unconstitutional.

That leaves only the third type of substantive law under

which Mrs. Corbin could carry her burden. “The final, and often

most difficult option is to demonstrate that ‘the official's

conduct was so far beyond the hazy border between excessive and

acceptable force that [the official] had to know he was violating

the Constitution even without caselaw on point.’” Sebastian v.

Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019)(alteration in

original)(cleaned up)(quoting Priester v. City of Riviera Beach,

Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000)). “This method is

reserved for ‘extreme circumstances’ presenting ‘particularly

egregious facts’ that would have put any reasonable officer on

notice that his actions ‘offended the Constitution.’” DeMarcus,

2025 WL 1076822, at *9 (quoting Baxter, 54 F.4th at 1268). It

has applied in situations when an inmate has been left for days

in a cell covered in feces, when an inmate has been handcuffed

to a post for seven hours in the hot sun without access to a

bathroom or much water, and when an arrestee was slammed into a

car after already being handcuffed and controlled. Id.

(collecting cases). “The conduct . . . here, while most

regrettable, isn't in that universe.” Id. Nothing about the facts

found by the jury in this case satisfies Mrs. Corbin’s burden

under the third method.

Because Mrs. Corbin has failed to satisfy her burden under

any method, Deputy Williams is entitled to qualified immunity,

and judgment must be entered in his favor as to the excessive

force claim. See Williams v. Consol. City of Jacksonville, 341

F.3d 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2003). Because Mr. Corbin’s loss of

consortium claim is derivative of Mrs. Corbin’s excessive force

claim, judgment must be entered in Deputy Williams’ favor as to

the loss of consortium claim as well. Bombalier v. Lifemark Hosp.

of Fla., 661 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(“[I]f the injured

spouse's claim is defeated, the derivative claim of the other

spouse for loss of consortium also falls.”).

The Court concludes that qualified immunity applies and

results in an entry of judgement in favor of Deputy Williams as

to Mrs. Corbin’s excessive force claim. As a result, Mr. Corbin’s

derivative loss of consortium claim must also be vacated. The

Court finds it unnecessary to reach Deputy Williams’ alternative

request of ordering a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(a).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. The Court previously ordered that “[e]ntry of judgment

shall be withheld pending review of the qualified

immunity issue.” (Doc. #177, p. 1-2.) Having now resolved

the qualified immunity issue, the Clerk of Court is

directed to enter judgment as follows as to all the Counts

of the Complaint (Doc. #1)2:

a. Count I: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams and

against Plaintiff who shall take nothing pursuant

to the jury verdict. (Doc. #176.)

b. Count II: In favor of Defendant David Gensimore

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss (Doc. #67)

and with prejudice pursuant to this Court’s Order

on Summary Judgment. (Doc. #131.)

c. Count III: In favor of Defendant Kenrick Roguska

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss. (Doc.

#67.)

d. Count IV: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams

pursuant to this Order on qualified immunity.

e. Count VI: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams and

with prejudice pursuant to this Court’s Order on

Summary Judgment. (Doc. #131.)

f. Count VII: In favor of Defendant David Gensimore and

with prejudice pursuant to this Court’s Order on

Summary Judgment. (Doc. #131.)

2 The counts were misnumbered in the Complaint and they are here

numbered as they appear in the Complaint.

g. Count VIII: In favor of Defendant Bill Prummell, Jr.

and against Plaintiff who shall take nothing

pursuant to the jury verdict. (Doc. #176.)

h. Count VIII: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams and

against Plaintiff who shall take nothing pursuant

to the jury verdict. (Doc. #176.)

i. Count IX: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams and

against Plaintiff who shall take nothing pursuant

to the jury verdict. (Doc. #176.)

j. Count X: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams and

against Plaintiff who shall take nothing pursuant

to the jury verdict. (Doc. #176.)

k. Count XI: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss. (Doc.

#67.)

l. Count XII: In favor of Defendant David Gensimore and

with prejudice pursuant to this Court’s Order to

Dismiss. (Doc. #67.)

m. Count XIII: In favor of Defendant Bill Prummell, Jr.

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss. (Doc.

#24.)

n. Count XIII: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss. (Doc.

#67.)

o. Count XV: In favor of Defendant Michael Davidson

pursuant to this Court’s Order to Dismiss. (Doc.

#67.)

p. Count XVI: In favor of Defendant Aaron Williams

pursuant to this Order on qualified immunity.

2. The Clerk is further directed to terminate all pending

matters and close the file.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this Ist day

of July 2025,

/ —" Ap

VRAA OD ZZ

JGHH E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Counsel of Record

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